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To: NYMIS - eTelegrams  
From: COMEN Gateway 2  
Subject: OUTTELS:DB:REST:IRAQ: BLIX AND EL-BARADEI PRESENTATIONS:  
OPEN DEBATE:NYMIS/FCOLN-15050347  
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PART ONE OF TWO

SUBJECT: IRAQ: BLIX AND EL-BARADEI PRESENTATIONS: OPEN DEBATE

## SUMMARY

1. Blix gives a more equivocal presentation than on 27 January, highlighting progress on process and other "hopeful" signs (e.g. new documents, the Iraqi commissions and the Iraqi decree on WMD). Concludes that disarmament could be completed rapidly "if immediate, active, and unconditional co-operation...were to be forthcoming". Villepin makes an impassioned plea for continued inspections (and, thanks to France, a better world) which wins unprecedented applause from the gallery. Most countries still arguing for continued inspections.

## DETAIL

2. The Security Council met on 14 February (at the level of Ministers, but for the Africans, Pakistan and Bulgaria) to hear the latest updates from Blix and El-Baradei on Iraq.

3. Blix (full text at <http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/blix14Febasdel.htm>) said the impression remained that Iraq had decided to co-operate on process. At his last updating he had said a decision to co-operate on substance was indispensable. Iraq had to tackle significant outstanding issues (e.g. on anthrax, VX, and long-range missiles) and avoid belittling the questions. At the 8-9 February meeting in Baghdad Iraq had presented papers on some of these issues. While these contained no new evidence, they could be indicative of a more active attitude. Iraq had also proposed that it might be possible to assess the quantity of material poured into the ground. UNMOVIC scientists had their doubts - documentary evidence and testimony seemed still to be

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needed. In this context, Iraq had on 12 February presented a list of 83 persons it said were involved in the unilateral destruction of chemical stocks in the summer of 1991. This appeared to be a useful substantive action and he hoped Iraq would provide a similar list on the biological side. Iraq's decision to widen the commission looking for chemical warheads to all WMD and to establish another to look for documents could also be useful tools. They needed to work fast to convince the world they were a serious effort. On private interviews, three people who had previously refused interviews on UNMOVIC terms had accepted them just prior to the Baghdad talks. Since then no further interviews had been accepted. Lastly, Iraq had now issued a Presidential decree prohibiting the importation and production of WMD (comment: Perricos mentioned to us in the margins that it did not seem to ban the possession of WMD).

4. Blix said UNMOVIC missile experts along with experts from a number of Member States had concluded unanimously that the Al-Samoud II missile could exceed 150kms and was therefore proscribed. Any engines configured for use in the system, and Iraq had said the 380 SA-2 engines discovered during an inspection in late December were for that system, would also be proscribed. The experts had concluded that reconstituted missile casting chambers could produce motors with a range significantly greater than 150kms. They therefore remained proscribed. They had also concluded that the Al-Fatah test stand could test proscribed engines but, so far, the stand had not been associated with proscribed activity. He intended to communicate these findings to Iraq.

5. Blix said that in the immediate future, UNMOVIC planned to deploy U-2's early the following week and Mirage aircraft later that week. They intended to examine the possibilities for surveying ground movements, notably by truck. UNMOVIC also continue to expand its staff and technical resources. Blix concluded that the task of "disarmament" had always been envisaged as being fulfilled in a shorter time span than that of "monitoring". If Iraq had provided the necessary co-operation in 1991, the phase of disarmament could have been short and a decade of sanctions could have been avoided. Today, "the period of disarmament through inspections could still be short if immediate, active, and unconditional co-operation with UNMOVIC and the IAEA were to be forthcoming".

6. El-Baradei (text at <http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Press/Statements/2003/ebsp2003n005.sh.tml>) said IAEA had managed to conduct four interviews in private, but these had been recorded by the interviewee. The IAEA continued to pursue the issue of uranium acquisition; had asked Iraq to explain the reason for the tight tolerance specifications on aluminium tubes (while also discovering transactions to procure carbon-fibre which seemed legitimate but which IAEA continued to pursue); and continued to investigate the relocation and consumption of HMX. It might never be possible to reach a final conclusion on the latter. The IAEA had continued to examine documents on laser enrichment which added nothing to its knowledge and looked like the personal files of the scientist concerned. Iraq had provided documents on the concerns outstanding since 1998 but no new information was contained. The IAEA would continue to expand its capabilities, including through more analysts.

