

D/CGS/51/9/4

20 May 03

CDS/PSO

Copy to:

MA1/DCDS(C)

**ACGS' TRIP TO IRAQ (17-21 MAY 03) – INITIAL FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION**

**SUMMARY**

1. Short notice trip with remit for SofS and CDS to scope the potential for UK role in improving proposed Security Sector Reform (SSR) package. Series of talks conducted with key personalities in theatre (including Sawers, Slocombe, Bremer, Comd US V Corps and Chief Constable Hampshire) together with 2 visits to HQ 1(UK) Armd Div. All agreed that Baghdad is the Coalition's Centre of Gravity and that restoring a sense of law and order quickly is the highest priority. Not improving the current fragile situation quickly seriously threatens success to date. ORHA beginning to look more competent under Bremer's leadership, but reliance on contractors makes short term solutions impossible. **Key in short and long term is making 7000 identified Baghdad police officers effective. Potential role for 16 Air Asslt Bde in kick-starting process through provision of much required leadership and on the job training, assisted by RMP, US MP and, if possible, UK MDP and Civpol (PSNI ideal). Would allow immediate joint military/police patrols throughout the city as well as serving as a confidence building example to US military, to short and long term advantage. Buys time needed by ORHA to produce longer term solution and covers period of 1 (UIS) AD's relief of tired 3(US) ID. Confident that, barring a major deterioration in situation affecting all aspects of Coalition activity, 16 Air Asslt Bde will be able to depart for UK within 2 months having created a functioning police force working to US MP direction. In process, will have brought much needed stability to streets of Baghdad. Other recommendations on less urgent UK contribution to SSR to follow. Note all in Iraq agree with above although clear this is scoping work only at this stage and no commitments given.**

**RECOMMENDATION**

2. That, having examined the full implications of doing so, 16 Air Asslt Bde (-) is deployed at best speed to Baghdad to create the nucleus of an effective police force.

**BACKGROUND**

3. Current plans for the re-establishment of the New Iraqi Army (NIA) envisage the creation of 3 sectors (North, Centre and South). Each sector will consist of one division recruited regionally but dispersed across the Army to ensure ethnic diversity. Initial operating

CONFIDENTIAL - UK EYES ONLY  
**DECLASSIFIED**

capability will be 3 light motorised infantry battalions to be established by 1 Aug 03, equipped and trained to conduct convoy drills and static check point duties. Training to meet this requirement is planned to be largely contractorised with Slocombe returning to the US shortly to finalise details. All officers above the rank of Lieutenant Colonel will be dismissed and there will be no pension/redundancy scheme. Under current plans, Slocombe will have a 3 Star US deputy, with two 2 Star officers leading the MOD construction and the Coalition Military Advisory Training Team (CMATT – confirmed as US officer). Possible slots for UK include MOD 2 Star (military or civil servant), 1 Star COS to Slocombe and 1 Star deputy commander CMATT. Other key areas are IO, media, civilian police, legal. Plans still fluid and subject to 3 Jun 03 conference in Washington.

4. Emerging plans for policing Baghdad are to restore the original nine police precincts with their own corresponding infrastructure and personnel. In time, this will also involve re-establishing the Police Training Academy in Baghdad. Despite US occupation of the city for the last 4 weeks, the law and order situation is fragile. The indigenous police service has not returned to work in any coherent manner. 3 ID are clearly tired and wrongly configured to conduct joint military/police patrolling. Moreover, federal regulations specifically prohibit the US military from training foreign police forces.

5. Bremer and Slocombe now recognise that SSR is broader than merely rebuilding the Iraqi Army. Slocombe has been given police and likely to get judicial process, prisons etc too. But the immediate requirement is clearly to restore law and order in Baghdad. Two key areas have been identified for the UK to make a contribution. First, and supported strongly by Bremer, Slocombe, Sawyer, and US and UK military, is the rapid deployment of 16 Air Asslt Bde (-) to create the nucleus of an effective police force in Baghdad. It should achieve this through galvanising and taking control of ORHA's creation of a functioning police force and effective guard service. Second, and in the longer term, to place UK personnel in key appointments within the organisations responsible for delivering SSR.

6. The first area allows the UK to provide the energy and leadership required to bump-start the restoration of law and order in Baghdad. It buys vital time for ORHA to establish the long term contractor based central police academy. It also gives the UK a high profile role in the city without the committal of further troops to the operation. Closure, at latest by early August, has been accepted by ORHA and the US military. A more detailed breakdown of the tasks is at Annex A but, vitally, it gets UK troops onto Baghdad's streets, conducting joint military/police patrols within a security framework provided by the US.

