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B

We need maps showing targets & see facts that Europe is at risk.

Jp43

DAVID MANNING

cc Sir Richard Wilson
'C'
Peter Ricketts
Francis Richards
Stephen Lander
Simon Webb
Joe French
Tom McKane
Julian Miller

WMD PROGRAMMES OF CONCERN - UNCLASSIFIED

1. Tom McKane's minute of 19 February commissioned a number o papers for the Prime Minister. We have provided him with the classified mater al requested from the Assessments Staff.

2. Additionally, we were asked to produce a paper for public use on the WMD threat. A draft is attached. We have had initial discussions with Agencies and others on this. There are reservations on several points:

- acknowledging that specific judgements draw on intelligen e;
- including material that we know only from intelligence sou ces;
- going further than before in our accusations, especially on Iranian and Libyan programmes. There are concerns here for bilat ral relations and the position of the IAEA.

3. We can discuss these issues (and indeed whether the paper should only focus on Iraq) at your meeting tomorrow. I note, however, that while the draft does take a maximalist line, it goes little further on most points than the material already published by the Americans (to whom we are showing this version in parallel).

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4. Getting the presentational tone right will clearly be a key. We will need to consider at what stage to consult Alastair Campbell. Alastair is aware that the draft paper is being shown to you today and stands ready to advise. The present draft attempts to set out the main concerns and conclusions in very accessible form in the opening paragraphs. But the supporting detail is drafted a little more formally, to convey the sense that these difficult issues have been given authoritative treatment. It would be helpful to take an initial view tomorrow on whether this is the right approach.



pp **JOHN SCARLETT**

6 March 2002

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WMD PROGRAMMES OF CONCERN

This document draws on information from a range of sources, including intelligence. Because of the need to protect the safety of sources, details underpinning intelligence judgements cannot be made public. But HMG is confident of the judgements set out in this paper.

Introduction

- Nuclear, chemical and biological weapons are collectively known as Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Several countries have WMD programmes and missiles systems to deliver nuclear, chemical or biological warheads. They are working to develop more accurate and longer range missiles that will allow them to threaten more than just their immediate neighbours.

- Several countries that promised not to acquire nuclear weapons are trying to build them; North Korea has probably already succeeded.

- There are similar problems over chemical weapons. Most countries banned them long ago. But some countries have still not ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention and others are in breach of it. Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons against Iran, and against his own Kurdish people, as recently as the late 1980s.

- Some countries also have, or wish to acquire, biological weapons, some of which have the potential to cause casualties on the same scale as nuclear weapons.

- We know too that Usama Bin Laden's Al Qaida has for several years tried to get nuclear, chemical and biological agents. They had some success, and may even have obtained some chemical, biological and radiological materials, before being seriously disrupted by coalition action in Afghanistan. They will keep on trying.

- These facts are alarming. This paper sets out what the Government knows about them, consistent with the protection of sensitive sources of information.

Background

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) provides an important framework for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. Some 188 nations have signed and ratified it. Four nations have chosen not to. Three of whom we know have developed nuclear weapons. This is a matter of concern – not least in the context of the current tensions between two of them; India and Pakistan.

The position of the NPT non-signatories is a matter of serious concern. But it is well known. The focus of this paper is elsewhere. There is increasingly worrying evidence that several countries that have signed the NPT are nonetheless seeking to breach the Treaty and acquire nuclear weapons. Such actions are illegal and destabilising. The governments concerned are themselves volatile and unpredictable. If these countries succeed in bypassing their international obligations and acquire nuclear weapons, the world will become immeasurably more dangerous.

These programmes are shrouded in secrecy. However, because these countries are dependent on external assistance to achieve their objectives, intelligence can be acquired through the activities of those who are supplying them with materials, components and expertise.

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Summary

North Korea:

- North Korea is currently the world's most prolific supplier of ballistic missile systems.
- It has sold hundreds of missiles and remains ready and able to continue.
- It has developed and produced a number of different types of missile for its own forces and also for export.
- North Korea has already produced at least 1-2 nuclear weapons and continues with a covert nuclear weapons programme.
- It probably has both offensive CW and BW weapons programmes.

Iraq:

- Iraq has a chemical and biological weapons capability.
- Iraq is seeking a nuclear weapons capability.
- Iraq is developing longer-range ballistic missiles capable of delivering these weapons of mass destruction through out the Middle East and Gulf Region.

