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SoS: - no money - no movement

FROM:

- no UN mandate, no work alongside US

20 VS: Ext:

- 'irresponsible to go on planning as if there are going to be new resources, until we know there will be'

DATE: 17 February 2003

CC:

PS/PUSS
PS/Suma Chakrabarti
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Mark Lowcock
Peter Grant
Michael Mosselmans
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- not prepared to be involved in big US-led human effort without UN mandate (NB: not quite firm).

- Need to work up pressure for UNSCR talking about UN role.

- Can't do Kuwait fund base yet. Even if means we are playing catch-up later. Assessment team can go out - but no physical base yet.

To: 1. Carolyn Miller - Agreed. Once we have a steer from the SoS on the balance of effort we will work this up in greater detail. CM 17/2

Special Advisers

2. PS/Secretary of State

- Need answer on finance
- Dept. needs to examine conscience in event SoS leads about how much we do.

IRAQ - CONTINGENCY PLANNING: DEPLOYMENT PLAN

Issue

1. How the Secretary of State would like DFID to plan to deploy its limited human resources in support of the provision of humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi people in the event of conflict - in particular what balance to get between planning for an exemplary role in the southern zone, and support to the UN and wider international effort across the country and region.

- Need a doc saying: this is what we can do if x
this is what we can do if y
- (GB. danger SoS wants DFID to be as (un)generous as chip).

Recommendation

2. Subject to the Secretary of State's views, I recommend that we plan at this stage to be prepared to do all four of these activities:

- Support humanitarian needs nationally and in the region, primarily through the UN and Red Cross/Red Crescent movement
- Work alongside and influence humanitarian action by US DART teams
- Work alongside the UK military
- Undertake DFID bilateral humanitarian action

3. These activities are complementary and doing them all could maximise our impact - working in an exemplary way in a part of the country under UK

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military control (through activities b), c) and d)) will have greater influence if we are cooperating closely with UN and US delivery of assistance elsewhere in the country (through activities a) and b)).

4. To be prepared to do this, we need to take a number of pre-deployment decisions in the very near future (as set out at paragraph 23).

5. The balance of our financial efforts will depend on any indications of further resources from No.10/HMT. We recommend indicative allocations based on the current situation, ie that we do not have these resources and will only have access to limited CHAD, MENAD and contingency reserve funds (as set out at paragraph 24).

Timing

6. Urgent. A meeting is pencilled in the diary to discuss this on Tuesday at 4.30pm. The humanitarian role of the UK military will be discussed at a Chiefs of Defence Staff meeting on Wednesday at 9.30am. Given lead times for military planning (and DFID's own HR planning), we need to give a clearer steer to the military at this meeting of the role we think DFID would play and what we think they should be planning to do.

Publicity

7. None. The details of our contingency planning are not for public information. Our existing Press Line that DFID is preparing for a range of contingencies and working closely across the UK government and with relevant humanitarian actors.

Background and Argument

8. Our contingency planning work continues to look at a range of eventualities, and at refining the military options in Iraq to reduce the humanitarian risks. One of those eventualities is conflict resulting in substantial humanitarian needs to which the UK would want to respond. Although the timetable for the weapons inspections process and possible moves to increase a second UN SCR is now unclear, to be properly prepared for the roles ministers might want them to play, both the military and CHAD

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OT now need a more detailed policy steer on humanitarian deployment planning.

9. The Prime Minister, the Secretary of State and her Foreign and Defence counterparts agreed on Thursday that in the event of conflict involving the UK, the UK should take the lead on humanitarian issues in the southern zone of Iraq, and do an exemplary job on both the military and humanitarian front, with coordination but independence between the two. We need to balance this with our commitment to support the international system, particularly the UN, in humanitarian work across Iraq and the region. We need to prioritise our scarce human and financial resources between these activities.

10. We have discussed the "exemplary role" idea briefly with senior military and MoD officials and they are willing to contribute to it in circumstances where the military may be the only people able to deliver humanitarian assistance, or they are needed to facilitate access by others. We have been invited to present our ideas at a meeting of Chiefs of Defence Staff on Wednesday morning. Given military planning lead times, this discussion needs to move quickly into the detailed practicalities of deployment planning, including human resource, logistical and financial issues for both the military and DFID.

11. There are broadly speaking four ways of humanitarian working which we can envisage:

- a) Support humanitarian needs nationally and in the region, primarily through the UN and Red Cross/Red Crescent movement
- b) Work alongside and influence humanitarian action by US DART teams
- c) Work alongside the UK military
- d) Undertake DFID bilateral humanitarian action

Options a) and b) could be used to address humanitarian needs nationwide. Options b), c) and d) could be used in any areas under British control. Details on each of these options follow.

