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Operations Directorate/Iraq Team/11

9 Dec 09

## **IRAQ SECURITY SECTOR REFORM**

### **INTRODUCTION**

1. This document covers Security Sector Reform (SSR) during Op TELIC. In particular, capacity-building work focused on the armed forces and the police. The information provided reflects the main projects undertaken by the MOD.

### **PURPOSE**

2. Question 10.10 from the Tribunals and Inquiries Unit (TIU) requires "an essay outlining the key stages and objectives for building capacity in the Iraqi Armed and Police/Security forces during Operation Telic. This should also include UK based training initiatives such as Staff College attendance".

### **SCOPE**

3. The scope of this document is limited to MOD lead initiatives or those where British forces were heavily involved, as dictated by reporting at the time. However, where additional information has been available in MOD records it has been included. The FCO and PJHQ have also been consulted.

### **BACKGROUND**

4. Military conflict in Iraq began in the early hours of 20 March 2003. By 6 April British forces had captured their strategic objective, Basra airport, and had taken control of the city itself. For British forces this represented the beginning of the transition from Phase III (Decisive Operations) to Phase IV (Aftermath). As an occupying force, under the terms of the Hague and Geneva Conventions, the UK assumed responsibility for ensuring public order and safety within their area of operations. A SSR strategy was developed to meet these obligations and to cultivate an indigenous internal security capability as a precursor to Coalition military disengagement. The Coalition Command Structure is given at [Annex A](#).

### **TELIC I: FEB 03 – JUN 03**

5. Commanders on the ground in the British controlled areas of Umm Qasr, Basra, and Al Amarah quickly instigated Coalition plans to draw heavily on the existing Iraqi police force, prisons and judiciary to establish and maintain local law and order. British forces established contact with local leaders and assisted in restoring a functioning police force while completing their own patrols, guarding key facilities, and detaining criminals associated with serious crime. The first joint UK-Iraqi police patrols took place one week after Basra had been liberated.

6. These interim measures were taken to stabilise the security situation and to enable humanitarian and reconstruction operations to begin while a long term Coalition SSR strategy for Iraq was agreed. In Basra the Criminal Justice System (CJS) infrastructure was degraded with police stations, courthouses and prisons having been looted by the local population. There were also instances of targeted and deliberate theft, which appeared to be led by criminals released from the prisons by Saddam Hussein's regime prior the conflict. The UK's primary concern was therefore policing, where it was viewed that early action was urgently required to address public safety and to establish the conditions for peace and stability. The FCO, who had the lead on

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policing, sponsored a visit to Iraq by Chief Constable Paul Kernaghan in May in order to inform their Iraq policing reform strategy.

7. The objective at this stage was to provide a visible presence on the streets to reassure the wider population. UK forces were responsible for policing, with RMP in the lead. Local volunteers were recruited as auxiliaries and they, together with members of the established police force who had volunteered to return to work, were being trained by the RMP in the basics of police work.

#### TELIC II: JUL 03 – OCT 03

8. As the lead country in Multi-National Division (South-East) (MND(SE)), which was formed when 1(UK) Division handed over to 3(UK) Division in Basra on 10 Jul 03, the UK was responsible for the command and control of forces in South East Iraq. To that end the UK developed SSR programs that would deliver public safety in the southern sector and contribute to Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) objectives for the transition of Iraq into a peaceful, law-abiding, rights-based, democratic and prosperous state. This objective was summarised as "to establish a legitimate, accountable and sustainable security sector ensuring the rights of individual citizens and adequate defence of state sovereignty" under a joint MOD/FCO/DFID Iraq Strategy.

9. In 2003 a Global Conflict Prevention Pool (GCPP) (MOD/FCO/DFID) budget of £7.5million was made available for UK activities in Iraq. This was mostly expended on SSR and media development projects in line with a strategy drawn up for this purpose. The overarching objective in terms of SSR was to build capacity of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). Annex B details GCPP projects for 2003/04.

10. A number of security sector pillars were identified; Iraqi Police Service (IPS), Iraqi Civil Defence Corps (ICDC), Facilities Protection Service (FPS), Border Police and Customs, New Iraqi Army (NIA), Iraqi Navy, Iraqi Air Force, Iraqi Ministry of Defence (IMOD), Judiciary, Prisons, and Immigration. The UK priorities for SSR were identified as 1) ICDC 2) IPS and 3) New Iraqi Armed Forces (NIAF). It was felt this prioritisation would best deliver an indigenous internal security capability as a precursor to coalition military disengagement. The prioritisation of the ICDC can be linked directly back to one of Chief Constable Kernaghan's recommendations; to reorganise all specialist police forces under a guards force without police powers as part of the wider goal to de-militarise the police force. As NIAF were a lower priority the UK contribution to the Coalition Military Assistance and Training Team (CMATT) aimed to follow a policy of 'smart engagement'; focusing on the provision of HQ/Planning Staffs and niche capabilities. The UK's initial SSR objectives (2003) are detailed at Annex C.

