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24 July 2008

## **STABILISATION AND DEPLOYED CIVIL EFFECT**

### **Issue**

1. The National Security Strategy and recent statements by the Prime Minister have identified the need to strengthen the UK's, and international, ability to deploy civilian stabilisation experts. A Cabinet Office Review Team was created at the beginning of June 2008 which has worked closely with Departments. I enclose an interim report. It would be helpful to have any views which Ministers want to feed into the work, before full advice is formally submitted in the autumn.

### **Background**

2. Civil effect activity builds public confidence and support for an enduring peace and focuses on the 'survival functions' of a state such as public order and the rule of law, basic public services and economic stability. To succeed, it needs to be an integrated effort, bringing together civilian agencies (including multilateral agencies), the military and local partners.

3. The UK's current civil effect capability has developed without a clear long-term strategy, and more specific guidance is required on what our capability goals should be. Our assessment is that existing mechanisms do not provide confidence that current activity is effective (in terms of the skills and experience of the personnel deployed) or sustainable (in terms of our ability to maintain current commitments indefinitely). Moreover, there is no robust basis on which we could calculate our "standby" or "total" capacity - of civil servants, police or contractors/consultants. If we are to make real progress then we need to agree broad policy objectives for the capability around which we can design effective structures (or improve the existing ones).

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4. In taking forward the work, it would be helpful to have Ministers' views on:

- the extent to which we are seeking to build on the lessons of current campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan to develop a capability that will be significantly better able to deliver civil effect in such exceptionally demanding environments, alongside UK, coalition or multilateral forces;
- the emphasis we should put on supporting regional capacity building and multilateral engagement in a wider range of conflict and fragile state scenarios; and
- whether the recommendations set out at paragraph three of the paper, which *inter alia* set out the proposed scale and composition of a possible UK standby capability as the basis for further, detailed work, are pitched at the right level.

6. Officials will put forward further advice in the autumn, with detailed proposals for the actions HMG could take to strengthen its capability to deliver civil effect. That will include: identifying which proposals should be taken forward as priorities; timescales for action; and cost implications.

7. I am sending a copy of this letter to Peter Ricketts (FCO), Paul Rimmer and Bill Jeffrey (MOD), and Minouche Shafik (DFID), and James Quinault (HMT), Richard Westlake and Vic Hogg (Home Office), and to Gus O'Donnell.

MARGARET ALDRED

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## STABILISATION AND DEPLOYED CIVIL EFFECT

### INTRODUCTION

1. The National Security Strategy and recent statements by the Prime Minister identified the need to strengthen the UK's, and international, ability to deploy civilian stabilisation experts. A Cabinet Office led Review was launched at the beginning of June 2008, with the aim of producing preliminary recommendations on capability requirements and delivery options for Ministers before the summer recess, with a final set of implementation recommendations to follow in September 2008. This is the Review Team's interim report, and invites Ministers to give direction on the level of ambition we should have for development of the UK's civil effect capability and our policy for encouraging development of wider multilateral capabilities.

### AIM

2. This paper provides:
- an overview of our current capability for the deployment of civil effect in stabilisation operations; and
  - options for future development of civil effect capability, with indicative costs.

### RECOMMENDATIONS

3. Ministers are recommended to:
- a) Note that current capabilities for civil effect need further development to meet national commitments and aspirations for our multilateral contribution.
  - b) Note that we intend to develop detailed proposals for a civil effect capability which would:
    - i. support joint civil-military stabilisation operations and deliver at least 100 civilians and 50 police continuously deployed, with appropriate readiness and training standards;
    - ii. make a further contribution of up to 100 civilians and 100 police, with similar qualities and standards, to a wider range of multilateral deployments;
    - iii. identify an overall structure of at least 1000 personnel under an over-arching identity as the UK Civilian Standby Capability; and

