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OFFICIAL COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE AND OVERSEAS POLICY

SUB-COMMITTEE ON IRAQ (DOP(I))

Chaired by the Prime Minister

MEETING to be held the Cabinet Room, No 10  
on Tuesday 20 December 2005 at 1730

AGENDA

Item 1 - Election outcome

Reference:

- Oral presentation from the FCO

Item 2 - US/UK plan to help secure early formation of an inclusive government and early actions for that government

Reference:

- FCO paper on "Iraq: Post-Election: UK Work Plan"

Item 3 - Up-date on security transition planning and the "forward perspective" on security

Reference:

- MOD paper on "Ensuring the Iraqis are Ready for a Handover of Security Responsibility"
- MOD "Up-date on Progress of Iraqiisation"

Item 4 - AOB

Cabinet Office

19 December 2005

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## IRAQ: POST-ELECTION: UK WORK PLAN

### *Attachment – Iraq Political Process Action Grid*

#### UK OBJECTIVES

This note sets out HMG's key Iraq priorities for the next three months. It does not go into detail: detailed joint UK-US planning on help for key Ministries is going forward in Baghdad. Our **immediate objectives post election** are:

- A **short and well-managed interregnum** between Transitional Government and the next Government, leading to;
- **Rapid formation of a competent and representative Government**, legitimate in the eyes of all Iraq's communities, followed by;
- A **limited number of key decisions** (which serve the Iraqi people and partnership between Iraq and the Coalition) taken quickly and visibly, in parallel with;
- **Increasing Sunni Arab political participation** and;
- **Smooth progress in the South-East** towards transition
- Visible **international commitment**, in context of 2006 partnership with Iraq

#### DELIVERY

##### Interregnum

The interregnum between interim and transitional governments was painful and lost the political momentum. This time, we and the US will take a **more hands-on approach**, including Ministerial phone calls and visits (at A), pressure by Khalilzad and Patey and effective use of UK and US media assets focused on:

- **post-election statements by US, UN, UK, EU, Arab League**, with follow-up statements when Council of Representatives (CoR) is convened, on need for quick government formation and on international community's expectations
- **main Iraqi political coalition leaders keeping up momentum** and showing the will to compromise (ie through joint public statements bring together representatives from all Iraqi society)
- **steer from Iraqi Chief Justice on interregnum framework** for ITG

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- elements for **Talabani** to make a statement of principles when he convenes **CoR**
- **CoR Speaker** to make a complementary forward-looking and well-trailed speech on key **CoR** principles of work

## Forming the government

Much of this dynamic will depend on the election results. In support, **we must:**

- **Make clear our interest in having key Ministries occupied by transparent, competent Ministers** not under the sway of militia
- Press the **UIA** to agree their nomination for **Prime Minister** and **nominate responsible candidates to sovereign Ministries**
- Work on **Allawi** and major **Sunni Arab parties** to cooperate on an **agreed and realistic approach** which will give them negotiating clout with Shia and Kurds
- **Keep lines open to al-Sadr**, whose bloc within the **UIA** will be influential
- Keep the **Kurds sensitised to the risks of too close an association with a Shia alliance** antipathetic to their core principles

## Key decisions / statement of principles

The government formation process will squander some momentum. The new government will need to regain it. We will **press for:**

- **Early Cabinet statement setting out comprehensible key principles** of government, committing to deliver for Iraqis on:
  - A **forward perspective on security** (a cue for us to set out our own transition planning);
  - **electricity/services**;
  - **economic growth**, including jobs (but noting need for reforms)
  - **effective centre-region arrangements** (specific example: Kirkuk)
  - **human rights** (including Commission to investigate abuse)
- **Stand-alone security statement** on the conclusions of the Joint Committee for Transferring Security Responsibility to the Iraqis. Ideally (but not essential) this should refer to (a) an amnesty, and; (b) the need to integrate or disband militias

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- **Early decisions on meeting IMF Stand-By Arrangement preconditions**, including on fuel pricing, while communicating implications to the Iraqi people
- **Forming constitutional review committee** (a CoR lead, with government support)
- Early, regular and well-organised **Cabinet meetings**

