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TO7856

DAVID MANNING

*I have now mounted back
after a mty into Jonathan, Markin & from India
Pls keep available on file.*

IRAQ: PUBLIC DOCUMENTS

Jan 17/7

Summary

1. Ministerial guidance needed on:
 - a. Whether Ministers are content with the texts of the three Iraq public documents attached.
 - b. Whether to invite the International Development Secretary to sign the Foreword alongside the Foreign and Defence Secretaries.
 - c. Timing of publication.
 - d. Whether to treat three Iraq public documents as a package or separate out the Iraq WMD paper.
 - e. Whether in the meantime to publish the wider WMD Programme of Concern paper.

Detail

2. I attach the latest versions of three Iraq public documents: on WMD, Weapons Inspections and Abuse of Human Rights. The drafts, which take account of comments from the CIA but have not been passed to other parts of the US government, are capped by a draft foreword which could be issued in the name of the Foreign Secretary or, as is suggested here, the Foreign, Defence and International Development Secretaries - though at this stage the drafts have not been shared with DFID.

3. On timing, the advice from the group which has overseen the production of the Weapons Inspections and Human Rights Abuses papers

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and the incorporation of the three papers into a single package, is that the drafts should now be held in readiness for an appropriate moment to issue them. Choosing that moment requires careful judgement. The publication of the documents will be regarded by some as an indication that the Government has moved closer to decisions on military action. On the other hand, as part of a carefully co-ordinated exercise, they could serve to increase the pressure on Saddam Hussein.

4. We understand that the US is planning its own paper on Iraqi WMD but we have yet to have a sight of it. The timing of the publication of any US paper may well be the decisive factor influencing the timing of our own publications.

5. A decision needs to be taken also on whether to issue the three papers as a single package or keep the WMD paper separate. John Scarlett's strong preference is to keep the WMD paper separate in order to preserve its status as a considered assessment of what the intelligence says about Iraq's existing WMD capabilities – in contrast with the other two papers which are based on a mixture of historical material, intelligence and reportage. Most of my group felt that this point was outweighed by the advantages of presenting the three papers as a single package, in particular, because of the close relationship between the WMD and the Weapons Inspection papers.

6. Finally, I should draw attention to the latest version of the wider WMD Programme of Concern paper, a copy of which is also attached. The Foreign Office, in particular, have advised that this paper should not be published at the same time as the Iraq dossier, because of awkward comparisons which might be drawn between the threat posed by other countries of concern and that posed by Iraq. More generally, the FCO

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have concerns about the quality of the "evidence", the fact that we have international obligations to bring any concerns over non-compliance with nuclear safeguards to the attention of the IAEA and the damage that publication of this dossier will do to bilateral relations with the countries being accused. Each of these points has a bearing on the timing of publication. Despite the case for shining a spotlight on all states of WMD concern, the balance of the arguments points towards delaying, at least until we are clearer about the way forward on Iraq.

6. I am copying this to Alastair Campbell, Simon McDonald (FCO), Peter Watkins (MOD), Sebastian Wood (Washington) Andrew Allberry and John Scarlett (Cabinet Office) and to members of my group.



TOM MCKANE

21 June 2002


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**BRITISH GOVERNMENT
BRIEFING PAPERS
ON
IRAQ**



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IRAQ

The Government has made clear its concern that Saddam Hussain previously developed and is still developing weapons of mass destruction and is ignoring UN Security Council Resolutions. We are also concerned at Saddam's continuing abuse of the human rights of the people of Iraq.

Saddam Hussain continues to claim that he has no chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, that the people of Iraq do not directly suffer under his leadership and he has not agreed to the return of UN weapons inspectors on UN terms. We are therefore taking this step of publishing this set of papers.

These papers show that Saddam Hussain has dangerous chemical and biological weapons and is still seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. These also shows the appalling human rights abuses the Iraqi people continue to suffer directly from Saddam Hussain.

Our concern is heightened by the knowledge that he may use these weapons – he has already used them against his own people and neighbours. This makes him unique among modern dictators: his threat is unique.

We are convinced that he will be prepared to use these weapons again against his neighbours and our friends and allies

Doing nothing is not an option.

The world is urging Saddam Hussain to comply with UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) of which he is in breach, in line with UNSC 1284 which demands that he agree to the return of UN weapons inspectors with full access to Iraq – any time, any place, any where.

No decision has been taken to launch military action. It is up to Saddam Hussain to show the world that he is serious about fulfilling Iraq's international and humanitarian obligations.

[Ministers to sign]

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY



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IRAQI WMD PROGRAMMES

NUCLEAR WEAPONS:

Iraq has a nuclear weapons programme, **in breach of its NPT and IAEA obligations and of UNSCR 687**, but will find it difficult to produce fissile material while sanctions remain in place.

- Comprehensive programme prior to the Gulf War;
- Recalled scientists to work on a nuclear weapons programme;
- Covert efforts to procure nuclear related materials and technology.

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS:

Iraq has a capability to produce chemical and biological weapons **in breach of UNSCR 687**.

- The amount of chemical and biological material, including weapons and agents, left unaccounted for when the UNSCOM inspections terminated would provide a significant offensive capability;
- Produced and used proficiently a variety of chemical weapons in 1980s against Iran and its own citizens;
- Concealed large scale production of the nerve agent VX until discovered by UNSCOM;
- Produced and weaponised at least three BW agents but concealed this capability until forced to declare it in 1995;
- Failed to convince UNSCOM of the accuracy of its declarations.

BALLISTIC MISSILES:

Retains more than a dozen prohibited Al Hussain missiles (650km) **in breach of UNSCR 687**; working on designs for longer-range missiles **in breach of UNSCR 687**;

- Infrastructure damaged in the Gulf War and Operation Desert Fox has now largely been reconstituted;
- Infrastructure for longer-range missiles is under construction;
- UNSCOM unable to account for all imported missiles; others could have been built using hidden retained components.

UN WEAPONS INSPECTIONS IN IRAQ

- UNSCR 687 fixed the terms of the cease-fire in the Gulf conflict following the illegal invasion and occupation of Kuwait by Iraq under Saddam Hussain.
- The history of UN weapons inspections in Iraq has been characterised by persistent Iraqi efforts to frustrate, deceive and intimidate inspectors.
- One of the greatest threats to Allied forces during Operation Desert Storm in 1991 was Iraq's stockpile of chemical and biological weapons and long-range ballistic missiles.
- UNSCOM and the IAEA were given the remit to designate any locations for inspection at any time, review any document and interview any scientist, technician or other individual and seize any prohibited items for destruction.
- UNSCR 707 demanded that Iraq should allow inspection teams "immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to any and all areas". For over a decade **Iraq has consistently failed** to meet this standard.
- Iraq has **admitted** having had a large, effective, system for hiding proscribed material including documentation, components, production equipment and, possibly, biological and chemical agents and weapons from the UN.
- In July 1995, Iraq **acknowledged that biological agents had been produced** on an industrial scale at Al-Hakam.
- Iraq acknowledged that it had pursued a biological programme that led to the deployment of actual weapons. Iraq admitted producing in excess of **200 biological weapons** with a reserve stock of agent to fill considerably more.
- Saddam has refused to admit UN-mandated weapons inspectors to Iraq since 1998.
- The IAEA has pointed out that their annual inspection does "not serve as a substitute for the verification activities required by the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council."
- In April 1999, an independent UN panel of experts endorsed the Butler report and noted that "the longer inspection and monitoring activities remain suspended, the more difficult the comprehensive implementation of Security Council resolutions becomes, increasing the risk that **Iraq might reconstitute its proscribed weapons programmes.**"

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IRAQI REGIME: CRIMES AND HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES

- Saddam Hussain seized control of Iraq in 1979. Five of his close friends were subsequently executed after they opposed his take-over.
- In 1983, 8,000 male Kurds aged 13 and upwards were taken prisoner and later executed – for no reason, except that they were Kurds.
- Amnesty International in 1985 told of 300 KURDISH CHILDREN who were arrested in Sulaimaniya – some were tortured and three were killed.
- At least 100,000 Kurds were killed or disappeared during the Anfal campaign.
- According to Human Rights Watch, a single CHEMICAL WEAPONS attack on the town of Halabja killed up to 5,000 civilians and injured some 10,000 more.
- The Iraqi regime used chemical weapons – MUSTARD GAS and the nerve agents TABUN and SARIN – extensively from 1984, resulting in over 20,000 Iranian casualties.
- Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990. Abuses committed by its forces included ROBBERY, RAPE of Kuwaitis and expatriates, and summary EXECUTIONS.
- More than 600 Kuwaitis taken by the Iraq regime ARE STILL MISSING and unaccounted for over TEN YEARS after the Gulf War.
- More than 100 MUSLIM CLERICS have disappeared since 1991.
- An estimated 2,500 PRISONERS WERE EXECUTED between 1997 and 1999 in a “prison cleansing” campaign.
- In October 2000, dozens of women accused of prostitution were BEHEADED WITHOUT ANY JUDICIAL PROCESS, together with men accused of pimping. Some were accused for political reasons.
- Men, women and CHILDREN continue to be ARRESTED, DETAINED, TORTURED AND MURDERED on suspicion of political or religious activities, or because they are related to members of the opposition.

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IRAQI WMD PROGRAMMES

This document draws on information from a range of sources, including intelligence. Because of the need to protect the safety of sources, details underpinning intelligence judgements cannot be made public. But the Government is confident of the judgements set out in this paper.

Introduction

- Nuclear, chemical and biological weapons are collectively known as Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Several countries have WMD programmes and missile systems capable of delivering nuclear, chemical or biological warheads. They are working to develop more accurate and longer-range missiles that will allow them to threaten more than just their immediate neighbours.
- Most countries have promised not to acquire these weapons. They have signed relevant international agreements including the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the Biological and Toxins Weapons Conventions (BTWC).
- A few countries have either failed to sign these agreements or have decided to break them. The position of Iraq is a particular concern. Iraq is a signatory to the NPT, but since the late 1980s it has not abided by its obligations. Since the Gulf War Iraq has been bound by five UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) relating to its WMD programmes. It remains in breach of all of them. In 1980 and 1990 Saddam Hussain used his conventional forces to mount unprovoked attacks against his neighbours, Iran and Kuwait respectively. He has used chemical weapons both against Iran and against his own Kurdish people.
- The International Community has repeatedly sought to disrupt Iraq's efforts to acquire WMD. On each occasion Saddam has sought to rebuild his capabilities. His efforts are making progress. The Government monitors these efforts very closely. This paper sets out what the Government is able to say about them.

Background

Before the Gulf War, Saddam Hussain demonstrated his readiness to deploy extensively WMD in the form of chemical weapons both against his neighbours and his own population. Since the Gulf War, he has **failed to comply with UN Security Council Resolutions**, which his government accepted.