Iran:

- Iran is developing a full range of ballistic missiles, and could have an intercontinental capability by the end of the decade.
- Iran's pursuit of a fully indigenous nuclear fuel cycle provides legitimate cover for procuring technology applicable to its nuclear weapons programme.
- Iran has a chemical weapons programme and is capable of producing a wide range of chemical weapons. Iran is also capable of producing biological weapons.

Libya:

- Libya is seeking to extend the range of its ballistic missiles to cover more of southern Europe and Israel.
- Libya is conducting research and development into offensive chemical and biological weapons.

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IRAQ

SUMMARY

Ballistic Missiles:

- Retained more than a dozen prohibited Al Hussein (650km) missiles;
- Working on designs for longer range missiles;

Evidence:

- *Infrastructure damaged in Gulf War and Operation Desert Fox now largely reconstituted.*
- *Infrastructure for longer range missiles under construction*

Nuclear:

- Iraq has a nuclear weapons programme, but is unable to produce fissile material while sanctions remain in place.

Evidence:

- *Comprehensive programme prior to Gulf War;*
- *Recalled scientists to work on a nuclear weapons programme;*
- *Covert efforts to procure nuclear related materials and technology.*

CBW

- Iraq has a capability to produce CBW weapons at short notice

Evidence:

- *The amount of chemical and biological material, including weapons and agents, left unaccounted for when the UNSCOM inspections terminated would provide a significant offensive capability;*
- *Produced and used proficiently a variety of chemical weapons in 1980s against Iran and its own citizens;*
- *Concealed the development of the nerve agent VX until discovered by UNSCOM;*
- *Produced and weaponised at least three BW agents but concealed this capability until forced to declare in 1995;*
- *Failed to convince UNSCOM of the accuracy of its declarations.*

Successful enforcement of the sanctions regimes and the UN arms embargo have hindered Iraq's reconstitution efforts, although WMD programmes continue. Since the withdrawal of inspectors in 1998, monitoring of Iraqi attempts to restore a WMD capability has become more difficult.

Ballistic Missiles

Prior to the Gulf war, Iraq had a well-developed missile industry. Iraq fired 500 SCUD-type missiles at Iran during the Iran-Iraq War and 93 SCUD type-missiles during the Gulf War. Iraq produced a stretched version of the SCUD missile, the Al Hussein, with an extended range of 650 km. Iraq was also working on a longer range stretched SCUD, the Al-Abbas, with a range of 900km. Iraq was also seeking to reverse engineer the SCUD engine with a view to producing new missiles and had plans for a new SCUD-derived missile with a range of 1200km. Iraq also conducted a partial flight test of a multi-stage satellite launch vehicle based on SCUD technology, known as the Al Abid.

Iraq was also developing the BADR-2000, a 700-1000km range two-stage solid propellant missile (based on the Iraqi part of the 1980s CONDOR-2 programme run in co-operation with Argentina and Egypt). There were plans for 1200-1500km range solid propelled follow-on systems.

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Since the Gulf War Iraq has been openly developing short-range missiles up to a range of 150km, which are permitted under UN Security Resolution 687. The short range Al-Samoud liquid propelled missile has been extensively tested, has appeared on public parade in Baghdad and is judged to be nearing deployment. Testing of the solid propelled Ababil-100 is also underway. In the absence of UN inspectors, Iraq has also worked on extending the range of these missiles beyond the 150km limit. We judge that Iraq has also retained more than a dozen Al Hussein missiles, which were either hidden from the UN as complete systems, or have been re-assembled using illegally retained engines and other components.

Iraq is now working to develop longer-range missile systems, with ranges up to 2,000km, which will enable it to threaten Israel, regional neighbours and NATO members. Many hundreds of people are believed to be working on this programme. There is evidence of an engine test facility being constructed, which would be capable of supporting missile systems larger than existing SCUD variants. Iraq is also working on improving guidance technology to increase missile accuracy. However, while UN restrictions remain in place, the development of these systems is likely to be a slow process. These restrictions impact particularly on the:

- availability of foreign expertise;
- conduct of test flights;
- acquisition of guidance and control technology.

Saddam remains committed to developing longer-range missiles and could achieve a limited medium range capability by the end of the decade even if sanctions remain in place.