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- iv. incorporate a Stabilisation Volunteer Network, enabling us to identify and draw upon a wider range of potential volunteers than existing mechanisms.
- c) Note that such a capability would cost around £8M to £10M per annum to maintain, depending on the precise implementation route chosen; and that there would be more substantial deployment costs. Funding issues will need to be resolved.
- d) Agree that we should focus our efforts in developing multilateral capability on:
  - i. establishing a shared international assessment of need;
  - ii. encouraging current multilateral efforts (including recent Danish proposals for a roster of civil experts) by seeking agreed national targets for contributions, and leading by example; and
  - iii. seeking to improve multilateral structures, including, over the long term, by developing a UN civil capability equivalent to the (military) DPKO, and, in the shorter term, supporting development of the existing EU Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability.
- e) Note that we intend to consider what scope there might be for further support to regional capacity building in addition, or possibly as an alternative, to the UK's capability goals described in the paper.

#### SCOPE AND DEFINITIONS

4. There is no single agreed definition of stabilisation or civil effect, but we have assumed the following definitions, which broadly describe the scope of the review.

"Stabilisation" is support to places emerging from violent conflict in:

- preventing or reducing violence;
- protecting people and key institutions;
- promoting political processes which lead to greater stability; and
- preparing for longer term development and non-violent politics.

"Civil effect" is activity to build public confidence and support for an enduring peace and focuses on the 'survival functions' of a state:

- public order and the rule of law;
- basic public services; and
- economic stability.

For success, an integrated effort - bringing together the efforts of civilian agencies (including multilateral), military and local partners - is required.

5. In practice, many of the current issues around stabilisation have arisen where combat or counter-insurgency operations are still continuing, as in Helmand and Iraq, or where the security environment remains very difficult, as in Sudan and the DRC. But the international demand for civil effect skills goes wider. Discussions in the EU and UN about stabilisation and peacebuilding have also addressed a range of post-conflict scenarios where the aim is to strengthen public institutions and enable states to function effectively (e.g. Bosnia, Moldova, Nepal, Palestine).

#### POLICY PRIORITIES

6. The UK's civil effect capability has developed without a clear long-term strategy, and more specific guidance is required on what our capability goals should be. If we are to make real progress, then we need to agree broad policy objectives for the capability around which we can design effective structures (or improve the existing ones). We believe that Ministers need to consider further the priorities they attach to the two main areas of capability.

a) Joint civil-military stabilisation campaigns. To what extent are we seeking to build on the lessons of current campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan in order to develop a capability that will be significantly better able to deliver civil effect in such exceptionally demanding environments, alongside UK, coalition or multilateral forces?

b) Developing multilateral responses. How much emphasis should we put on supporting regional capacity building and multilateral engagement in a wider range of conflict and fragile state scenarios?

These are not mutually exclusive options. A capability set designed to complement expeditionary military activity will generate personnel and skills with wider potential application, including in support of multilateral activities. Nevertheless, we should determine the level of capability, and the resources we are prepared to commit, to each.

#### CURRENT CAPABILITY

7. HMG currently deploys around 50 civil servants, 80 civilian contractors and 140 serving and retired police officers on what can be defined (more or less loosely) as stabilisation tasks, involving the delivery of civil effect in post-conflict situations. Military personnel also engage in these activities, for the most part in circumstances where it is not possible for civilians to operate and linked to the pursuit of military objectives. In Helmand, some of this effort is more directly driven by civil objectives, including 24 Royal Military Police (RMP) mentoring Afghan National Police. From November, there will be five Military Stabilisation Teams of six personnel each acting in support of civilian stabilisation officers at the Forward Operating Bases.

8. Of our current deployed civilians, about 120 are working within a national framework, paid for either by the Stabilisation Aid Fund or directly by departments: 50 civil servants; 20 other civilians; and nearly 50 police (half of these retired and recruited via contractors), mainly in Iraq and Afghanistan. The UK currently supplies around 150 individuals to multilateral peace support operations, run by the UN, EU or OSCE. The latter are administered by the FCO and paid for from the discretionary part of the tri-departmental Peacekeeping Budget, after assessed costs to multilateral organisations have been paid. 90 of these are police and 60 are civilian experts working on a range of tasks (including senior leadership, judicial support, security analysis, logistics, political advice, project management).