While the successful enforcement of the sanctions regimes and the UN arms embargo have impeded Iraq's efforts to reconstitute its weapons of mass destruction, they have not halted them. Much of Iraq's missile infrastructure has been rebuilt; the nuclear weapons programme is being reconstituted; and Iraq continues to have the capability to produce chemical and biological weapons, and may already have done so.

Since the withdrawal of inspectors in 1998, monitoring of Iraqi attempts to restore a WMD capability has become more difficult.

UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) relating to WMD

UNSCR 687, April 1991 created the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) and required Iraq to accept, unconditionally, "the destruction, removal or rendering harmless, under international supervision" of its chemical and biological weapons, ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150km, and their associated programmes, stocks, components, research and facilities. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was charged with abolition of Iraq's nuclear weapons programme. UNSCOM and the IAEA must report that their mission has been achieved before the Security Council can end sanctions. They have not yet done so.

UNSCR 707, August 1991, stated that Iraq must provide full, final and complete disclosure of all its WMD programmes and provide unconditional and unrestricted access to UN inspectors. Iraq must also cease all nuclear activities of any kind other than civil use of isotopes.

UNSCR 715, October 1991 approved plans prepared by UNSCOM and IAEA for the monitoring and verification arrangements to implement UNSCR 687.

UNSCR 1051, March 1996 stated that Iraq must declare the shipment of dual-use WMD goods.

UNSCR 1284, December 1999, established UNMOVIC (United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission) as a successor to UNSCOM and calls on Iraq to give UNMOVIC inspectors "immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to any and all areas, facilities, equipment, records and means of transport"

Saddam's Weapons

Nuclear Weapons

Before the Gulf War, Iraqi plans for the development of a nuclear weapon were well advanced. Iraq was planning and constructing fissile material production facilities and work on a weapon design was underway. Their declared aim was to produce a weapon with a 20 kiloton yield, which would ultimately be delivered in a ballistic missile warhead.

We assessed in 1991 that Iraq was less than three years away from possessing a nuclear weapon.

After the Gulf War, Iraq's nuclear weapons infrastructure was dismantled by the IAEA. But we judge that Iraq is still working to achieve a nuclear weapons capability, **in breach of its NPT and IAEA obligations and UN Security Council Resolution 687**. Much of its former expertise has been retained.

Effect of a 20 kiloton nuclear device in a built up area

A detonation occurring over a city might flatten an area of approximately 3 square miles.

Within 1.6 miles of detonation, blast damage and radiation would cause 80% casualties, three-quarters of which would be fatal. Between 1.6 and 3.1 miles from the detonation, there would still be 10% casualties, 10% of which would be fatal injuries.

In the last year intelligence has indicated that specialists were recalled to work on a nuclear weapons programme in the autumn of 1998. But Iraq needs certain key equipment and materials for the production of the fissile material necessary before a nuclear bomb could be developed. We judge that the Iraqi programme is based on gas centrifuge uranium enrichment, which was the route Iraq was following for producing fissile material before the Gulf War.

Iraq is covertly attempting to acquire technology and materials with nuclear applications. This includes specialised aluminium, which is subject to international export controls because of its potential application in gas centrifuges used to enrich uranium. Although this material has applications in a range of other weapon systems.

So long as sanctions continue to hinder the import of such crucial goods, Iraq would find it difficult to produce a nuclear weapon. After the lifting of sanctions we assess that Iraq would need at least five years to produce a weapon.

Progress would be much quicker if Iraq was able to buy suitable fissile material.

Chemical And Biological Weapons

Iraq made frequent use of a variety of **chemical weapons** during the Iran-Iraq War. Iraq used significant quantities of mustard, tabun and sarin resulting in over 20,000 Iranian casualties. In 1988 Saddam also used mustard and nerve agents against the Kurds in northern Iraq. Estimates vary, but according to Human Rights Watch up to 5,000 people were killed. Iraq's military maintains the capability to use these weapons, with command, control and logistical arrangements in place.

Iraq admitted in 1991 to the production of blister agent (mustard) and nerve agents (tabun, sarin, and cyclosarin).

Effects of chemical agents

Mustard is a liquid agent that causes burns and blisters to exposed skin. It attacks and damages the eyes, mucous membranes, lungs, skin, and blood-forming organs. When inhaled, mustard damages the respiratory tract; when ingested, it causes vomiting and diarrhoea.

Tabun, sarin and VX are all nerve agents of which VX is the most toxic. They all damage the nervous system, producing muscular spasms and paralysis. As little as 10 milligrammes of VX on the skin can cause death.

A chemical weapon is the agent combined with a means of dispersing it.

After years of denial Iraq admitted to producing about 4 tons of VX nerve agent, but only after the defection of Saddam's son-in-law, Hussain Kamil in 1995. Iraq maintains that the chemical weapons programme was halted in January 1991 and all agents under its control were destroyed by the summer of 1991. However, there are inconsistencies in Iraqi documentation on destruction.

Analysis of figures provided by UN weapons inspectors indicate that they have been unable to account for:

- up to 360 tonnes of bulk chemical warfare agent, including 1.5 tonnes of VX nerve agent;
- up to 3000 tonnes of precursor chemicals including approximately 300 tonnes which, in the Iraqi CW programme, were unique to the production of VX;
- over 30,000 special munitions for delivery of chemical and biological agents.

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We cannot be sure whether these have been destroyed or remain at the disposal of the Iraqi government. But we judge that Iraq retains some production equipment and at least small amounts of chemical agent precursors.

Following four years of pressure from weapons inspectors and the information provided by Hussein Kamil, Iraq finally admitted to the existence of a **biological weapons** programme in 1995.

Iraq admitted to:

- producing anthrax spores, botulinum toxin and aflatoxin and to working on a number of other agents;
- weaponising some agents, which included the filling of warheads for its Al Hussain ballistic missiles;
- testing spraying devices for agents.

Iraq has claimed that all its biological agents and weapons have been destroyed, although no convincing proof of this has been offered. UN inspectors could not account for large quantities of growth media procured for biological agent production, enough to produce over three times the amount of anthrax Iraq admits to having manufactured. Reports that Iraq has conducted research on smallpox and a number of toxins cannot be corroborated. Iraq is assessed to be self-sufficient in the technology required to produce biological weapons.

We assess that Iraq has a covert chemical and biological weapons programme, **in breach of UN Security Council Resolution 687.**

All the necessary expertise has been retained. Iraq appears to be refurbishing sites formally associated with its chemical and biological weapons programmes. This includes a facility near Habbaniyah, previously associated with the production of precursors. Iraq is assessed to have some chemical and biological agents available, either from pre-Gulf War stocks or more recent production.

We judge Iraq has the capability to produce the chemical agents:

- **sulphur mustard, tabun, sarin, cyclosarin, and VX.**

and the biological agents:

- **anthrax, botulinum toxin, aflatoxin and ricin.**

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Iraq retains conventional delivery means for chemical and biological weapons such as free fall bombs and missile warheads. But given Iraq's admission of testing spray devices, we judge that the modification of the L-29 jet trainer could allow it to be used for the delivery of chemical and biological agents. The L-29 was subject to UNSCOM inspection for this reason.

Effects of biological agents

Anthrax

Anthrax is a disease caused by the bacterium *Bacillus anthracis*. Inhalation anthrax is the manifestation of the disease likely to be expected in biological warfare. The symptoms may vary. If the dose is large (8,000 to 10,000 spores) death is common. The incubation period for anthrax is 1 to 7 days, with most cases occurring within 2 days of exposure.

Botulinum toxin

Botulinum toxin is a neurotoxin produced by the bacterium *Clostridium botulinum* and is one of the most toxic substances known to man. The first symptoms of botulinum toxin A poisoning may appear as early as 1 hour post exposure or as long as 8 days after exposure, with the incubation period between 12 and 22 hours. Paralysis leads to death by suffocation.

Aflatoxin

Aflatoxins are fungal toxins, which are potent carcinogens. Aflatoxin contaminated food products can cause liver inflammation and cancer.

Ricin

Ricin is derived from castor beans and can cause multiple organ failure within one or two days of inhalation. A lethal dose is estimated to be about 1 milligram


A biological weapon is the agent combined with a means of dispersing it.

Saddam's Missiles

Ballistic Missiles

Prior to the Gulf War, Iraq had a well-developed missile industry. Iraq fired over 500 SCUD-type missiles at Iran during the Iran-Iraq War and 93 SCUD type-missiles during the Gulf War. The latter were targeted at Coalition forces stationed in the Gulf region and Israel. Armed with conventional warheads they did limited damage. Iraq had chemical and biological warheads available but did not use them.

ABABIL-100



Most of the missiles fired in the Gulf War were an Iraqi produced stretched version of the SCUD missile, the Al Hussain, with an extended range of 650 km. Iraq was working on other longer-range stretched SCUD variants, such as the Al Abbas, which had a range of 900km. Iraq was also seeking to reverse engineer the SCUD engine with a view to producing new missiles; recent evidence indicates they may have succeeded at that time. In particular Iraq had plans for a new SCUD-derived missile with a range of 1200km. Iraq also conducted a partial flight test of a multi-stage satellite launch vehicle based on SCUD technology, known as the Al Abid.

SCUD missiles

The short-range mobile SCUD ballistic missile was developed by the Soviet Union in the 1950s, drawing from the technology of the German liquid-propellant V-2 which saw operational service towards the end of World War II.

For many years it was the mainstay of Soviet and Warsaw Pact tactical missile forces, and it was also widely exported. Recipients of Soviet-manufactured SCUDs included Iraq, North Korea, Iran, and Libya, although not all were sold directly by the Soviet Union.

Also during this period, Iraq was developing the BADR-2000, a 700-1000km range two-stage solid propellant missile (based on the Iraqi part of the 1980s CONDOR-2 programme run in co-operation with Argentina and Egypt). There were plans for 1200-1500km range solid propellant follow-on systems.


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Since the Gulf War, Iraq has been openly developing two short-range missiles up to a range of 150km, which are permitted under UN Security Council Resolution 687. The Al-Samoud liquid propellant missile has been extensively tested, has appeared on public parade in Baghdad and is judged to be nearing deployment. In the absence of UN inspectors, Iraq has also worked on extending its range to at least 200km. Testing of the solid propellant Ababil-100 is also underway, with plans to extend its range to at least 200km.

AL HUSSEIN



Any extension of a missile's range to beyond 150km would be **in breach of UN Security Resolution 687.**

Compared to liquid propellant missiles, those powered by solid propellant offer greater ease of storage, handling and mobility. They are also quicker to take into and out of action and can stay at a high state of readiness for longer periods. We judge that Iraq has retained more than a dozen Al Hussain missiles, **in breach of UN Security Council Resolution 687.**

These missiles were either hidden from the UN as complete systems, or could have been re-assembled using illegally retained engines and other components. We judge that the engineering expertise available would allow these missiles to be effectively maintained. We assess that some of these missiles could be available for use.

