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24 February 2003

Ambassador George Ward
ORHA

Dear George,

At the Rock Drill on Saturday, General Jay Garner invited me to send him, via you, our idea of the sort of civil transitional administration that might get UN Security Council authorisation without crossing your red lines.

I attach an outline. May I draw your attention to the following aspects:

- The head of the civil administration, or High Representative, is a politically neutral figure (ie not a national of one of the military coalition countries), with a track record of administrative achievement. We would only agree to the authorising resolution in the Security Council if the individual was someone who enjoyed our confidence.
- The High Representative is responsible for pulling together a team of individuals to run the civil administration of Iraq. He would be encouraged to make maximum practicable use of Iraqis, both from the diaspora and from within Iraq.
- US-led coalition forces providing the secure environment are not subordinated to the civil administration but report to CENTCOM.
- The UN are only involved where they have relevant expertise. They are not running Iraq.
- The World Bank, in collaboration with the IMF, would have the lead in taking forward economic reconstruction.
- Initially the OFF mechanisms, suitably modified, would continue to apply. But at some stage we would need to move Iraq off this dependency without losing the protection for oil revenues from third party claims that the OFF arrangements provide. This is complicated and would have to be considered alongside new arrangements for handling Iraq's debt and existing compensation payment mechanisms.
- The baton for overseeing the political process in Iraq would pass from Zai Khalilzad to a representative of the UN Secretary-General. But the US influence on the process, though more in the background than formerly, would undoubtedly remain strong.

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- Overall, the aim would be to build on the achievements of the US-led interim administration, under General Garner's leadership, which would precede the establishment of these arrangements.

Whether something this UN-lite would win the UN Security Council's approval will of course depend, amongst other things, on the political circumstances prevailing. We would have to make that call at the time. If there is a second resolution authorising military action, it should be easier to get a third UN-lite resolution for Phase IV. To save costs, we would hope to finance the UN role in these arrangements through assessed contributions.

If it would be helpful, I and/or my colleagues would be very happy to come to Washington to go through these ideas with you and General Garner in more detail.

Yours sincerely,

Dominick

Dominick Chilcott
Iraq Planning Unit

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