11. The major UK achievements of TELIC II were the establishment of the ICDC - a temporary security and emergency service agency to complement operations conducted by the Coalition - and the continued development of policing capability. The UK ICDC training team arrived in theatre in late September with the aim of training 1,200 troops by mid-October, and 5,000 in total for deployment in MND(SE). The Coalition was aiming to recruit and train 40,000 ICDC to fill some 36 battalions to take over guarding and patrolling in April 2004.

12. Real progress had also been made in improving the ad-hoc policing arrangements that existed during TELIC I, with around 10,500 Iraqi police operating alongside Coalition forces in MND(SE) by the end of TELIC II; a stark contrast to the few hundred policemen, volunteers, and auxiliaries that were available before. Forces in MND(SE) had also restored 92 police stations and nearly all 20 district courthouses to a serviceable condition, and set up local security forces to provide neighbourhood security in co-ordination with the Iraqi police. In total there were over 40,000 Iraqi police, these numbers were planned to progressively rise to 70,000 by August 2004. The Coalition aimed to accept 5,200 people into police training each month at facilities in Iraq and Jordan.

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13. The CMATT began training the NIA during TELIC II, to take over the role of border security from the Coalition, at Kirkush Military Training Base (KMTB), northeast of Baghdad. Their target was for 35,000 troops by September 2004. The first battalion graduated in early October. The UK provided a small military team, headed by a Brigadier, to support the training.

**TELIC III: NOV 03 – APR 04**

14. By the end of TELIC III there were 21 fully operational ICDC battalions throughout Iraq (over 35,000 personnel) performing a range of duties such as fixed site security, route/convoy security, patrols, and manning cordons and checkpoints alongside multinational forces. Intense coalition activity aimed at developing a credible Facilities Protection Service saw numbers swell to a force of some 70,000 (including women); the Facilities Protection Service was developed to protect Iraq's major strategic infrastructure, government buildings and cultural and educational sites, with a separate wing, the Diplomatic Protection Corps, guarding foreign embassies. There were also over 7,500 Iraqi Border Police and over 2,000 Customs Inspectors nationwide in operation at this time.

15. In March 2004 the Coalition Police Assistance and Training Team (CPATT) was established, under a UK 1\* Commander with responsibility for delivering police training across Iraq, including MND(SE). CPATT was subordinate to the Office of Security Transition (OST), headed by a US 2\*, and aimed to replicate the achievements of CMATT. A total of 304 International Police Officers, mainly located in Baghdad, were conducting a large scale training operation that had 2,000 recruits at any one time. CPATT International Police Liaison Officers (IPLOs) provided training and mentoring in MND(SE) and assisted in ensuring that training was consistent with efforts across Iraq. CPATT activity was aimed at bolstering the existing 75,000 Iraqi police officers operating across the country at the time.

16. UK forces in MND(SE) continued to recruit and train ICDC, who at this point had been transferred to the Iraqi Ministry of Defence as a component of the New Iraqi Armed Forces by the CPA, for deployment in South East Iraq. A further 2,000 police were trained during this period, which took total Iraqi Police numbers in MND(SE) up to 12,500. Additional UK activity included the deployment of Royal Navy personnel to help to develop the Iraqi Coastal Defence Force, a number of Iraqi Officers also successfully completed training in the UK at Dartmouth.

**TELIC IV: MAY 04 – OCT 04**

17. With SSR progressing well, despite an atmosphere of continued tensions and insurgency, the newly established (June 2004) Multinational Security Transition Command (Iraq) (MNSTC-I) announced that development was on track to deliver a manned, trained and equipped Iraqi Security Force (ISF) by 1 July 2005. The Coalition Command Structure is detailed at Annex A.

18. The notable UK contribution during TELIC IV was towards the New Iraqi Navy (previously known as Iraqi Coastal Defence Force) based at Umm Qasr. The Royal Navy led on developing the fledgling Iraqi Navy (IzN) and successfully trained 10 officers Dartmouth. A further eight officers were trained in Jordan and 170 other ranks were trained at the Umm Qasr naval academy. The (IzN) was passed to Iraqi control in a ceremony on 12 June with an initial operating capability of five patrol boats.

19. Development of the NIA continued although, as a lower priority, it suffered from some poaching of equipment and personnel for higher priority counter insurgency tasks. The Coalition fell short of their target for 35,000 troops by September with just 9,000 in place. A revised target of 27,000 personnel to be trained and equipped by July 2005 was set. Over a dozen UK NCOs attached to CMATT were training Iraqi NCOs at KMTB while the majority of Iraqi Army Officers were being trained in Jordan. In the UK two students from the NIA started their Sandhurst Commissioning course (September 2004) following completion of English language training at Beaconsfield and were due to graduate in August 2005. The provision of 2 places on each



Commissioning course for Iraqi students continues to this day. UK based training is detailed at Annex D.

20. In July 2004 the new Iraqi government changed plans to leave the ICDC as a largely passive defence force and converted it to a National Guard.<sup>1</sup> The UK extended its responsibility (pays/trains/sustains) for the ICDC in MND(SE) to six battalions (approximately 6000 troops).

