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DJC/IRAQ/DOP(I)

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(Cabinet Office)



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**IRAQ: STRATEGY GROUP WORKSTRANDS**

1. You asked for further detail following last week's Basra meeting and Iraq Strategy Group.
2. ISF Update. The following comments are broadly in line with the key assumptions of the imminent JIC paper, although there may be some difference in nuance. In general terms, the ISF is developing according to long-standing plans, with a few known and expected areas of weakness which are increasingly becoming the focus of coalition effort. In summary:
  - This programme is on target, less the forces in Al Anbar province, the Air Force and Navy capabilities: 80% currently trained, all complete by Dec 06.
  - Higher level command and control, logistics, equipment husbandry and intelligence are immature throughout the Iraqi Security Forces, placed deliberately at the back of the force generation process.
  - 50% of the Iraqi Army battalions and brigade/divisional headquarters are already at the requisite level for transition, defined as '*A unit capable of planning, executing and sustaining counterinsurgency operations (COIN) with ISF or Coalition support*'. There are no key shortfalls that are not in hand and at that level all units should, with appropriate Coalition support, be capable of the full range of COIN operations.
  - The police are some way behind but significant progress is expected during 2006.
  - Equipment shortfalls are caused by MOI recruiting beyond the agreed establishment and exacerbated by the ministries' immature procurement process.
  - Within MND(SE) the same issues of higher level command and control, logistics, equipment husbandry and intelligence are prevalent in the ISF, but are less acute and will improve markedly during 2006.

- The ISF in MND(SE) should be capable of managing the threat that they will face but could quickly be undermined by poor leadership. The emphasis therefore, is rightly on training and leadership. Equipment is adequate and fit for purpose.

3. ISF Responsibility.

- PM Maliki's recent visit to Basra has already done much to put ISF in the spotlight, but this is also a natural product of Coalition SSR investment. The IPS is very much in the lead in Basra city and the IA has deployed in support when required. However, sound local governance is also a pre-requisite for well-directed ISF activity. The continued presence of Governor Wahili and his antagonism towards both the Chief of Police and GOC 10 IA Div are significant impediments in this regard.
- The public face of the security lead rests very much with the Iraqis; the ISF are not spectators. Indeed, given the ever present threat of intimidation to ISF and their families their level of commitment and robustness should be acknowledged.

4. ISTAR. Work is in hand to complement national ISR capability with coalition assets. We hope to improve MND(SE)'s ability to downlink imagery from US ISTAR platforms as they overfly enroute to / from Baghdad and north west Iraq.

5. Baghdad Security Strategy.

- **Baghdad Security Plan.** The plan was agreed by the Ministerial Committee for National Security (MCNS) earlier this week and as a consequence we will see a gradual shift of responsibility away from US forces towards IA and ultimately the IPS. The plan includes broad political engagement and a public information programme beforehand, linked to a long-term solution for the militias issue. The Prime Minister will retain overall responsibility for the operation, but with the Minister of Interior (once appointed) and his Ministry having the lead for security operations in Baghdad. At the operational level, the US divisional commander will have command and control of an Iraqi division and the nine National Police Brigades, with operations co-ordinated through the Baghdad Joint Co-ordination Cell.
- The UK should support this plan. As ever, it is the implementation that will determine its success. Inevitably a non-sectarian, functioning leadership that is supported by a government of national unity and a trusted security apparatus are key. However, UK's ability to influence events is limited to key individuals in theatre and their ability to sway the planning effort, principally the Ambassador and SBMR-I, but also UK's embedded deputy corps commander. UK should support this plan.

6. Basra Security Plan and Resourcing.

- **Basra Security Plan** After a promising launch by PM Maliki, there is a risk that the plan may stall. Confusion reigns over precisely who is in overall command. Encouragingly, following the recent MCNS, the plan sees the neutering of Governor Wahili, but we need to continue to press for clarity on its ownership and, in particular, Iraqi leadership.
- **Resourcing** The existing UK SSR effort comprises established civil and military projects, focussed on building Security Ministry and ISF capacity, thereby

achieving conditions for transition, principally in MND(SE). In seeking efficiencies to resource the new initiatives proposed in the Basra paper, it would be counterproductive to disrupt established projects in MND(SE), which are on the critical path for transition, to then re-invest in the same sectors. Furthermore, where military forces are committed to SSR activities, there is very limited scope to reappportion TELIC operational funds, in favour of new civil SSR initiatives. With regard to UK funded national SSR projects, it would be unwise to pare away our limited investment in Ministry capacity building, but some savings may be achieved by drawing down our commitment to the Jordan International Police Training Centre (JIPTC). The FCO is already exploring options to reduce this commitment, which has the potential to save £3.5M with minimal impact upon ISF capacity building in MND(SE), but this proposal may meet with opposition in US quarters. Beyond this narrow margin for efficiency there are no other areas of UK SSR activity where resources could be reallocated without significant impact upon our own plans for Iraqi capacity building and subsequently, operational transition.

