

UK Support to CPA South Area – Next Steps

Overview

1. This paper has been prepared by a DFID/MOD team¹ that visited Basrah from 2-5 June 2003.
2. The key actions required to make further progress in the South are:
 - (a) clarifying CPA South's remit, and making it fully operational;
 - (b) restoring Iraqi public administration;
 - (c) maintaining and improving law and order;
 - (d) improving public communications; and
 - (e) internationalising the Coalition effort.
3. All of this requires urgent action by CPA Baghdad: (i) to clarify terms of reference for CPA South (and the other Regions), including reporting lines and decision-making processes; and (ii) to ensure US firms deliver on their contracts to provide operational support for CPA South (Kellogg Brown & Root) and to repair essential infrastructure (Bechtel); and (iii) to provide operating/emergency budgets so that Iraqi public institutions are able to get back to work.
4. The UK is already doing a lot through 1 Division, in addition to funding provided through UN agencies for power, water and sanitation programmes, health and agriculture, food distribution and mine/UXO clearance. But there is more that we can do to bring about tangible improvements in the quality of daily life for ordinary Iraqis: electricity supply; water supply; solid waste disposal; rubbish collection; street lighting; visible policing; and job creation. The proposals set out below encompass: further funds for quick impact projects, including media support (an extra £6 million from DFID, on top of MOD's existing £10 million); additional senior and support staff for CPA South (from DFID and MOD); a project management team plus equipment for up to 3 months (about £250,000); short-term operating costs if required; and police trainers and equipment (£1 million).
5. Measuring progress remains difficult, because of the paucity of hard data and the security constraints to movement around the region. We expect that the revised UN Appeal, to be published on 23 June, to provide as detailed and systematic an account as is possible of progress against key economic and social indicators. We will feed in ideas about how to establish a set of baseline data against which to track the performance and impact of the external assistance effort. This will be discussed at donor meetings to be convened by the UN in New York on 23-25 June.

Current situation

6. Reliability of power and water supplies in the South remains variable, but is probably no worse than before the military action. However, infrastructure in the region is suffering from lack of investment and maintenance over the past 12 years. As a result, electricity, water, sewage and solid waste disposal systems are fragile and liable to sudden breakdown. Looting of electrical cables and equipment, and

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tapping into water pipelines, is making the systems even more vulnerable. Current and immediate planned action by 1 Div, UN agencies, ICRC and latterly Bechtel (US contractors) comprises:

- Repairing serious leaks in the water distribution system through support to and formation of additional maintenance teams.
- Hiring of 9 x 1KVA generators through RTi to secure power generation at important water treatment plants, until UNDP generators come on line, expected in July.
- Providing water treatment chemicals and monitoring teams to improve water quality.
- Ensuring fuel supplies are delivered to power, water and sewage facilities.
- Drawing up a work programme (Bechtel) for refurbishment of water treatment plants and pipelines over the next 12 months, drawing heavily on UNICEF and ICRC assessments: work to start in July.
- Initiating quick impact programmes (1 Div with Basrah Municipality and UN) to remove refuse from the city and try to re-establish the sewage reticulation and septic tank emptying systems. Longer term replacement of equipment is in hand, but will require improved security.

7. In addition, Bremer announced on 10 June the creation of a \$100 million construction fund, to "pay for much-needed investment in Iraq's infrastructure including \$15 million for each of the North, South and South Central regions to employ local workers on urgent construction projects. We are seeking details of how this will be managed and implemented, and by when.

A STRENGTHENING CPA SOUTH

8. There are four CPA Regions, covering Baghdad, the North, the South and South Central parts of the country. The UK, with Denmark, is leading the CPA South operation. As yet, there is no mission statement or terms of reference either for the CPA as a whole nor the Regional offices. UK secondees have helped CPA South draft a Mission and Objectives statement, but this has not been agreed with Baghdad. The key elements are:

- Mission: on behalf of the CPA, to exercise fair and effective temporary governance of the Southern Region (four Governorates), until the population is in a position to decide its own destiny.
- Objectives: to give direction and assist coalition forces in providing a secure environment; to facilitate the provision of sustainable public services and utilities; to direct international reconstruction efforts; to create the conditions for and promote the economic and financial development of the Southern Region.

(Comment: the draft Mission and Objectives need to be discussed further in Whitehall and with CPA Headquarters. CPA Headquarters' seeming ambivalence towards the regional offices reflects the centralised structure of Iraqi government – essentially information and resources flow direct from Baghdad to the governorates. The role of CPA regional offices should be to facilitate and oversee this process.

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Further, we should ask Legal Advisers to confirm that the text is compliant with Occupying Power responsibilities as amplified by SCR 1483.)