Iraq has managed to rebuild much of the missile production infrastructure destroyed in the Gulf War and in Operation Desert Fox in 1998. Despite a UN embargo, Iraq has also made concerted efforts to acquire additional production technology, including machine tools, and raw materials such as graphite for use in missile nose cones and jet vanes. The embargo has succeeded in blocking many of these attempts, but some items have inevitably slipped through and will continue to do so.

New missile-related infrastructure is under construction, including a plant for producing ammonium perchlorate, which is a key ingredient in the production of solid propellant rocket motors. This was obtained through an Indian chemical engineering firm with extensive links in Iraq. While Slobodan Milosevic was in power Iraq also received considerable help from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including assistance with guidance and control technology. While no longer officially sanctioned, some Belgrade arms dealers maintain links with Baghdad.

Nuclear

Before the Gulf war, Iraqi plans for the development of a nuclear weapon were well advanced. Iraq was planning and constructing fissile material production facilities and work on a weapon designs was underway. We assess that in 1991 Iraq was only three years away from possessing a nuclear weapon. Iraq still wants a nuclear weapons capability and is working to achieve it. Much of their former expertise has been retained and there is intelligence that specialists have been recalled to work on a nuclear weapons programme. But Iraq needs certain key components and materials for the production of fissile material, which would be necessary before a nuclear bomb could be developed. Iraq is covertly attempting to acquire nuclear related technology and materials, such as specialised aluminium, which is prohibited under the terms of international non-proliferation agreements because of its potential application in gas centrifuges used to enrich uranium.

So long as sanctions continue to hinder the import of such crucial goods, Iraq would find it difficult to produce a nuclear weapon. After the lifting of sanctions we assess that Iraq would need five

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years to produce a weapon. Progress would be much quicker if Iraq was able to buy suitable fissile material.

Chemical and Biological Weapons

Iraq had made frequent use of a variety of chemical weapons. During the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq used significant quantities of mustard, tabun and other nerve agents resulting in some 25,000 Iranian casualties. In 1988 Saddam also used mustard and various nerve agents against the Kurds in northern Iraq, resulting in 1,500-3,500 casualties. Iraq has admitted to the production of blister agent (mustard), nerve agents (tabun, sarin, cyclo-sarin) and there is good evidence that it stockpiled a mental incapacitant (Agent 15).

After years of denial Iraq has admitted to producing 3 tons of VX nerve agent, but only after UNSCOM discovered strong evidence of VX in missile warheads. Iraq maintains that the chemical weapons programme was halted in January 1991 and all agents destroyed by April 1991. However, there are inconsistencies in Iraqi documentation on destruction. UN weapons inspectors have been unable to account for:

- 4,000 tons of declared precursor chemicals used in the production of chemical weapons;
- 610 tons of precursor chemicals used in the production of VX;
- some 31,000 chemical weapons munitions.

Despite pressure from weapons inspectors after the war, Iraq did not admit to the existence of a biological programme until 1995 when the defection of Saddam's son-in-law, Hussein Kamil forced its hand. It admitted to producing anthrax, botulinum toxin and aflatoxin and to working on a number of other agents. Iraq finally admitted that it had weaponised some agents, which included warheads for its Al Hussein ballistic missiles. It has claimed that all its biological agents have been destroyed, although no proof of this has been offered. UN inspectors could not account for large quantities of growth media used in biological weapon production, enough to produce over three times the amount of anthrax Iraq admits to having manufactured.

We assess that Iraq has a covert chemical and biological weapons programme. All the necessary expertise has been retained. Iraq appears to be installing or repairing dual use equipment at suspect facilities, which could be used for chemical or biological weapon production. This includes the Habbaniyah Chemical Headquarters site. Iraq is assessed to be self-sufficient in terms of producing biological weapons. Iraq is assessed to be capable of producing the chemical agents:

- sulphur mustard, tabun, sarin, GF, VX, hydrogen cyanide, and phosgene

and the biological agents:

- anthrax, botulinum toxin, plague and aflatoxin.

As well as retaining more conventional delivery means such as free fall bombs and missile warheads, Iraq is also modifying L-29 light aircraft and seeking UAV technology, which would be suited for delivery of chemical and biological weapons. Strategies that enable key parts of the chemical and biological weapons programme to survive a military strike have been developed.

Conclusion

- **Iraq has a chemical and biological weapons capability.**
- **Iraq is seeking a nuclear weapons capability.**
- **Iraq is developing longer-range ballistic missiles capable of delivering these weapons of mass destruction through out the Middle East and Gulf Region.**

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