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UK CIVPOL MISSION – IRAQ

CHIEF POLICE ADVISOR

STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT

August 2006

‘The window of opportunity’

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INTRODUCTION

'Warts and All'

This strategic assessment provides:-

- A 'warts and all' view of the current state of the IPS in Basrah. It is intended for an FCO London audience, subject to amendments and additional comments by the Consul General - Iraq.
- A direction for the UKCIVPOL mission in Iraq – sighting the FCO on potential requirements for the future.
- Detailed information relating to the future of UKCIVPOL discrete work areas. (At annex 'A').

This assessment recognises the crucial interplay between people, states and fear and that, after water and shelter – security is the next important human need.

I have relied upon 22 years of policing experience to inform this assessment – coupled with evidenced reports and other material.

It is a blend of pragmatic factual reporting and a certain amount of 'best guessing'.

The assessment is Basrah centric and recognises the primary UK effort there.

There are no recommendations – merely *examples (in italics)* and **points to note (in bold)**

Dick Barton

Assistant Chief Constable

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OVERVIEW:-

'The Runaway Train'

We have trained and trained the lower echelons of the IPS and have equipped them to a reasonable standard – but that does not create a police service. It's not like training and equipping an army Battalion or staffing an office function, the complexities of policing are wide and variable.

If you created a police service from scratch in the UK – I'd estimate you'd need at least 3 years to bring them to anything like full operating capability.

In Iraq, there are pockets of good practice (the performance of the Tactical Support Unit for instance) and some examples of individual high performance.

But.....

- *There is a high level of 'corruption'. (This isn't 'hand in the till' activity, the Serious Crimes Unit is synonymous with killings, torture and abuse.)*
- *There is a woeful lack of command and control skills by senior Iraqi Police Officers. They have no concept of 'grip' or strategic influence at major incidents.*
- *There is little public confidence in the IPS as an entity – evidenced by the slow uptake of the Basra 'TIPS' confidential line, which regrettably showed IPS officers answering the phone on the advertising posters.*

'Good Enough'

The Secretary of State – Des Browne, commented that 'we should not let the best be the enemy of the good' and he is right. We must recognise that we should train to a standard of 'good enough'.

The mere presence of contractors (such as Armorgroup) in the training process can militate against the 'good enough' concept. In their desire to provide a high quality service and feeling free of the constraints of mainstream policing, there is a tendency to want to build the perfect policing model. Known as mission creep, it's could be aptly described as 'building castles in the sand'. (Our mission has 3 strict priorities to control this).

The Coalition has all too often provided the wrong type of training and equipment.

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Training should have been focussed 'top down' (the leaders/commanders) rather than 'bottom up' (the numbers game – IPS trained at basic level).

Equipment has been issued to achieve 'targets' and we've supplied technological solutions way above the local need – smartboards and complex computer systems which get stolen (by the police) or can't be used due to lack of power. What they need (and like) is desks, pens, ledgers and stationery.

Amongst all this – there are brave and honest Iraqi officers who try to do the right thing – we can only imagine how hard that must be for them.

The UK CIVPOL Mission has three key priorities:-

- 'Rule of Law'
- Anti-corruption
- Provincial Iraqi Control

RULE OF THE LAW – The Justice Circle

The Cree Native American Indian view of justice is that justice is not complete until the full circle is joined. Crucial links between the Iraqi police, prisons and the judiciary are no more than fledgling concepts – there is no justice circle.

An example: The police station in the International Zone in Baghdad has 30 unconvicted prisoners living in one cell. Some of them have been there for 2 years. This is supposedly a 'model' police station within coalition control – so what of the others?

On a positive note: EUJUSTLEX has invested in murder investigation courses (joint judges/police training) and the Baghdad forensic academy is to be opened in October 2006.

I believe our Justice Advisory Team in Basrah has the odds stacked against them – too few judges – all of whom are liable to intimidation – no existing Central Criminal Court, unclear and fragile funding streams, all this conspires to make their job almost impossible.

We are soon to lose a valuable asset from the country – Judge Howard Morrison QC. The mentor judge on the Saddam Hussein trial, he returns to UK shortly. It is exactly this kind of heavyweight expertise that is needed to drive change through.

Lets be prepared to make the financial investment required for this type of individual.