9. CPA South is unable to deliver in terms of determining priority needs, overseeing implementation, or supporting the political transition. There is a lack of vision; CPA South is severely undermanned; and has almost no systems or resources in place to deliver any tangible improvements soon. In consequence, 1 (UK) Div retains almost all executive authority in the UK area of operations (AO). In turn, locals look to the British military, not CPA South, to address local problems. To the extent that these functions are being carried out at present, it is due to the unstinting efforts of 1 Div, the few UK secondees in the South, and, more importantly, the high quality of the Iraqi counterparts they are working with.

10. **Challenges:** building CPA South capability; transferring effective (as opposed to de jure) executive authority to Ambassador Olesen; maintaining progress in the UK AO through the 1Div/3Div handover.

11. **Action:**

- Strengthening CPA South's hand in Baghdad will be crucial to achieving many of the effects we seek. The establishment in CPA (HQ) of a small CPA South Liaison Team would serve to track policy development in Baghdad and champion CPA South's cause. DFID is looking for suitable staffing. We need Bremer's agreement to such an arrangement.
- CPA South needs **staffing support at a senior level**. The current Chief of Staff needs to be replaced, though this will need careful handling as he is the only US official in CPA South at present. Janet Rogan (FCO) is due to take over as Deputy to Olsen. Her duties will be primarily political, ie roughly analogous to the role performed by John Sawers in Baghdad. There is a very urgent need for someone to act as Director of Operations for Olsen, to coordinate efforts in the region (roughly analogous to the role that will be done by Andy Bearpark in CPA HQ). A senior 1 (UK) Div commander is due to sit alongside and support Olsen on a temporary basis. DFID/FCO will look for a permanent replacement. A team of four CPA representatives is required, one for each governorate (although this will not be the model followed by the US in the other regions). We should look to fill at least one, and ideally two, of these positions.
- CPA South also needs additional staffing support at working level. 1 (UK) Div is planning this week to move a large part of the Civil Military Operations Centre (CMOC) team into CPA South, and – if the military chain of command is content – rolling temporarily on into 3 Div thereafter. This will include support on press and public relations, and include the recently arrived 5 strong DFID team focusing on economic and governance issues. DFID will look to recruit additional staff with appropriate skills to support CPA South. Searches are already underway for support on water and sanitation, information management, and gender issues.

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- CPA South has a weak communication system. This should be provided by CPA Headquarters. The lack of effective communications is a major contributory factor to many of the other problems the CPA is experiencing. Solving the communications issue should be our top priority. Given this urgency, 1 (UK) Div and DFID will complete a joint assessment of immediate needs by 11 June with a view to putting in place a temporary solution.
- CPA South currently lacks operating funds. Discussions are underway with CPA Headquarters to resolve these issues. In the meantime, 1 (UK) Div will provide administrative support, whilst DFID/MOD look to place an office management team into CPA South as soon as possible. The office management team will have access to operating funds for up to 3 months should CPA South require them.
- CPA South currently benefits from co-location with a 1 (UK) Div unit. Security should be provided by OCPA/Dyncorp. CPA South and UK CPA representatives are looking to expedite deployment of DynCorp. In the meantime, DFID – in liaison with 1 (UK) Div - will help CPA South develop an independent security policy (by 13 June).

B RECOVERING IRAQI PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

12. Recovering Iraqi public administration is essential for a return to normality. Neither the CPA South, nor the military, have the capacity to administer the CPA South area without a functioning Iraqi public administration. Whilst schools, health facilities and utilities are recovering and public sector salaries have been paid, most Iraqi administrative buildings remain looted and gutted. Without restoring these facilities, public sector managers and administrators will be unable to work effectively alongside the Coalition.

13. **Challenges**: restoring public administration facilities quickly; securing set up, and running costs and departmental budgets from CPA Headquarters.

14. **Action**:

- The release of funds for the operating budget requires a high-level political push. In parallel, CPA South and UK representatives will continue to press CPA Headquarters at official level. CPA South will need to work with governorate level departments to facilitate release of emergency allocations from central ministries in Baghdad. There is a risk that this will not immediately be forthcoming. We therefore need to identify a line of funding that will – effectively – cover the costs of being an occupying power until other sources are freed up. Realistically, this might be for three months.
- Alongside the above efforts, 1 (UK) Div will continue to direct quick impact projects towards restoring public infrastructure, and DFID will continue to fund similar quick impact activity through UN agencies and NGOs that have operational capability in the South. To date, 1 (UK) Div has approved nearly 200 projects with a total value of just over £3.7 million. These include refurbishment of bridges, school buildings, health centres; vehicle and plant hire, and uniforms for the police.