Although not very accurate when used against *other countries*, they are still an effective system, which could be used with a conventional, chemical or biological warhead.


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Reporting has recently confirmed that Iraq's priority is to develop longer-range missile systems, which we judge are likely to have ranges over 1000km, enabling it to threaten regional neighbours, Israel and some NATO members. These programmes employ hundreds of people. Imagery below has shown a new engine test stand being constructed (A), which is larger than the current one used for Al Samoud (B), and that formerly used for testing SCUD engines (C) which was dismantled under UNSCOM supervision.



We judge that this new stand will be capable of testing engines for **missiles with ranges over 1000km, which are not permitted under UN Security Council Resolution 687.**

Iraq is also working to obtain improved guidance technology to increase missile accuracy. The success of UN restrictions means the development of new longer-range missiles is likely to be a slow process.

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These restrictions impact particularly on the:

- availability of foreign expertise;
- conduct of test flights to ranges above 150km;
- acquisition of guidance and control technology.

Saddam remains committed to developing longer-range missiles. We assess that, if sanctions remain in place, the earliest Iraq could achieve a limited missile capability of over 1000km is 2007, but it is more likely to be towards the end of the decade (Figure 4 shows the range of Iraq's various missiles).

To be confident that it has successfully developed a longer-range missile Iraq would need to conduct a flight-test. Current UN Security Council Resolutions do not permit tests of over 150km.

Iraq has managed to rebuild much of the missile production infrastructure destroyed in the Gulf War and in Operation Desert Fox in 1998. New missile-related infrastructure is currently under construction, including a plant for indigenously producing ammonium perchlorate, which is a key ingredient in the production of solid propellant rocket motors. This was obtained through an Indian chemical engineering firm with extensive links in Iraq.

Despite a UN embargo, Iraq has also made concerted efforts to acquire additional production technology, including machine tools and raw materials, **in breach of UN Security Council Resolution 1051.**


The embargo has succeeded in blocking many of these attempts, but, despite the dual use nature of some of the items, we know some items have found their way to the Iraqi ballistic missile programme and will inevitably continue to do so.

Concealment

Strategies to conceal and protect key parts of Iraq's WMD and ballistic missile programmes from a military attack or a UN inspection have been developed. These include the:

- use of transportable laboratories in their chemical and biological weapons programmes;
- use of covert facilities;
- dispersal of equipment when a threat is perceived.

In particular we know that the Iraqi leadership has recently ordered the dispersal of its most sensitive WMD equipment and material. This order is being carried out.



CURRENT AND PLANNED/POTENTIAL BALLISTIC MISSILES

CONCLUSION

- Iraq retains some prohibited missile systems.
- Iraq is developing longer-range ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction throughout the Middle East and Gulf Region.
- Iraq is seeking a nuclear weapons capability.
- Iraq has a chemical weapons capability, and has used it. It also has a biological weapons capability.

HISTORY OF UN WEAPONS INSPECTIONS IN IRAQ

This paper draws on a number of different published and intelligence sources, including reports by UN personnel and non-Governmental organisations.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 687 (UNSCR 687) of 3 April 1991 fixed the terms of the cease-fire in the Gulf conflict following the illegal invasion and occupation of Kuwait by Iraq under Saddam Hussain and his defeat by an international coalition of forces in Operation Desert Storm.

UNSCR 687 also established the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM).

The purpose of this body was to oversee, in conjunction with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the dismantling of Iraq's arsenal of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and to maintain a monitoring programme to ensure that it was never rebuilt.

Saddam Hussain



The history of UN weapons inspections in Iraq has been characterised by persistent Iraqi efforts to frustrate, deceive and intimidate inspectors. Despite the conduct of the Iraqi authorities towards them, both UNSCOM and the IAEA Action Team have valuable records of achievement in discovering and destroying biological and chemical weapons stocks, missiles and the infrastructure for Iraq's nuclear weapons programme.

By the end of 1998 there nevertheless remained significant uncertainties about the disposition of Iraq's prohibited WMD programmes. A series of confrontations and the systematic refusal by Iraq to co-operate, left UNSCOM unable to perform its disarmament mandate and the inspectors withdrew on 13 December 1998.

The US and the UK had made clear that anything short of full co-operation would make military action unavoidable. Operation Desert Fox (16-19 December 1998) was designed to degrade Saddam's ability to regenerate and deploy biological and chemical weapons and prevent him from threatening his neighbours with these or other weapons.

Since December 1998, Iraq has refused absolutely to comply with its UN disarmament and monitoring obligations and allow access to weapons inspectors. We judge that Iraq has used the intervening 40-month period to rebuild significant aspects of its chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic missile programmes.

These actions not only present a direct challenge to the authority of the United Nations. They also breach Iraq's commitments under two key international arms control agreements:

- the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention – which bans the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of biological weapons; and,
- the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) – which prohibits Iraq from manufacturing or otherwise acquiring nuclear weapons.

This note clarifies the UN's inspection mandate in Iraq, records just some instances of Iraqi obstruction over the past decade and focuses on one of the most egregious examples of non-compliance with UN resolutions: Iraq's consistent denial of a biological weapons programme. The note ends with a summary of developments since the last inspection in December 1998, and the steps we think Iraq now needs to take if the international community is ever to have any assurance that Saddam Hussain's ambitions to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have finally been thwarted.

UNSCR 687 and the Formation of the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM)

One of the greatest threats to Allied forces during Operation Desert Storm in 1991 was Iraq's stockpile of chemical and biological weapons and long-range ballistic missiles. At the time, there were genuine concerns that Saddam Hussain would authorise the use of such weapons against Allied troops and his neighbours. In the mid-late 1980s Iraq had shown no compunction about using chemical weapons in its war with Iran and against the Kurdish people of Halabja. According to the non-governmental organisation (NGO), Human Rights Watch, the latter resulted in up to 5,000 deaths.

But the true scale of Iraq's programme to acquire WMD and their means of delivery only became apparent with the establishment of a UN weapons inspection regime in the aftermath of Desert Storm. UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 687 was adopted in April 1991. It obliged Iraq to provide declarations on all aspects of its WMD programmes within 15 days and accept the destruction, removal or rendering harmless under international supervision of its chemical, biological and nuclear programmes, and all ballistic missiles with a range beyond 150km.

UNSCR 687 mandated two inspection teams to handle Iraqi disarmament and establish long term monitoring regimes: the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) would tackle the chemical, biological and missile programmes; and the Action Team within the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) would be responsible for tracking down and dismantling Iraq's illicit nuclear weapons programme.

UNSCOM and the IAEA were given the remit to designate any locations for inspection at any time, review any document and interview any scientist, technician or other individual and seize any prohibited items for destruction.

Iraqi Non-Co-operation with UN Weapons Inspectors

The UN passed a further Resolution in 1991 that set out in clear and specific terms the standard of co-operation the international community expected of Iraq. UNSCR 707 (August 1991) demanded that Iraq should allow inspection teams "immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to any and all areas". For over a decade Iraq has consistently failed to meet this standard.

Prior to the first inspection, the Iraqi regime did its utmost to hide stocks of WMD. The former Chairman of UNSCOM, Richard Butler, reported to the UN Security Council that in 1991 a decision was taken by a high-level Government committee to provide inspectors with only a portion of its proscribed weapons, components, production capabilities and stocks. UNSCOM concluded that Iraqi policy was based on the following actions:

- to provide only a portion of extant weapons stocks, releasing for destruction only those that were least modern;
- to retain the production capability and documentation necessary to revive programmes when possible;
- to conceal the full extent of its chemical weapons programme, including the VX nerve agent project;
- to conceal the number and type of chemical and biological warheads for proscribed long-range missiles;

- and to conceal the very existence of its massive biological weapons programme.

At the same time, Iraq tried to maintain its nuclear weapons programme via a concerted campaign to deceive IAEA inspectors. In 1997 the Agency's Director General stated that the IAEA was "severely hampered by Iraq's persistence in a policy of concealment and understatement of the programme's scope."

Harassment of Inspectors by Iraq

Once inspectors had arrived in-country, it quickly became apparent that Iraq would resort to any measures (including physical threats and psychological intimidation of inspectors) to prevent UNSCOM and the IAEA from fulfilling their mandate. Examples of Iraqi obstruction are too numerous to list in full. But some of the more infamous examples include:

- firing warning shots in the air to prevent IAEA inspectors from intercepting nuclear related equipment (June 1991);
- keeping IAEA inspectors in a car park for 4 days and refusing to allow them to leave with incriminating documents on Iraq's nuclear weapons programme (September 1991);
- announcing that UN monitoring and verification plans were "unlawful" (October 1991);
- refusing UNSCOM inspectors access to the Ministry of Agriculture. Threats were made to inspectors who remained on watch outside the building. The inspection team had reliable evidence that the site contained archives related to proscribed activities;
- refusing to allow UNSCOM the use of its own aircraft to fly into Iraq (January 1993). In 1991-2 Iraq objected to UNSCOM using its own helicopters and choosing its own flight plans;
- refusing to allow UNSCOM to install remote-controlled monitoring cameras at two key missile sites (June-July 1993);
- repeatedly denying access to inspection teams (1991- December 1998);
- interfering with UNSCOM's helicopter operations, threatening the safety of the aircraft and their crews (June 1997);
- demanding end of U2 overflights and the withdrawal of US UNSCOM staff (October 1997);
- destroying documentary evidence of WMD programmes (September 1997);
- and refusing access to inspection teams on the grounds that certain areas and even roads were deemed "Presidential Sites" (1997-98).

In response to these incidents, the President of the Security Council issued frequent statements calling on Iraq to comply with its disarmament and monitoring obligations.

In December 1997 Richard Butler reported to the UN Security Council that Iraq had created a new category of sites – presidential and sovereign – from which it claimed that UNSCOM inspectors were henceforth barred.

The terms of the cease-fire in 1991 foresaw no such limitation.

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
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Iraq consistently refused to allow inspections access to the eight Presidential sites until the invention of the UN Secretary General in February 1998, which enabled special access to UNSCOM/IAEA teams observed by diplomatic representatives. These sites are in fact massive compounds containing many buildings, some of which house security units that have in the past been associated with concealing Iraq's WMD programme.