9. There is no specifically identifiable cadre of civil servants with relevant skills and experience on which we can draw for this capacity, although individual departments do seek to identify pools of potential volunteers. The Stabilisation Unit maintains a number of framework agreements with contractors who can provide people or relevant services for stabilisation or other conflict-related missions, as well as a database of civilian experts with relevant skills who might be available for deployment. This database holds over 800 names, but the majority have not been subject to adequate screening and details held are not sufficient in most cases to enable individuals to be readily matched to specific requirements. Individuals on the database are assumed to be prepared to operate in demanding environments. But, even if the database were fully up to date, many will either not be available when required, deployed elsewhere on contracts for third parties, or will need further training and preparation before deployment. Each operation will also require a different skills mix. Readiness and availability are, therefore, difficult to assess with accuracy. We estimate that 30 to 40 of our currently deployed civilian experts have been recruited through the database, but the Stabilisation Unit believe that it could support the deployment of at least 90 at any one time, perhaps more depending on the skills mix in demand and available at the time.

10. Our 140 deployed serving and retired police officers work either in executive roles (as in Helmand, or embedded in local police forces as in Kosovo), or in mentoring/training roles. Many of those performing executive roles are from the Ministry of Defence Police (MDP) - 47 of the current total; others are from domestic police forces (56); retired officers deployed via an FCO database (14); or via contractors (23). In response to the EU's Civilian Headline Goal (14,000 civilians overall, the UK has undertaken to make 475 police officers available for deployment. The FCO database holds records of about 500 officers who have expressed an interest, but screening has established that only 225 would be suitable for deployment. Chief Constables hold a veto over the deployment of individual officers to particular missions. In practice, force generation for any requirement is slow and uncertain. A new International Police Assistance Board (IPAB) has been formed to act as a clearing house, matching available officers to requirements. Even with this functioning well we think it unlikely that the MDP and domestic police forces would be capable of generating more than about 150 deployed officers for a sustained period.



11. Our assessment is that existing mechanisms do not give sufficient confidence that current operational activity is effective (in terms of the skills and experience of the personnel deployed) or sustainable (in terms of our ability to maintain current commitments indefinitely). It is also difficult to calculate our "standby" or "total" civil effect capacity - of civil servants, police or contractors/consultants - in a way which would stand up to external scrutiny.

### POLICY IMPLICATIONS

#### A. Joint Civil-Military Stabilisation Campaigns

##### *Skills*

12. Key stabilisation tasks cover a wide range of skills and functions, including: leadership; Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR); strategic communications; economic reform; governance and public services; security and justice. In most campaigns, we would wish to focus at the outset on effective delivery where we can have the most impact on the potential for strategic success, namely: rule of law, governance and finance. Language and cultural skills will be critical, as will generic skills in e.g. leadership and project management, as well as relevant experience of diplomatic and military environments. In most cases, the best way to secure such specialised skills quickly is by deploying a mix of civil servants, contracted specialists and police officers. Individual skills are not, however, enough on their own. They need to fit within a framework of effective doctrine and procedures, developed through structured learning from operational experience and regular exercises.

##### *Scale*

13. Defence planning assumes a requirement to be able to mount three concurrent military expeditionary operations. For the foreseeable future, the most significant of those will be in Afghanistan; any other operations will be at smaller scale. Not all contingent expeditionary tasks for which the MOD plans will involve stabilisation, or require complementary civil effect to be employed. But it is also possible that we would wish to mount some civil effect operations in the absence of a significant UK military component, or to continue delivering civil effect after the military component has been withdrawn. **Overall, therefore, it is reasonable to set a baseline target for deployable civil effect capability broadly complementary to our expeditionary military capability, that would enable three enduring, concurrent operations, one of Helmand scale and two smaller, to be supported.**

14. Numbers and capability mixes for any operation, whether military or civil, will vary according to a wide range of factors. But for the most part the numbers of UK civilian personnel required to support the range of activities will be small compared to the military effort, and the majority will be involved in planning, advisory and mentoring roles rather than executive delivery itself.

