



D/DOMA/C/7

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**OPERATION TELIC - MILITARY STRATEGIC ANALYSIS OF PROS/
CONS OF ADOPTING A SOUTHERN LAND FORCE OPTION**

A Paper by the SPG

INTRODUCTION

- US have not yet written off opportunity for US conventional land force options mounted from Turkey (Northern Option), within current window for action
- But, US deployment plans for Northern Option already delayed, and US military planners have placed highest priority on delivering US combat power if Turkey becomes available
- As a result UK highly unlikely to be able to deploy a conventional land force through Turkey and meet current military planning; therefore a reassessment of UK force packages necessary, if UK wishes to contribute Land Force package and meet US planning timetable
- UK land force package preparations were based on Div HQ and a square Armoured Brigade, concurrent with FRESCO. There is minimal spare capacity, and any rejig of packages will therefore engender changes to FRESCO manning

WINNING CONCEPT

- Early work illustrated that in order to achieve desired strategic goals campaign would need to be "quick and successful". Emphasis on tempo protects Coalition CofG (Public Support for Operations), and offers best means of attacking Iraqi CofG (Saddam Hussein's grip on power).
- In order to achieve "quick and successful" campaign, plan needs to address key effects to be delivered in North: fix Iraqi forces in North and deny Iraqis manoeuvre space; secure Northern oilfields; prevent Iraqi action against Kurds; prevent pre-emptive Kurdish action; afford flexibility in campaign planning. Failure would not mean Iraq could not be defeated but campaign would be longer, likely to be increasingly attritional, placing achievement of End State at risk.

CREATING CONDITIONS IN THE NORTH

- Effects in North may be delivered by a variety of means including most preferred solution of coalition conventional force operations. However, this may now be denied, and therefore not all the necessary effects in the north can be guaranteed leading to a campaign conducted under two different conditions:
 - **Condition A.** All desired effects are delivered in the North, by whatever means.

- **Condition B.** Some or all of the desired effects in the North are not delivered.

SOUTHERN OPTIONS VS NORTHERN CONDITIONS

- Likely effects of the conditions created in the North on the campaign unfolding from the south are:
 - Condition A – Effects Delivered.
 - Regional states reassured that declared End State of Iraq as a unitary state can be delivered
 - Potential for regional adventurism denied
 - Risks of major humanitarian crisis in North addressed/ averted
 - Iraqis forced to face two ways
 - Simultaneous attacks more likely to lead to rapid collapse of regime – it is evident they have nowhere to go
 - Condition B – Effects Not Delivered.
 - Regional states concerned that Iraq will not emerge as a unitary state
 - Potential for complicating regional adventurism
 - Risk of Iraqis using humanitarian suffering as a weapon (attack Kurds as coalition Allies and drive them into Turkey)
 - Iraqis may use North as manoeuvre space, and offers opportunity for regime to gravitate back towards its home territory (Tikrit)
 - Northern oilfields not secured
 - May encourage Iraqis to use CW/ BW to slow campaign further in belief that they can “win”
 - Demands on air to fix/ write down Iraqi forces in North will detract from Main Effort, and likely to increase kinetic/ attritional targeting
 - Campaign will be slower
- Therefore, on balance, forces operating in South under Condition B are likely to be at greater risk of:
 - CW/ BW attack
 - Stiffer Iraqi conventional resistance
 - Potential Iraqi unconventional military operations/ civilian resistance

SOUTHERN OPTIONS

- PJHQ have established that CFLCC would prefer a UK force package with sufficient combat power that will be able to provide a relief in place for US forces in the early phases of the campaign. This releases US combat power to fulfil other Main Effort tasking
- However, UK could declare a variety of what may be sub-optimal packages from a US planning perspective, and US reaction to this is unknown, it may be polite – but it may not be accommodating; in time available following UK Land force packages can be generated:
 - ATG Only
 - ATG + Armd Bde
 - ATG + light Bde
 - ATG + Armd Bde + Light Bde
- Broadly anticipated tasks would be as in CJO's paper, but clearly smaller forces than those recommended will have a lesser role, and are likely to be more focussed only on Aftermath
- Mil Strat pros and cons of each of these force packages are at Annex A
- Given current unpredictability of outcome over Turkey UK force package should be capable of continuing operations in the South under Conditions A or B. However, this does not diminish the UK's conviction that delivering required effects in the North remains central to delivering a winning concept: a message we should aim to continue to deliver at all levels of engagement with US.

STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF SOUTHERN OPTIONS

- If UK commits to a Southern Option, over and above ATG, has the following implications for our current strategic COA:
 - COA 1. Reinforces message that US is not alone and that UK is committed to seeing UN process through to conclusion
 - COA 2. Provides Ministers with additional leverage in planning phases; demonstrates UK commitment to all phases of operation and crucially in the Aftermath
 - COA 3. Further commitment to US planning and operational effort, makes UK forces integral to success of current US concept. UK will therefore gain a potential veto, but exercising it would strain UK/ US relations for some time to come. US may be emboldened to adopt COA 3 on basis of US/ UK action vs US action only.

- US combat power will deliver military success in Iraq, but strategic victory, under any COA, is in successful delivery of Aftermath and limiting unintended consequences.
- UK adopting southern land option, as outlined by PJHQ, has potential to:
 - Release US combat power to increase tempo of operations
 - Provide UK with leading role in key areas of Iraq (free of Kurdish political risks) in Aftermath, and thus provide leverage in Aftermath Planning efforts, especially related to:
 - Humanitarian effort
 - Reconstruction of key infrastructure
 - Future control and distribution of Iraqi oil

CAPABILITY IMPLICATIONS OF ADOPTING SOUTHERN OPTION

- A detailed breakdown of land force implications for adopting a Land Package option in the south, vs continuing to prepare forces for the North is at Annex B (together with how the force will be generated against the background of Op FRESCO at App 1 to Ann B)
- Key judgements of adoption of a Land Package for the South against Defence Capabilities are:
 - Prepare
 - Pro:
 - UOR.
 - Reduction in probable need for high intensity warfighting and shorter LoC reduces CS/ CSS requirement and reduces UOR risk.
 - Con:
 - UOR.
 - 16AAB not yet in UOR package but requirement is mainly for dismounted close combat (DCC) and communications equipment. EC are evaluating probability of delivery, and Land/ MO1 risk of non-delivery.
 - Training.
 - No time for many elements of land force to complete in theatre training or integration prior to commitment to action. Risk deemed acceptable given

high readiness of forces, CPX for participating HQs, working within UK division structure, and nature of likely tasks

- Project

- Pro:

- Very significant reduction in complexity and demand along Land LoC

- Con:

- Impact of split in UK LoC to mount and sustain Air package in north and Land/ Maritime in South has yet to be fully scoped. Current understanding is that both commitments can be met, but at an as yet unquantified risk
- Very demanding timeline with no margin for error; delays caused by ships delayed sailing, delays at Suez, poor weather, or disembarkation delay will immediately impact on readiness to achieve tasks; however US are exposed to an equal measure of risk.
- To deliver force and meet UOR timelines will require increase in airlift, with extensive reinforcement by commercial charter. Market has yet to be tested.
- UK commits both its VHR light Bdes and SH to this operation, potentially reduces strategic balance of remaining JRRF pool.

- Command and Inform

- Pro

- UK likely to have discrete AOR established early and less demanding C2 than for North
- Reduction in C3 demand means we are unlikely to call on UK ARRC resources to meet UK operational commitment

- Operate

- Pro

- UK has opportunity to exercise command in discrete southern AOR
- UK force no longer required to manoeuvre alongside digitised US formations

- Con

- Key UK enablers including SH remain committed
- UK residual land reserve limited to SLE Bn while FRESCO continues.

- Lack of clarity in detail of proposed tasks
- Sustain
 - Pro
 - If land force deploys and operation is not triggered, offers opportunity to exercise in Kuwait and then recover personnel and leave vehicles; improves readiness for Window 2
 - Factor
 - RN can sustain force package for 6 months, but in order to be available for Window 2, force would need to be recovered for 3-4 months and deployed again later
 - RAF will need to recover FJ, but prepositioning would be complete reducing deployment times for any further operation
 - UK will have made an early commitment to Aftermath that will probably demand a commitment for a number of years. This would be hard to avoid in any event, and engagement in South offers significant advantages over possibly being fixed in North with Kurds

CONCLUSION

- UK is at a strategic decision point to provide the US with a revised Force Package, given the convergence of US military preparation and timelines, continued Turkish prevarication, and the need to maintain pressure on the Iraqi regime to deliver COA 1.
- From a review of all the factors the downside military risk of UK disengaging from the Northern Land Option is outweighed by the upside benefits of the proposed engagement in the South

RECOMMENDATION

- It is recommended that COS:
- Agree CJO's recommendation for a UK force package to be deployed in the South
- But, recognise that we need to keep up the pressure to ensure there is a credible means of delivering the effects desired in the North, and that if in due course timelines slip outside Window 1 we may need to reopen our options to re-engage in the North with an operationally decisive force.
- And that in doing so the UK accepts the following current risks and uncertainties:
 - Lack of detailed definition in tasks to be completed in South

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- Adopting Southern Option advances us toward the possibility of Strategic COA 3, but at the same time provides a significant degree of leverage
- Timings for force preparation, delivery, and integration are challenging and carry considerable risk
- The US are fully alive to the need to deliver the required effects in the North, but have not yet determined how this will be achieved if Turkey continues to refuse a Land Package.