## Sunni Arab participation

Sunni Arab expectations are high. There is a clear risk the electoral results will disappoint them, they will cry foul, or they will claim early on to be excluded from government/decisions making. So **we need to:**

- Hear out complaints but **hold Sunni Arab parties to engagement** on government formation. Press them to cooperate with each other, including outreach to others
- **Continue our Sunni Arab outreach** efforts, through regional engagement and US/UK Embassies' joint plan. Commit Shia (and Kurds) to join outreach.
- Press the **MNF to afford the Sunni Arab community space**, including working on local cease-fires and avoidance of major offensive operations
- Press for **completion of investigation of Bunker incident** and other facilities, with full public report
- Push for **early US release of 4-6000 detainees**, as trailed by Administration, and release of limited numbers of higher value (to insurgency) detainees on proviso we are sure they do not represent a significant threat
- Press for early **review of de-Ba'athification Commission** (as provided for under Constitution) and continue to stall de-Ba'athification of (successful) electoral candidates
- Press for **rapid formation of constitutional review committee** (see above)

## Smooth progress in MND (SE)

We want to avoid a hiatus in the South-East. At the national level, this will mean:

- insisting on an **early and solid connection between Baghdad and Basra**

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- **Iraqi (and US) buy-in to our PRT model.**

## International Commitment

A permanent government and parliament should herald a visible shift to partnership from the international community. This means:

- a **constructive Arab League Conference**, in Baghdad. Arab states to deliver on Ambassadorial representation in Baghdad
- **UK-US-Italy Trilateral** (26 January); subsequent **Quads** with Japan, Australia
- **Early Donors Conference**, in Iraq. Focus on disbursing Madrid pledges/debt write-off, with particular pressure on Gulf states. Baghdad donor coordination mechanism entrenched
- **International Conference** (in slower time)

Iraq Policy Unit  
FCO  
16 December 2005

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IRAQ POLITICAL PROCESS – UK PLANNING GRID				
DATES	IRAQ	UK	US	REGION/INTERNATIONAL
December				
Early	<b>Govt formation:</b> briefings to would-be PMs ( <b>done</b> )  <b>Sunni Arab outreach:</b> UK-US plan begun; regional outreach begun			
15 DECEMBER ELECTIONS				
15	<b>Interregnum:</b> Statements from US, UN, UK/EU, Arab League Action: Whitehall; Cairo			
16 >>		<b>Interregnum:</b> UK-US media assets produce supporting messages. Action: IPU, FCO		
17 >>	<b>Interregnum:</b> phone calls to Iraqi leaders, by Straw, Reid, Benn, Ann Clwyd MP Action: Whitehall			
17	<b>Interregnum:</b> seek steer from Chief Justice on status of ITGAction: Baghdad			
18	<b>Economy:</b> Fuel Price Rises			

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ANNEX A

DATES	IRAQ	UK	US	REGION/INTERNATIONAL
19 DECEMBER: PARTIAL RESULTS EXPECTED				
20		DOP-I (PM Chair)		
20+	<b>Interregnum:</b> elements of CoR speech laid with Talabani. Action: IPU/Baghdad			
23				<b>International/Economy:</b> IMF Board Meeting, on Iraq
24-27	CHRISTMAS BREAK			
27>>	<b>Interregnum:</b> - ITG takes appropriate decisions in response to IMF meeting (above)  <b>Govt Formation:</b> - Set <b>our bottom lines</b> on key Ministries - Work on <b>UIA</b> (nomination PM / other Ministries) - Press <b>Allawi and Sunni Arab parties</b> to cooperate on agreed approach - Sensitise <b>Kurds</b> to risks of close alliance with UIA - Keep line open to <b>Sadr</b>  <b>Sunni Arabs:</b> - Hold Sunni Parties to engagement - Continue outreach efforts in Iraq (and region) - Work on MNF to afford Sunni community more space - Push for early release of detainees ( <i>slower time</i> ) - Press Shia/Kurds for: de-Ba'athification review; abuse investigations; constitutional review mechanism.			Sunni Arabs: <b>continue regional effort</b>