21. Additional cross government UK SSR activity during this period included; UK MOD assisting the Iraqi Defence Minister to modernise the IMOD; DFID training elements of the Iraqi judiciary; HM Customs and Exercise providing considerable support to border and customs police and helping to set up the Department of Border Enforcement (DBE); and a UK expert engaged in the development and recruitment of the Iraqi Air Force (IzAF).

22. In response to a request by the Government of Iraq, the NATO Training Mission - Iraq (NTM-I) was established in July 2004 to train and equip the ISF. The aim of the mission was to help Iraq build the capability of its government to address the security needs of the Iraqi people. It was envisioned that the NATO mission would take over training and mentoring of middle and senior level personnel from the ISF in and outside of Iraq, and play a role in co-ordinating offers of equipment and training from individual NATO and partner countries.

#### **TELIC V: NOV 04 – APR 05**

23. A shift in emphasis during TELIC V saw the UK focus on developing the capability of the ISF rather than the high intensity recruitment and training that had prevailed previously. The strategic objective was to develop sovereign Iraqi capabilities that would enable them to take over control of security themselves, such as leadership, command and control, intelligence, and logistics. UK forces in MND(SE) therefore focused on developing these key capabilities by mentoring Iraqi Army HQs at Division and Brigade level. To facilitate this the Iraqi Army Divisional HQ was set up in Basra Air Station, next to HQ MND(SE).

24. In terms of targets, the feeling at the time was that it was too risky to make local control of law and order a formal milestone; as the capability of the IPS remained patchy. The embarrassment of having to return to an area which had been handed over to ISF would have been a setback for the Coalition. However, at this time (April 05) 150,000 ISF recruits had been trained and equipped by the Coalition, including 55,000 IPS, 15,000 DBE, 22,000 Army (Regular and Intervention Force), and 40,000 former National Guard (reintegrated into the NIA). ISF had held local control since June 2004, but without necessarily being able to maintain law and order and conduct counterinsurgency operations without the support of Coalition forces. ISF manning between 2004 and 2009 is detailed at Annex E.

25. HMG also began to accelerate the Iraqi equipment programme to support ISF efforts to maintain stability in the UK area of operations, enhance wider conflict resolution efforts and ultimately, facilitate UK withdrawal. The ISF were facing a determined and well-equipped insurgency and needed the right weapons, kit and equipment, as well as training, to be able to take them on effectively. The total cost of gifts under Project OSIRIS 1 (FY04/05) was just over £27M, and was purchased using funds from the Global Conflict Prevention Pool (2.5M) and Treasury Reserve (£24.8M).

26. UK commitment to developing an effective IPS continued with a Senior UK Police Officer based in Baghdad supporting Iraqi Ministers and mentoring Senior IPS staff, and UK military personnel working in the Coalition Police Advisory Training Team (CPATT). These contributions helped to increase the number of IPS trained and equipped by the Coalition to over 55,000.

<sup>1</sup> <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/icdc.htm>

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27. Capability building of the NIA also continued apace with the UK responsible for training and sustaining six former Iraqi National Guard Army battalions (approximately 6000 troops) in MND(SE), and a UK Brigadier serving as Deputy Commanding General of the Coalition Military Advisory Training Team (CMATT). The total trained and equipped by coalition at the time stood at 22,000 new recruits and 40,000 former National Guard.

#### **TELIC VI: MAY 05 – OCT 05**

28. During TELIC VI further progress was made in establishing Iraqi independence through the development of sovereign command and control structures, logistics, intelligence, leadership and support structures. The Iraqi Government were actively engaged in this process as demonstrated by Prime Minister Ja'afari's announcement, on 23 July 05, that a Joint Committee would be formed to establish conditions to gradually transition security responsibility back to ISF.

29. The Coalition continued to steadily deliver increased numbers of operationally capable ISF personnel. Around 88 Iraqi Army and special operations battalions had progressed to the stage where they could take part in combat operations against the enemy, 36 of which were assessed as being 'in the lead' or fully independent. In total, over 206,000 ISF had been trained and equipped by the Coalition, including approximately 107,600 Ministry of Interior (includes Police) and 98,600 Ministry of Defence (includes Army, Navy and Air Force). In the UK's area of operations ISF were able to operate with some independence, but the varying security situation across Iraq meant that there was regional variations in the ability of ISF to take on responsibility for security.

30. Training of Police in MND(SE) was delivered through two main lines. Basic Recruit Training (BRT) was delivered at Jordan International Police Training Centre (JIPTC) where 61 UK staff were based. At this time 2735 students out of 6341 authorised MND(SE) officers had completed BRT. Specialist training courses were delivered in MND(SE) by 26 UK staff and 101 contractors. Follow up training and mentoring in MND(SE) was supplied by the Italian Carabinieri in Dhi Qar province and UK RMP in Basra, Maysan and Muthanna.

31. HMG continued to equip ISF as part of the strategy to upscale ISF capability with £55.463M worth of vehicles, communications kit and infrastructure improvements gifted under Project OSIRIS 2 (FY05/06).