- DFID will assess (by 13 June) the case for *additional project support* to civil administration through CPA South, in consultation with 1 (UK) Div, to provide bridge funding for vehicles hire and for urgent office equipment and supplies. The process for determining priorities also needs clarifying and probably rationalising. A project team is currently being identified alongside the assessment.

C SECURITY

15. The situation remains fragile, though there has been some encouraging progress. 1 (UK) Div has so far managed to get some 5,500 police back to work; and courts and prisons have begun to function. But there is a risk that Iraqi frustration with the pace of progress could cause the situation to deteriorate. The UK's ability to push the pace will be constrained by the reduction in force strength following the transition to 3 (UK) Div.

16. **Key challenges:** maintaining the pace of reinstating Iraqi law and order institutions; building an overall Coalition force strength and composition to assure law and order.

17. Action:

- Support Danish efforts to build capacity in CPA South and to extend law and order provision in the rest of the CPA South area. Specifically, provide a 21-person MOD Police team to help immediately (from 18 June, subject to PJHQ approval) with patrolling, and to initiate police training. We will also consider provision of equipment and vehicles, within the broader framework of security sector reform in Iraq. (This is being developed under the direction of Walt Slocombe. Policing issues are led by former New York Police Commissioner Kerik, whose endorsement of the proposed actions here should also be obtained).
- Maintain the integrated approach to judiciary, policing and prisons developed by 1 (UK) Div in Basrah and Maysan governorates, and broaden this to the whole of the CPA South area.
- Continue 1 (UK) Div quick impact projects to rehabilitate police stations and training facilities, court houses and prisons. Continue to identify, screen and re-employ key personnel.
- In collaboration with the Danes and others, consider retraining and re-equipping the new Iraqi Civil Police service in the South.
- With CPA and Iraqi counterparts, DFID adviser to review civil law in anticipation of likely disputes (eg land/property).

D PUBLIC INFORMATION

18. Effective communication with the Iraqi population remains tenuous at best. There is little visibility of the extent to which CPA Headquarter "proclamations and

edicts" are reaching and being understood by the Iraqi people, in itself a contributing factor to instability.

19. **Key challenges:** urgent need for a coherent public information campaign directed at Iraqi, regional and international audiences; establish an independent and accountable Iraqi media engaged in responsible journalism.

20. **Action:**

- Whitehall secondees have successfully pushed for CPA Headquarters to establish a "Directorate of Strategic Communications", and are now engaged in launching a national campaign.
- 1 (UK) Div and No10 will have two media specialists in place with CPA South by 13 June. Further, 1 (UK) Div and CPA South will work jointly on public information issues.
- DFID is assessing a BBC World Service Trust proposal for a 24 month programme to develop an independent, accountable and sustainable TV and radio facility in the South. (Initial services would commence within 6-12 weeks of project start, and would need to stay in line with any emerging regulatory framework).
- DFID is also discussing the set up of independent radio with the UN; and is anticipating a proposal from the Institute of War and Peace Reporting to develop journalist capacity in Iraq.
- Alongside public information, there is an urgent need to improve communications infrastructure within the South and with Baghdad. UK officials/Ministers need to press CPA HQ to address these issues soonest.

E INTERNATIONALISING THE COALITION EFFORT

21. Substantial Italian and Dutch military forces are expected in the CPA South area over the next four to six weeks. The UK AO will expand to four governorates to match the CPA South area. Progress between the two governorates covered by the 1 (UK) Div and those currently covered by the US army varies significantly. Further, 1 (UK) Div currently has limited visibility of current circumstances in the US managed governorates. The expansion of the UK divisional command and its integration with a multinational force will require close coordination on governance and reconstruction issues. With Danish leadership of CPA South, there is an opportunity to build a broad European effort.

22. **Key challenges:** establishing coordinated Italian, Dutch, Danish, UK engagement in governance and reconstruction activities in the South.

23. **Action:**

- MOD/DFID jointly to brief Dutch and Italian military, civil military and development counterparts.

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- A Danish mission has recently visited Iraq and scoped assistance to CPA South, law and order, and on human rights. DFID is liaising with the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs on respective plans with a view to formulating joint interventions where possible.
- DFID currently has a two-person team in Basrah to scope and oversee initial implementation of the above programme. DFID is discussing the case for a joint Dutch, Danish and UK development office in Basrah.

Conclusion

25. The total UK package will be worth about £26 million over a six-month period to end October 2003. This comprises £10 million of MOD funds and £5m from DFID, for quick impact projects; up to an estimated £10 million from DFID for technical assistance and associated support costs (including media support); and up to £1m from the Global Conflict Prevention pool for short-term police training. This figure does not include military inputs in kind (including personnel), or UK inputs through DFID funding to UN and ICRC projects.

DFID/MOD
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