A photograph of a presidential site or what have been called "palaces"

Buckingham palace has been super-imposed to demonstrate their comparative size




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


Buckingham Palace and grounds

Iraq's Chemical and Biological Weapon sites

Iraq - CW - Related Facilities as of Jan 1991



Iraq - BW - Related Facilities as of Jan 1991

Iraqi Concealment Unit

Iraq acknowledged that a group of technical, security and intelligence staff was established in April 1991 to conceal vital aspects of its proscribed programmes including documentation, personnel, components, research and production equipment, biological and chemical agents and weapons. Shortly after the adoption of UNSCR 687 in April 1991, an Administrative Security Committee (ASC) was formed with responsibility for advising Saddam on the information which could be released to UNSCOM and the IAEA.

The Committee consisted of senior Military Industrial Commission (MIC) scientists from all of Iraq's WMD programmes. The Higher Security Committee (HSC) of the Presidential Office was in overall command of deception operations. The system was directed from the very highest political levels within the Presidential Office and involved, if not Saddam himself, his youngest son, Qusai.

The system for hiding proscribed material relied on high mobility and good command and control. It used lorries to move items at short notice and most hide sites appear to have been located close to good road links and telecommunications. The Baghdad area was particularly favoured. In addition to active measures to hide material from the UN, Iraq has attempted to monitor, delay and collect intelligence on UN operations to aid its overall deception plan.


Iraq's Biological Weapons Programme

Nowhere was Iraqi obstruction of UN inspectors more blatant than in the field of biological weapons. Iraq denied that it had pursued a biological weapons programme until July 1995. Between 1991 and 1995, Iraq refused to disclose any details of its past programme.

In the course of the first biological weapons inspection in August 1991, Iraq indicated that it had merely conducted a military biological research programme. At the site visited, Al-Salman, Iraq had removed equipment, documents and even entire buildings. Later in the year, during a visit to the Al-Hakam site, Iraq declared to UNSCOM inspectors that the facility was used as a factory to produce proteins derived from yeast to feed animals. Inspectors subsequently discovered that the plant was a central site for the production of anthrax spores and botulinum toxin for weapons. Iraqi officials had also systematically cleaned up the factory in order to deceive inspectors.

Another key site, the Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine Institute at Daura which produced botulinum toxin and probably anthrax, was not divulged as part of the programme. Five years later, after intense pressure, Iraq acknowledged that tens of tonnes of bacteriological warfare agent had been produced there and at Al-Hakam.

Iraq's Nuclear
Weapon sites



Iraq consistently tried to obstruct UNSCOM's efforts to investigate the scale of its biological weapons programme. It created forged documents to account for bacterial

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growth media, imported in the late 1980s, specifically for the production of anthrax, botulinum toxin and probably plague. The documents were created to indicate that the material had been imported by the State Company for Drugs and Medical Appliances Marketing for use in hospitals and distribution to local authorities.

Iraq also censored documents and scientific papers provided to the first UN inspection team, removing all references to key individuals, weapons and industrial production of agents.

Iraq has yet to provide any documents concerning production of biological agent and subsequent weaponisation. Iraq claims to have destroyed, unilaterally and illegally, some biological weapons in 1991 and 1992 making accounting for these weapons impossible. In addition Iraq cleansed a key site at Al-Muthanna – its main research and development, production and weaponisation facility for chemical warfare agents - of all evidence of a biological programme in the toxicology department, the animal-house and weapons filling station.

The first biological inspection team tasked with establishing monitoring of compliance was denied access to Baghdad University Veterinary School in March 1993. In July 1995, Iraq acknowledged reluctantly that biological agents had been produced on an industrial scale at Al-Hakam. Following the defection in August 1995 of Hussain Kamel, Iraq released over 2 million documents relating to its WMD programme.

Iraq acknowledged that it had pursued a biological programme that led to the deployment of actual weapons. Iraq admitted producing in excess of 200 biological weapons with a reserve of agent to fill considerably more.

As documents recovered in August 1995 were assessed, it became apparent that the full disclosure required by the UN was far from complete. Successive inspection teams went to Iraq to try to gain greater understanding of the programme and to obtain credible supporting evidence. In July 1996 Iraq refused to discuss its past programme and doctrine forcing the team to withdraw in protest.

Monitoring teams were at the same time finding undisclosed equipment and materials associated with the past programme. In response, Iraq grudgingly provided successive disclosures of their programme which were judged by UNSCOM, and specially convened international panels, to be technically inadequate.

Iraq refused to elaborate further on the programme during inspections in 1997 and 1998, confining discussion to previous topics. In July 1998, Tariq Aziz personally intervened in the inspection process stating that the biological programme had been more secret and more closed than other WMD programmes. He also played down the significance of the programme. This is consistent with Iraq's policy of trivialising the

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biological weapons programme as the personal adventure of a few misguided scientists.

In late 1995, Iraq acknowledged weapons testing the biological agent ricin, but did not provide production information. Two years later – in early 1997 – UNSCOM discovered evidence that Iraq had produced ricin. Ricin is a highly dangerous toxin derived from castor bean pulp which can cause multiple organ failure and death within one or two days of inhalation

UNSCOM and IAEA Achievements

UNSCOM surveyed 1015 sites in Iraq, carrying out 272 separate inspections. Despite Iraqi obstruction and intimidation, UN inspectors uncovered details of chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic missile programmes the scale of which surprised the world.

One of the most sobering discoveries was that at the time of the Gulf War, Iraq had been within less than three years of acquiring a nuclear weapon. Other major UNSCOM/IAEA achievements included:

- the destruction of 40,000 munitions for chemical weapons, 2,610 tonnes of chemical precursors and 411 tonnes of chemical warfare agent;
- the dismantling of Iraq's prime chemical weapons development and production complex at Al-Muthanna, and a range of key production equipment;
- the destruction of 48-SCUD type missiles, 11 mobile launchers and 56 static sites, 30 warheads filled with chemical or biological agents, and 20 conventional warheads;
- the destruction of the Al-Hakam biological weapons facility and a range of production equipment, seed stocks and growth media for biological weapons;
- and the removal and destruction of the infrastructure for the nuclear weapons programme, including the Al-Athir weaponisation/testing facility.

Operation Desert Fox

The US and The UK had made clear, when calling off airstrikes in November 1998, that anything short of full co-operation would lead to immediate military action against Iraq.

Richard Butler was requested to report to the UN Security Council in December 1998 and made clear that, following a series of direct confrontations, coupled with the systematic refusal by Iraq to co-operate, UNSCOM was no longer able to perform its disarmament mandate.

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As a direct result, on December 13 the weapons inspectors withdrew and Operation Desert Fox was launched by the US and the UK three days later.

During Operation Desert Fox (16-19 December 1998):

- Iraq's ability to deliver biological or chemical agents by ballistic missile was weakened.
- There were attacks against missile production and research facilities and the destruction of infrastructure associated with the concealment of material and documents associated with the biological, chemical, nuclear and long-range missile programmes;
- Key facilities associated with Saddam's Ballistic Missile programme were significantly degraded, setting this back between one and two years.


The Situation Since 1998

Despite UNSCOM's efforts, a series of significant disarmament issues nevertheless remained to be resolved. In summarising the situation in a report to the Security Council in February 1999, the UNSCOM Chairman, Richard Butler, set out a damning account of Iraqi deceit. For example:

- Butler declared that obstructive Iraqi activity had had "a significant impact upon the Commission's disarmament work;"
- contrary to the requirement that destruction be conducted under international supervision, "Iraq undertook extensive, unilateral and secret destruction of large quantities of proscribed weapons and items";
- and Iraq "also pursued a practice of concealment of proscribed items, including weapons, and a cover up of its activities in contravention of Council resolutions."

There have been no UN-mandated weapons inspections in Iraq since 1998. In an effort to enforce Iraqi compliance with its disarmament and monitoring obligations, the Security Council passed resolution 1284 in December 1999. This established the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) as a successor organisation to UNSCOM. It also set out the steps Iraq needed to take to in return for the eventual suspension and lifting of sanctions.

A key measure of Iraqi compliance will be full co-operation with UN inspectors, including unconditional, immediate and unrestricted access to any and all sites.

Iraq - Missile - Related FacilitiesIraq's
Missile sites

For the past three years, Iraq has allowed the IAEA to carry out an annual inspection of a stockpile of low-enriched uranium. This has led some countries and western commentators to conclude – erroneously – that Iraq is meeting its nuclear

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disarmament and monitoring obligations. As the IAEA has pointed out in recent weeks, this annual inspection does "not serve as a substitute for the verification activities required by the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council."

Since 1998, the UK believes that Iraq has pressed ahead with its WMD programmes. Dr. Hans Blix, the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, and Dr. Mohammed El-Baradei, the Director General of the IAEA, have declared that in the absence of inspections it is impossible to verify Iraqi compliance with its UN disarmament and monitoring obligations.

In April 1999, an independent UN panel of experts endorsed the Butler report and noted that "the longer inspection and monitoring activities remain suspended, the more difficult the comprehensive implementation of Security Council resolutions becomes, increasing the risk that Iraq might reconstitute its proscribed weapons programmes."

In the interests of regional and global security, the international community cannot allow this stand off to continue indefinitely.

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IRAQI REGIME: CRIMES AND HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES

Not only does Saddam Hussain's regime represent a threat to international security because of its continuing development of weapons of mass destruction, its aggression, violation of the laws of armed conflict and its record of systematic abuse of human rights is chilling.

This paper draws on a number of different published and intelligence sources, including reports by UN personnel and non-Governmental organisations.



Saddam Hussain

Pre-Gulf War Record

Saddam's rise to power was marked by the brutality that now characterises his regime. Five of his close friends, members of the ruling Revolutionary Command Council, were executed for opposing his takeover of the Presidency in 1979. His uncle, General Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr, who stepped down from the Presidency in Saddam's favour, was also killed. Saddam is also widely believed to have been behind the helicopter "accident" that killed his wife's brother, Adnan Khairallah, in June 1989.

Saddam quickly established all-pervasive control of Iraq. Right from the start, he committed numerous atrocities. Iraq's Shi'a Muslim and Kurdish communities in particular have suffered at his hands.

In April 1980, a leading Iraqi Shi'a cleric, Ayatollah Mohammed Baqir al-Sadr, was executed. Many members of another leading clerical family, the Hakims, were arrested in May 1983 and executed. Another member of the same clerical family, Sayed Mahdi al-Hakim, was murdered in Khartoum in January 1988.

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
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Documents captured by the Kurds during the Gulf War and handed over to the non-governmental organisation Human Rights Watch indicated that Saddam's persecution of the Kurds amounts to a policy of genocide. 8,000 Kurds, males aged 13 and upwards, were taken prisoner in 1983 and later put to death.

Amnesty International in 1985 drew attention to reports of hundreds more dead and missing, including the disappearance of 300 Kurdish children arrested in Sulaimaniya, of whom some were tortured and three died in custody.

In 1988, Iraqi government forces systematically razed Kurdish villages and killed civilians.



