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From: MENAD  
Sent: 09 February 2003 16:29  
To: MENAD - All Staff  
Subject: FW: LEAD: OO FCOLN/ABIDJ 67: IRAQ: "DAY AFTER" QUESTIONS

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Message To: ABIDJ  
MessageFrom: FCOLN

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From: Swift Incoming Telegrams (Machine 1)  
Sent: Sunday, February 09, 2003 4:28:46 PM  
To: MENAD  
Subject: LEAD: OO FCOLN/ABIDJ 67: IRAQ: "DAY AFTER" QUESTIONS  
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SUBJECT: IRAQ: "DAY AFTER" QUESTIONS

Summary

Guidance on our policy on "day after" questions on Iraq. Please do not take the initiative in raising this issue. You may draw defensively on paras 2 to 6 in conversation, but should not hand the text over to your interlocutors. Paras 7 to 14 are strictly for your own background use only

Detail

MAY BE DRAWN ON IN CONVERSATION

2. Our policy objectives have not changed. Our goal is disarmament of Iraq's WMD, not regime change. We continue to believe that war is a last resort and is not inevitable.

3. But since military action cannot be ruled out, it is sensible to plan, on a contingency basis, for what the international community should do in Iraq in the event that Saddam Hussein's regime were removed from power by coalition forces. We are not making public the content of those deliberations.

Iraqi opposition

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4. What is HMG's relationship with the Iraqi opposition?

- UK maintains contacts with a wide range of Iraqi opposition groups and supports their role in mapping out the future of a post-Saddam Iraq.
- We give moral [though not financial] support to the Iraqi opposition.

5. Did you support the recent Opposition conference in the UK?

- A junior FCO official attended the Iraqi Opposition conference in London on 13-17 December last year as an observer. Funding and other arrangements were entirely a matter for the conference organisers, and not for HMG.

6. Does HMG support the work of INDICT (NGO trying to indict Saddam and other senior officials for war crimes)?

- Support INDICT in its aim to bring Saddam Hussein and others senior officials to justice.

## MATERIAL FOR YOUR OWN BACKGROUND ONLY

7. If coalition forces liberate Iraq, they will become the de facto government of the country as soon as Saddam falls. But we have no wish to colonise Iraq. Our aim will be to hand back power, as quickly as possible, to the Iraqis themselves. But before doing so, we want to see Iraq radically reformed for the better - to give up its attachment to WMD, to stop supporting terrorism, no longer to threaten its neighbours, and to have a broad-based, representational, democratically elected government which respects human rights. We recognise that this is setting the bar very high.

8. So we envisage Iraq undergoing a major transformation after Saddam. That transformation should be brought about largely by the Iraqis themselves, with the international community holding the ring and providing support. While these reforms are being introduced, Iraq should be governed by a transitional civilian administration, supported by coalition troops providing security.

9. There are therefore broadly three stages - coalition military rule, leading quickly to a transitional civilian administration overseeing reform, followed by the handover of power to a new Iraqi government. As well as stabilising the country, the coalition will have a particular role in facilitating the delivery of essential supplies, immediate post conflict reconstruction such as restoring utilities and key public buildings.

10. We do not know how long each of these stages will last. We expect coalition military rule to last only as long as it takes for the civilian transitional administration to be established - perhaps weeks, rather than many months. The second stage should be rather longer, as it will take time for the Iraqis to agree on new political structures and for the reforms to be introduced.

11. We shall be encouraging, throughout the first and second stages, the maximum participation of ordinary Iraqis in the administration of Iraq. There will need to be some kind of consultative machinery involving the transitional administration and representative Iraqis. Iraq has a relatively sophisticated public administration and we expect that it will work adequately once the most senior old regime officials have been removed. Iraq should not be like Kosovo where ministries and public services had to be created from scratch.

12. We shall also be careful to ensure that the territorial integrity of Iraq is preserved and that this is seen from the start to be our aim. The Kurds in the north, the Shia in the south (and

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(minorities) will have to fulfil any aspirations for political autonomy within a single, though probably federal Iraq. But the future constitution arrangements of Iraq are essentially matters for the Iraqis to decide.

13. In advance of a chapter VII authorising Security Council Resolution we cannot be sure exactly what role the UN will play. But it is hard to imagine that it will not be at the centre of any transitional administration. Coalition forces in Iraq would probably act in support, but not be answerable to, the civilian transitional administration. How heavy (or light) the UN footprint would be is still a matter for active debate within the US administration as well as between the US and the UK.

14. We are in contact with a number of international players, including in particular the US, about these sensitive matters. We are not making the content of these contingency talks public. Nor should you. If asked specifically about UK involvement in day-after planning, you should confirm yourselves to the positions in paragraphs three and four above.

STRAW

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[MENAD, CHARLES GRAY, ]

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