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eGram



3797/05

<b>Classification</b>	RESTRICTED	<b>Caveat</b>
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<b>Action Immediate</b>	eP FCO	
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<b>Info Immediate</b>	eP BAGHDAD;eOGD OFFICE;eOGD	;eOGD DFID;eOGD CABINET
<b>Info Routine</b>		
<b>FCO Distribution</b>	eD IRAQ DIRECTORATE	
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<b>Military Action Imm</b>		
<b>Military Action Rtn</b>		
<b>Military Info Imm</b>	MODUK; SIC I9E	
<b>Military Info Rtn</b>		
<b>Subject</b>	IRAQ: SSR: POLICE IN THE SOUTH	
<b>Summary</b>	Agreement on the way forward. Increased tempo. Focus on Maysan and Muthanna. Sensible division of responsibilities.	

Summary

1. Agreement on the way forward. Increased tempo. Focus on Maysan and Muthanna. Sensible division of responsibilities.

Detail

2. GOC Riley, Senior Police Adviser (SPA) and I met on 2 May to discuss the programme of training and assistance to the Iraqi Police Service (IPS). It was agreed that our common objective was to improve the capabilities of the IPS within the context of our overall programme of SSR. Riley said that SSR was now the main focus of the UK military's efforts in MND(SE); the Iraqi Army programme was proceeding well; the priority over the coming months was to devote more attention to the IPS and increase the tempo of the programme. This would be necessary if we were to achieve the target dates for handing over responsibility for security to the ISF; for Maysan and Muthanna the aim was to do this by October.

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3. We agreed. The 12 month Police Plan, which had been drafted by the SPA and his team in consultation with the Provost Marshall and MND(SE)'s SSR team, took full account of the time lines, and in particular of the need to move quickly ahead in Maysan (Muthanna was less of a problem). Resources would be appropriately allocated. Riley said that the military could and should do more to help, and that military resources would not be a problem. We welcomed this. Smith said that the Plan envisaged giving the lead to the military in those areas where they could make the most impact: recruitment, basic training, logistics, weapons handling, management, leadership, discipline, finance and budgeting and organisational structure. CivPol would focus more on specialist police training e.g. forensics, intelligence, investigations, TSU, and criminal justice. The Plan set it all out in detail; the practicalities of the tasking would be finalised by the end of the month, but the new phase of implementation was already effectively under way.
4. Riley confirmed that military support would be available for 2-3 months after the decision had been taken to begin draw down of UK forces in Maysan and Muthanna - it would take at least that time to complete the process of dismantling the UK presence. Smith said this was good news: it would be most helpful to rely on continued and substantial UK military input to the programme in those provinces at least until the end of the year.

**Comment**

5. Useful discussion, which established the common principles and set out in general terms the division of responsibilities between the Military and CivPol. The way is now clear for a more intensive joint effort over the coming months, with more effective use of MND(SE) resources.

**Sign Off**

Innes

**Contact Name**

Stuart Innes

**Contact Telno.**

**Attachments**



Original eGram

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