Amnesty International estimates that over 100,000 Kurds were killed or disappeared during the 1987-1988 campaign, known as the Anfal campaigns, to quell Kurdish insurgency and activities.

The campaign included the use of chemical weapons. According to the non-governmental organisation Human Rights Watch, a single attack on the Kurdish town of Halabja killed up to 5,000 civilians and injured some 10,000 more.

Chemical Massacre at Halabja, March 1988

The brutal massacre of the oppressed and innocent people of Halabja began before the sunrise of Friday, 17th of March 1988. The Iraqi regime committed one of its most tragic and horrible crimes against the civilian people on Friday, 17th of March. On that day, Halabja was bombarded more than twenty times by Iraqi regime's warplanes with chemical and cluster bomb.

That Friday afternoon, the magnitude of Iraqi crimes became evident. In the streets and alleys of Halabja, corpses piled up over one another. Children playing in front of their houses were killed instantly. The children did not even have time to run back home. Some children fell down at the threshold of the door of their houses.

Early in the Iran-Iraq war, Saddam shot a Minister who argued for peace during a Cabinet meeting. Saddam started the war because he disputed the Iran-Iraq border, despite having himself negotiated that border before he became President.

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The war claimed a million casualties. The Iraqi regime used chemical weapons – mustard gas and the nerve agents tabun and sarin – extensively from 1984, resulting in over 20,000 Iranian casualties.

Ali Hasan al-Majid

"Chemical Ali"

As commander for the northern region, he bears direct command responsibility for the chemical weapons attack on the town of Halabja in northern Iraq which resulted in the death of up to 5,000 people.


He also took a leading role in the brutal repression of the uprising that followed the Gulf War in 1991, which included mass executions, torture and widespread destruction.



The UN Security Council considered the report prepared by a team of three specialists appointed by the UN Secretary General in March 1986, following which the President made a statement condemning Iraqi use of chemical weapons. This marked the first time a country had been named for violating the 1925 Geneva Convention banning the use of chemical weapons.

Non-Judicial Beheading and Torture

This document follows the Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council's appointment of **Hasan al-Majid** as the one in charge of all security, military and civil affairs in northern Iraq in March 1987. Immediately after his appointment, the Anfal campaign was launched. Indiscriminate deadly methods, ranging from chemical attacks against Kurdish civilians to destruction of Kurdish villages to beheading of Kurds, were used by the regime to follow through on its campaign.



One Arab Nation With an Eternal Message

The Ba'ath Arab Socialist Party

The Qutr of Iraq

Northern Organisation Bureau Command

Number: 5083 (Secretariat Office)

Date 22 Aug 1987

-Confidential and Personal-

To: First Corps Command

Subject: Execution of Criminals

Comradely Salute,

[Re:] your personal and confidential letter [No.] 352 on 8 Aug 1987.

The valiant comrade, Ali Hasan al-Majid, Commander of the Northern Organisation Bureau, has commented as follows on your aforementioned letter:

"We do not object to the decapitation of traitors. But it would have been preferable had you also sent them to Security for the purpose of interrogating them. [Security personnel] could have found with them other significant information that could have been useful, prior to their execution."

Kindly review...Respectfully

[Signature]

Tahir Tawfiq

Secretary of Northern Affairs Committee

Iraq also started the "war of the cities", involving the indiscriminate bombing of civilian targets, with its attack on Ahwaz in March 1985. And it consistently mistreated POWs, including by brainwashing.

Farzad Bazoft

Farzad Bazoft was a young journalist working for the Observer when he was arrested by the Iraqi authorities in September 1989. The 31-year old Iranian exile, who was travelling on British travel documents, had visited Iraq at the invitation of the Iraqi authorities on several occasions previously. He was researching a story on a large explosion at the rocket-testing complex at Qaqa, south of Baghdad when he was arrested. Detained with him was Mrs Daphne Parish, a British nurse who worked at one of Baghdad's major hospitals, who had driven him to the site. They were accused of spying for Britain and Israel. Mrs Parish was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment, spent six months in solitary confinement before being moved to a women's prison, and was eventually released in 1990.

Bazoft was less fortunate. He was forced to make a confession (allegedly after being drugged) and sentenced to death by hanging after a cursory trial. Despite widespread international protest and condemnation, the Iraqi regime carried out the death sentence on 15 March 1990. In a callous snub, Mr Latif Nassif Jassem, the Iraqi Information Minister and confidant of President Saddam, said "Mrs Thatcher wanted him alive. We gave her the body", after Mr Bazoft's corpse was handed over to the British embassy in Baghdad.

Invasion of Kuwait

Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990. Abuses committed by its forces included robbery, rape of Kuwaitis and expatriates, and summary executions. Amnesty International documented many other abuses during the occupation of Kuwait.

Iraq denied access to the Red Cross, which has a mandate to provide protection and assistance to civilians affected by international armed conflict. The death penalty was extended to looting and hoarding of food.

As Iraq tried to implement a policy of Iraqisation of the occupied territory, Kuwaiti civilians were arrested for "crimes" such as wearing beards. People were dragged from their homes and held in improvised detention centres. In findings based on a large number of interviews, Amnesty listed 38 methods of torture used by the Iraqi occupiers, including beatings, breaking of limbs, extracting finger and toenails, inserting bottle necks into the rectum, and subjecting detainees to mock executions.

More than 600 Kuwaiti POWs and missing are still unaccounted for. We believe some were still alive in 1998. Iraq refuses to comply with its UN obligation to account for the missing. It has provided sufficient information to close only three files.



Aziz Salih Numan

Aziz Salih al-Nu'man

As Governor of Kuwait during the latter part of the occupation, November 1990 – February 1991, he bears responsibility for grave breaches of Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time Of War committed by Iraqi forces during that period, including murder, torture, rape and deportation.

In an attempt to deter military action to expel it from Kuwait, the Iraqi regime took several hundred foreign nationals (including children) in Iraq and Kuwait hostage, and prevented thousands more from leaving. Worse still, hostages were held as human shields at a number of strategic military and civilian sites, many in inhumane conditions. These acts constituted a flagrant violation of international law – the Fourth Geneva Convention, to which Iraq is a party – as was confirmed in United Nations Security Council resolutions 670 and 674.

At the end of the Gulf War, the Iraqi army fleeing Kuwait set fire to over 1,160 Kuwaiti oil wells, with serious environmental consequences. And inside Iraq, an uprising by Iraqi Kurds and Shi'a Muslims was brutally suppressed, with the loss of tens of thousands of lives.

Continuing abuses

Since the Gulf War, the Iraqi regime's systematic repression of the Iraqi people has continued unabated.

Persecution of the Kurds

Persecution of Iraq's Kurds continues, although the protection provided by the northern No-Fly Zone has curbed the worst excesses. The Baghdad regime has continued a policy of Arabisation in northern Iraq to remove Kurdish claims to the oil-rich area around the city of Kirkuk. Kurds and other non-Arabs are forcibly relocated to the three northern Iraqi governorates – Dohuk, Arbil and Sulaimaniyah – which are under de facto Kurdish control.

The United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) Special Rapporteur for Iraq reports that 94,000 individuals have been expelled since 1991. Kurdish reports indicate that four million square metres of agricultural land owned by Kurds has been

confiscated and redistributed to Iraqi Arabs. Arabs from southern Iraq have been offered incentives to move into the Kirkuk area and, in disputes with their Kurdish neighbours, are always favoured by the authorities.

'B'

B (name withheld), a Kurdish businessman from Baghdad, married with children, was arrested in December 1996 outside his house by plainclothes security men. Initially his family did not know his whereabouts and went from one police station to another inquiring about him. Then through friends they found out that he was being held in the headquarters of the General Security Directorate in Baghdad. The family was not allowed to visit him.

Eleven months later in November 1997 the family was told by the authorities that he had been executed and that they should go and collect his body. His body bore evident signs of torture. His eyes were gouged out and the empty eye sockets were filled with paper. His right wrist and left leg were broken. The family was not given any reason for his arrest and subsequent execution. However, they suspected that he was executed because of his friendship with a retired army general who had links with the Iraqi opposition outside the country and who was arrested just before B's arrest and also executed.

In addition, ethnic Kurds and Turcomans have been prevented from buying property and those who own property and wish to sell have to do so to an Arab. Kurds have also been encouraged to change the ethnicity on their identity cards to Arab as part of this process.

Persecution of the Shi'a community, including murder of Shi'a religious leaders

More than 100 Shi'a clerics have disappeared since the 1991 uprising. Sayyed Muhammed Taghi al-Khoie was killed in a staged car accident in July 1994. Following the assassination in 1998 of two leading Shi'a clerics, Grand Ayatollah Shaykh Mirza Ali al-Gharawi and Ayatollah Shaykh Murtadaal-Burujerdi, the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights reported his fears that this formed part of a systematic attack on the independent leadership of Shi'a Muslims in Iraq.

Barzan al-Tikriti

Saddam's half brother. Personally responsible for the detention and/or murder of several thousand male members of the Barzani tribe in 1983. While head of Iraqi Intelligence (the Mukhabarat) 1979-1983, he was responsible for the repression of religious and ethnic minorities, including forced deportation, disappearances and murder.

Linked to the arrest of 90 members of the al-Hakim family and the murder of at least six of them



In early 1999, during a peaceful demonstration in response to the Iraqi regime's murder of the most senior Shi'a cleric in Iraq, Grand Ayatollah Sayyed Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr, security forces fired into the crowd of protestors, killing hundreds of civilians, including women and children. Security forces were also involved in efforts to break-up Shi'a Friday prayers in Baghdad and other cities. Large numbers of Shi'a were rounded up, imprisoned without trial and tortured. In May 2001, two more Shi'a clerics were executed in Baghdad for publicly accusing the regime of the Grand Ayatollah's murder.

Al-Shaikh Yahya Muhsin Ja'far al-Zeini

Al-Shaikh Yahya Muhsin Ja'far al-Zeini, from Saddam City, is a 29-year-old former theology student in *al-Hawza al-'Ilmiya* in al-Najaf. On 2 July 1999 he was arrested in his parents' house following his arrival from al-Najaf. His father and two brothers had been detained as substitute prisoners until his arrest. Security men blindfolded him and took him to a Security Directorate building. Once there, he was taken to a room and his blindfold was removed. He told Amnesty International:

" ... I saw a friend of mine, al-Shaikh Nasser Taresh al-Sa'idi, naked. He was handcuffed and a piece of wood was placed between his elbows and his knees. The two ends of the wood were placed on two high chairs and al-Shaikh Nasser was being suspended like a chicken. This method of torture is known as *al-Khaygania* (a reference to a former security director known as al-Khaygani). An electric wire was attached to al-Shaikh Nasser's penis and another one attached to one of his toes. He was asked if he could identify me and he said "this is al-Shaikh Yahya". They took me to another room and then after about 10 minutes they stripped me of my clothes and a security officer said "the person you saw has confessed against you". He said to me "You followers of [Ayatollah] al-Sadr have carried out acts harmful to the security of the country and have been distributing anti-government statements coming from abroad". He asked if I have any contact with an Iraqi religious scholar based in Iran who has been signing these statements. I said "I do not have any contacts with him"... I was then left suspended in the same manner as al-Shaikh al-Sa'idi. My face was looking upward. They attached an electric wire on my penis and the other end of the wire is attached to an electric motor. One security man was hitting my feet with a cable. Electric shocks were applied every few minutes and were increased. I must have been suspended for more than an hour. I lost consciousness. They took me to another room and made me walk even though my feet were swollen from beating.... They repeated this method a few times."

