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To: MADRX - eTelegrams
From: COMCEN Gateway 1a
Subject: 1:00:UNCL:IRAQ: TABLING OF US/UK/SPANISH DRAFT
RESOLUTION: UK:NYMIS/FCOLN 303;Id=0355967
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OO HELSI HOSEE ISLAM LISBO MADRI NEDEL OTTAW PARIS ROMEE SANAA
OO STOCK VIDEL VIENN VIMIS WASHI
FM NYMIS TO FCOLN
250346Z FEB
GRS 1463

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FM UKMIS NEW YORK
TO DESKBY 250830Z FCO
TELNO 303

OF 250346Z FEBRUARY 03

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MY 2 IPTS

SUBJECT: IRAQ: TABLING OF US/UK/SPANISH DRAFT RESOLUTION: UK
STATEMENT

Following is my statement introducing the US/UK/Spanish draft
resolution on Iraq:

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- I should like to explain carefully to Council colleagues why
this text is being tabled at this time and in this form, and what
action we are then proposing.

- The Co-Sponsors are convinced that Iraq is not achieving, nor
intending to achieve, the objective of SCR 1441. 1441 set out that
objective in strict and compelling terms: (OP2) "bringing to full
and verified completion the disarmament process established by SCR
687". 1441 attracted world attention not just because of its
subject matter and the process which led to its adoption, but
because its unanimous message represented a powerful signal that
the UN was in control. The Security Council was challenged by the
US President to raise its game on its most difficult agenda item;
and, by adopting 1441, it did so. The Resolution set out the most
stringent terms ever decided upon by the United Nations for the
process of disarmament. But there was also an olive branch in
1441. Iraq was given every incentive to repair its documented
non-compliance.

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- Today, 15 weeks on from 1441, we are no further advanced towards that objective of complete disarmament. Indeed, nor is Iraq taking adequate steps to correct its wider breaches of 687, including its continued support for terrorism. The terms of Resolution 1441 are not being respected, and in parts of the current debate not even being remembered.

- 1441 deplored Iraq's past behaviour. What we all asked of Iraq was, first, a marked change from its denial and deception of 1991 to 2002, which had already placed it in material breach of relevant resolutions; and second, full compliance with and cooperation with the implementation of 1441. In other words, a decision by Iraq, visibly and unmistakably, to divest itself of Weapons of Mass Destruction immediately, unconditionally and actively. That means bringing proscribed materials or programmes to the notice of inspectors and providing a full and credible account of Iraq's WMD activity backed up by documentary evidence and testimony from personnel.

- What 1441 was not was the establishment of a detective or a containment exercise. Again, the objective was to bring disarmament to "completion". UN Inspectors in the field of WMD are instruments for the effective delivery and verification of that complete disarmament. This has been the case since 1991. SCR 687 gave Iraq 15 days to declare the location, amounts and types of proscribed items. Iraq was asked to yield possession of them to UN inspectors for destruction, removal or rendering harmless. This time, 12 years on, there can be no retreat into procrastination or partial results. The final opportunity afforded in SCR 1441 was not for the Council to slide back into process, but for Iraq to recognise a new determination in the Security Council to complete the business in a way which represented a complete change of attitude in Baghdad.

- That has not happened. Let me say why we are convinced that Iraq has decided to remain in defiance of the UN:

- First, look at the immediate run-up to the return of inspectors. In 2002, Iraq began seriously to discuss the issue of inspections only when it realised that we, as the international community, would not give up on complete disarmament. For months, Iraq sought to haggle with the Council, to set preconditions (the "19 questions"), and to negotiate away its non-compliance of the past. Iraq only agreed to inspections four days after President Bush's speech of 12 September in a cynical attempt to scupper any new resolution strengthening them.

- Second, we hoped - certainly the United Kingdom hoped - that the adoption of 1441 would see a change of heart by the Iraqi regime. Iraq's 13 November letter following the adoption of 1441, full of tirades and complaints, and grudgingly accepting that it would "deal with" the resolution, was way short of the wholehearted commitment to voluntary disarmament we had hoped for. Their 23 November letter on how 1441 "contradicts" international law underlined this.

- Then came the responses to the detailed requirements of 1441.

- Iraq has produced a 12,000 page declaration that is indisputably inadequate. Dr Blix called it "rich in volume but poor in new

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information, and practically devoid of new evidence";

- Iraq has done everything possible to prevent unrestricted interviews, without Iraqi minders, eavesdropping, or intimidation of potential interviewees. UNMOVIC has so far been able to conduct only three private interviews - all of which took place with people volunteered by the Iraqis and all of which took place in the immediate run-up to Dr Blix's last visit to Baghdad. Since then nothing;

- Iraq has dragged its feet on as many other elements of procedural co-operation as possible. Instead of serious collaboration with the inspectors, Iraq has tried to make the process into a tightly monitored media circus, with demonstrators ready to harass inspectors if they come too close to hidden material. As Dr Blix told the Council on 27 January, "Demonstrations and outbursts...are unlikely to occur without initiative or encouragement from the authorities. We must ask ourselves what the motives may be for these events";

- Iraq's co-operation on substance has been non-existent. Since inspections resumed UNMOVIC have not been able to close a single outstanding issue. We still do not know what happened to 8,500 litres of anthrax, 2,160 kilograms of bacterial growth media, 360 tonnes of bulk chemical warfare agent, 3,000 tonnes of precursor chemicals, 1.5 tonnes of VX nerve agent, and 6,500 chemical bombs. We have never had satisfactory answers about the entire scope of Iraq's BW programme. And there are now even more unresolved questions: for example, why has Iraq developed a prohibited missile programme and why has it refurbished equipment - rocket casting chambers and chemical processors - destroyed by UNSCOM? Does this show anything other than clear intent to restart prohibited programmes? Instead of providing full documentation, including administrative documents relating to personnel and funding, Iraq has provided no substantive new evidence. It has scattered its documents into private houses and vehicles to hide the scope of its programmes and to provide a basis for extending them when the pressure is off. And it has in public pretended that there are no outstanding issues, even though many of these have been well known for years.

- This continues the 12-year pattern of Iraq seeking to deceive the Council: an all too familiar pattern of Iraq trying to get us to focus on small concessions of process, rather than on the big picture. The cardinal point is that there is no semblance of whole-hearted co-operation; nothing like voluntary and active disarmament; nothing like a regime with nothing to hide; nothing like the South Africa model referred to by Dr Blix.

- The United Kingdom, through tabling this draft in this form, seeks to keep the Council in control of the process and to build renewed Council consensus, as on 8 November, that Iraq has made the wrong choice, the choice not to take, at last, the final opportunity voluntarily to disarm in accordance with UN resolutions. We shall, in detailed discussion, set out further the argument that this choice has been made, that the choice is a defiance of 1441 and that the available remedies are fast disappearing.

- But we are not asking for any instant judgements. This is a

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serious subject, and the stakes are significant. There is time still, under pressure from the Council, for Iraq to make the right choice. We shall not call for a vote on this text until a proper debate has been held, and we are ready for the propositions in the text to be fully examined. It is not our intention that the text should change in any great degree; and that is why we are asking for it to be put into blue now. But we do want further time for full discussion.

- There is still an opportunity to avert conflict. But the Council's judgement that Iraq has made the wrong choice should be clear and consensual. The last chance for peace is that the Council should say this together and formally, confront Baghdad with the stark implications, and trust that, in these final weeks, the response will be the complete disarmament which we demanded - 14 resolutions ago - in SCR 687, on 8 April 1991.

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