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A six month prognosis on Rule of Law ?

Little or no change unless we get a heavyweight lead and investment. This is vital long term work.

What can we realistically achieve in 12 months? We'll leave in place a fledgling rule of law structure with Iraqi judges leading change.

So, the Rule of Law circle is broken – what of corruption in the Police?

CORRUPTION

'Hobson's Choice'

Let's face it – this is the big one. As an anti-corruption investigator I see the concept of 'good enough' as important here. The laudable zero tolerance approach just won't work. Iraqi policing sits against a backdrop of historic tribal loyalties – political division, family ties and intimidation – creating an environment which breeds 'corruption'. (Think freemasons, backhanders and promotion chances and you can see a western context).

The path to corruption is all about choices, so imagine this - don't investigate a crime - or get tortured and shot. Hobson's choice.

We need to be realistic about the level of influence we can have on this culturally embedded concept. UK CIVPOL have been central in setting up and running the new Basrah Internal Affairs Division – clean 'untouchables' who will mainly target bad cops and the 'death squads'. This is key activity of course, but it's not a 'silver bullet'. It won't remove the deeply rooted corruption acceptance level. (Note that corruption acceptance levels vary, even across Europe).

The Ministry of Interior need to be strong in their decision making – sacking bent or inefficient cops and promoting the good ones.

'You are not in Kansas anymore' :-

In a recent 'purge' of MOI employees (including IPS) there were 86 convicted murderers, 345 with bribery convictions, rapists, kidnappers and even two IPs who were supposed to have been executed in the 90's but were alive and well working in Baghdad!

Convincing the MOI to continue the 'purge' approach is where consistent and sustained political support from the UK can be best targeted.

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Our own anti-corruption mentoring in Basrah should be maintained, with a clear time line on handing over to the Iraqis. The capability doesn't have to be great, lessons learned in law enforcement show that the mere existence of an Internal Affairs capability can have a positive effect.

'What about militia infiltration of IPS?'

It is impossible to state percentages – Each police station and each unit has different allegiances and whilst our advisors have some experience in assessing this, it is not an exact science.

Similarly, it is wrong to talk about infiltration of 'the ISF'. The IPS is a special case due to the localised nature of its work and the high octane influences present in a police station environment.

Not an 'Arab' issue.

In 1994, in a police station called Rigg Approach in London, a team of elite 'Flying Squad' detectives were found to have been long-term involved in organised crime, working alongside criminals for financial gain.

Prognosis for Basrah ?

Six months down the line we will have a basic anti-corruption capability with an Iraqi face – 3 months after that – we must hand all work and development in this area over to the Iraqis. We will not be able change the deeply engrained 'corrupt' cultural issues.

PROVINCIAL IRAQI CONTROL The window of opportunity.

I believe we are at a crossroads.

On the one hand, there are some success stories such as the confidential 'TIPS' hotline, transition to PIC in Muthanna province and training of the Tactical Support Unit.

On the other hand, despite mentoring and training regimes, despite equipment issues, despite Provincial Director of Police one-to-one mentoring, we still seem to be at first base with the Basrah Police.

So, how and when do we hand the responsibility for policing to the Iraqis in Basrah?

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The 'Window'.

Phase 1. Deep involvement with Operation Date Palm.

0 to 6 months.

We will take advantage of the window of opportunity afforded by Operation Date Palm and the 'Better Basrah' finance to launch a surge of activity over a six month period to bring the police stations to a 'good enough' standard.

Targeted, intense mentoring at police stations. All available resources used there. (The best mentoring, at a personal or organisational level, always starts with the setting of an exit strategy) so we will set an end date which dovetails with the end of the Armorgroup contract.

During this phase we must concentrate on getting IPS to take the lead. Train the trainers, mentor the mentors and lead the leaders.

We will take notice of subjective and objective assessments and adjust operations accordingly.

Phase 2. Respite

6 to 12 months

We should plan a respite period where a team of UKCIVPOL (6) Senior Police Advisors, assisted by a small team of specialist International Police Advisors concentrate on finalising our work in specialist areas such as Forensics and Intelligence with strictly capped timelines.