In response to on-going attacks on government buildings and officials in southern Iraq during 1999, the Iraqi army and militia forces destroyed entire Shi'a villages in the south. This was a continuation of the regime's policy, pursued throughout the 1990s, of draining the marshes area of southern Iraq, so forcing the population to relocate to urban areas where it was unable to offer assistance to anti-regime elements and could be controlled more effectively by the regime's security forces.

Harassment of the Opposition

The UNCHR Special Rapporteur on Iraq has received numerous reports of harassment, intimidation and threats against the families of opposition members living abroad.

In mid February 1999 the brother of a senior London-based member of the Iraqi National Accord (INA) was arrested by Iraqi Intelligence (the Mukhabarat) in Basra and forced to phone his brother in the UK and explain his predicament. A

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
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Mukhabarat officer subsequently spoke to the INA member and demanded that he co-operate with the Mukhabarat.

In January 1999 the Mukhabarat phoned another INA official, who was told that his children and brother were under arrest and would face punishment if he did not co-operate with the Mukhabarat. The Mukhabarat demanded details of the home, car and routines of INA head Dr Ayed Allawi.

A Professional Rapist

Government personnel card of Aziz Saleh Ahmed, identified as a "fighter in the popular army" whose "activity" is "violation of women's honour" (i.e. a professional rapist).



The family of General Nahib al-Salehi, a political opponent living in Jordan, have been subjected to arrests, questioning and other forms of harassment. In June 2000, he received a videotape showing the rape of a female relative. Ten days later, he was contacted by the Iraqi Intelligence Service, who told him that they were holding another female relation and urged him to stop his activities.

Special Operations

"Special Operations" refers to regime-sanctioned sabotage, kidnapping and assassination missions. Since the early 1970s the Intelligence Services have planned and carried out assassinations of prominent Iraqi oppositionists and other political targets. Since 1991, these include:

- MUAYAD HASAN NAJI AL-JANABI, a scientist formerly engaged in Iraq's nuclear programme, who was murdered in Jordan in late 1992.
- SHAYKH TALIB AL-SUHAYL, an Iraqi dissident, murdered in Lebanon in 1994.
- The attempted assassination of former US President GEORGE BUSH in Kuwait in early 1993.

Arbitrary killings

Executions are carried out without due process of law. Relatives are often prevented from burying the victims in accordance with Islamic practice, and have even been charged for the bullets used. An estimated 2,500 prisoners were executed between 1997 and 1999 in a "prison cleansing" campaign (not the first – in 1984, 4,000 political prisoners were executed at a single prison, the Abu Ghraib). In February 2000, 64 male prisoners were executed at Abu Ghraib, followed in March by a further 58, all of whom had previously been held in solitary confinement. In October 2001, 23 political prisoners, mainly Shi'a Muslims, were executed at Abu Ghraib.

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Between 1993 and 1998 around 3,000 prisoners from the "Mahjar" prison (see below) were executed in an execution area called the "Hadiqa" (garden) near to the prison. The "Hadiqa" consisted of an open area and sand bank which was covered by a steel awning. Prisoners from the "Mahjar" were executed in the "Hadiqa" by machine gun. A Special Oversight Committee at the prison decided on the executions.

Udayy Saddam Hussain

Saddam's elder son. Has been frequently accused of serial rape and murder of young women.

Personally executed dissidents in Basra during the uprising which followed the Gulf War in March 1991.

As a member of the National Security Council, he bears command responsibility for all crimes committed with the authority or acquiescence of that body.



In October 2000, dozens of women accused of prostitution were beheaded without any judicial process, together with men accused of pimping. Some were accused for political reasons. Members of the Feda'iyye Saddam (the militia created in 1994 by Saddam's elder son, Udayy Hussain) used swords to execute victims in front of their homes.

'Ala 'Abd Al-Qadir Al-Majid

In mid 2001, 'Ala 'Abd Al-Qadir Al-Majid fled to Jordan from Iraq, citing disagreements with the regime over business matters. 'Ala was a cousin of Saddam Hussain, a former intelligence officer and, latterly, a businessman. He returned to Iraq after the Iraqi Ambassador in Jordan declared publicly that his life was not in danger. He was met at the border by Tahir Habbush, Head of the Iraqi Intelligence Service (the Mukhabarat), and taken to a farm owned by 'Ali Hasan Al-Majid. At the farm 'Ala was tied to a tree and executed by members of his immediate family who, following orders from Saddam, took it in turns to shoot him.

Saddam has a history of dealing with disloyalty by arranging for traitors, as Saddam sees them, to be killed by their family or tribal associates. This helps to prevent blood feuds between different family/tribal groups and to distance his involvement.

'Ala is just the latest of some 40 of Saddam's relatives, including women and children, that he has had killed. In February 1996, his sons-in-law Hussain Kamal and Saddam Kamal were executed. They had defected in 1995 and returned to Iraq from Jordan after the government had announced amnesties for them.

Arbitrary arrest, detention under inhumane conditions, inhumane punishments, and torture

Men, women and children continue to be arrested and detained on suspicion of political or religious activities, or simply because they are related to members of the opposition. Political prisoners are held in inhumane and degrading conditions throughout Iraq.

The "Mahjar" prison located on the Police Training College site in central Baghdad formerly housed the Police Dog Training Centre. The normal occupancy of the "Mahjar" is 600-700 people. Thirty of the cells are underground and thirty other cells used to be dog kennels. Prisoners are beaten twice a day and the women regularly raped by their guards. They receive no medical treatment, but some prisoners have survived up to a year in the "Mahjar". Two large oil storage tanks each with a capacity of 36,000 litres have been built close to the "Mahjar". The tanks are full of petrol and are connected by pipes to the prison buildings in the "Mahjar". The prison authorities have instructions to set light to the petrol and destroy the "Mahjar" in an emergency.

Torture and Mistreatment in Abu Ghraib Prison

Abdallah, a member of the Ba'ath Party whose loyalty became suspect has still-vivid personal memories from his four years of imprisonment at Abu Ghraib in the 1980s, where he was held naked the entire time and frequently tortured.

On the second day of his imprisonment, the men were forced to walk between two rows of five guards each, to receive their containers of food. While walking to get the food, they were beaten by the guards with plastic telephone cables. They had to return to their cells the same way, so that a walk to get breakfast resulted in twenty lashes. "It wasn't that bad going to get the food", Abdallah said, "but coming back the food was spilled when we were beaten." The same procedure was used when the men went to the bathroom.

On the third day, the torture began. "We were removed from our cells and beaten with plastic pipes. This surprised us, because we were asked no questions. Possibly it was being done to break our morale", Abdallah speculated. The torture escalated to sixteen sessions daily. The treatment was organised and systematic. Abdallah was held alone in a 3x2-meter room that opened onto a corridor.

"We were allowed to go to the toilet three times a day, then they reduced the toilet to once a day for only one minute. I went for four years without a shower or a wash", Abdallah said. He also learned to cope with the deprivation and the hunger that accompanied his detention:

"I taught myself to drink a minimum amount of water because there was no place to urinate. They used wooden sticks to beat us and sometimes the sticks would break. I found a piece of a stick, covered with blood, and managed to bring it back to my room. I ate it for three days. A person who is hungry can eat anything. Pieces of our bodies started falling off from the beatings and our skin was so dry that it began to fall off. I ate pieces of my own body.

"No one, not Pushkin, not Mahfouz, can describe what happened to us. It is impossible to describe what living this day to day was like. I was totally naked the entire time. Half of the original group [of about thirty men] died. It was a slow type of continuous physical and psychological torture. Sometimes, it seemed that orders came to kill one of us, and he would be beaten to death."

The "Sijn Al-Tarbut" (the casket prison) is located on the third underground level of the new Directorate of General Security (DGS) building in Baghdad. The prisoners here are kept in rows of rectangular steel boxes, as found in mortuaries, until they either confess to their crimes or die. There are around 100-150 boxes which are

opened for half an hour a day to allow the prisoners some light and air. The prisoners receive only liquids.



Qusayy Saddam Hussain

Saddam's younger son. As head of the Iraqi internal security agencies, he has permitted and encouraged the endemic use of torture, including rape and the threat of rape, in Iraq.

The "Qurtiyya" (the can) prison is located in a DGS compound in the Talbiyyah area of the Saddam City district of Baghdad. This consists of 50-60 metal boxes the size of old tea chests in which detainees are locked under the same conditions as the "Sijn Al-Tarbut". Each box has a tap for water and a floor made of mesh to allow the detainees to defecate.

A Tortured Family

A particularly nasty example of torture involved a family which was arrested in late 2000 and taken to two separate interrogation centres within Republican Guard facilities located along the road to Abu Ghraib. The husband was held in one centre whilst the wife and children were held at a women's facility. The husband and wife were interrogated under torture about the husband's sale of a vehicle which, the interrogators said, had been captured by Iraqi security forces during a raid on Iraqi oppositionists.

The interrogators said separately to both husband and wife that they would cease the torture if they signed confessions admitting to be collaborating with the oppositionists. They refused. The wife was stripped naked and cigarettes stubbed out on all parts of her body whenever she refused to implicate her husband. She was beaten and thrown around the interrogation room. Her children were forced to watch the torture. She was eventually released, having been told that her husband would continue being tortured until she returned to confess. She was arrested again two weeks later and the same pattern of torture was repeated, leaving her a psychological wreck.

During his interrogation, the husband's arms were tied behind his back and he was then suspended in the air using a hook hung from the ceiling. This caused intense pain as his shoulder muscles and ligaments were torn. After a period, the interrogators entered the room and the husband was unhooked and placed in a chair in the middle of the room. From close range, he was then shot at with a pistol whenever he refused to agree to sign his confession. Sometimes shots were fired which missed his body, at other times the pistol muzzle was placed against his fingers, toes or arms and fired so as to mutilate these areas.