If the current Helmand effort is taken as a model, **we would need to be able to field around 100 civilians and 50 police at any one time to enable three concurrent operations to be adequately supported.**

#### *Readiness & Endurance*

15. Readiness is an important factor, and one where current capabilities fall further short of what is required. Very few civilians may be required in a permanent cadre, beyond that provided by the Stabilisation Unit itself. Nevertheless, defence planning assumes the capability to mount small scale operations well within the two to three months it takes to undertake training and security clearance for civilian experts. Ideally, the leading civilian participants should be appointed as quickly as possible in any significant joint operation, so that they can undertake planning, collective training and preparation alongside the military units. Our future capability should, therefore be able to identify, clear, train and make available a significant proportion of its total personnel at high levels of readiness. That is likely to be a significant cost driver. More work is needed to establish the requirement in detail. We also need to define the maximum level of commitments for which we would seek to maintain or reconstitute a high readiness civil capability.

16. Any capability should reflect the assumption that most stabilisation operations will need to be sustained for a considerable time. The factors affecting the endurance of military units and individual personnel in joint campaigns are not identical to those for civilians, but we do need to be able to provide for personnel to be replaced in theatre on a planned basis, ensure that tour lengths are reasonable, and that we build on rather than burn out operational experience.

#### B. Developing Multilateral Responses

##### *Skills*

17. Civilians on multilateral deployments require a similar range of sector-specific, regional/linguistic and generic skills as those on UK-led missions. But they may not need as much experience of working alongside the military, and the operating environments will sometimes be less hostile. As with national operations, effective and agreed doctrine is also required to provide a common framework for collective effort – that remains a substantial challenge in the multilateral environment.

##### *Scale*

18. The UK currently responds to multilateral requests for support on an ad hoc basis. International demand for civilian skills in stabilisation is rising. The EU's experience and ambitions in stabilisation are growing, and member states have not yet met the Civilian Headline Goal. We and others have identified a capacity gap as one of the main issues hampering UN efforts to address early recovery (alongside gaps in leadership and funding). But not enough is known about current multilateral stabilisation needs to develop a



clear sense of what the scale of UK or international ambitions should be in this area. To get to this point, further work is needed, including:

- **A shared international assessment of need.** Stabilisation, peacebuilding, early recovery, transition and statebuilding are loose and evolving terms and international consensus on the actions and skills required has not yet emerged. A comprehensive view of where the gaps are would allow organisations and countries to develop capability accordingly.

- **A pooled supply of expertise.** In tandem with establishing international demand for civilian post-conflict expertise, we should encourage efforts to establish levels of supply. Denmark is studying the feasibility of an international clearing house or roster of civil effects experts. We will need to consider how many of our experts we would wish to make available for deployment via such a roster. We can encourage others to boost their own supply of experts by setting agreed national targets for an international clearing house, or for the EU Civilian Headline Goal, or for another mechanism, with an ambitious UK target setting an example.

- **Improved multilateral structures.** While police (like the military) on UN missions are deployed to the Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), there is no equivalent UN structure to absorb civilian experts. Civilian members of UN missions are taken on as UN employees, and there are national quotas (which the UK exceeds) limiting our ability to deploy. We could equip the UN with a civilian equivalent of DPKO, allowing it to deploy civilians on the same basis as police or military personnel, and with the planning capacity to co-ordinate other international players in theatre. In the short term, we may find that the EU is a more effective vehicle for the rapid deployment of any increased UK civil effect capability. It has developed a Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) which provides an operational headquarters for civilian deployments. Better integration with NATO military planning capabilities would help further.