32. A significant step for Iraqi independence was the handover of two camps from British to Iraqi control. Camp CHINDIT in Az-Zubayr, southwest of Basra, was handed over by the 1st Battalion the Royal Anglian Regiment to the 2nd Battalion the 10th Division of the Iraqi Army on 29 September. At Tallil training base the Basic Training Centre (BTC) flag was passed from the Multi-National Force (MNF) instructors to the Iraqi Army on 25 August.

33. Training of Iraqi Army students in the UK continued with 35 Iraqi soldiers passing out at the Infantry Battle School in Brecon, these newly qualified military instructors returned to Iraq to train young officers at the Ar Rustimiyah Military Academy. Training and sustainment of the 10th Division of the Iraqi Army based in MND(SE) by British forces continued with 6 out of 10 battalions formed. The objective for concluding this programme was to complete the remaining 4 battalions by spring 2006.

34. In September 2005, NATO launched the cornerstone of its training effort in Iraq, at the National Defence University (NDU) at Ar Rustamiyah in South East Baghdad. All 26 NATO countries provided support to the NTM-I, by providing either personnel, equipment or funding to train ISF in and outside of Iraq. The UK contributed 22 personnel to support both the mission, leading on the Basic Officer Career Course (BOCC) which subsumed the MNSTC-I basic officer training effort (also led by the UK), and aimed to train around 900 potential officers.

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35. The IPS came under the spotlight during TELIC VII due to the earlier arrest and detention of two British soldiers at the main Basra police station on 19 September 2005. As part of a review of progress on SSR Sir Ronnie Flanagan, HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary, was asked to provide an objective assessment of the UK's policing programme in Iraq, and make recommendations to ensure that UK support was delivering an effective IPS that served the needs of all Iraqi people. It was recognised that the police suffered from infiltration from militia, and so Sir Ronnie was asked to look closely at how to enhance the UK police training effort. Sir Ronnie visited Iraq between 21 and 25 November 2005 and again in early January 2006. He delivered his final report to the Secretary of State at the end of January 2006.

36. By the end of TELIC VII MOD had overall responsibility for the delivery of ISF in MND(SE), including the police. The MOD lead for IPS SSR produced new emphasis and vigour along all lines of operation. A new Strategic Working Group in MND(SE) – chaired by the General Officer Commanding (GOC) – gave guidance to all the involved parties. It was recognised that the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior (IMOI) had not developed as quickly as the Iraqi Ministry of Defence (IMOD) and, as a result, capacity in the police and judicial sectors was lacking. Support to IMOI continued through a Senior UK Police Officer based in Baghdad who supported Ministers and mentored Senior IPS staff. Additionally there were also UK civilian police officers providing basic level training in Basra and Jordan, and a UK team of 120 civilian police and contractors led by a Senior UK Police Officer in MND(SE). In Basra, once full cooperation between UK forces and the IPS had resumed (following the events on 19 September) the programme to train approx 29,000 IPS in MND(SE) continued. By the end of TELIC VII the total police trained by the UK had risen to 22,000, and the coalition as a whole had trained and equipped over 73,000 police in total.

37. MND(SE) supported the DBE in protecting the Iranian, Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian borders. The last of 61 forts covering 1700Km of border opened on 10 December 2005. Operations during TELIC VII showed an increasing level of capability of the DBE including a significant Improvised Explosive Devise (IED) find on the Iranian border. Training and mentoring of the DBE was conducted under the auspices of CPATT in Baghdad.

38. The Coalition steadily delivered increasing numbers of operationally capable ISF personnel. Numbers increased by around 5,000 per month, with 63 of 112 NIA battalions assessed as being 'in the lead' or fully independent when conducting counter-insurgency operations. Approximately 250,000 ISF had been trained and equipped by the Coalition by this time, including 134,900 IMOI and 115,100 IMOD.

39. The UK was responsible for training and sustaining the 10th Division of the Iraqi Army based in MND(SE). Significant progress in reforming the division was made, with 9 out of 10 Battalions for the southern division formed. The target had been to complete all ten battalions by spring 2006, but with one battalion remaining to be trained, the target slipped to early summer 2006. Four of the trained battalions were assessed as being at training readiness level 1 – fully independent. Progress was also made with the essential support elements of the Division, such as transport, engineering, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. The main focus continued to be the mentoring of the Army HQs at Division and Brigade level and partnering of Iraqi Army units with MNF-I units. As and when possible, Iraqi Army ranks undertook training courses in the UK.

40. A further sign of growing Iraqi independence during this period was the continued handover of Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) from Coalition to Iraqi control. FOB Honor was the 33<sup>rd</sup> of 110 Coalition Force bases to be turned over to ISF as part of the conditions based FOB turnover plan.

41. The UK also continued to play a lead role in developing the Iraqi Navy to be able to protect the Iraqi coast, territorial waters, vital ports and offshore assets against both external and internal security threats. This significant commitment was designed to prepare the Iraqi Navy and Marines

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to protect their nation's offshore oil infrastructure. Royal Navy warships and Royal Fleet Auxilliary support vessels formed part of the coalition Task Force overseeing the security of the oil platforms. It was planned that this responsibility would be gradually handed over to the Iraqi maritime forces, as they developed the capability to discharge the essential role themselves.

