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To: NYMIX - eTelegrams  
From: COMCEN Gateway 2  
Subject: OUTTELS:DD:CONF:IRAQ: 14 MARCH:NYMIS/FCOLN-15011903  
Sent: 15 March 2003 01:13:41 GMT

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DESKBY FOR RESIDENT CLERK (PLS PASS TO AZORES PARTY AND OTHER  
RELEVANT OFFICIALS)

SUBJECT: IRAQ: 14 MARCH

## SUMMARY

1. Undecided six proposal confirmed dead. I maintain contact with key players during the day, making clear to Annan the leading role he could play, if a conflict scenario emerged, in healing wounds and reinserting the UN into the post-conflict scenario. In addition to other instructions flowing from Azores, grateful if you could consider whether it is worth giving UNMOVIC/IAEA and the UN advance notice of any announcement on next steps to allow early evacuation preparations.

## DETAIL

2. This records developments on Iraq on 14 March following my telno 441.
3. The undecided six (U-6) made no further efforts to reach consensus during the day. Zinser (Mexico) told me late on that he considered the initiative to be dead. It had ground to a halt because the text leaked (the leaked version did not resemble the final draft) and because of Lagos speaking about it too soon (alerting the US who then put on great pressure to kill it). Maquiera (Chile) confirmed to Thomson that the U-6 initiative was dead because of intense US pressure (the pressure on Chile, in particular, had been more, in his view, than that put on them to support the UK/US/Spain resolution in the first place). The Chilean mission were clearly feeling pretty bitter.
4. EU Heads of Mission met to take stock. I said discussions were continuing. I had made clear to both the Africans and the Latin

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Americans that I was ready to talk at any stage. But there remained differences on substance and procedure. Pleuger (Germany) said that both the British and U-6 proposals were dead in the water. I said we would keep going. The Azores Summit represented a final opportunity.

5. Vassilakis (Greece) wondered what the EU could have done to help the Council come together. I said that the EU could still do some useful things. It would be worth Vassilakis asking the Secretary-General what the EU could now do to help mitigate the consequences of a possible conflict on the UN and the international system. This provoked an anguished rambling intervention from Sabliere (France) who said that there were "difficult issues" associated with the relationship between the UN and Iraq in the event of conflict. It would therefore be premature to discuss these issues with the Secretary-General on behalf of the EU. (Comment: I had expected my comment to cause La Sabliere mild difficulty. The scope of his anguish was surprising.)

6. I had a word with Blix late on 14 March to give him an update on (the lack of) Security Council activity during the day. I said that the Azores Summit had, on top of the U-6 failure to produce a result, made people realise that there was little to talk about. We had cancelled a scheduled P5 meeting for that reason. I would try to bring him up to date when I had my post-Azores instructions. Blix was grateful for this. I asked him whether he and El-Baradei were still considering a further visit to Baghdad, which I had heard was a possibility. He said that they had decided there was no good reason to go at this juncture. As for the UNMOVIC work programme, he was now collating comments from the College of Commissioners and hoped to have a version in English to distribute to Council Members on the evening of 17 March. He intended to send a copy to the Iraqis on 16 March, and would insert their response in the Council version if he got one. I took the opportunity to suggest (since I had seen a current draft) that he should make as clear as possible the need for full Iraqi cooperation if work on the key remaining disarmament tasks was to be at all realistic. He said (disingenuously, to judge from the state of the draft) that he had this fully in mind.

7. I later spoke to Annan, and gave him a similar update. He was focused on the Azores meeting and realised why Council activity had faded away. I also thanked him for his public comments on Bush's statement about the road map: he said he warmly appreciated the Prime Minister's role in this. I repeated my earlier message to him that if the conflict scenario materialised, he could play a leading role in healing wounds and reinserting the UN into the post-conflict situation. He said that he continued to give this thought, and would try to head off any unhelpful moves in the General Assembly. I mentioned the EU in this context (and the French PR's disobliging remarks at an EU lunch about the reinsertion of the UN). Annan said that he had spoken with the Greek Presidency about restoring transatlantic diplomacy with much more urgency and effort, to which Papandreou had responded, he thought, quite well.

## COMMENT

8. The fact of the Azores summit, the collapse of the U-6

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compromise under our combined pressure and general exhaustion here in New York have all added up to a less troublesome day than we might have expected.

9. Clearly key decisions on the Resolution will be made at the summit. In addition to any other instructions, grateful if you could consider whether it is worth giving UNMOVIC/IAEA and the UN advance notice of any announcement on next steps so that they can make the earliest possible preparations to evacuate staff from Iraq (your telno 141 expressed concern about the risk of hostage taking).

Desk Officer for Iraq: (+ ) and on  
Firecrest

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