

DJC/Iraq/Land4/MITT/PM/2

22 May 08

APS/SofSCopy to:
See DistributionIRAQ: MND(SE) MILITARY TRANSITION TEAM CONCEPT - PROVISION OF PROTECTED MOBILITY

ISSUE

1. Protected Mobility (PM) for Military Transitions Teams (MITTs) in MND(SE).

RECOMMENDATIONS

2. That Secretary of State:

a. **notes** that the UK Protected Mobility (PM) requirement for the comprehensive MiTTing of 14 Inf Div and associated tasks is 60 vehicles. The most appropriate available vehicle to fulfil the MiTT task is Mastiff, of which MND(SE) has 51 currently employed across a range of tasks, 43 of which could be re-allocated to the MiTT task.

b. **agrees** the military advice, endorsed by Chiefs of Staff, that in order to make all 43 Mastiff available for the MiTT task, 29 Vector are deployed to southern Iraq to replace the Mastiff currently operating in Umm Qasr and on Op HART¹, at manageable risk to personnel on those tasks.

c. **agrees** that the remaining short-fall of 17 vehicles is met in the short term by Bulldog in order to provide the best protection available. Presentationally, this may have a negative effect on Basrawis and ISF consent.

TIMING

3. **Priority.** 7 Armoured Brigade are due to take responsibility for implementing the enhanced MiTT force structure in MND(SE) from 1 Jun 08.

BACKGROUND

4. We have submitted separately on the implementation of an enhanced MiTT concept and its impact on force levels from June². To enable the MiTT force structure, GOC MND(SE) has identified a requirement for 60 PM vehicles.

5. **Mastiff Reallocation.** The vehicle best capable of meeting the requirement within current resources is Mastiff. In order to allocate the maximum number of Mastiff to the

¹ Op HART is the daily logistics convoy task between Kuwait and the COB.

² DJC/IRAQ/OPERATIONS, 'IRAQ: OP TELIC: IRAQ FORCE LEVELS IN SOUTHERN IRAQ 2008', dated May 2008

Alt: Ed Ferguson 31
(I've also asked PJHQ if I can get this to you via the links so you can get answers the spot).

I can't see that there are other answers to this, though it doesn't feel very comfortable. Therefore I felt SofS should see it rather than Mi.

sign it or Paul
22/

Need clarity on where GOC is. SofS would leave to discretion of CDRs on ground to deploy vehs. so they see

MiTT task, reallocation of in-theatre resources is required. MND(SE) has 51 Mastiff, 8 of which cannot be diverted from their current tasks, leaving 43. The commitment of these vehicles to the MiTT task will inevitably incur greater risk elsewhere, but PJHQ and GOC MND(SE) consider this to be acceptable. A further 12 Mastiff are available if Vector is deployed to deliver the PM requirements in Umm Qasr and on Op HART.

6. **Vector.** PJHQ has requested that 29 Vector be deployed to release the 12 Mastiff³ in use in Umm Qasr and on Op HART. Analysis suggests that the risk of employing Vector in Um Qasr is less than in other areas, and therefore manageable. On Op HART, the threat is graduated such that it is highest in the vicinity of Basra, but decreases significantly some 10 kms south of the city. MND(SE) intends to use Mastiff or Warrior in the high threat area close to the city, but Vector for the lower threat route to the border where the risk is manageable⁴. This use of Vector, on the recommendation of GOC MND(SE), will be subject to a continuous MND(SE) intelligence-based threat assessment. The allocation of Vector to Op TELIC can be achieved through the deployment of the UK-based vehicles dedicated to regeneration and Op HERRICK Pre-Deployment Training (PDT). Whilst the risk to Op HERRICK PDT and re-generation is not insignificant, Headquarters Land Forces considers it manageable in the short term. To meet the demanding timeline of 1 Jun 08 for MiTT IOC, the first tranche of vehicles have already been deployed to the Kuwait Support Facility, and are being held pending ministerial clearance for their use in southern Iraq. *meaning?*

7. **Use of Bulldog to Back-Fill Mastiff.** The lack of available Mastiff means the shortfall of 17 vehicles can only be met by using Bulldog. To minimise the presentational impact of using tracked vehicles in the city, their deployment will be limited. Should consent for Bulldog deteriorate to an unacceptable level, the 17 vehicles proposed for the MiTT role could be replaced with the first 17 Mastiff vehicles from Mastiff Tranche 2, between late Sep and late Oct 08 (earliest). Mastiff Tranche 2 is currently set to deliver 19 vehicles to Op TELIC PDT and 20 vehicles to Op HERRICK PDT, followed by 20 vehicles per month to Op HERRICK and the PDT pool. The net effect to Op HERRICK would be a delay to Mastiff fielding of 1-2 months. The decision point to divert the vehicles to Op TELIC is 31 Jul 08, by which time a comprehensive assessment of the impact of Bulldog in the MiTT role can be made.

8. **UOR Solutions.** Industry cannot produce an adequately protected new vehicle in less than 6-9 months. The Ridgeback vehicle is already being procured for Op HERRICK, but DEC(GM) advise that the earliest it could be deployed would be early 2009. Similarly, there is no viable solution to modify other UK vehicles, or lease from allies, that will deliver adequate protection in the required timescale. The provisional timeline for completing the MiTT task is around May 09, although this could well change. Given the timelines of any potential UOR solutions and the expected duration of the MiTT task, DCRS advise that HMT is most unlikely to fund a new vehicle or modifications to existing vehicles.

PRESENTATION

9. Vector was originally procured to meet a lesser threat on Op HERRICK, and as a result, provides considerably lower levels of ballistic protection than either Mastiff or Bulldog (although Vector does provide similar levels of ECM protection). As a result,

³ The requirement for 29 Vectors to replace 12 Mastiff reflects both the smaller capacity of Vector and the opportunity to provide a more complete capability for the task.

⁴ The use of tracks throughout the route is undesirable due to the considerable Equipment Support burden such high track mileage would necessitate.

accusations could be levelled that Vector is being employed in a theatre for which it was not originally procured, providing unacceptably low levels of protection to UK forces. A comprehensive handling plan which alludes to relative threat levels on different tasks, and at differing locations, should minimise the impact and is consistent with our position on the provision of PM across all operational theatres. This handling plan is currently being developed by DJC and PJHQ for 27 May 08.

why?
No!

DJC SEC 7

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GOC's pos'n - needs to be clear that this represents his position; esp. para. 6.

- he would wish to leave some vehs. on Op HART
- ∴ allow new vehs. to come out

- ~~Buildings~~ ^{Vector} were bought for off road in Afg., not Iran
∴ need narrative to explain this; its content to proceed