#### **TELIC VIII: MAY 06 – OCT 06**

42. TELIC VIII was characterised by the UK's push to stop Iraq's leading political factions using militias to project power. The use of militias had been outlawed in 2004 in an agreement between the CPA and the Interim Iraqi Government, but banning them alone had not worked. A strategy was formed to reintegrate the militias into the ISF. Statements made by Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki and the UK Secretary of State for Defence in May 2006 announced their shared commitment to tackling the militias.

43. The Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC), based in Baghdad, assumed operational control of the Iraqi Navy, Air Force and the 8<sup>th</sup> Division of the Iraqi Army; a critical step towards Iraqi sovereignty over their Armed Forces. A rolling program was planned for the IGFC to assume control of the remaining nine Iraqi Army Divisions at a rate of approximately two per month. Coalition forces continued to underpin ISF efforts, and provided support where required.

44. As of 4 October 2006, there were a total of six Iraqi Army Division HQs, 30 brigades and 89 of 123 battalions in the lead for their respective areas of operation in Iraq. Also, of the 110 bases Coalition forces had occupied since 2003, 52 had been transferred to Iraqi control. The Coalition continued to steadily deliver increased numbers of operationally capable ISF personnel - 312,400 ISF had been trained and equipped by the Coalition, including 180,800 IMOI and 131,600 IMOD.

45. In September 2006 Operation SINBAD was launched in MND(SE). SINBAD was an Iraqi-led initiative, driven by deteriorating security in BASRA, to bring about improvements to the quality of life in Basra City. In addition to mentoring of the ISF SINBAD included neighbourhood improvement projects, infrastructure and agricultural development and overall improvements to the environment throughout Basra City. SINBAD ran until Jan 2007 and was linked to the Better Basra (June 2006) UK cross-government initiative which concentrated on rule of law, governance, and economic restructuring.

46. Additionally, NATO assumed full responsibility for the training of the ISF, at the Iraqi Military Academy at Ar Rustamiyah, from Coalition auspices, in mid-July 2006.

#### **TELIC IX: NOV 06 – APR 07**

47. In TELIC IX policing continued to be UK main effort. There were around 100 UK police advisers deployed in Iraq, consisting of both serving and retired officers. The majority were deployed in Basra Province where the UK led on policing. Significant progress was made with the UK establishing a Department of Internal Affairs (DIA) at Basra Air Station to identify and prosecute high-profile corruption cases within the Basra police; and a Prosecution Mentoring Unit (PMU), staffed by international prosecutors, to mentor the Basrawi judges prosecuting cases through the DIA. The UK also provided prisons support and advice to the regional director of the Iraqi Correctional Service to oversee the construction of Basra Central Prison and training of new staff.

48. As of March 2007, there were a further 3 divisions of the Iraqi Army under Iraqi Ground Force Command (IGFC) including 10 Iraqi Army Division in MND(SE). The 4 Iraqi Army Divisions were taking their orders directly from the Iraqi Joint Headquarters in Baghdad. The total number of trained ISF was 333,100 which included 193,300 IMOI and 139,800 IMOD.

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**TELIC X: MAY 07 – OCT 07**

49. By TELIC X the Iraqi Army had matured considerably demonstrated by its growing confidence in security operations in Baghdad and Basra where it frequently tackled insurgency without assistance from Coalition forces. The 10th Division of the Iraqi Army, mentored by British forces in southern Iraq, had shown increasing capability. For example, two battalions from Iraqi Army 10 Division deployed to Baghdad where they took part in a joint Iraqi and US forces operation to clear areas of rogue militia.

50. A summary of achievements at this time shows that over four years of operations the UK had helped to train over 13,000 Iraqi Army troops, including 10,000 troops serving with the 10th Division on operations in Basra and across the south of the country. Across Iraq, 359,700 ISF had been trained and equipped by the Coalition, including 194,200 IMOI and 165,500 IOMD.

51. A notable success for the UK policy of 'smart engagement' in non-core activities during TELIC X was that of the Coalition Air Force Transition Team (CAFTT) who helped to build an Iraqi Air Force (IzAF) capable of conducting sustained counter-insurgency operations and setting conditions for achieving air sovereignty. The UK had a small, but influential, team embedded within the otherwise solely-US CAFTT. In addition, the UK provided places for Iraqi students on a number of training courses in the UK, including 15 Iraqi officers and cadets on an Iraqi-funded International Defence Training course. The IzAF was keen to send further students on a number of UK-based courses, in particular, Train the Trainer and Air Traffic Control courses.