19. These steps would enable us to establish the skills and numbers of people we (and others) want to have available for deployment to multilateral missions. In the absence of such clarity, capability could be linked to the wider ability to mount civil/military missions. If we were looking to build a larger capability, still able to deal with the most demanding stabilisation operations but including a wider range of multilateral or multinational scenarios where UK forces might not be involved, we could double our overall deployment aspiration, to around 200 civilians and (more or less matching current deployments) 150 police concurrently.

20. Contacts with international partners and multilateral organisations suggest that increased numbers of British civilians would not, on their own, necessarily improve global ability to achieve civil effect. The quality and skills of individuals deployed are more important than sheer numbers. Even where

British individuals have the right sector or generic skills, experts with a similar regional or cultural background to the local population might be preferred. If we wished to put more resources into global civil effect capability beyond those implied by the capability goals summarised in paragraph 21 below, we should probably focus on **building capacity at the regional level**. There are number of routes for doing this: training individuals in key countries direct; funding regional organisations to train nationals of their member states; funding other countries' multilateral deployments over and above our assessed contributions to the UN (which could be more cost-effective than deploying our own nationals); or enlarging and expanding our own databases to include foreign nationals or diaspora communities, making them available to multilateral organisations and giving them the same training as we would for UK nationals on our rosters.

#### CAPABILITY GOALS

21. A joint civil-military requirement to deliver against more demanding stabilisation operations, within both national and multilateral deployment frameworks, leads to a capability with the following broad characteristics (summarised in tabular form, and compared to our current capability at Annex A):

- a standing structure able to develop coherent doctrine, systems, procedures, contingency plans, individual and collective training and, critically, able to contribute fully to strategic decision making and campaign planning from the outset of any operation (the current Stabilisation Unit is not set up to meet this requirement in full);
- a screened, trained and capable deployable civil service cadre of around 200, from which we would expect to be able to deploy around 50 at any one time;
- a fully resourced database of 800-1000 deployable civilian experts, enabling deployment of 150 at one time;
- a number of framework agreements to access specific expertise; and
- a civil police cadre able to deploy at least 50 officers in armed executive policing roles (this capability is effectively provided already by the MDP, although it may not be fully resourced) together with up to another 100 officers drawn from domestic forces (including some retired officers).

**Properly resourced and organised, we believe such a capability would be consistent with the Prime Minister's commitment to create a 1000-strong UK civilian standby capacity, and we could seek to give it a formal overarching identity.**

#### DELIVERY OPTIONS AND COSTS

22. We can raise this capability from a number of sources.

23. **The Civil Service.** To increase the supply and sustainability of civil service deployments into stabilisation missions, particularly those with the

ability to plan civil effects efforts, integrate them with military actions, mentor central or regional government officials, plan strategic communications, etc, we would need a more formal central database of trained civil servants, and/or a more defined cadre with a much stronger career focus on security and conflict roles (both deployed and in Whitehall, spanning the international departments). Costs will vary according to assumptions, but a database of **200**, with a significant proportion pre-trained for deployment, would cost at least **£1M** pa to maintain. That would be a relatively small pool against a requirement to deploy 50 concurrently – larger overall numbers might well be needed. Costs would rise depending on how much priority was placed on career management of the pool or cadre.

24. **Database of Deployable Civilian Experts.** Stabilisation Unit's current database covers just over 900 personnel. Information on some of the people on the database is scanty, and SU are improving it, but there is scope to upgrade the database to reflect a higher level of ambition. We estimate that an enhancement of the existing database to **1,000** people, with 10-15% deployable, would cost **£300-500K** to develop and **£3.5M** per annum to maintain with the majority of personnel on a fairly low level of readiness; increased readiness would cost more.