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DATES	IRAQ	UK	US	REGION/INTERNATIONAL
28 DECEMBER: RESULTS GIVING SEAT ALLOCATIONS EXPECTED				
January				
6 JANUARY: APPEALS PERIOD ENDS AND RESULTS ANNOUNCED				
EARLY JANUARY: ??COUNCIL OF REPRESENTATIVES CONVENES??				
early	BE Baghdad reinforced by London-based officials:		DFID working level meeting with counterparts in US	
early	Interregnum: Statements from US, UN, UK/EU, Arab League on (a) need for rapid formation of government and (b) international community expectations. Action: Whitehall; Cairo			
early	Interregnum: Press CoR Speaker to on key principles speech			
26		International Commitment: UK-US-Italy trilateral (Quads with Japan and Australia in slower time)		
23-27	Foreign Affairs Committee visit to Iraq			
GOVERNMENT FORMS END JANUARY?				



DATES	IRAQ	UK	US	REGION/INTERNATIONAL
February				
Early				Sunni Arabs: regional outreach
Early	US senior level visit tbc			
Early	Visit by Hilary Benn tbc			
Mid	<b>Key Government decisions / statements:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Cabinet statement on security transition conditions</li><li>- Cabinet statement on: electricity/services; economic growth; effective centre/region arrangements</li><li>- Decisions on how to continue to commit to SBA conditions</li><li>- Forming the constitutional review committee (CoR lead; Govt input)</li></ul> <b>MND(SE):</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- early visit by senior Government Minister (eg PM / MoI) to Basra</li><li>- early buy-in (US and Iraqi) to UK PRT model</li></ul>			
March				
Early				Arab League National Dialogue Conference, in Baghdad

April				
May				
EARLY MAY: ??PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS??				
Early	International Commitment: International Donor Conference in Erbil or Turkey			
Late	International Commitment: International Conference (political)			

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## UPDATE ON PROGRESS OF IRAQIISATION

1. The development of the Iraqi Army (IA) remains on track. It is expected to reach its fully funded and trained figure of 130,000 by Dec 2006. The IA already has four brigades and 36 battalions operating in their own areas of responsibility (includes significant parts of the cities of Baghdad and Najaf). By Feb 06, two divisions (of the final target of 10), 16 brigades (of 32) and 64 (of 100) battalions will have assumed responsibility for security in areas of Iraq.
2. The most recent assessments of the effectiveness of the IA indicate that its major shortcomings including the inability to provide independent logistic support and the lack of junior officers.
3. The IA has performed well on recent operations in the upper Euphrates river valley. This operational exposure has shown that their fighting spirit and morale is high, and their ability to endure adversity when exposed to battle is robust.
4. The Iraqi police are making an increasing significant contribution, but still lag behind the IA. Currently 112,000 of the projected strength of 194,500 are fully trained and equipped. There are plans to accelerate the development of police capacity during 2006. Key shortcomings in the police that need to be addressed by the new government are the malign influence of the militias, the need to remove the incompetent the establishment of strong national control.
5. The common weakness in both IMOD and IMOI forces is the ineffective higher level command and control. This will become severely tested as the process of transition starts to shift the responsibility for security control to the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) during 2006. Nevertheless, the planning and execution of the security operations for the referendum and elections have been successfully led by the Iraqi Security Ministries.
6. Equipment shortfalls centre particularly on weapons and vehicles for the police. The UK has little influence over the focus and delivery of the US-funded requirement plan, but we continue to provide equipment and infrastructure to the ISF in MND(SE) under Op OSIRIS; so far, over £40.5M has been committed. Further funding requests will be made (£30M) for additional equipment for the ISF if they are to assume responsibility for security in MND(SE) next year. This paper is not seeking approval of this amount.
7. The Department for Border Enforcement (DBE) numbers 17,5000; it is estimated that it will reach full strength (28,000) by May 2006. The DBE priority work remains conducting operations on the Jordanian and Syrian borders with coalition support. In MND(SE) the last of 61 forts covering 1700km of border was opened on 10 Dec 05. Logistic support is frail.
8. The Iraqi Navy has been one of the success stories but it is now being undermined by the failure of IMOD to provide a suitable acquisition programme. The Iraqi Navy and Iraqi marines' personnel have been performing oil platform protection duties in the northern Gulf since August with coalition support. The number and the quality of the patrol boats remains the main challenge to the Iraqi Navy. A minimal investment now by Uk could avoid the UK Navy being fixed in the northern Gulf later.