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translators and customs experts and through increased technical meetings and interviews. They had found no evidence of ongoing prohibited nuclear activities. Their experience showed that it was possible, particularly with intrusive inspections, to assess the presence of a nuclear programme even without full co-operation. But full co-operation would speed up the process. He hoped Iraq would continue translating its commitments into concrete sustained action.

7. Al-Sharaa (Syria) said Iraq had opened all doors while Israel refused any inspection of its nuclear facilities. We should continue inspections giving them enough time to succeed. War would be a failure and was unanimously rejected by Arabs and the majority of world opinion. The efforts by some Council members - France, Germany, Russia, China and the majority of the Council - gave hope that the world order was in good shape. The French ideas on strengthening inspections would allow complete disarmament. War in the 21st century would be a tragedy. We could achieve peace if we worked in good faith.

8. Villepin (France) said that not one of us felt the least indulgence to Saddam's regime. In adopting 1441 we had agreed to two-stages: disarmament through inspections and, only if that failed, contemplating serious consequences and a second resolution. Inspections had not been taken to their end and the use of force was so fraught it should only be a last resort. The Blix/El-Baradei reports showed inspections were producing results though we each wanted more and would continue the pressure. We all realised that success required Iraq's full co-operation where progress was also being made - interviews had taken place without minders and aerial surveillance been agreed. Much work remained and we should give inspectors every chance of succeeding. France had set out concrete practical proposals quickly to enhance the effectiveness of inspections not requiring a new resolution. War might seem, a priori, to be the swiftest option in ensuring Iraqi compliance, but a long and difficult peace would have to be built to maintain the stability of the region. Faced with that, the alternative of inspections allowed us to move forward with effective peaceful disarmament. Was that choice not the most sure and rapid? France proposed another ministerial meeting on 14 March to assess progress. Military action would undermine the unity of the Council and detract from the fight against terrorism. France had no intelligence linking Iraq and Al-Qaida but would war not exacerbate the divisions that nurture terrorism? France did not exclude recourse to force, but before this would have to ask whether the threat justified it and whether the risks could be kept under control. Nothing in the Council should be done in haste, suspicion or out of fear. In this "temple of the UN" our responsibility and honour had to lead us to give priority to peaceful disarmament. France was an old country from a continent that had suffered wars, occupation, and barbarity. But it had always stood upright in the face of history, remained faithful to its values, and believed in our ability to build a better world. As Villepin ended his speech applause broke out from the gallery.

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PART TWO OF TWO

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SUBJECT: IRAQ: BLIX AND EL-BARADEI PRESENTATIONS: OPEN DEBATE

9. Tang (China) said the universal hope of the international community was to find a political solution in the UN framework. Iraq should co-operate actively. The visit to Baghdad had produced positive results and Iraq should make good on its commitments. Inspections should continue under 1441 and the top priority was strengthening them to ensure a peaceful solution.

10. Palacio (Spain) said she had listened hard to the presentations to hear just one sentence affirming active immediate compliance by Saddam's regime. What resounded instead was Blix's statement that disarmament could succeed if immediate, active and unconditional co-operation were forthcoming. The most important question was co-operation. Enhance or reforming inspections would send the message of weakness in the face of non-compliance. Spain supported a UN solution and preferred a peaceful one. But peace and security was ensured by respect for Security Council resolutions. The Council would have to assume its responsibilities if a change in attitude did not take place.

11. Speaking partly extempore, you said that when we had adopted 1441 we had made clear that Iraq's proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and non-compliance was a threat to international peace and security. In April 1991 we had given Iraq 90 days to disarm. In the 11 years, 7 months, and 12 days since the

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Council's deadline ran out, they had concealed and played games. It had taken the defection of Saddam's son-in-law, after four years of fruitless inspections, to uncover Saddam's biological weapons. It was striking that no one so far today had suggested Iraq was fully and actively complying. Iraq's material breaches remained intact. Why had Iraq refurbished equipment destroyed under UNSCOM? How many private interviews had taken place? Were these subject to bugging? Had any outstanding questions been dealt with by Iraq? Had Iraq come to a genuine acceptance of the disarmament required of it? You said the issue was the authority of the UN and Saddam's defiance of it. While you hoped for a peaceful solution, this required an immediate dramatic change by Saddam. This could only be achieved if we held our nerve, backing diplomacy with the credible threat of force, and being ready, if necessary to use that threat. This was not just about Iraq, but about how we dealt with proliferators across the globe. If we sent out the message that defiance of the UN paid, it would not be peace we had secured.