**TELIC XI: NOV 07 – APR 08**

52. In 2008 UK SSR strategy in Iraq progressed to Mentoring, Monitoring and Training (also known as 'M2T'). This shift in focus was enabled by the success of previous work that had focused on recruitment and training in the early TELICs and capability building more recently. This training supported Iraqi efforts to build their security forces, and was primarily conducted by the M2T Battle Group from the 1<sup>st</sup> Scots Guards. The UK strategy consisted of; specialist training in urban operations and other counter-insurgency skills; conducting basic infantry training to a large number of recruits; selecting a number of competent officers to become trainers themselves; mentoring trainers; and monitoring Iraqi-led training programmes once they became sufficiently mature.

53. Iraqi independence increased markedly with all Iraqi Army Divisions transitioning to IGFC control. The IGFC had previously assumed operational control of the Iraqi Navy, Air Force and one division of the Iraqi Army from the Coalition in September 2006.

54. The significant event for the UK during TELIC XI was the transition (on 16 December 2007) to Provincial Iraqi Control in Basra which marked the development of the Iraqi Government and its Security Forces to the level where they were able to take on responsibility for security in Basra. British troops remained in Basra Province, in a position of over watch, to support the Iraqi authorities as they implemented the rule of law. The UK view was that only Iraqis could successfully tackle criminal activity and political violence, which were linked to social and economic factors.

55. A factor in handing over Provincial Iraqi Control in Basra was the robust and focused leadership in place, in the form of an Iraq Army Commander in charge of the Basra Operations Centre, and a Basra Provincial Director of Police, that had been developed. Their leadership and management made the ISF institutions far more capable than they were previously. It was acknowledged that throughout Iraq, the police service and judicial system would take many years to operate effectively by western standards and that the institutional reform that was required by the IPS could only be delivered by an Iraqi led solution, through the Ministry of Interior. But the UK continued to work hard to engender this solution. The UK was assisting the IPS by; mentoring

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national and local training of Iraqi Police Colleges, enabling them to move to a self-sustaining training effort; providing expert advice to the IMOI to improve their management of the Police Services of Iraq; and helping to develop specific niche training programmes for the IPS in leadership, internal affairs, and investigations.

56. At this point the UK had helped to train over 22,000 members of the IPS, including 7,760 police officers in Basra. Basra was able to field a total of over 15,000 police but there were significant challenges with competence, corruption and infiltration by militias. There remained 35 UK police advisers that were deployed in Iraq, with the majority in Basra, to build the capability of the local police.

57. The UK focus on training the Iraqi Army moved away from the 10th Division, who had progressed to operating effectively without any coalition assistance, to training 14th Division. Of which there were additional Brigades planned for mid-2008 (3<sup>rd</sup>) and early 2009 (4<sup>th</sup>) to provide a full operating capability to Basra Operational Command. The fully formed 14 (IA) Div equated to approximately 12,000 to 15,000 troops. UK forces also continued to support Iraqi Army trainers at the Divisional Training Centre at Shaibah, focusing on tactical training for Iraqi Army recruits. Specialist training teams also provided training and mentoring to increase 14 Division's capacity in niche areas including signals (communications), transportation, logistics and surveillance. Strong emphasis was also being put on ensuring that the Iraqi Army could sustain and maintain itself and the UK Logistics Battalion was heavily involved.

58. By TELIC XI the UK had helped to train over 20,000 Iraqi Army troops, including an estimated 12,000 that were serving with 10 (IA) Division. Across Iraq, there were more than 444,000 ISF that had been trained and equipped by the Coalition, including approximately 238,000 IMOI and 202,000 IMOD.

#### **TELIC XII: MAY 08 – OCT 08**

59. UK troops in the south of Iraq had trained over 22,000 policemen and 20,000 Iraqi soldiers since 2004; first as part of building up the 10th Iraqi Army Division in South East Iraq and, from 2007, training the 14th Division in Basra. The 10th Division proved its military effectiveness when it was deployed to Baghdad as part of Iraqi/US operations to combat Al Qa'eda and other insurgents. In total, the coalition had trained and equipped more than 542,000 ISF personnel, including approximately 265,000 IMOI and 242,000 IMOD.

#### **TELIC XIII: NOV 08 – APR 09**

60. The role played by UK combat forces drew to a close with the conclusion of TELIC XIII. The final UK mission under Operation TELIC was to complete the key task of mentoring and training the 14th Division of the Iraqi Army in Basra. The UK completed all remaining military tasks by 31 May 2009 and all troops were withdrawn from Iraq by the end of July.

61. The 14th Division is now an effective force, firmly in control of Basra. Here and elsewhere in Iraq, a stable security situation is allowing economic growth, reconstruction, and political progress to take root.

62. Across Iraq, more than 558,000 ISF have been trained and equipped by the Coalition, including over 290,000 IMOI and over 260,000 IMOD.

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
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Annexes:

- A. Coalition Command Structure
- B. GCPP Projects for FY03/04
- C. Initial SSR Objectives 2003
- D. UK Based Training
- E. Iraqi Security Force Manning 2004-2009
- F. Bibliography

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## COALITION COMMAND STRUCTURE<sup>2</sup>



The Multi-National Security Transition Command Iraq (MNSTC-I) was established on June 28 2004, building on previous efforts under the Coalition Provisional Authority. The command is responsible for developing, organizing, training, equipping, and sustaining the Iraqi Security Ministries and their associated Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). The command achieves this through the Coalition Military Assistance and Training Team (CMATT), the Coalition Police Assistance and Training Team (CPATT) and the Joint Headquarters Advisory Support Team (JHQ-ST).