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## ENSURING THE IRAQIS ARE READY FOR A HANDOVER OF SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY

At first glance the elections appear a success and are an answer to the sceptics and pessimists. The interval between close of polls and inauguration of the new Government allows us to formulate practical political and security plans to help shape/support/influence the priorities of the new Government, especially those directed toward the conditions for a successful handover.

**Issue:** Planning for regional and national transfer of security responsibility. Security forces are broadly on track but two significant challenges remain:

- The role of the Iraqi Government in defining the handover plan.
- The capacity of Government and the Ministries to direct and sustain the civil and military security forces. Alongside this goes the risk of increasing sectarianism and Militia infiltration.

**Is the Coalition doing enough? What more can UK do?**

### Understanding the Problems

**Political:** The Iraqi Government will wish to appear strong in the early stages of a new Government and the obvious area is in defining the 'end of the occupation'. This is not necessarily bad and with reasonable choreography it could launch the 'future perspective' on security.<sup>1</sup>

Assessments against the Conditions for Transfer of Security Responsibility will need to allow for political decisions that have an element of risk and are measured against Iraqi not western standards.

Any UK ideas for planning the handover will need to be consistent with the new Campaign Plan and mesh with US intentions.

**Ministries:** There are elements of the physical make-up of the security forces that need addressing before the Iraqis can operate independently. Most significant and most pressing is the capacity of the security ministries where there are two distinct problem areas: the **output** of the Ministries; and the proper Government **control** of the ministries<sup>2</sup>. One without the other simply doesn't cut the mustard and at the moment the first is poor<sup>3</sup> and almost totally undermined by the latter.

The huge Coalition effort thus far has focussed more resources on the nuts and bolts of 'recruit, train and equip' the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). We have got what we have resourced:

- Development of the Army, up to Divisional level, that is on or ahead of track;
- Development of the police, up to Chief of Police level, which is behind the curve. Now, with the exception of weeding out the ghost police and reducing the influence of the militias there is a plan which should deliver significant progress by the end of 2006;

<sup>1</sup> See FCO paper on The First 100 Days, December 2006

<sup>2</sup> Government/PM control of the Ministers/Ministry as well as control by the Ministries of force elements.

<sup>3</sup> See MNSTC-I and RAND reporting for details of capacity shortfalls.

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- ISF effectiveness is improving at the unit level. Training completions running at 5000 per month. See ANNEX A for highlights of the development of ISF

## What is missing:

- The MOI is not yet able to deliver effective command functions at the national level with control of the Chiefs of Police being a major issue;
- Control of and administering MOI payroll remains a significant issue that could see a gradual collapse of control towards the regions from the centre.
- MOD has better Command and Control but lacks key enablers in mobility and support.
- Both Ministries lack the capability or systems to adequately address higher level planning and problem solving.
- Expiry of CPA orders will leave the Ministries without an adequate legislative framework.
- Inadequate Iraqi resources (the budget allocation for 2006, while significantly increased over the 2005 budget, is too small as the US funding reduces.)
- At regional level, there are enough good leaders (Chief of Police and Divisional Commander level) but criminal and sectarian officers need dismissing.

Assisting the security ministries to become efficient and resourced to the point of self reliance is essential. The measurements we adopt should be an Iraqi and not a western standard. **But that does not address the issues of control and misuse.**

- At the national HQ and Ministry level, there are some good people but they are marginalised by quixotic ministers and partisan personal advisors that usurp the executive functions.
- Successive Iraqi governments have ducked the need to make public statements on security and, latterly on the way forward on transition. With transition in the South now imminent the need for a public handling plan is now pressing.
- Building the Civil Service is a long term aim but there are a number of smaller steps such as new Iraqi Government backing for the existing code of conduct.