12. Powell abandoned his text and spoke without notes. He said he was pleased that there had been some progress. But this was all on process not substance. Tricks were being played on us. Did we really believe a decree would change the situation or that the commissions would seek information Iraq had actively been trying to deny? 1441 was not about inspections, but about the disarmament of Iraq. Iraq had met the early test of their intention to comply - the declaration - by effectively saying they would see how much they could slip under our noses. They had not agreed to inspections out of the goodness of their hearts, but because of pressure and the Council standing firm. The link between Iraq and terrorism existed and he would provide further evidence. We could not wait for these weapons to show up in our cities and wonder where they had come from. To this day we had not had the co-operation we had hoped for. It did not take brain-surgery to get real co-operation - if we had it the documents would be flooding out and there would be a queue for private interviews. Inspections were a way to assist Iraq in complying. We did not need improved inspections but immediate co-operation. The threat of force should remain - it should be a last resort but it should be a resort. The process could not be strung out until the world's attention was diverted elsewhere. The Council had to think through the consequences of walking away or the reality of facing this problem and the choice, as distasteful as it might be, of whether or not it was time to consider the serious consequences intended by 1441.

13. Ivanov (Russia) said that substantial progress had been made at Baghdad: aerial monitoring; interviews without minders; new documents and commissions. We had to set clear tasks, including through the submission of the work programme and list of key remaining tasks under 1284 (comment: due at the end of March). This would allow us to set criteria by which to assess progress and whether Iraq was a threat to international peace and security. Inspections should continue in the interests of a political settlement.

14. Alvear (Chile) said Iraq still had an ambivalent attitude towards inspections. They should be continued, strengthened and enhanced to thwart Iraqi evasion. Time was not infinite but should be adequate to seek the broadest consensus. We should

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reserve a decision on force until it became clear to all that peaceful means had failed. Derbez (Mexico) said inspections seemed to be making progress although Iraq had to change its attitude drastically. We should make the fullest use of peaceful methods. Traore (Guinea) said we should take time to deliver consensus but a peaceful solution depended on Iraq stopping its delaying tactics. Akram (Pakistan) said progress so far was due to the Security Council's determination which should be maintained. Most people believed all options should be exhausted before force. Pakistan also believed this and hoped Iraq too would put its people first. Eboutou (Cameroon) urged Iraq to continue on the course of co-operation. Gaspar-Martins (Angola) said that Iraqi co-operation showed what diplomatic efforts could achieve with time. The decisions we took should be proportionate and justified. The consequences of war outweighed the benefits. Tafrov (Bulgaria) said Iraq's co-operation was unsatisfactory and it was in material breach of 1441.

15. Fischer (Germany) said Iraq must co-operate fully if the looming tragedy was to be avoided and that the inspection and verification regime should be made more effective in line with French ideas. Inspectors should be given the time to finish their job and all options for a peaceful solution should be exhausted.

16. Al-Douri (Iraq) said Iraq had agreed "to deal with" 1441 based on the fact that this could help resolve the "so-called" disarmament issue. Iraq had done all it could to co-operate proactively. It had submitted a declaration in record time which should be reconsidered as it was not clear it had been studied with the required diligence. Iraq had opened doors; encouraged scientists to accept interviews; agreed to U-2 and other overflights (it was logical that UK/US plans should cease their attacks while they were flying); enacted a decree on WMD activities; provided further documents even though all the details were already in the declaration; and set up to two commissions. On this basis, where was the material breach? What did proactive co-operation mean? Iraq could not give up that which it did not have. Iraq had declared the missiles which did not have a range over 150kms. Iraq proposed a random test of missiles to ascertain their range. At a time when voices were calling on the US and UK to heed reason and international legitimacy, they continued to amass forces. Iraq had chosen the path of peace and was willing to do everything necessary to clarify the real picture.

17. At this point the Council adjourned, and recongregated afterwards for a closed session (see MIFT).

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