

**From: Matthew Rycroft**  
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**PRIME MINISTER**

**cc: Jonathan Powell**  
**David Manning**  
**Sally Morgan**  
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**Godric Smith**  
**Danny Pruce**  
**Nick Cannon**

**IRAQ, BLIX, BENCHMARKS AND MORE TIME?**

You asked for a plan that we could work up with the Mexicans and Chileans, as a way of bringing them to vote for the second Resolution.

We should define full cooperation by setting out benchmarks for Iraqi behaviour, and make clear that judgements are for the Security Council, not for Blix (though of course Blix's reports would form an important basis for the facts underpinning the judgements). This differs from our previous work on benchmarks in that it is not Blix putting forward the benchmarks and answering the questions on Iraqi compliance, but us.

The basis of the plan:

The benchmarks need to flow from 1441, which contains the following specific demands on Iraq:

- "a currently accurate, full and complete declaration of all aspects of its programmes to develop chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and other delivery systems ..." From OP3
- "immediate, unimpeded, unconditional and unrestricted access" to all areas the inspectors wish to inspect" OP4
- "immediate, unimpeded, unrestricted, and private access to all officials and other persons whom UNMOVIC or IAEA wish to interview in the mode or location of UNMOVIC's or IAEA's choice pursuant to any aspect of their mandates" OP5
- "UNMOVIC and IAEA may at their discretion conduct interviews inside or outside Iraq" and "at the sole discretion of UNMOVIC and IAEA such

interviews may occur without the presence of observers from the Iraqi government" OP5

- From all the detail in OP7, the key points are:

- (i) "UNMOVIC and IAEA shall have the right to be provided by Iraq the names of all personnel currently and formerly associated with Iraq's chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic missile programs and the associated research, development and production facilities"
- (ii) "UNMOVIC and IAEA shall have the right to declare, for the purposes of freezing a site to be inspected, exclusion zones... in which Iraq will suspect ground and aerial movement"
- (iii) "UNMOVIC and IAEA shall have the free and unrestricted use and landing of fixed and rotary winged aircraft, including manned and unmanned reconnaissance vehicles"
- (iv) "UNMOVIC and IAEA shall have the right at their sole discretion verifiably to remove, destroy or render harmless all prohibited weapons, subsystems, components, records, materials, and other related items, and the right to impound or close any facilities or equipment for the production thereof".

Benchmarks:

So we could incorporate the following benchmarks as part of full compliance:

- (a) Full explanations of all the material unaccounted for in the last UNSCOM report, and answers to all of UNSCOM's questions.
- (b) A full list of those Iraq says were involved in the destruction of old CW stocks, and full and unfettered access to them in interviews at the location of the inspectors' choice and without Iraqi government representatives.
- (c) Similarly full cooperation over the interviews of any other witnesses called by the inspectors, inside or outside Iraq.
- (d) Full cooperation with the inspectors over any exclusion zones they declare.
- (e) Full cooperation with the inspectors over the destruction of the Al Samoud rockets and all other material identified for destruction by the inspectors.

Of these, (d) and (e) are in hand, so we should concentrate on (a), (b) and (c). In more detail, the benchmarks could be:

1. BW. Iraq must provide outstanding documentary evidence and/or testimony from key personnel on all aspects of research in Iraq in the development of materials which could be potential BW agents, their weaponisation and delivery systems, including:

- Evidence for the production and destruction of the 8,500 litres of anthrax it claims was destroyed in 1991.
- Evidence of the purpose and use and possible destruction of the 650 kg of bacterial growth material which Iraq admitted possessing in February 1999.

2. CW. Ditto for CW, including:

- Evidence of Iraq's work on VX, including purification and stabilisation, weaponisation, the whereabouts of VX precursor chemicals and of the 1.5 tonnes of VX identified by UNSCOM.
- Evidence to account for the discrepancy in Iraqi figures of chemical bomb production which leave 6,500 bombs and the chemical agent they contained unaccounted for.
- The destruction of the re-furbished chemical processing equipment at Al Fallujah.

3. Missiles. Iraq must eliminate, under UNMOVIC/IAEA supervision, all missiles and associated programmes identified by UNVOMIC/IAEA as proscribed, including:

- Full destruction of all the Al Samoud rockets and all associated infrastructure including test stands and casting chambers.
- A full account of the Al Fatah missile programme.
- A full account of the recent import of materials used in propellants, test instrumentation and guidance systems.

4. Documentation. All relevant documentation must be produced.

5. Personnel. Iraq must agree to hold interviews without Iraqi minders, eavesdropping, tape-recording or intimidation, inside and outside Iraq.

Timings and tactics:

It is just possible that the lack of a positive Turkish vote will give the US a little extra time before they are ready for military action. If not we face an uphill struggle securing US agreement to any further time.

We must not tie the judgements on Iraqi performance to Blix's 7 March report. Nor must we seek or encourage a further Blix report after 7 March. And we must avoid at all costs a further Council decision after our second resolution.

We could set out our detailed benchmarks today or tomorrow. We could be vague publicly about when we would judge Iraqi behaviour. But we would have to make clear privately to the US that we were talking about making those judgements at some point next week, or at the latest early in the week of 17 March.

Working up the plan:

In chronological order, we need:

- (a) Further Whitehall views. David Manning has not yet seen this but will be back at about 1300 today. Jack Straw wants to speak to you as soon as possible. The FCO oppose benchmarks on the grounds that Saddam will fulfil a few of them. We need to make clear that the only way we would judge that Saddam was fully cooperating was if we gave full, positive answers to all of the questions, not partially positive answers to some of them.
- (b) Jeremy Greenstock's input, including on the tactics. His advice so far is that we should not respond to the Chilean concerns until after 7 March, because it may be unnecessary if by then the Chileans intend to vote for our resolution and because it would cause a split with the US.
- (c) To float this with the US. They will not like it so we shall have to explain that we are working it up as a contingency.
- (d) To talk this through with Mexico and Chile. If this is to fly, we would need to know that it would be both necessary and sufficient to secure their positive votes.

Even if we decide not to do this for Mexico/Chile reasons, some of it would be useful for UK reasons, in particular the further detail on what constitutes full compliance. By setting out the whole of the underlined list, we show that destruction of a handful of Al-Samouds is a small part of the picture.

Other work:

We are also:

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- Drawing up further information on South African and other voluntary disarmament.
- Sourcing to the 1999 UNSCOM report in more detail the questions on the unaccounted for left-overs.

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