25. **Framework Agreements.** Databases can be supplemented by standing contracts with companies (including Private Military and Security Companies, management consultants or NGOs) who can provide individuals or expertise as required, including at short notice. To keep companies interested and engaged, and to build assurance that the right people with the right skills will be available when we need them, such agreements need to be used. Once set up, the contracts themselves do not cost much to maintain, and we do not incur the set-up and maintenance costs of running our own database. Deployment costs are, however, much higher than through other mechanisms (see para. 30). While personnel deployed under framework agreements are clearly part of our active civil effect effort, it is less easy to assign a value to them in terms of a standby capability headcount.

26. **Civil police.** Police support for stabilisation falls into two distinct areas, with different skill sets and probably different types of officer required for each:

- Armed executive policing, often working in violent environments to restore order alongside the military. MDP are likely to be the main UK source of this capability (the Met and PSNI also have significant armed policing capabilities, but are unlikely to be able to release officers in large numbers). European partners with a gendarmerie tradition are better placed to supply this capability in large numbers than we are.
- Mentoring and training in "policing by consent", which is more likely in less violent environments. Domestic police forces are seen as having these skills in more depth than the MDP.

27. Both of these skill sets can be supplemented by retired officers recruited via databases or framework agreements. For UK-led civil/military missions, MDP are looking at ways in which they could provide the core capability. In addition, and particularly for multilateral missions, we should encourage the development of the International Police Assistance Board (IPAB) as a clearing house for requests. If Ministers wanted a substantial increase in the UK contribution to this area, we would need to work towards acceptance - by police forces, the Home Office and the devolved administrations - that international policing experience is a desirable attribute in their best officers and that international policing directly contributes to the safety of UK citizens. Separately, the FCO is carrying out a study of international policing which will look further at both potential demand for and options for improving supply of police.

28. The immediate requirement, however, is to consider further how we might demonstrate that we can meet our EU headline goal target of 475 deployable civilian police. We do not believe that this is a feasible target in current (or plausible future) circumstances for a total deployed capability. It would probably be better interpreted and presented as an aspiration to develop a more robust database of screened and, up to some level, trained police officers, who would support our requirement to field about 150 officers at any one time. We will need to look further at how this might be delivered in practice, although we would expect there to be additional costs (on a similar scale to those implied by other databases) if we sought to provide training to officers on standby.

29. **Volunteer Reserves.** MOD is working to establish a record of the civilian skills of reservists. We may be able to draw on that for civil effects missions, including potentially where other military personnel are not deployed. We do not yet know the numbers who might be available via this route, and they are unlikely to be large.

30. **Deployed Costs.** While costs for maintaining standby capabilities may be relatively modest, costs of deploying civilian personnel, particularly to demanding environments, are high. Typical costs for each civilian deployed to Helmand, before pay and allowances are taken into account, are estimated at around £400K per annum in transport, accommodation, supplies and security. For less demanding environments these 'platform' costs may be much lower. Even so, the capitation rate, including allowances, for a civil servant, police officer or deployed civilian expert would normally be in the range of £100K to £150K. Individuals deployed under framework arrangements with contractors are typically much more expensive, with annual fees (before platform costs are added) typically £250K to over £300K per person. The total annual costs for each individual deployed in the most demanding environments can therefore range from £500K to £800K. With 350 personnel deployed, on a range of operations, we could expect to be spending £100M to £140M to put people in the field. For each deployment, The high costs of fielding British experts will need to be balanced against other options for delivering civil effect eg aid or through employing local personnel.



*A civil reserve/volunteer corps?*

31. We have also looked at the possibility of a civil reserve or volunteer corps along the lines of elements of the civil reserve corps being developed by the US. The principle, essentially of a civilian version of the Volunteer Reserves, is an organisation which people could train with in their spare time (though probably with much less commitment than normal for military Volunteer Reserves). They would agree in principle to deploy to use their civilian skills if required and for a finite period (a few months to a year). Their employer would be legally obliged to allow their deployment and guarantee them a job on return. They would be paid on a similar basis to civil servants, while under training or deployed, possibly (as with the Volunteer Reserves) with top ups to compensate for any losses of earnings in their normal employment.

