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**SECRETARY OF STATE'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON, 22-23 JANUARY:
IRAQ** (2003)

Key issues

Context

- During our discussion in New York on Monday, you said we needed a clear day-by-day plan for the next ten days, through to the Bush/Blair Camp David meeting. Have put together some thoughts which focus on this period. But would also like to discuss some longer-term issues.

De-dramatising 27 January

- Continuing need to de-dramatise 27 January progress report, given likelihood that despite inspectors' recent finds (CW warheads, nuclear documents) it will be inconclusive and will not convince others of need for military action.
- Should not allow pointless arguments over SCR 1441 vs 1284 timetables to distract Council from key question, i.e. is Iraq cooperating? Dr Blix has agreed to more frequent (fortnightly) progress reports. No question of "business as usual".

Continue building the case

- Our view: give the inspectors time. Need to continue building the case. Sooner or later Iraqi non-cooperation will become too obvious to deny.
- UK supporting US in urging Blix/ElBaradei to: step up inspections, including full use of powers on interviews; pursue gaps in Iraqi declaration; and accept our expert help. Support principle of out of country interviews: Blix told us he has agreed in principle with Cypriots to use Larnaca. Understand US will offer asylum to any Iraqis interviewed who seek it - and their families?
- Keeping up flow of good, timely intelligence crucial to success. Recent finds have put sceptics on back foot, even while they dispute significance.
- US thinking on "Adlai Stevenson" moment? Timing still post-PM visit? How convincing is the case? How much will be made public? How to answer criticism?
- Likewise any further guidance on Iraq-related contents of State of the Union speech (28 January)?

Second SCR

- In domestic political terms we need this more than ever. If evidence of non-cooperation is clear enough, should be achievable (Kofi Annan: "Security Council must face its responsibilities") or at least any veto will appear unreasonable.

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45

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- Ready to start sharing thoughts. Our initial instinct is to keep it simple: authorise member states to use all necessary means to implement SCR 1441 and other relevant resolutions. But we will need to agree our position on other issues, e.g. Ultimatum? Need for regular reports to the Security Council? Scope for bringing the French in at an early stage? UKMis and USUN should keep in close touch.
- Must also decide how to respond if Saddam suddenly steps up his cooperation with the inspectors (or promises to) at this stage. He will already have had his last chance, but others won't see it that way.

Handling regional/other diplomatic initiatives

- Expect proliferation of initiatives to avoid war (e.g. Prince Saud proposal to get the Arab League to persuade Saddam to step down; Turkey's proposed regional conference). Our view: will consider anything that achieves our objective of Iraqi compliance with SCRs.
- Do you think Arabs can deliver Saddam in exchange for offer of a safe haven? Will he try to set terms (immunity, take others with him etc).

Military Action

- Pentagon and MOD in close touch about operational issues. No wish to second guess them. But there will be aspects we and our officials need to discuss, along with NSC/No.10 contacts. Kosovo showed importance of maximising consensus about objectives of military action, recognising our different positions (US would state regime change; UK would focus on disarmament). Targeting issues, although primarily for the military, raise important political/legal issues. For example, all (including US) attacks from Diego Garcia would need to be cleared with UK. More generally, the nature and scale of the targeting envisaged would need to be carefully explained, to public opinion in our countries and more widely. Need to see military dimension in wider context.

Day after (subject to updating in light of Edward Chaplin's 22 January discussions)

- Need for closer coordination with you on "day after". [Chaplin's talks yesterday have taken this a little further.] Need to focus on a whole range of issues, including security, relief and reconstruction, handling of oil/oilfields and, crucially, political.
- How will Iraq be administered in short and medium term (US military government? UN civil administration)? Decisions on these issues will play into all others. We need to look at this hard, soon and jointly.

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Key documents (attached)

- SCRs 687, 1284 and 1441

US views

- Washington telno 45 - Peter Ricketts 13 January visit to Washington
- Washington telno 58 - US approach on UNMOVIC
- Washington telno 73 - US views

Security Council discussions

- UKMis New York telno 35 - 9 January discussion
- UKMis New York telno 88 - 16 January discussion

Day after

- Annotated agenda/overarching paper and note on interim administrations, produced for Edward Chaplin's 22 January discussions.

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