As the lead country in MND(SE) the UK was responsible for ensuring public safety locally in the southern sector and for contributing to strategic MNF-I objectives for the transition of Iraq into a peaceful, law-abiding, rights-based, democratic and prosperous state.

<sup>2</sup> As of June 2004 (TELIC IV)



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**GCPP PROJECTS FOR FY03/04<sup>3</sup>**

Project No.	Owner	Title	Funds (£) 03/04	Summary
SSR 1	FCO	Police training Amman	3,029,611	100 UK Police Trainers to train up to 35,000 Police in Amman and Basra
SSR 2 <sup>4</sup>	FCO	Senior Iraqi Police Command Training Course	334,220	40 Senior police officers to attend 6-week residential police college at Bramshill
SSR 3	FCO	Project Dixon	1,950,000	To improve responsiveness of Emergency Services by supplying handheld (3200) and vehicle (300) radios, and a commercial vehicle. Contract with Motorola
SSR 4	FCO/CPA	Vetting system for Iraqi Administration	15,000	Scoping study to develop Iraqi vetting system. Fujitsu Services contractor visit in October
SSR 5	FCO/MOD/CMATT	CMATT – New Iraqi Army (NIA) Training Aids	50,000	Provision of classroom and field training aids
SSR 6	FCO/HM Customs	Iraqi Customs Senior Managers study visit to UK	14,906	To equip Senior Iraqi Customs Managers with expertise to efficiently manage the business of Customs work in an effective manner compatible with a democratic state
SSR 7	FCO/MOD/CMATT	CMATT – New Iraqi Army (NIA) Officer Training (Induction)	32,000	To screen and induct NIA officer candidates
SSR 8	FCO/MOD/CMATT	CMATT – New Iraqi Army (NIA) Officer Training (Jordan)	35,000	Provide leader training for NIA officer candidates
SSR 9	FCO/MOD/CMATT	CMATT – New Iraqi Army (NIA) Officer Training (NCOs)	17,500	Provide leader training for NCOs
SSR 10	PJHQ/MOD	Equipping 5 <sup>th</sup> ICDC Battalion	213,000	Provide basic equipment and uniforms
SSR 11	PJHQ/MOD/CMATT	Training ICDF Officer Corps	63,933	Ten Iraqis trained at BRNC Dartmouth for eleven weeks

<sup>3</sup> Projects approved by Committee/IPU between October and December 2003

<sup>4</sup> Project Cancelled

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### INITIAL SSR OBJECTIVES 2003<sup>5</sup>

#### POLICE<sup>6</sup>

- Two Deputy Chief Constables (DCCs) (Baghdad and Basra) to help to develop a coherent and deliverable CPA policing strategy
- Establish a police training centre in Jordan to deliver 3 and 6 week training programmes
- One DCC in Basra and 21 police officers as required by Police Advisory Team (PAT) plan for reform in South East Iraq
- Up to 100 UK police officers to establish a regional training centre in MND(SE) and deliver 3 week police training and supervisor programmes
- Four police officers to establish a UK commitment to the Police Joint Coordination Centre in Baghdad focusing on improved police/military cooperation
- Iraq Specific Police Commanders Course run by CENTREX at Bramshill to increase command capacity at a senior level in the IPS

#### IRAQI MILITARY<sup>7</sup>

- UK team of 9 military personnel headed by a Brigadier seconded to CMATT (total 148 personnel) to establish and train New Iraqi Army (NIA)
- Train infantry battalions and establish an Officers' Academy
- One 2\* SCS to establish a civilian MOD (the Defence Support Agency)
- Two RN SO1s to establish New Iraqi Navy
- One SO1 to establish Army Air Corps/New Iraqi Air Force as priorities dictate
- Training team for Basra River Service
- Review of NIA training needs and establishment of CMATT training requirement and syllabus
- Deployment of 6 – 12 UK Junior NCOs to enhance training programme

#### IRAQI CIVIL DEFENCE CORPS<sup>8</sup>

- Training ICDC under MND(SE) auspices to develop basic security forces capable of guarding Iraqi installations and facilities
- One SO1 on short-term deployment to scope potential for establishing a Iraqi Military Academy

#### CUSTOMS

- Two posts to establish Iraqi Customs as a revenue collection and anti smuggling force operating at points of entry and recruit a Head of Department and 3 Deputies
- Properly trained Iraqi Customs Officers
- One post to facilitate training of Senior Iraqi management team in UK

#### IMMIGRATION

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<sup>5</sup> DRAFT dated 16 September 2003

<sup>6</sup> FCO Lead (United Nations Department)

<sup>7</sup> MOD Lead

<sup>8</sup> MOD Lead

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- Emphasis on the repatriation of refugees and reopening of Baghdad International Airport
- Policy to establish border controls
- CPA has identified a requirement for a senior post in the MOI to develop plans and policy for immigration