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Option a): Support to humanitarian needs through UN/ICRC, etc

12. The UN humanitarian agencies, the ICRC and the Iraqi Red Crescent, are crucial to an effective humanitarian response. DFID has already committed £3.5 million towards UN preparedness measures. This should be enhanced through intensifying our discussions with UN agencies by undertaking assessment missions to the Region to examine the status of preparedness and through secondments to support coordination mechanisms. Initially this would involve consultancy and equipment support to UN OCHA to establish a Humanitarian Information Centre (HIC) being set up in Larnaca. The UN agencies are pre-positioning food and non-food items in the Region and would engage in humanitarian action within Iraq as soon as safe to do so. They would immediately be able to support Iraqi and other nationals crossing into neighbouring countries. In the event of conflict the UN agencies will need early funding support for the first three months of response operation. **We should be ready to release funding support of around £10 million quickly towards the UN's first month's needs.**

13. In the immediate days post conflict, the ICRC could bear the burden of being the only organisation with international staff working within Iraq. ICRC has pre-positioned food and non food items in Jordan, Syria, Iran and Iraq for its response and would also be ready to support the Iraqi RC. The importance of ensuring that existing national coping systems remain intact cannot be underestimated and the role of the Red Cross/Crescent movement in supporting protection and provision of humanitarian relief will be vital. Following conflict the ICRC/IFRC are expected to launch an international appeal. **We should consider an immediate level of support to ICRC of around £5 million.**

14. International NGOs are unlikely to have a major role in providing immediate support, save a few with current programmes, notably CARE, SCF and MAG. Some NGOs may have an important role to play as implementing partners of the UN but we should discourage other NGOs without experience of Iraq from anticipating a response presence. Those NGOs already supported by DFID would be our most likely partners and may need additional funding support to increase their operational response to address

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urgent humanitarian needs in the areas in which they are working. **We should be prepared to consider support to NGO partners by setting aside an allocation of around £5 million.**

Option b): Working alongside US DART operations

15. This Option b) could play a role in both a national strategy and in supporting exemplary assistance in the southern zone. We understand that at present the US is planning to do humanitarian work across the country, including in any UK-controlled sector. If we are not content with this we would need to convince the US at a very senior level to change their plans and assure them that we are adequately resourced to play an exemplary role. This is not currently the case. **It may be more realistic to plan to supplement and influence US efforts in a UK sector.**

16. OFDA has stockpiles of commodities and equipment. USAID also has call down contracts with the private sector. This includes, for example, the ability to fully rehabilitate the port at Umm Qasr if destroyed and, if WFP fails to deliver, undertake food distributions. OFDA's Disaster Assessment Response Team (DART) will be 50 strong. Three field offices will be set up (Kuwait, Jordan and Turkey). There will be a small presence prior to military action, with teams being deployed 'at the last minute'. Teams will be made up of specialists from core sectors (including 5 food security specialists) and include coverage for asylum seekers (BPRM).

17. Although there is confidence in their operational and assessment capacity, they will be heavily influenced by the US military and risk being tasked with humanitarian action as directed by the US military rather than the priority need of the Iraqi people. It would be important for DFID to engage as closely as possible with the US DART to influence their actions for priority humanitarian need within Iraq and particularly any response actions considered in a UK area of operation (AOR). Whilst ensuring that any engagement didn't hinder our own potential operational capacity, **we should seek to work alongside the Kuwaiti base for DART operations to protect and supplement the proposed exemplary role for UK humanitarian action.**

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Option c) Working alongside the UK military

18. The UK military are increasingly aware that they may be called on to play a significant humanitarian role. They are considering how they might revise their plans and allocate existing human resources to do this. These military resources are expensive and beyond costs usually associated with humanitarian response but it is in the interest of UK and coalition objectives that such an additional allocation or diversion of military assets is considered. Given their own constraints, it could be highly advantageous if other coalition military units with specialist capabilities, particularly medical teams and NBC units, could supplement UK efforts where these are weakest. The shape of any military coalition is of course under detailed discussion. But we should add this perspective to these discussions – which of course further underlines the advantages of a second UN SCR backing any military action. We need to be able to retain a flexibility of response given that UN and other humanitarian organisations may not be able to operate at an early stage. In that circumstance we would need to rely on military forces supported by embedded DFID civil/military humanitarian advisers and/or a DFID operational team.

19. Although significant planning and preparedness has been undertaken, certain sectors appear to be poorly covered, these include, for example, fuel supply (supporting electricity generation and distribution systems), water and sanitation and the power sectors. A principle concern will be the security environment and the ability of agencies to engage. The UK military are keen for DFID to be able to undertake a humanitarian response effort in any area they may be allocated. Experience of previous crises, eg Kosovo and Afghanistan, and taking account of lessons learned, indicate that direct DFID/UK military humanitarian action can save lives alleviate suffering and assists the process towards recovery and stabilisation.

