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From: Matthew Rycroft  
Date: 8 March 2003

PRIME MINISTER

cc: Jonathan Powell  
David Manning  
Alastair Campbell  
Sally Morgan  
Nick Cannon  
John Scarlett

## IRAQ: CHILE

You are calling Lagos again on a secure line at 1530. The purpose is to explore with him some key tests (the Americans don't like the word bench-marks) to assess whether Saddam has had a genuine change of heart by 17 March.

You could say:

- As you know, the second resolution is vital for us. We have already amended it to give Saddam some extra time, a final final opportunity, to comply with 1441.
- Blix has drawn up a draft, 167-page document, called the "clusters document". After our last conversation, I sent you our summary. This and Blix's report to the Security Council yesterday make clear that noone believes that Saddam has given immediate, unconditional or full cooperation. Intelligence shows that he has no intention of doing so, but that he will continue to dribble out concessions under pressure from our military build-up, in order to fool some people and divide international opinion.

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- We must not allow ourselves to be fooled. Equally we need to be fair, so that Saddam genuinely does have a chance for a change of heart to avert military action. So I have taken on board your point that you need some concrete tests to judge Saddam by.
- I have picked out five key areas, and one key test in each area, for Saddam to meet by 17 March. If he had any intention of complying, he would be able to do these. If he were to do all of them, it would show that he has had a change of heart, though even then it would not add up to full disarmament – there are 29 clusters of questions, not just five.
- All of the five tests flow from 1441 and Blix's clusters document. I have tried to make them as straightforward and concrete as possible. In each case, Saddam needs to provide the material that UNMOVIC says is unaccounted for, or documentation proving its destruction. We must not forget that the onus is on Saddam to prove his innocence, not on us to prove his guilt.
- My five proposed tests are:
  1. Interviews. 150 named scientists must be made available for interview outside Iraq by 17 March. UNMOVIC have a list of some 3,500 potential witnesses. So far they have called just 38 (1%) to interview and succeeded in interviewing just 10 – all with intimidation and bugging, none of them outside Iraq despite specific provision in UNSCR 1441 (OP5) for interviews outside Iraq. IAEA have a separate list, and in the last ten days have interviewed just two scientists. The Cyprus government has made available facilities for these interviews, as UNMOVIC know. I propose that UNMOVIC and IAEA

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should now select 150 of the key individuals covering each of the programmes. They will be accompanied by spouses, children and parents, and any additional family members they designate. If any family members choose not to travel they may ask the UN authorities or an NGO to monitor their safety and well-being during the absence of the interviewee.

2. Chemical weapons - VX. 1.5 tonnes of bulk agent and large quantities of precursors are unaccounted for. **By 17 March Iraq must provide all this material or full documentation proving its destruction.**
  3. Biological weapons - Anthrax. 10,000 litres are unaccounted for. **By 17 March Iraq must provide it all or full documentation proving its destruction.**
  4. Missiles. At least 14 SCUDs are unaccounted for. Iraq claims to have destroyed them, but has not provided the documentation. **By 17 March Iraq must provide them all or full proof of their destruction.**
  5. Remotely Piloted Vehicles. Iraq denies that it has designed a spray tank capable of being used to spray CW. This is contradicted by Iraq's own documentation. **By 17 March Iraq must provide full documentation to resolve the contradictions.**
- I hope this – or something very like it – meets your need for verifiable tests and that you will now be willing to set them out publicly in the next few days. If you do, I will support you, and if it will help you I will get others (like

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Bush and Aznar) to join us. Again if it would be helpful I would be happy to codify them in a joint statement or agreement.

- But to do any of this, I would have to know "how much water is in the swimming pool" as you put it. In other words, I need to know that this would allow you to support the resolution when it is put to a vote.
- Do you think Fox will go down this route?

As background, John Scarlett and [redacted] have worked up the attached facts - with exact references - on interviews, VX, anthrax, missiles and RPVs from Blix's clusters document. You could offer to send it and a copy of the five tests to Lagos, who already has Nick's summary of the clusters document.