Phase 3. Regeneration

12 months to 2 years

We should engage two UK CIVPOL Senior Police Advisors in long-term regeneration and reconstruction, working alongside the PRT. One SPA in Rule of Law Basrah, one SPA in Rule of Law Baghdad. (There may still be a requirement to have a CIVPOL officer in the Hostage Working Group, Baghdad).

In addition, we should adopt a 'consultancy' approach (like the DfID model), to provide policing support to particular projects.

Longer term involvement will be dependent on political will and we should acknowledge the benefits of strategic patience.

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Conclusion:- Opening the window.

We have many enabling factors in place:-

- The fresh pair of eyes of a new Consul General
- The impetus of highly motivated military support
- 'Better Basrah'
- Engagement at Police Station level.

In addition,

We won't have a better opportunity to get the IPS to a 'good enough' standard.

We won't have a better opportunity to set our stall for the future with timelines.

We won't have a better opportunity to influence UK interests by developing a safe and just Iraq.

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Chief Police Advisor Iraq.

August 2006

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Annex 'A'

Activity Analysis

Table of contents:-

- a) Provincial Iraqi control - Basrah Province
- b) Provincial Iraqi control - Muthanna Province
- c) Provincial Iraqi control - Maysan Province
- d) Basic Recruit Training and TIPS course
- e) Internal Affairs Division –Basrah
- f) Major Crime Unit-formation
- g) National Information and Investigations Agency – formation
- h) Basrah Custody Suite
- i) 'Tips' Confidential phone lines - Basrah/Baghdad
- j) Forensic Projects
- k) Hostage Working Group

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Activity Assessments.

The attached activity assessments are based on quantitative and qualitative information in relation to individual workstreams.

No inference can be drawn from the 'Impact Assessment' in relation to quality of delivery. High quality training does not always result in high quality action by the Iraqi Police Service (IPS).

Similarly, it is recognized that some of the project work is long term and the impact is not fully developed.

Risk Assessment Gradings.

- **LOW** Where there is risk, but that risk is encountered within a controlled environment.
- **MEDIUM** Where there is risk but controls over that risk may be threatened by an uncertain environment.
- **HIGH** Where there is risk and there is little or no control over the risk environment.

Impact Assessment Gradings.

- **RED** Impact on the overall performance of the IPS is negligible/slight.
 - **AMBER** Impact on the overall performance of the IPS is marginal/improving.
 - **GREEN** Impact on the overall performance of the IPS is medium/high.
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PROJECT DETAILS

Project 'B':- Achieve Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC) in Muthanna Province

Activity

Extensive mentoring, monitoring, equipping and training of the Iraqi Police Service (IPS) in Muthanna to achieve the US Modified Table of Organisation and Equipment (MTOE) and ensure in all aspects that the IPS are 'fit for purpose' thus facilitating transition to Iraqi Control (PIC).

Resources Used

Two Civ Pol (Superintendent and Constable).
Forty ArmorGroup (International Policing Advisors).

Security Risk Assessment

Very low risk.

Impact Assessment – GREEN

Of the MTOE training target of 2616 officers to be trained we achieved just over 107% (2810). In addition, many more were trained to a basic level through a Japanese funded project in As Samawah. Over 45% of the equipment set out in the MTOE has been issued and as it comes 'on stream' more equipment will be issued in the coming months. In every other respect the Provincial Police are assessed as being 'Green'. PIC was eventually achieved in July 2006. US Civ Pol (CPATT) continue to provide support alongside the Military.

Recommendation

Now that transition has been achieved this part of the Mission is complete. No further UK Civ Pol work should be considered unless the situation in the Province deteriorates to such an extent that coalition re-engagement is necessary.

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Project 'A':- Achieve Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC) in Basra Province

Activity

Extensive mentoring, monitoring, equipping and training of the Iraqi Police Service (IPS) in Basra to achieve the US Modified Table of Organisation and Equipment (MTOE) and ensure in all aspects that the IPS are 'fit for purpose' thus facilitating transition to Iraqi Control (PIC). In addition, corruption and criminality within various Units of the IPS are endemic. A number of special projects (covered separately) have been established to reform these Units and root out corrupt and criminal officers.

Resources Used

Three Civ Pol (Superintendent and two Chief Inspectors).
Fifty ArmorGroup (International Policing Advisors).

Security Risk Assessment

Medium risk.