#### INTELLIGENCE

- Deputy Director Intelligence in CPA to be filled by a secondee responsible for developing a vetting system

#### PRISONS

- Two posts to re-establish the management of Iraqi prisons
- Seven prison officers to fill roles in CPA
- Initial plans indicate a requirement for 87 prison officers to assist with training and development of Iraqi Prison Service

#### FACILITIES PROTECTION SERVICE

- Security Consultant to oil industry

#### JUSTICE

- One post to complement PJHQ CPA embed

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## UK BASED TRAINING

### Programmed Activities:

#### 2005-2006

- Two NIA students to attend Army Commissioning Course at RMA Sandhurst
- One student to attend Royal College of Defence Studies
- One NIA student Advanced Command and Staff Course (ACSC) at the Joint Services Command and Staff College (JSCSC)
- Development of Iraqi Maritime Forces - doctrine/tactics; ELT; EEZ/border control/counter smuggling
- Iraqi National Guard EOD training for three brigades
- Two Iraqi Air Force students to attend Initial Officer Training at RAFC Cranwell
- Two Iraqi Navy students to attend RN Young Officers' Course at BRNC Dartmouth

#### 2006-2007

- One student to attend Royal College of Defence Studies
- One Iraqi Air Force student to attend Advanced Command and Staff Course (ACSC) at the Joint Services Command and Staff College (JSCSC)
- Two NIA students to attend Army Commissioning Course at Royal Military Academy Sandhurst
- Seven Iraqi Air Force students to attend Initial Officer Training at RAFC Cranwell
- Two Iraqi Navy students to attend RN Young Officers' Course at BRNC Dartmouth
- Development of Iraqi Maritime Forces - doctrine/tactics; English Language Training; EEZ/border control/counter smuggling
- Acquisition and procurement training
- Four Iraqis to attend Farnborough International Airshow

#### 2007-2008

- Two NIA students to attend Army Commissioning Course at Royal Military Academy Sandhurst
- Two Iraqi Air Force students to attend Initial Officer Training at RAFC Cranwell
- Two Iraqi Navy students to attend RN Young Officers' Course at BRNC Dartmouth
- Development of Iraqi Maritime Forces - doctrine/tactics; English Language Training; EEZ/border control/counter smuggling
- Seven students to participate in Flying Training Programme in UK
- Exclusive Economic Zone Course Overseas (Reserve Activity)
- 3-stage English Language Training project
- Train-the-Trainer courses for up to 48 Iraqi SNCOs/Officers
- Two Iraqis invited to attend DSEi

#### 2008-2009

- One NIA Officer to attend the Advanced Command and Staff Course (ACSC) at the Joint Services Command and Staff College (JSCSC)
- Two NIA students to attend Army Commissioning Course at Royal Military Academy Sandhurst
- Six Iraqi Air Force students to attend Initial Officer Training at RAFC Cranwell

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- Six Iraqi Navy students to attend RN Young Officers' Course at BRNC Dartmouth
- Development of Iraq Maritime Forces - doctrine/tactics; English Language Training: EEZ/border control/counter smuggling
- Training Programme in UK to include English Language Training, Initial Officer Training and Flying Training for fifteen students
- One Iraqi Officer to attend the International Intelligence Directors' Course
- Two Iraqi Navy students to attend the International Small Ships Command Course
- Two students to attend the International Principal Warfare Officers' Course (B) in UK
- Visa extensions for 11 self-funded students.

2009-2010

- Army Commissioning Course at Royal Military Academy Sandhurst
- Royal Navy Young Officers' Course at BRNC Dartmouth
- Initial Officer Training at Royal Air Force Cranwell
- International Intelligence Directors' Course
- International Principal Warfare Officers' Course (B) in UK
- Exclusive Economic Zone Protection Officer Course in the UK
- International Small Ships Command Course
- International Sub Lieutenant (Executive) Course
- International Coastal Operations Course
- Combined Arms Tactics Course
- International Battle Group Commanders' Course in UK
- International Urban Operations Course
- International Signals Communication Officer
- Defence Diplomacy Scholarship Scheme: Managing Defence in the Wider Security Context Course in the UK
- Visit by Iraqi delegation to UK training establishments
- Royal College of Defence Studies and associated English Language Training if required


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**IRAQI SECURITY FORCE MANNING 2004 – 2009<sup>9</sup>**

	IMOI	IMOD	Total
TELIC I			
TELIC II			
TELIC III			
TELIC IV			
TELIC V	70,000	62,000	150,000
TELIC VI	107,600	98,600	206,000
TELIC VII	134,900	115,100	250,000
TELIC VIII	180,800	131,600	312,400
TELIC IX	193,300	139,800	333,100
TELIC X	194,200	165,500	359,700
TELIC XI	238,000	202,000	444,000
TELIC XII	265,000	242,000	542,000
TELIC XIII	290,000	260,000	558,000



<sup>9</sup> Lack of comparative data prior to 2004 (TELIC V) due to inconsistent reporting at the time

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