Over the following two weeks further interrogations occurred at intervals, following periods of food and water deprivation. Eventually a bribe was paid to an Iraqi Intelligence officer by the husband's and wife's wider family and both the husband and wife were released. They subsequently escaped Iraq.

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Prisoners are also subjected to brutal torture. Methods include knife cuts, sexual attacks, electric shocks, eye gouging, cigarette burns, pulling out of fingernails and mutilation of hands with electric drills. "Official" rape is also systematically used against Iraqi women.

In early 1998, the Iraqi regime obstructed a UN weapons inspection team which was trying to investigate claims that Iraq had conducted biological weapons experiments on prisoners during the mid-1990s.

Saddam has issued a series of decrees establishing severe penalties (amputation, branding, cutting off of ears, or other forms of mutilation) for criminal offences. Anyone found guilty of slandering the President has their tongue removed. These punishments are practised mainly on political dissenters. Iraqi TV has broadcast pictures of these punishments as a warning to others.

Senior regime figures have been personally involved in these abuses. General 'Abd Hamud, the head of Saddam's private office, has played a direct role in supervising all of these prisons and their security. Both he and Saddam have signed death warrants for prisoners. The archive files holding these death warrants were kept hidden within the cafeteria area on the eighth floor of the main Ministry of Interior building in Baghdad.

Udayy Hussain maintained a private torture chamber, known as the "Ghurfa Hamra" (Red Room) in a building on the banks of the Tigris disguised as an electricity installation. In one infamous incident of mass torture, Udayy Hussain ordered the national football team to be caned on the soles of their feet after losing a World Cup qualifying match.



Saddam's chemical gifts to the Marsh Arabs

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
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Iraq: Current and Planned/Potential Ballistic Missiles



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WMD PROGRAMMES OF CONCERN

This document draws on information from a range of sources, including intelligence. Because of the need to protect the safety of sources, details underpinning intelligence judgements cannot be made public. But the Government is confident of the judgements set out in this paper.

Introduction

- Nuclear, chemical and biological weapons are collectively known as Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Several countries have WMD programmes and missiles systems capable of delivering nuclear, chemical or biological warheads. They are working to develop more accurate and longer range missiles that will allow them to threaten more than just their immediate neighbours.
- Several countries that promised not to acquire nuclear weapons are trying to build them; North Korea has probably already succeeded.
- There are similar problems over chemical weapons. Most countries banned them long ago. But some countries have still not ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention and others are in breach of it. Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons against Iran, and against his own Kurdish people in the late 1980s.
- Some countries also have, or wish to acquire, biological weapons, some of which have the potential to cause casualties on the same scale as nuclear weapons.
- We know too that Usama Bin Laden's Al Qaida has for several years tried to get nuclear, chemical and biological agents. They had some success, and may even have obtained some chemical, biological and radiological materials, before being seriously disrupted by coalition action in Afghanistan. They will keep on trying.
- These facts are alarming. This paper sets out what the Government knows about them, consistent with the protection of sensitive sources of information.

Background

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) provides an important framework for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. Some 187 nations have signed and ratified it. Four nations have chosen not to. We know that three of them have developed nuclear weapons. This is a matter of concern – not least in the context of the current tensions between two of the countries; India and Pakistan.

The position of the NPT non-Parties is unsatisfactory. But it is well known. And these countries do not pose a direct threat to us. The focus of this paper is elsewhere. There is increasingly worrying evidence that several countries that are Parties to the NPT are nonetheless seeking to breach the Treaty and acquire nuclear weapons. Such actions are illegal and destabilising. The governments concerned are themselves volatile and unpredictable. These programmes are shrouded in secrecy. However, despite the difficulties, there are various ways in which intelligence on these programmes can be gained including an examination of external supply chains.

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Additionally these and other countries are attempting to acquire biological and chemical means of mass destruction and the necessary delivery systems to go with them, in some cases in breach of their obligations under the Biological and Toxin Weapons and Chemical Weapons Conventions which entered into force in 1975 and 1997 respectively. Chemical and biological weapons programmes can be hidden within legitimate civil industrial and medical programmes and are therefore easier to hide than nuclear weapons programmes, given the dual-use nature of much of the equipment and many precursor materials.

Aim

This paper sets out what we know about the efforts by states of concern to acquire weapons of mass destruction. We focus on four countries, whose activities are assessed to pose a direct threat to our interests. It inevitably draws upon sensitive intelligence sources and there is a limit to the level of detail which can be revealed.

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Summary

Iraq:

- Iraq retains some prohibited missile systems.
- Iraq is developing longer-range ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction throughout the Middle East and Gulf Region.
- Iraq is seeking a nuclear weapons capability.
- Iraq has a chemical weapons capability, and has used it. It also has a biological weapons capability.

Iran:

- Iran is developing a range of ballistic missiles, and could have an intercontinental capability by the end of the decade.
- Iran's pursuit of a fully indigenous nuclear fuel cycle provides cover for procuring technology applicable to its nuclear weapons programme.
- Iran is assessed to have a chemical weapons programme and is capable of producing a wide range of chemical weapons. Iran is also capable of producing biological agents.

North Korea:

- North Korea is currently the world's most prolific supplier of ballistic missile systems.
- North Korea has sold hundreds of missiles and continues to do so.
- North Korea has developed and produced a number of different types of missile for its own forces and also for export. Some could be capable of reaching the UK and the US.
- North Korea probably has produced at least 1-2 nuclear weapons and continues with a covert nuclear weapons programme.
- North Korea probably has both offensive chemical and biological weapons programmes.

Libya:

- Libya is seeking to extend the range of its ballistic missiles to cover Israel and more of southern Europe.
- Libya is seeking a nuclear weapons capability.
- Libya is seeking to re-establish a production capability for chemical weapons and is conducting research and development into biological weapons.

Al Qaida

- Al Qaida will continue with its efforts to acquire WMD and will use them if successful.

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IRAQ

SUMMARY

BALLISTIC MISSILES:

- Retains more than a dozen prohibited Al Hussein missiles (650km) **in breach of UNSCR 687**;
- Working on designs for longer-range missiles **in breach of UNSCR 687**;

Evidence:

- *Infrastructure damaged in the Gulf War and Operation Desert Fox has now largely been reconstituted;*
- *Infrastructure for longer-range missiles is under construction;*
- *UNSCOM unable to account for all imported missiles; others could have been built using hidden retained components.*

NUCLEAR WEAPONS:

- Iraq has a nuclear weapons programme, **in breach of its NPT and IAEA obligations and of UNSCR 687**, but will find it difficult to produce fissile material while sanctions remain in place.

Evidence:

- *Comprehensive programme prior to the Gulf War;*
- *Recalled scientists to work on a nuclear weapons programme;*
- *Covert efforts to procure nuclear related materials and technology.*

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS:

- Iraq has a capability to produce chemical and biological weapons **in breach of UNSCR 687**.

Evidence:

- *The amount of chemical and biological material, including weapons and agents, left unaccounted for when the UNSCOM inspections terminated would provide a significant offensive capability;*
- *Produced and used proficiently a variety of chemical weapons in 1980s against Iran and its own citizens;*
- *Concealed large scale production of the nerve agent VX until discovered by UNSCOM;*
- *Produced and weaponised at least three BW agents but concealed this capability until forced to declare it in 1995;*
- *Failed to convince UNSCOM of the accuracy of its declarations.*

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BACKGROUND

Before the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein demonstrated his readiness to deploy extensively WMD in the form of chemical weapons both against his neighbours and his own population. Since the Gulf War, he has **failed to comply with UN Security Council Resolutions**, which his government accepted. While the successful enforcement of the sanctions regimes and the UN arms embargo have impeded Iraq's efforts to reconstitute its weapons of mass destruction, they have not halted them. Much of Iraq's missile infrastructure has been rebuilt; the nuclear weapons programme is being reconstituted; and Iraq continues to have the capability to produce chemical and biological weapons, and may already have done so. Since the withdrawal of inspectors in 1998, monitoring of Iraqi attempts to restore a WMD capability has become more difficult.

UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) relating to WMD

UNSCR 687, April 1991 created the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) and required Iraq to accept, unconditionally, "the destruction, removal or rendering harmless, under international supervision" of its chemical and biological weapons, ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150km, and their associated programmes, stocks, components, research and facilities. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was charged with abolition of Iraq's nuclear weapons programme. UNSCOM and the IAEA must report that their mission has been achieved before the Security Council can end sanctions. They have not yet done so.

UNSCR 707, August 1991, stated that Iraq must provide full, final and complete disclosure of all its WMD programmes and provide unconditional and unrestricted access to UN inspectors. Iraq must also cease all nuclear activities of any kind other than civil use of isotopes.

UNSCR 715, October 1991 approved plans prepared by UNSCOM and IAEA for the monitoring and verification arrangements to implement UNSCR 687.

UNSCR 1051, March 1996 stated that Iraq must declare the shipment of dual-use WMD goods.

UNSCR 1284, December 1999, established UNMOVIC (United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission) as a successor to UNSCOM and calls on Iraq to give UNMOVIC inspectors "immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to any and all areas, facilities, equipment, records and means of transport"

BALLISTIC MISSILES

Prior to the Gulf War, Iraq had a well-developed missile industry. Iraq fired over 500 SCUD-type missiles at Iran during the Iran-Iraq War and 93 SCUD type-missiles during the Gulf War.

SCUD missiles

The short-range mobile SCUD ballistic missile was developed by the Soviet Union in the 1950s, drawing from the technology of the German liquid-propellant V-2 which saw operational service towards the end of World War II.

For many years it was the mainstay of Soviet and Warsaw Pact tactical missile forces, and it was also widely exported. Recipients of Soviet-manufactured SCUDs included Iraq, North Korea, Iran, and Libya, although not all were sold directly by the Soviet Union.

The latter were targeted at Israel and Coalition forces stationed in the Gulf region. Armed with conventional warheads they did limited damage. Iraq had chemical and biological warheads available but did not use them. Most of the missiles fired in the Gulf War were an Iraqi produced stretched version of the SCUD missile, the Al Hussein, with an extended range of 650 km. Iraq was working on other

longer-range stretched SCUD variants, such as the Al Abbas, which had a range of 900km. Iraq was also seeking to reverse engineer the SCUD engine with a view to producing new missiles; recent evidence indicates they may have succeeded at that time. In particular Iraq had plans for

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a new SCUD-derived missile with a range of 1200km. Iraq also conducted a partial flight test of a multi-stage satellite launch vehicle based on SCUD technology, known as the Al Abid. Also during this period, Iraq was developing the BADR-2000, a 700-1000km range two-stage solid propellant missile (based on the Iraqi part of the 1980s CONDOR-2 programme run in co-operation with Argentina and Egypt). There were plans for 1200-1500km range solid propellant follow-on systems.