All resources work from hardened bases and a strict FCO 'movement' policy is in place. All bases come under 'indirect fire' on a regular basis and movement by road can be a risk due to the number of IED attacks.

Impact Assessment – RED

Of the MTOE training target of 16196 officers to be trained we achieved almost 70% (11175). Over 51% of the equipment set out in the MTOE has been issued and as it comes 'on stream' more equipment will be issued in the coming months. Much work is ongoing on the specialist projects alluded to previously but on the mentoring front there has been a considerable setback earlier in 2006 due to non-engagement by the Iraqis. This has thwarted much of the Civ Pol effort and it has only started to be effective again over the summer months. Moreover, during July and August there has been a significant re-structuring of resources (including military) to optimise the Multi National Force objectives. This led to the

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formation of a Police Transition Team in Basra. This project is now the main focus of the Mission.

Recommendation

This project must continue to receive substantial resourcing to bring it to a successful conclusion during 2007. Whilst it will be subject of monthly reviews it should be completely reassessed in March.

Project 'C':- Achieve Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC) in Maysan Province

Activity

Extensive mentoring, monitoring, equipping and training of the Iraqi Police Service (IPS) in Maysan to achieve the US Modified Table of Organisation and Equipment (MTOE) and ensure in all aspects that the IPS are 'fit for purpose' thus facilitating transition to Iraqi Control (PIC).

Resources Used

One Civ Pol (Superintendent).
Twenty five ArmorGroup (International Policing Advisors).

Security Risk Assessment

High risk.

Camp Abu Naji in the Provincial Capital of Al Amarah was continually attacked by insurgents using mortars and rockets. Consequently the Civ Pol Superintendent was withdrawn in July 2006 and the ArmorGroup resources when the Camp closed in August.

Impact Assessment – ORANGE going GREEN

Of the MTOE training target of 5330 officers to be trained we have achieved 79% (4226). Around 64% of the equipment set out in the MTOE has been issued and as it comes 'on stream' more equipment will be issued in the coming months. Almost half of the Policing Districts are currently assessed as 'Green'. During the

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latter part of 2005 and early 2006 there was little engagement with the IPS due to the Governor's diktat directing non co-operation. Maysan was always going to prove extremely challenging because of the historic nature of insurgency/lawlessness in the Province, the geographic remoteness and its proximity to Iran. However, given the high risks of delivering Security Sector Reform in such a hostile environment much has been achieved. Transition to PIC should occur in the next few months.

Recommendation

In light of the Risks no further Civ Pol engagement should be considered.

Project 'G':- National Information and Investigation Agency (NIIA) Basra

Activity

As part of a US led initiative to establish, vet, train and develop an NIIA in Basra Province. The Agency will form part of a National Strategy to gather criminal intelligence and investigate serious crime. This project forms part of a wider reform package of the key Policing Units in Basra.

Resources Used

One Civ Pol part-time in Baghdad (previously a Chief Superintendent and now a Superintendent).
One Civ Pol in Basra (Chief Inspector).
One ArmorGroup (International Policing Advisor).

Security Risk Assessment

Low Risk.

The officers deployed on this Project work from hardened accommodation in secure bases. The NIIA has been established in the Warren (Iraqi Police Headquarters).

Impact Assessment - RED

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The NIIA has already been established in the Warren. The objective is to have a reformed Agency of 229 fully vetted and professionally trained staff (the training is carried out in the Baghdad Police College). Currently a significant number of the existing staff has been vetted and trained but it is known that a number of officers are aligned to a militia. Moreover, Multi National Forces have no confidence in the Leadership of the Agency. The need for a more targeted approach by Civ Pol has therefore been identified.

Recommendations

- Continue with the support for this Project both in Baghdad and Basra.
- Strengthen the Civ Pol element in Basra.
- Review progress and reassess support by April 2007.

Project 'E':- Internal Affairs Division (IAD) – Basra.

Activity

Establishing, training and developing an IAD for the Province in Basra Air Station with the objective to deter, detect, investigate and prosecute cases of criminality by members of the Iraqi Police Service (IPS). The IAD will comprise 40 men from the IPS.

Resources Used

One Civ Pol (Chief Inspector).

Three ArmorGroup (International Policing Advisors).

One CRG team.

It is proposed to increase the Civ Pol element by one Superintendent and three to four Detective Constables.