7. Further advice will be given on return on the medium and longer term aspects of SSR. Slocombe's proposed conference in Washington on 3 Jun 03 is likely to be key. As well as attempting to bottom-out funding issues, it will address organisational issues and identify contributor nations.

ACGS

CONFIDENTIAL - UK EYES ONLY  
**DECLASSIFIED**

CONFIDENTIAL - EYES ONLY  
**DECLASSIFIED**

**ANNEX A TO**  
**D/CGS/51/9/4**  
**DATED 20 MAY 03**

## **A POSSIBLE CONOPS**

### **MISSION**

1. To create the nucleus of an effective police force in Baghdad in order to restore a sense of law and order in the city as soon as possible.

### **EXECUTION**

2. **Intent.** 16 Air Asslt Bde (-) is to deploy at best speed to Baghdad on light scales to galvanise and take effective control of ORHA's creation of a functioning police force and guard service in Baghdad. In the process, through the need to conduct joint police/military patrols throughout the city, they are to demonstrate to the wider coalition the benefits of the UK's approach to PSO and allow Baghdad's people and the world to see a rapid improvement in this key area. The operation is to stun ORHA, the coalition and Iraqi population with its speed and efficiency thus maximising UK influence. The morale effect is key. ORHA is to be invigorated by UK playing a vital and very high profile role in resolving its most pressing problem. Media/IO is very important.

### **CONOPS**

3. 16 Air Asslt Bde deploys at best speed to Baghdad for a close ended operation that sees its return to UK at about the 6 month point (early Aug). The brigade superimposes itself across the existing five US brigade sectors that currently encompass the 9 Iraqi police districts. UK units and sub-units are co-located with US sector HQs as appropriate. Working under command 3ID but in close cooperation with ORHA's police adviser and Iraqi police officials, 16 Air Asslt Bde establishes a police screening, recruiting and training capability. Sub-units train the police in the stations from which they operate; 16 Air Asslt Bde C2 providing the focus, order, sense of purpose and leadership currently lacking.
4. Existing US efforts by 18 MP Bde to conduct joint patrol activity are maintained, encourage and closely coordinated within the overall programme. As part of the process and as soon as Comd 16 Air Asslt Bde is ready, 16 Air Asslt Bde led joint police/military foot and mobile patrols are conducted throughout Baghdad working with the framework security provided by US forces. A US LO team would join each team.
5. Specialist police advice to the training would be provided by US military police and RMP deployed with 16 Air Asslt Bde and UK civil police deployed from UK as a matter of the highest priority. The operation buys time for ORHA to develop a long term strategy for the police including the Police Training Academy. Detailed CONOPS to be developed by Comd 16 Air Asslt Bde.

A-1

CONFIDENTIAL - EYES ONLY  
**DECLASSIFIED**

SPECIFIED TASKS<sup>1</sup>

6. a. Establish course for police leaders (7-14 days).
- b. Establish basic policing course (7-14 days including practical exercise patrolling the streets).
- c. Establish security guard course (2 days).

MAIN EFFORT

7. To establish the police selection and training capability, switching to the conduct of joint patrols at the earliest opportunity.

COORD INSTRS

8. a. Deployment of PSNI: CC/PM/HS-MOD.
- b. Recce and liaison parties to Baghdad: ASP.
- c. Establish 16 Air Asslt Bde locations in line with 3ID laydown.
- d. Re-establish Baghdad Police precincts: ORHA/18 MP Bde.
- e. Identify training audience: 18 MP Bde.
- f. Identify interpreters: ORHA.
- g. Payment of police officers: ORHA/18 MP Bde.
- h. Provision of police equipment (vehs, comms, uniforms): ORHA/18 MP Bde.
- i. Rapid creation of judicial and prison systems: ORHA.
- j. Training objectives to be achieved include the use of force, ROE, arrest procedures, weapon handling, first aid, mobile and static guard duties and UXO.

LOGISITC SUPPORT

9. US have offered to provide all non-specialist life support to 16 Air Asslt Bde (rations, fuel, water etc). Site for BSG element to be confirmed on recce.

C2

10. a. 16 Air Asslt Bde to be TACOM 3ID (to be replaced by 1AD).

---

<sup>1</sup> The length of each course and numbers of students attending are subject to further detailed staffing.

CONFIDENTIAL - EYES ONLY  
**DECLASSIFIED**

- b. DIRLAUTH ORHA and MP Bde.
- c. Individual patrols work to sector (Bde/Bn) Comds.
- d. Close liaison is key. US must own the process.

CONFIDENTIAL - EYES ONLY  
**DECLASSIFIED**