FIGURE 1: ABABIL-100

to at least 200km. Any extension of a missile's range to beyond 150km would be **in breach of UN Security Resolution 687**. Compared to liquid propellant missiles, those powered by solid propellant offer greater ease of storage, handling and mobility. They are also quicker to take into and out of action and can stay at a high state of readiness for longer periods. We judge that Iraq has retained more than a dozen Al Hussein missiles (Figure 2), **in breach of UN Security Council Resolution 687**. These missiles were either hidden from the UN as complete systems, or could have been re-assembled using illegally retained engines and other components. We judge that the engineering expertise available would allow these missiles to be effectively maintained. We assess that some of these missiles could be available for use. Although not very accurate when used against Iran, Israel and Saudi Arabia, they are still an effective system, which could be used with a conventional, chemical or biological warhead.

Since the Gulf War, Iraq has been openly developing two short-range missiles up to a range of 150km, which are permitted under UN Security Council Resolution 687. The Al-Samoud liquid propellant missile has been extensively tested, has appeared on public parade in Baghdad and is judged to be nearing deployment. In the absence of UN inspectors, Iraq has also worked on extending its range to at least 200km. Testing of the solid propellant Ababil-100 (Figure 1) is also underway, with plans to extend its range




FIGURE 2: AL HUSSEIN

Reporting has recently confirmed that Iraq's priority is to develop longer-range missile systems, which we judge are likely to have ranges over 1000km, enabling it to threaten regional neighbours, Israel and some NATO members. These programmes employ hundreds of people. Imagery (Figure 3) has shown a new engine test stand being constructed (A), which is larger than the current one used for Al Samoud (B), and that formerly used for testing SCUD engines (C) which was dismantled under UNSCOM supervision. We judge that this new stand will be

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capable of testing engines for missiles with ranges over 1000km, which are not permitted under UN Security Council Resolution 687.



FIGURE 3: AL RAFAH/SHAHIYAT LIQUID PROPELLANT ENGINE STATIC TEST STAND

Iraq is also working to obtain improved guidance technology to increase missile accuracy. The success of UN restrictions means the development of new longer-range missiles is likely to be a slow process. These restrictions impact particularly on the:

- availability of foreign expertise;
- conduct of test flights to ranges above 150km;
- acquisition of guidance and control technology.

Saddam remains committed to developing longer-range missiles. We assess that, if sanctions remain effective, the earliest Iraq could achieve a limited missile capability of over 1000km is 2007, but it is more likely to be towards the end of the decade (Figure 4 shows the range of Iraq's various missiles). To be confident that it has successfully developed a longer-range missile Iraq would need to conduct a flight-test. Current UN Security Council Resolutions do not permit tests of over 150km.

Iraq has managed to rebuild much of the missile production infrastructure destroyed in the Gulf War and in Operation Desert Fox in 1998. New missile-related infrastructure is currently under construction, including a plant for indigenously producing ammonium perchlorate, which is a key ingredient in the production of solid propellant rocket motors. This was obtained through

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an Indian chemical engineering firm with extensive links in Iraq. Despite a UN embargo, Iraq has also made concerted efforts to acquire additional production technology, including machine tools and raw materials, **in breach of UN Security Council Resolution 1051**. The embargo has succeeded in blocking many of these attempts, but, despite the dual use nature of some of the items, we know some items have found their way to the Iraqi ballistic missile programme and will inevitably continue to do so.

Iraq: Current and Planned/Potential Ballistic Missiles




FIGURE 4: CURRENT AND PLANNED/POTENTIAL BALLISTIC MISSILES

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Before the Gulf War, Iraqi plans for the development of a nuclear weapon were well advanced. Iraq was planning and constructing fissile material production facilities and work on a weapon design was underway. Their declared aim was to produce a weapon with a 20 kiloton yield, which would ultimately be delivered in a ballistic missile warhead.

Effect of a 20 kiloton nuclear device in a built up area
A detonation occurring over a city might flatten an area of approximately 3 square miles.

Within 1.6 miles of detonation, blast damage and radiation would cause 80% casualties, three-quarters of which would be fatal. Between 1.6 and 3.1 miles from the detonation, there would still be 10% casualties, 10% of which would be fatal injuries.

We assessed in 1991 that Iraq was less than three years away from possessing a nuclear weapon. After the Gulf War, Iraq's nuclear weapons infrastructure was dismantled by the

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IAEA. But we judge that Iraq is still working to achieve a nuclear weapons capability, in breach of its NPT and IAEA obligations and UN Security Council Resolution 687. Much of its former expertise has been retained. In the last year intelligence has indicated that specialists were recalled to work on a nuclear weapons programme in the autumn of 1998. But Iraq needs certain key equipment and materials for the production of the fissile material necessary before a nuclear bomb could be developed. We judge that the Iraqi programme is based on gas centrifuge uranium enrichment, which was the route Iraq was following for producing fissile material before the Gulf War. Iraq is covertly attempting to acquire technology and materials with nuclear applications. This includes specialised aluminium, which is subject to international export controls because of its potential application in gas centrifuges used to enrich uranium. Although this material has applications in a range of other weapon systems.

So long as sanctions continue to hinder the import of such crucial goods, Iraq would find it difficult to produce a nuclear weapon. After the lifting of sanctions we assess that Iraq would need at least five years to produce a weapon. Progress would be much quicker if Iraq was able to buy suitable fissile material.

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

Iraq made frequent use of a variety of **chemical weapons** during the Iran-Iraq War. Iraq used significant quantities of mustard, tabun and sarin resulting in over 20,000 Iranian casualties. In 1988 Saddam also used mustard and nerve agents against the Kurds in northern Iraq. Estimates vary, but according to Human Rights Watch up to 5,000 people were killed. Iraq's military maintains the capability to use these weapons, with command, control and logistical arrangements in place.

Effects of chemical agents

Mustard is a liquid agent that causes burns and blisters to exposed skin. It attacks and damages the eyes, mucous membranes, lungs, skin, and blood-forming organs. When inhaled, mustard damages the respiratory tract; when ingested, it causes vomiting and diarrhoea.

Tabun, sarin and VX are all nerve agents of which VX is the most toxic. They all damage the nervous system, producing muscular spasms and paralysis. As little as 10 milligrammes of VX on the skin can cause death.

A chemical weapon is the agent combined with a means of dispersing it.

Iraq admitted in 1991 to the production of blister agent (mustard) and nerve agents (tabun, sarin, and cyclosarin).

After years of denial Iraq admitted to producing about 4 tons

of VX nerve agent, but only after the defection of Saddam's son-in-law, Hussein Kamil in 1995. Iraq maintains that the chemical weapons programme was halted in January 1991 and all agents under its control were destroyed by the summer of 1991. However, there are inconsistencies in Iraqi documentation on destruction. Analysis of figures provided by UN weapons inspectors indicate that they have been unable to account for:

- up to 360 tonnes of bulk chemical warfare agent, including 1.5 tonnes of VX nerve agent;
- up to 3000 tonnes of precursor chemicals including approximately 300 tonnes which, in the Iraqi CW programme, were unique to the production of VX;
- over 30,000 special munitions for delivery of chemical and biological agents.

We cannot be sure whether these have been destroyed or remain at the disposal of the Iraqi government. But we judge that Iraq retains some production equipment and at least small amounts of chemical agent precursors.

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Following four years of pressure from weapons inspectors and the information provided by Hussein Kamil, Iraq finally admitted to the existence of a **biological weapons** programme in 1995. Iraq admitted to:

- producing anthrax spores, botulinum toxin and aflatoxin and to working on a number of other agents;
- weaponising some agents, which included the filling of warheads for its Al Hussein ballistic missiles;
- testing spraying devices for agents.

Iraq has claimed that all its biological agents and weapons have been destroyed, although no convincing proof of this has been offered. UN inspectors could not account for large quantities of growth media procured for biological agent production, enough to produce over three times the amount of anthrax Iraq admits to having manufactured. Reports that Iraq has conducted research on smallpox and a number of toxins cannot be corroborated. Iraq is assessed to be self-sufficient in the technology required to produce biological weapons.

We assess that Iraq has a covert chemical and biological weapons programme, **in breach of UN Security Council Resolution 687**. All the necessary expertise has been retained. Iraq appears to be refurbishing sites formally associated with its chemical and biological weapons programmes. This includes a facility near Habbaniyah, previously associated with the production of precursors. Iraq is assessed to have some chemical and biological agents available, either from pre-Gulf War stocks or more recent production. We judge Iraq has the capability to produce the chemical agents:

- sulphur mustard, tabun, sarin, cyclosarin, and VX.

and the biological agents:

- anthrax, botulinum toxin, aflatoxin and ricin.

Effects of biological agents

Anthrax

Anthrax is a disease caused by the bacterium *Bacillus anthracis*. Inhalation anthrax is the manifestation of the disease likely to be expected in biological warfare. The symptoms may vary. If the dose is large (8,000 to 10,000 spores) death is common. The incubation period for anthrax is 1 to 7 days, with most cases occurring within 2 days of exposure.

Botulinum toxin

Botulinum toxin is a neurotoxin produced by the bacterium *Clostridium botulinum* and is one of the most toxic substances known to man. The first symptoms of botulinum toxin A poisoning may appear as early as 1 hour post exposure or as long as 8 days after exposure, with the incubation period between 12 and 22 hours. Paralysis leads to death by suffocation.

Aflatoxin

Aflatoxins are fungal toxins, which are potent carcinogens. Aflatoxin contaminated food products can cause liver inflammation and cancer.

Ricin

Ricin is derived from the castor bean and can cause multiple organ failure within one or two days of inhalation. A lethal dose is estimated to be about 1 milligramme.

A biological weapon is the agent combined with a means of dispersing it.

Iraq retains conventional delivery means for chemical and biological weapons such as free fall bombs and missile warheads. But given Iraq's admission of testing spray devices, we judge that the modification of the L-29 jet trainer could allow it to be used for the delivery of chemical and biological agents. The L-29 was subject to UNSCOM inspection for this reason.

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CONCEALMENT

Strategies to conceal and protect key parts of Iraq's WMD and ballistic missile programmes from a military attack or a UN inspection have been developed. These include the:

- use of transportable laboratories in their chemical and biological weapons programmes;
- use of covert facilities;
- dispersal of equipment when a threat is perceived.

In particular we know that the Iraqi leadership has recently ordered the dispersal of its most sensitive WMD equipment and material. This order is being carried out.

CONCLUSION

- Iraq retains some prohibited missile systems.
- Iraq is developing longer-range ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction throughout the Middle East and Gulf Region.
- Iraq is seeking a nuclear weapons capability.
- Iraq has a chemical weapons capability, and has used it. It also has a biological weapons capability.

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