Security Risk Assessment

Low risk.

The officers work in a purpose built compound within the security 'footprint' of Basra Air Station. Whilst in the compound interacting with Iraqis they are protected by CRG. The officers live in the B&B compound within the Air Station and are vulnerable to attack by 'indirect fire' by insurgents.

Impact Assessment – RED moving to AMBER

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Civ pol together with military colleagues has established a secure base from a brown field site (in May 2006). Forty Iraqi Police have been identified, vetted, trained and will shortly become operational and commence investigations into the activities of Basra's 'bent' cops. A full Policing Plan with performance indicators, targets and actions for the period September 2006 – August 2007 has been formulated. This project has the potential to change things and develop a 'Better Basra' with some quick wins.

Recommendations

The funding and life support for this Project is in place until December 2007.

- The Project should be supported by Civ Pol until September 2007 at least.
- There should be continual performance measurement of the key targets outlined in the Strategic Plan.
- The Project should aim to have a high level of Iraqi self sufficiency by September 2007.

Project 'H':- Basra Custody Suite – Warren Police Headquarters

Activity

Establish, train and develop (Iraqi Police Officers) a Custody Suite for the detention of prisoners in Basra City. The objective is to ensure prisoners are processed, interviewed and detained in accordance with International Human Rights standards. This project has the potential to transfer many of the 90 (or so) pre-trial prisoners currently detained in the infamous Al Jameat Police station in Basra and pave the way for its closure.

Resources Used

Currently there are no resources dedicated to this project as the building work has been taking place since the start of the year. The building will be handed over in September and will be ready for use in October. It will therefore be necessary to deploy ArmorGroup IPAs to train the nominated IPS officers in 'custody' work and establish proper procedures for the detention of prisoners.

Security Risk Assessment

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Low risk.

The mentors will work in hardened accommodation. The Warren Headquarters is subjected to some indirect fire attack but not on the same scale as other sites in the City.

Impact Assessment – RED

The building work is all but complete and the Custody Suite should become operational in October so the opportunity to make a real impact will arise in the next period.

Recommendations

This project will require support up until March 2007. Oversight will be provided by the SPA Crime (when appointed).

- Establish detention procedures.
- Identify and train custody officers.
- Mentor and monitor the work within the suite.

Project 'F':- Major Crime Unit (MCU) – Basra

Activity

To create a sustainable and credible major crime (terrorism, murder, rape etc) investigation unit within the Iraqi Police Service in Basra. This will necessitate rooting out the corrupt elements of the existing Serious Crime Unit (officers from the Unit are engaged in serious criminal activity including murder) selecting, vetting and training officers for a new (re-branded) MCU.

Resources Used

One Civ Pol (Chief Inspector)
Three ArmorGroup (International Policing Advisors).

It is proposed to appoint a Superintendent to lead on this important project.

Security Risk Assessment

Low Risk.

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The officers will work in hardened accommodation. The Warren Headquarters is subjected to some indirect fire attack but not on the same scale as other sites in the City.

Impact Assessment – RED

This project is being carried forward together with those of the National Information and Investigation Agency, Forensic Laboratory and the Custody Suite within the same IPS Headquarter complex at the Warren and the Internal Affairs Division at Basra Air Station. A detailed scoping study has been undertaken and will be the basis for taking the Project forward. Some of the MCU officers will be 'housed' within the new purpose built Custody Suite coming on-line this autumn.

Recommendation

It is critically important that this project is resourced sufficiently to bring it to a successful conclusion. The Project should be reviewed in June 2007.

Project 'J':- National Forensic Academy Baghdad and Scientific Support in Basra.

Activity

To establish a National Forensic training programme and deliver it in a purpose built Academy within the Baghdad Police College (BPC) complex for the Iraqi Police Service.

To commission a Forensic Laboratory within the Police Headquarter complex in Basra City.

To provide Scenes of Crime training in South-East Iraq and mentoring for Scenes of Crime Officers (SOCOs) in MND(SE).

Resources Used

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Nine ArmorGroup (International Policing Advisors).

Security Risk Assessment

Low to Medium risk depending on location.

The resources are deployed in the BPC, the Basra Training College and in Basra City. Resources in Basra are at low risk although bases in Basra do come under attack from indirect fire on a regular basis. The resources in Baghdad are at considerably more risk in the BPC which is in the red zone in the City.