20. DFID could provide technical advice and support to UK military formations with the capacity and capability to intervene in relief activities. Also, the collateral benefits of limited interventions may help generate stability within communities. Quick Impact Projects (QIPs)

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supported by DFID funding could achieve this. **Initially, for the first month, up to £5 million should be available for UK military QIPs.**

Option d): DFID bilateral humanitarian action

21. The military may also provide the security and logistics capability to support direct DFID interventions. This would involve supporting DFID to undertake assessments and depending on priority needs potentially including the maintenance and management of key infrastructure including water and sanitation, transport infrastructure and electricity generation and transmission infrastructure in an AOR. Under these circumstances DFID would assist with technical programme support directly or via specialist contractors retained internationally. However, it has to be noted that our human resource capacity is limited (CHAD-OT can provide around 25 specialists, including recruiting additional experts) and the scale of need could be immense and we may face problems not previously encountered, notably the threat of CBW. Therefore, we should concentrate on those tasks where our experience and expertise would add most value, working alongside coalition military where necessary and with US DART capacity where it would enhance humanitarian response.

22. To respond to humanitarian needs DFID will need to have immediate funds and resources available to support those tried and tested partner agencies to respond when the security environment is permissive. Based on an assessment of critical needs, the package would include the funding of humanitarian partner agencies, the funding of DFID and UK military QIPS and dispatching relief commodities (such as tents, blankets, plastic sheeting). **£10 million may be needed for the first month for a rapid response capacity, including the cost of CHAD deployments.**

Enhanced preparedness and response plans

23. Depending on the Secretary of State's views, there are a number of further pre-deployment steps which we need to initiate now to be adequately prepared to play these roles effectively. To be able to have the capacity to shape planning on the ground and respond immediately to humanitarian need, when safe to do so, the following actions need to be taken forward as soon as possible. If we do not have people and assets in place and ready in

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time, we will not be able to respond quickly and as may be needed. Once conflict has begun logistical constraints will make it extremely difficult to respond unless we have put the preparations in place.

- Establish a forward base in Kuwait. The establishment of a forward base (including pre-positioning Field Office assets) will allow DFID to build its capacity for deployment into Iraq as humanitarian needs arise and security allows. This could potentially include the establishment of a field presence in a UK military AOR and/or Baghdad. Pre-positioning would allow DFID to have an immediate response capability when required.
- Deploy a Humanitarian Adviser to Amman to liaise and work with humanitarian partners.
- Undertake regional assessment missions. This should include visits to Larnaca (UN regional humanitarian coordination centre), Cairo (regional offices of WFP and WHO), Turkey and Iran to further liaise with partner agencies.
- Civil-military Humanitarian Adviser to General Officer Commanding UK military's 1 Division and undertake regular visits to CENTCOM (Qatar) to continue refining of military options.
- Secondments to support humanitarian coordination. Initially, deploying consultants and equipment to support UN OCHA establish a Humanitarian Information Centre (HIC). This will initially be set-up in Cyprus (Larnaca) to support the UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq and then be deployed forward when feasible.

Resource constraints

24. Until we get any indication from HMT/No.10 that further funds would be forthcoming in the event of conflict, we are planning on the basis that a substantial share of DFID's Contingency Reserve would supplement CHAD's emergency funds and MENAD's Iraq programme line. If a total of £60m were

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available on this basis for 2003/4, we would plan to commit initially £35m for immediate relief needs. Exactly how we would deploy this money would obviously depend on the nature of any conflict, needs assessments and what others were doing, but an indicative allocation of these funds in line with the balance of priorities suggested above might look like this:

Support to UN/RC/NGOs	£20m
Support to military (QIPs):	£5m
DFID Rapid Response Capacity and CHAD-OT deployment:	£10m
Total:	£35m

25. Under many scenarios, £35 million is unlikely to be perceived as an adequate UK contribution to any immediate relief effort, particularly if OFF collapses. Leaving £25 million for further humanitarian need, medium-term rehabilitation and reconstruction could also look very sparse. Action in response to the Secretary of State's previous two letters to the Prime Minister on this rests with No.10.

26. If the military is involved in the direct delivery of humanitarian assistance, there will be an issue about who pays. MoD claim to be financially stretched and are keen for DFID to pay. We have suggested that they should think carefully about the extent to which humanitarian concerns are a key part of their objectives. HMT are likely to convene a senior officials' meeting soon to address this. The amounts of money involved may not be large relative to total UK spend, although we still have insufficient information to cost how the military might respond to the impact of CBW use on civilians.

Humanitarian Programmes Manager
Conflict & Humanitarian Affairs Department

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Action Points

- Find out latest UNO (SP) UNSC resolution stuff. Follow up letter to Desmond Bower (Alistair).
- Get MoD / FCO to think about getting other countries' medical officers etc (Cardyn, Alistair).
- Scoping visits to Kuwait & elsewhere - but not deployments, apart from to UN.
- Get Tim Cross to come in.

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