SPG Leader

MIL START IMPLICATIONS OF FORCE PACKAGE OPTIONS

Option	Advantages	Disadvantages
ATG Only	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Possible with minimum effort and in time.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Does not fulfil US higher level expectations, constrains tempo and reach of US land operations.- Temporary involvement gaining no seat at the aftermath table.
Elms HQ 1 (UK) Armd Div HQ, ATG and Armd Bde	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Provides significant capability.- Minimal impact on OP FRESCO.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Does not fulfil US expectations, constrains tempo and reach of US land operations.- Requires significant logistical effort, although it is considerably less than that envisaged for operations from Turkey.- Requires Risk on Some UORs.- One Armd Bde and one Lt Bde is an unbalanced force with limited manoeuvre capacity.
HQ 1 (UK) Armd Div HQ, ATG and Armd Bde and 16 AAsslt Bde	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Fulfils US expectations by releasing coherent US forces to ensure rapid exploitation to North in place of ground manoeuvre from Turkey.- Allows for balanced transition to Phase IV and ensures adequate UK representation in aftermath planning.- Deploying 16 Bde vice a further Armoured or Mech Bde, allows the Division to be complete in time for operations and provides the flexibility of an Air Asslt Bde.- Tasks in the South form a geographically and functionally coherent whole requiring unity of command.- 3 manoeuvre bdes provides a more balanced and robust formation, able to respond independently to changes in the tactical situation in its AOR.- Increased military influence	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Requires significant logistical effort, although it is considerably less than that envisaged for operations from Turkey.- Requires risk on some UORs.- Impact on OP FRESCO (see Ann B App1).
ATG and 16 AAsslt Bde	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Possible with relatively little logistic effort.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Does not fulfil US expectations.- Unbalanced force with very limited combat power and ground mobility.

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| | <ul style="list-style-type: none">- Some impact on Op FRESCO- Lacks sustainability. |
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ANNEX B TO D/DOMA/C/7
DATED 7 JAN 03

ANALYSIS OF PROS AND CONS VS DEFENCE CAPABILITIES OF LAND PACKAGES NORTH AND SOUTH

	North – Package 3A (Armd Div)	South – Package 3B+3D with ATG (Armd Bde, AA Bde, Cdo Bde)
<u>Prepare</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> + Some op planning completed + Package 3C (armd div (-) in north basis for UORs + Early desertisation not critical <p>Limited time available for pre-deployment and in-theatre training Warfighting ops likely to begin before UOR package complete</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> + No detailed UK op planning yet. + 16 AA Bde at VHR <p>Limited time available for pre-deployment and in-theatre training Ops likely to begin before UOR package complete</p>
<u>Project</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> + Package potentially RIT 24 Mar (UK shipping) (G Day from 19 Mar) + Opportunity for efficient sharing of resources with UK Air Component <p>No guaranteed access to Turkey 4ID 1st in order of march up LofC may delay UK land forces</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> + 16 AA Bde potentially RIT by end Feb 03. Final elements (7 Armd Bde) RIT 19 Mar. + Access to Kuwait + US will enable UK force flow + Port infrastructure
<u>Inform</u>	- See Command	+ See Command
Command	<p>UK conventional forces on land in different parts of Theatre (Land north, ATG south) UK conventional forces working to 2 different US HQ</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> + All UK conventional forces on land in same parts of Theatre and under OPCOM 1 (UK) Armd Div + 1 (UK) Armd Div working to one US HQ (1 MEF)
Operate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> + Coherent, balanced UK package, suited for warfighting + Confident that package is able to defeat Iraqi forces in AOR - Ministerially approved package (3C) unsuitable: 2 x bdes needed <p>BH resources split north and south Combat engineer capability (river and minefield crossing) shortfalls exposed on warfighting ops - Uncertain and potentially unattractive Phase 4 role</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> + 2 x light bdes + strong armd bde: (prelim assessment) suitable for proposed task + BH resources concentrated in south + Potentially attractive Phase 4 role - Ministerially approved package (3C) unsuitable - More info required on threat and scale of tasks (e.g. Basrah)
Sustain	<p>2 x LofC North long LofC – inefficient Fuel and water distribution If force deploys but does not attack – very difficult (impossible?) to maintain 3A in Theatre and train replacement. Phase 4 location in north retains long LofC</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> + One LofC + Short LofC + If force deploys but does not attack, armoured brigade could be kept in theatre and used for training. A replacement armoured brigade could be generated. 16 AA Bde could recover to UK and re-deploy.
Recover	-- FRC takes (estimated) 3 years to re-establish.	+ Continuation of FRC for future crises possible.