Impact Assessment – RED moving to AMBER

The Academy in Baghdad is nearing completion and will be formally opened in October. A number of courses have now been arranged for the Academy for the last quarter of 2006. Forensic courses continue at the Basra Training College at Shaibah training IPS officers from the Provinces in South-East Iraq. Mentoring of SOCOs in Muthanna and Maysan Provinces is now complete. The refurbishment programme of the Basra Laboratory in the Police Headquarter Site (the Warren) will be completed by October. There is evidence that the IPS are capable of crime scene examination but of course no facilities exist (yet) for analysis. Currently Forensic Evidence is not widely recognised as a key part of the Justice system.

Recommendation

The existing projects will require support over the next six months but should be reviewed by March 2007.

Project 'K':- Hostage Working Group – British Embassy Baghdad

Activity

A trained Hostage Negotiator to work as an advisor to the British Embassy on hostage issues and on the development of the Major Crime Unit's kidnap capability.

Resources Used

One Civ Pol (Chief Inspector).

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Security Risk Assessment

Low risk

The officer works in the British and US Embassy's in the International Zone in Baghdad.

Impact Assessment – RED

This job is recognised as a key post in a Hostage Working Group comprising British and US Embassy staff dedicated to the prevention, recovery and prosecution of hostages and hostage taking in Baghdad. A key responsibility is to engage 'early' in any hostage incident and co-ordinate the response from UK based agencies. The job also provides a means to debrief released foreign and local hostages and their families and acquire intelligence to reduce the impact of hostage taking in Baghdad. From a British perspective all these issues have been addressed by having a dedicated officer in this post but the impact on the IPS in Baghdad has been negligible and hostage taking has become an integral part of the Iraqi mindset.

Recommendation

This job should continue for as long as the Ambassador identifies a need. 3

Project 'D':- Basic Recruit Training/Transitional Integration Programme (TIPS) course.

Activity

Delivering 10 week basic police recruit training and a 3 week 'TIPS' course (a transitional course for serving police officers).
Course covers Human Rights, law and tactical application of policing techniques. Undertaken at Basrah Training College, Shaibah, courses conclude with an official 'passing out' parade.

Resources Used

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One Civ Pol (Superintendent)
12 Civ Pol trainers
1 ArmorGroup Deputy Principal.

Security Risk Assessment

Low risk.

Officers work in secure compound with private security detail oversight . Low threat of indirect fire to workplace and living accommodation.

Impact assessment – AMBER

Newly trained IPS recruits have received a high quality training package delivered by expert trainers.

However, the working environment they return to is unsupportive, often corrupt and poorly led.

Some of the recruits will return to work on vehicle checkpoints or be assigned as drivers or administrators. Pay regimes, development regimes and command and control functions are practically non-existent.

Recommendation

The training academy is due to close at the end of December. At that time the military base at Shaibah would have closed and the threat assessment would move to RED.

Accordingly, all training to cease at that time, personnel repatriation plan to be put in place by CIG.

Project 'I':- 'TIPS' Confidential Hotline.

Activity

Two telephone hotlines functioning in Baghdad and Basrah - receiving confidential information relating to terrorist activity, suspects and crimes in action. Also develops source information and Humint.

Resources Used

14 ArmorGroup

Security Risk Assessment

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Low

The activity is undertaken in hardened buildings with FCO security regimes in place. Some danger from indirect fire to buildings.

Experienced staff have heightened awareness of security issues associated with source handling and confidential information.

Impact Assessment – AMBER

The day-to-day successes (terrorist related arms finds, source development, target development) is extremely successful and receives accolades from Coalition partners.

However, to date, whilst Iraqi staff man the telephones there is no Iraqi 'lead' and no Iraqi trainers. Basrah Tips line is new and slow to start, (individually graded as RED).

Recommendation

It would be extremely unwise to hand this project over to Iraqi control all the while we have Coalition troops on the ground. Between now and March the emphasis must be on:-

Developing the ability to hand the lines over to Iraqi control, i.e. train the trainers.

Bringing Basrah Tips line to a functional level.

Armorgroup staffing to remain at present but consideration will be given to replacing those resources with Iraqi mentors and potentially CPATT involvement.

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