32. The advantage of this approach is that it draws upon a wider pool of people, who have relevant skills but who are not pursuing active careers in conflict, humanitarian or development assistance in the way that contractors employed under framework agreements or through databases would be. Some sector skills, including for example legal and financial, may be relatively under-represented via existing channels. However, the scheme also has drawbacks:

a) it is not clear that enough people with the right skills would be engaged via a reserve corps. The civilian skills needed in a conflict or post-conflict situation are often specialised (and if the task is not specialised, then we should probably be getting a local to do it) and are best undertaken by those with significant experience and the resilience necessary to cope with demanding environments;

b) for some specialisms, particularly medical (were that to be part of the requirement), we could be drawing on elements of the public services that already struggle to cope with the demands imposed by the Volunteer Reserves, and we could find that some employers would be less willing to support a scheme that was based on civilian rather than military service, and the exploitation of specific civilian skills in which they themselves had an investment (though initial soundings with the National Employers Advisory Board indicated that they would be supportive of deployments of members of the Volunteer Reserves in civilian roles);

c) it would be politically and legally difficult to include compulsory deployment in the scheme, so readiness and availability of personnel might not be high and would not be guaranteed;

d) a civil reserve corps would require considerable investment. Work by the Stabilisation Unit suggests that a corps of 1000, assuming that 10% are deployable at any one time, would cost at least £2.5m in start-up costs and £10.5m in annual running costs – compared with



£0.5m and £3.5m for providing an equivalent capability through a database;

e) a reserve corps offering worthwhile employment protection, other legal safeguards and financial incentives would require primary legislation. It is unlikely to be possible to expand the coverage of the existing Reserve Forces Act, as the military legal framework, and the obligations under law that it implies for individuals, would not be appropriate to personnel who are engaged and deployed as civilians. A Civil Reserve Corps Bill would represent largely uncharted legal and political territory.

33. There are, however, other ways in which we might seek to engage people with relevant skills who may be keen to volunteer. We could, for example, create a scheme that establishes links with a range of organisations and initiatives that already manage pools of British citizens with suitable skills. Such links could include local government employees (through the Local Government Association), NHS employees, employees of a number of blue chip companies (e.g. through the Defence Career Partnering programme), and those on existing overseas volunteer schemes (such as VSO). Individuals interested in volunteering would be screened by their respective organisations to assess their suitability for more demanding deployments using common criteria. The details of successful applicants could be added to our central database. The costs of setting up and running such a **Stabilisation Volunteer Network** could be modest, probably in the region of £300K to £500K per annum. If we assumed that individuals recruited onto the database in this way were offset against the overall requirement for civilian experts, we would need no further allocation of funds for training and security clearance. Such an approach also assumes that the legal and contractual arrangements for deploying such volunteers, and therefore the deployed costs, would be the same as for other deployable civilian experts.

#### NEXT STEPS

34. Subject to Ministers' views, the Review will now concentrate on more detailed examination of the feasibility, costs and specific implications of meeting the capability aspirations outlined at paragraphs 3b and 21 above. It will also consider possible changes in cross-Whitehall structures and governance, to improve effectiveness.

STABILISATION REVIEW TEAM

**Annex A**

**CAPABILITY GOALS**

Capability		Current		Projected	
		Total in pool	Currently Deployed on Stabilisation	Total in pool	Numbers concurrently deployable
Civil Service		No effective pool	c.50	>200	50
Deployable Civilian Expert Database		900	<50	1000	>100
Stabilisation Volunteer Network		N/A	N/A	Within DCE Database totals	
Police	MDP	N/K	c.50	475	50
	Domestic & Retired	225	c.90	Based on commitment to EU headline goal	100
<b>UK CIVILIAN STANDBY CAPABILITY (TOTAL)</b>				<b>1000-1675</b> (depending on approach to calculation)	
Framework Agreements		N/K	<30	N/K	Demand driven