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From: acpo.international.affairs@hampshire.pnn.police.uk
Sent: 22 September 2003 18:04
To: @homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk
Cc: @fco.gov.uk; brandd@orha.centcom.mil;
@psni.pnn.police.uk; @homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk;
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Subject: On behalf of Paul Kernaghan QPM

To: Home Office

From: Paul Kernaghan, ACPO International Affairs

Copy: Peter Storr, Home Office
Jim Acton, Home Office
FCO
Anthony McDermott, MDP

Douglas Brand, CPA [Baghdad]
Stephen White, CPA [Basra]

Subject: Iraq - Recent Developments

Firstly, I am delighted that the Home Office have recognised the workload involved in servicing Iraq issues and have freed you up and placed you within Peter Storr's International Directorate. Clear Home Office support and guidance is a key factor in relation to ACPO's decision making and I know you will seek to ensure it is provided.

I now want to address issues raised in recent emails from Stephen White and Douglas Brand. I think I can summarise their emails as saying 'we need people to deliver a professional service in Iraq and are frustrated at what we perceive to be delays in providing personnel'. I can fully appreciate their position and feel it is important to clarify the current position and replace misconceptions with fact and clear policy guidance.

The meeting chaired by Jim Acton on 17/9/03, was clearly aimed at providing support to CPA policing projects as soon as possible. Indeed, officials indicated that there was strong political will to expedite deployments, notwithstanding the recruitment and selection timetable previously devised by the FCO [International Policing Unit].

In the context of the training facility for Basra I was prepared to contemplate a first party of UK civil police officers not requiring firearms training, if they were deployed to and remained in a secure environment. This was an attempt by me to respond to the apparent political imperative. Though I raised the issue as to whether or not the Danish officers would be armed and noted Stephen White's view that a professional threat assessment was required - in line with the practice I previously instituted re Sierra Leone etc.

I would remind all concerned that the policy that all UK civil police personnel deployed to Iraq would be armed was confirmed by me to in an email dated 29/7/03 and indeed was incorporated in to the International Policing Unit recruitment literature associated with the trawl for 'pool' personnel. If the political imperative requires us to deploy personnel without firearms training I would require a clear statement from the Home Office that such a move was seen as desirable.

I remain of the view that we should adhere to our policy of universal PPW carriage, with officers receiving proper pre-deployment training. I have no doubt that the International Policing Unit could expedite selection and training if directed to do so. Equally, firearms training facilities should be made available to support any such directive.

The security situation is such that complexes are subject to attack and we must have thought through the contingency that we will lose civil police officers from hostile acts in Iraq. This is not a reason to decline to deploy more officers, merely a reminder that policies must be consistent and that senior politicians and chief officers are able to justify the support arrangements for any officer killed and/or injured. Iraq is a combat zone and civil police officers from the UK have never before been deployed to an active combat zone.

All bids for UK civil police are processed via the FCO/Home Office/ACPO. there are no outstanding requests with ACPO, nor have any been refused to date.

I am very keen to support DB & SW but the firearms requirement obviously delays the date officers can be deployed

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Turning to DB's specific request re the JCC - if the FCO decide to approach PSNI, I would have thought a deployment within 14 days was viable. MDP officers are a matter for CCMDP. I merely suggested PSNI officers, given their previous operational experience in joint operations rooms and their existing firearms status. I strongly endorse DB's request for a rapid formal response to his request.

DB's report on Iraqi Police Training and Development dated 19/9/03 was extremely useful. The pure training element appears to have been the subject of our discussion on 17/9/03, with everyone seeking to support the concept of a large training facility in Jordan. However, the International Coalition Police Force (ICPF) section was the first mention I have seen of such an entity since early CPA background papers. The TOR re 'executive authority and authorised to be armed' requires clarification, as does the view that the ICPF might provide 'a civil disturbances [public order] or high-risk operations' capability to the IPS. I am clear that the FCO has not sought to identify such a capability and/or personnel domestically. Should the CPA and HMG not seek to decide now what capability is required and what country or countries are best placed to provide it? I do not favour creating such a capability from disparate personnel posted to a new ICPF. To avoid problems later on, this concept requires thought and staff work now.

In essence, the FCO, with the support of allied department and agencies, needs to provide quicker and more authoritative feedback to DB & SW. My idea of a chart produced by the International Policing Unit would be a very basic mechanism to highlight requests and their ongoing status.

I trust this summary of recent developments as known to me will assist all concerned in supporting our colleagues already in theatre.

gards,

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