APPENDIX 1 TO
ANNEX B TO D/DOMA/C/7
DATED 7 JAN 03

IMPACT OF LAND OPTIONS 3B AND 3B/3D

ISSUE

1. Update on the various impacts to Op FRESCO and the Arms Plot / Operational Commitments Plot (AP/OCP) of land packages 3B and 3B/3D.

REQUIREMENTS AND PENALTIES

2. Option 3B. The deployment of Package 3B could be done with minimum replacement of units on Op FRESCO. Furthermore, the deployment of a force largely constructed around an FRC High Readiness Brigade will result in minimum impact to the AP/OCP. However, the extension of Op FRESCO may result in some disruption to the AP/OCP. The worst case impacts for Option 3B are shown below, although experience shows that many of them will be reduced by HQ LAND by the imaginative use of resources, and all will be prevented if Op FRESCO ceases by early Feb 03.

Ser	Option	FRESCO Requirement	Impact (over time)
1	3B	Option 3B ORBAT is largely ringfenced, and therefore there will be minimal requirement for FRESCO replacement. Likely requirement to replace 1 x mech bn (42 GG crews).	<p>Mar 03. 1 x bn may be extended in Bosnia until cessation of Op FRESCO.</p> <p>Apr 03. If FRESCO continues, 5 way AP may be disrupted, including extension of 1 x Resident Bn in NI.</p> <p>Apr 03. 2 way AP will be delayed - may subsequently result in 1 x bn being extended on NIBAT 1 (from Sep 03).</p> <p>May 03. 1 x bn may be extended on NIBAT 3 until cessation of Op FRESCO.</p> <p>May 03. 4 way AP due to take place. Rattle accommodation required to prevent penalty to BOWMAN fielding, delay in closure of EBRINGTON Bks, and postponement of withdrawal of 5th Resident Bn from NI.</p>

3. Option 3B/3D. The requirement to replace 16 AA Bde units on Op FRESCO will cause additional impact to the AP/OCP. However, the cessation of Op FRESCO, and imaginative use of resources, could considerably reduce the worst case impacts shown below:

Ser	Option	FRESCO Requirement	Impact (over time)
1	3B/3D	The following units would need to be released from Op FRESCO: 1 PARA,	<p>Mar 03. 1 x bn may be extended in Bosnia until cessation of Op FRESCO.</p> <p>Apr 03. 5 way AP may be disrupted, including extension of 1 x</p>

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	<p>3 PARA, 1 R IRISH, 7 RHA, D Sqn HCR, elms of 2 RGJ, 1 x Mech Bn, and elms of 21 AD Bty.</p> <p>HQ LAND currently anticipate that a total of 262 GG Crews (1,572 individuals) will require replacement. 224 will be found by the Army, from 1 and 3 Div elements previously ringfenced. Of these 190 crews require training. 38 crews assumed to be found by the RAF.</p>	<p>Resident Bn in NI.</p> <p>Apr 03. 2 way AP will be delayed - may subsequently result in 1 x bn being extended on NIBAT 1 (from Sep 03).</p> <p>May 03. 1 x bn may be extended on NIBAT 3 until cessation of Op FRESCO.</p> <p>May 03. 4 way AP due to take place. Rattle accommodation required to prevent penalty to BOWMAN fielding, delay in closure of EBRINGTON Bks, and postponement of withdrawal of 5th Resident Bn from NI.</p> <p>Jun 03. RA sub-unit for OP TOSCA may have to come at minor impact to 1 Mech Bde Trg Year.</p> <p>Jun/Jul 03. Rft Bn for NI Marching season may have to come from 1 Mech Bde, at impact to their Trg Year.</p> <p>Sep 03. 1 x FR Sqn may be extended in Bosnia.</p> <p>Over Time. 1 R IRISH Gurkha Reinforcement Company (GRC) due to stand down in Jan 03. Any deployment of the GRC with 1 R IRISH will subsequently impact on 2 RGR manning.</p>
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