**MATTHEW RYCROFT**

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## FIVE TESTS OF IRAQ'S COMPLIANCE

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2. Chemical weapons - VX. 1.5 tonnes of bulk agent and large quantities of precursors are unaccounted for. By 17 March Iraq must provide all this material or full documentation proving its destruction.
3. Biological weapons - Anthrax. 10,000 litres are unaccounted for. By 17 March Iraq must provide it all or full documentation proving its destruction.
4. Missiles. At least 14 SCUDs are unaccounted for. Iraq claims to have destroyed them, but has not provided the documentation. By 17 March Iraq must provide them all or full proof of their destruction.
5. Remotely Piloted Vehicles. Iraq denies that it has designed a spray tank capable of being used to spray CW. This is contradicted by Iraq's own documentation. By 17 March Iraq must provide full documentation to resolve the contradictions.

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Background to the list we have included in the speaking note, with page references to material in the "Cluster Document"

## **VX Nerve Agent**

### **UNMOVIC assessment**

- Iraq admitted to UNSCOM to the production of 3.9 tonnes of VX. It could only prove the destruction of 2.4 tonnes. It claimed to have destroyed unilaterally the remainder 1.5 tonnes in 1991. It has produced no documentary evidence for this destruction. There are significant discrepancies in accounting for all the key precursors required to produce VX. (Page 73-77)

### **Action Points laid down by UNMOVIC**

- Present any outstanding quantities of precursors or provide credible evidence that all quantities imported have been consumed, destroyed or spoiled. (Page 77)
- Present all documents and other evidence relating to work on VX development (Page 77)
- In connection with Iraq's assertion that it had been unable to weaponise VX, explain with credible evidence
  - Why the VX it declared it produced in 1990 and unilaterally destroyed in 1991 was not indicated in the 1990 al Muthanna State Establishment storage inventory
  - Why a VX nerve agent degradation product was found on a swipe from a warhead by one laboratory (Page 77)
- Present documentary information on munitions designed to be filled with VX. (Page 78)

## **Anthrax**

### **UNMOVIC assessment**

- UNMOVIC has credible evidence that the total quantity of BW agent in bombs, warheads and in bulk at the time of the Gulf War was 7,000 litres more than declared by Iraq. This additional agent was most likely all anthrax. (Page 90)
- It seems highly probable that the destruction of bulk agent, including anthrax, stated by Iraq to have been destroyed in July/August 1991, did not occur. Based on all the evidence available, the strong presumption is that about 10,000 litres of anthrax was not destroyed and may still exist. (Page 92)
- Iraq currently possess the technology and materials to enable it to produce anthrax (Page 92)

### **Action Points laid down by UNMOVIC**

- Present any remaining stocks of anthrax or provide evidence for its destruction (Page 92)
- Explain with credible evidence
  - Its statement that anthrax had not been produced in 1991
  - The unaccounted for bacterial growth media (Page 92)
- Provide documentation to support its account of unilateral destruction of BW agent in 1991 (Page 92)

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## **SCUD Missiles**

### **UNMOVIC Assessment**

- UNMOVIC can not verify that all of Iraq's SCUD missile have been destroyed. In particular 14 SCUD missiles which Iraq claims to have used as targets in a missile interception project before 1991. The additional information Iraq provided on 8 February 2003 does not resolve the outstanding issues. (Page 19)
- UNMOVIC has also been unable to assess the number of SCUD engines produced in Iraq and whether all key engine parts have been destroyed as claimed.(Page 19)
- UNMOVIC are also unable to account for the destruction of about 50 SCUD warheads, which Iraq claims to have destroyed unilaterally. UNMOVIC state that these may have been retained for a proscribed missile force.(Page 19/20)

### **Action Points laid down by UNMOVIC**

- Present any proscribed SCUD missiles and associated equipment (Page 21)
- Present the remnants of key components identified by UNMOVIC (Page 21)
- Present the technical documentation, including videotapes and tracking data, concerning the interception missile project (Page 21)
- Present documentation, known to exist, that would help clarify the state of the combat force at the end of the Gulf War and the status of the force after the adoption of 687. (Page 20/21)

## **Remotely Piloted Vehicles**

### **UNMOVIC Assessment**

- UNMOVIC are concerned by contradictory information provided by Iraq about the development tanks used for spraying BW or CW agent. This is a difficult area to check since there are many spray systems in Iraq for use with agriculture aircraft that are identical to the devices modified for BW.(Page 53/54)

### **Action Points laid down by UNMOVIC**

- Provide further explanation and documentation on their work on spray tanks for CBW purposes (Page 55)
- Provide documentation or other evidence that explain what type of spray devices it had developed or planned to develop, and for which agents, for its RPVs (Page 55)
- Present any existing spray tanks or other spray devises modified for CBW purposes to UNMOVIC for destruction (Page 55)

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