## Addressing the Problems

An approach that tackles both output and control with increased resource is the only one that can deliver significant progress on self-reliance in the sort of timeframe we anticipate for a handover of security responsibility. The Iraqi part in this process must be as equal partners and greater inclusiveness of the Iraqi position must be a characteristic of a new approach. **UK action in first 100 days is essential.**

## Outputs

Developing and supporting the MOI and MOD ministries is now the responsibility of Multi National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) They are developing a 100 day plan that has thrown up a huge Coalition challenge for resourcing – MOI advisers up from 76 to 113; MOD advisers up from 45 (JHQ and MOD) to 103. It is envisaged that military, civilian and contractors will be used to fill civilian slots.<sup>4</sup> Less clear is how they will act - adviser/mentor or 'doer'.

<sup>4</sup> State Dept are anticipating difficulty resourcing the PRTs without this on top. So this may be aspirational.

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Recommendation 1: UK should conduct a review by the end of January recommending reallocation of existing positions<sup>5</sup>. Plus consideration of an increase in the number of UK security sector advisers (to include some 'doers' in IMOD) by April 06<sup>6</sup>. This would need to be done through reprioritisation;

Recommendation 2: In the Short Term develop a significant surge capacity of additional Baghdad based personnel by October 2006 for a 4-6 month one-off Ministry 'handover deployment'.<sup>7</sup> Other coalition partners may be persuaded of a *quid pro quo* for boots on the ground.

Recommendation 3: A new US/UK Compact<sup>8</sup> with the new Iraqi Government should include an Iraqi announcement of their wanting significant progress on handing over security responsibility by the end of 2006. Key parts of that compact would be to agree key interim capacity targets in the security ministries so that the Iraqi practitioners know what they need to do and an agreed partnership approach (piloted in MOI).

## Control Mechanisms

It is unlikely that MOI and MOD Ministers will be secular, moderate, experienced and strong or any combination of these. So we must look at alternative ways to constrain the excesses.

Recommendation 4: Immediate. The US/UK should seek a decree by the new Prime Minister in advance of appointments that sets out the role and responsibility of the Ministers. This would help persuade individuals that they are not untouchable and do not have unfettered power (including in wholesale personnel replacement). This might also codify procedures and processes.

Recommendation 5: Short Term (2006) UK/US should look to persuade the Iraqi Government to strengthen the Ministerial Committee for National Security (MCNS). These are structures that we can build on to widen the remit beyond emergency operations to cover such things as recruitment policy and vetting policy (including the re-introduction of a National vetting Agency).

Recommendation 6: Medium term (assuming 4 year Government term) The introduction of suitable legislation to create a framework where a broader section of Government/ National Congress is able to help drive a moderate course. A combination of select committees and strengthening a Congressional inspectorate are the most likely contenders for oversight bodies.

There are a number of other elements that could have a significant impact on the process and timing of handover including the capacity building in the PM's Office (building on the good work done by Embassy/DFID), and addressing the problems of high level capacity in Defence including the need for a Deputy Defence Minister to take on recruiting, vetting and longer term training establishments.

Our level of influence with the US in Iraq remains high as a result of our in-country expertise. We will need to capitalise on that if we are to promote our political and security ideas for MND(SE) and the Ministries above those of Washington.

<sup>5</sup> We currently have 8 military and 9 civilian security ministry adviser posts.

<sup>6</sup> MOI elements to be linked to Sir Ronnie Flanagan's reports

<sup>7</sup> Personnel from all Departments, military and civilian. Up to 50 Coalition resourced posts. To be viewed against potential announcements on a significant reduction in troop numbers. If large numbers of UK resource is required then full consideration of cost implications will be needed before commitment. MOI needs high quality civilian advisers where the MOD could absorb more 'doers'.

<sup>8</sup> Existing compacts not well observed.