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Washington, D.C. 20008-3600

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2108002

To:	Julian Miller	From:	Sebastian Wood
Fax:		Tel:	
Company:	Assessments Staff, Cabinet Office	Fax:	
Date:	20 March 2002	E-mail:	
Pages:	5		

Message:

WMD PROLIFERATORS' DOSSIER

Julian

With apologies for the rough packaging, I enclose some comments from here on the draft WMD Proliferators' dossier which you sent me last week.

I enclose also a paper copy of an email which I have sent separately to Peter Ricketts recording (diplomatically, I hope) our sense of slight bewilderment here as to what is going on (which paper are we proposing to publish, why does it have to be the beginning of next week, why are we giving the US so little time to comment etc etc).

Yours ever,

Sebastian Wood (Counsellor/JICREP)

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*[Handwritten signature]*

From: Michael O'Neill  
Date: 20 March 2002  
cc: Peter Gooderham  
Ian McCredie  
John Silcock

*Keep*

Sebastian Wood


#### WMD PROLIFERATORS DOSSIER

1. Thank you for showing me this. I have three general comments, and specific points based (as we discussed) on an informal chat with Van Diepen (DAS/Non-Proliferation, State).
2. I agree with you that the paper may attract scepticism, including over timing. Mr Hoon's comments today on nuclear response to WMD attack may make debate still more febrile. Perhaps we can try to present the paper in its wider context, alongside other evidence of our commitment to a wide range of non/counter-proliferation tools: eg Jack Straw's speech last month recognising the case for missile defence, but also that for multilateral instruments and other measures; the planned Green Paper on ways to strengthen the BWC; MOD funding for CW destruction in Russia, etc. All this is evidence that we take the problem seriously, and are pursuing multi-faceted answers.
3. For what it's worth, I have always found that visiting MPs of all parties respond well to similar US briefings on missile threats, eg at the Missile Defence Agency. MDA briefs usually include maps illustrating what various missile ranges mean in practical terms. Could the paper use the same device?
4. I agree with your comments on coordination with the US and the benefit of highlighting the state sponsorship/WMD nexus.
5. Van Diepen thought the paper very well-done and a useful exercise. He offered the following suggestions:
  - page 1 (Background): it is a little bald to say NPT non-signatories "do not pose a threat to us". Perhaps true. But their activities are part of a wider, dangerous pattern;
  - page 2 (background): Van Diepen commented that US agencies might be squeemish about the the second sentence on this page;
  - page 3 (Summary North Korea): this page says NK has already built 1-2 nukes, whereas the Introduction says only "probably". The same point applies to the North Korea section (page 5);
  - page 3 (Summary Libya): Van Diepen questioned the reference to R&D into CBW - I think he meant that it should be stronger. The same point applies to the Libya section (pages 13 and 14);

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- page 4 (North Korea): does CWC signature/BTWC non-accession really constitute "evidence" either way?
- page 12 (Iran): Van Diepen queried "no conclusive evidence";
- page 13 (Libya): the reference to India is very sensitive;

  
Michael O'Neill

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Sebastian Wood

T  
Cc: Peter Ricketts  
Subject: Tony Brenton;  
William Ehrman; Stephen Wright  
RE: US/UK WMD paper  
Carl Newns; Rob Macaire; Peter Gooderham;  
I; Mark Sedwill; William Patey

Peter,

I am sending to Julian Miller separate comments on the substance of the draft dossier on WMD proliferators, which he sent to me last week. We received today from Julian a side-copy of a further draft, this time confined to Iraqi WMD programmes. We imagine that this further draft overtakes the earlier one, although as we have not so far been consulted on this exercise it is hard to be sure.

But whichever paper London currently plan to publish, we have a couple of handling and policy points, separate from the substance of these papers, which we thought were better addressed to you than to Julian.

Firstly, if the primary aim of this exercise is to build public understanding of and support for decisive action to prevent Saddam's further acquisition of WMD, we think that whatever is published should spotlight the nexus between State sponsors of terrorism and WMD, and the associated risk that State-developed WMD technology is made available to terrorists who would not hesitate to use it: the Administration have repeatedly stated that this is their number one concern; and focussing the dossier on this risk would bring out more vividly the threat to the UK. Neither paper does this at the moment.

If the intention is still to put out the "WMD proliferators' dossier", we wonder whether consideration has been given to presenting the paper in its wider context, alongside other evidence of our commitment to a wide range of counter-proliferation tools: eg Jack Straw's speech last month recognising the case for missile defence, but also that for multilateral instruments and other measures; the planned Green Paper on ways to strengthen the BWC; MOD funding for CW destruction in Russia, etc. All this is evidence that we take the problem seriously, and are pursuing multi-faceted answers.

Finally, why are we busting a gut to publish this on Monday? We deduce from William Patey's email below that JD Crouch has been given a copy, and indicated that he would like time to study it. Our view is that think it would also be a good idea for this to be shared on the Rice/Manning channel, and for the Americans to be given some time to come to a view on the tactics and timing - after all, Cheney and his retinue of key officials gets back from the Middle East only today, and departments will be busy digesting the implications of his trip for the Administration's Iraq policy. We would not want them to think we are bouncing them on such a politically sensitive issue.

Sebastian Wood

-----Original Message-----

From: Peter Gooderham  
Sent: Wednesday, March 20, 2002 1:30 PM  
To: Rob Macaire; Sebastian Wood  
Subject: RE: US/UK WMD paper

Yes. And what's the big rush? Surely better to get it right vis a vis the US than go off at half-cock?

PG

-----Original Message-----

From: Rob Macaire  
Sent: Wednesday, March 20, 2002 1:24 PM  
To: Peter Gooderham; Sebastian Wood  
Subject: FW: US/UK WMD paper  
Importance: High

So, should we not be sharing it with OSD urgently as well as on JIC channels?  
Rob

-----Original Message-----

From: William Patey  
Sent: Wednesday, March 20, 2002 12:25 PM

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Cc: Stephen.Wright@fco.gov.uk; I  
Mark.Sedwill@fco.gov.uk  
Subject: US/UK WMD paper  
r@fco.gov.uk; Rob.Macaire@fco.gov.uk; mark.matthews@fco.gov.uk;

<< File: crouch 18 march\_.doc >>  
Peter

Re the unclassified paper on WMD - it looks as if it will be released on Monday (subject to a final decision tomorrow once special advisers have seen the final version). The JIC are sharing it with the US. Mark Sedwill thought the Foreign Secretary would want to tip off Colin Powell by telephone but it does not look as if Crouch will get the sort of time to study our paper that he would like. The Americans are briefing Security Council members and NATO allies on the WMD threat. The press will pick up any inconsistencies in our positions so it would be prudent to compare notes.

William Patey

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