7. Timetable with Conditions. FCO will forward a joint contribution on the elements that could be fed into a June statement on the medium-term perspective, but the latest version (6 Jun) is attached at Enclosure 2.

8. Iranian IED Link. DIS, in conjunction with SIS are working to produce a separate note. This will set out what has appeared in Iraq in terms of equipment and its origin based on technical evaluation. It will then address who supplied it and how, as well as considering the level and extent of Iranian involvement.

9. CERPS.

- CERPS are not the exclusive source of funds in MND(SE). However, our overall grasp of funding streams is less good than it could be. PJHQ is commissioning a study to address this.
- MND(SE) has committed \$66.2M in CERPS this US FY (Oct 05-Sep 06). A supplementary \$19.2M will arrive in Jul 06, when a separate \$11M worth of primary healthcare, co-ordinated by the US, is also due to be delivered.
- Beyond clarity on the amount of funds forthcoming (there are no indications of levels of 06/07 funding at this point) and in the slightly erratic nature, there are no reported problems with CERPS per se – although their emphasis on physical delivery does not always strike the same chord as the UK-led drive on education, governance and self-help.
- The 100kms Water Mains refurbishment is one of several larger-scale projects under consideration in MND(SE). Confirmation of both expected Japanese funding and participation by other agencies will help inform project management decisions.
- There is scope to draw from CERPS to fund a number of the projects listed in the Basra: The Way Forward paper.

10. Electricity/Point Generators. All ten 1.5 MW generators procured under OP AMPERE have been installed at 5 sites in Maysan and Dhi Qar provinces. Final commissioning of the generators required to connect them to the local electricity network should take place by the end of Jun 06. Training will also be provided to ensure that the

Iraqis can maintain and operate the generators. This remains a key risk for the project, as does the Iraqis' capability to provide the fuel necessary to keep the generators running.

Enclosure:

1. Update on progress of the ISF.
2. GoI security Statement.

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## GOI SECURITY STATEMENT

- This is a Government of National Unity which represents all Iraqis. We plan to establish a new compact with the Iraqi people and international partners. To achieve this, we will need to deliver progress on the most pressing challenges facing our country. Security is the most important and immediate challenge. That is why the political leaders have agreed to establish a Policy Council.
- We are determined to ensure that Iraqis may live without daily fear of violence.
- To achieve this, we must build capability of our security forces and trust between Iraqis. These efforts will form a process, which will take time.
- We must demonstrate visibly that Iraqis are taking over responsibility for security as the MNF reduce in numbers.
- The ISF are already poised to start taking over responsibility from the MNF. This will be based on conditions, the details of which we will set out in greater detail separately.
- But in summary the main objectives should be as follows.
  - The process of taking control of security will begin this month. By the end of July [Arabic calendar issues] [the Provincial Councils of Muthanna, Dahuk and As Sulaymaniyah will control security operations. We expect Maysan and other provinces will follow shortly afterwards] . (ref Maliki/PM speech)
  - By the end of 2006, we shall be facing the prospect of ISF assuming security responsibilities in [over half the] Governorates.
  - By the end of 2007 we would expect that transition of security responsibility over the whole of Iraq to be completed.
  - As this takes place, the role of the MNF will reduce and their numbers decline.
  - By the end of 2007, the numbers of MNF should be [less than a third] of what they are now, reducing over the succeeding [two years] to little more than a residual element, to come to the assistance of our security forces if required.
  - We shall need this continuing, but diminished, MNF presence: we shall address this when the current UN mandate expires at the end of the year
  - But we do not envisage permanent bases for foreign forces in Iraq.
- To achieve this, however, we also need to meet other challenges.

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- We have set as our target that the Iraqi Army should reach its full complement by the end of 2006. In addition 80% of the Police force will be trained. Numbers are important, but so is capability. Building capable ISF means:
  - forces which are loyal to the new Iraq
  - not involved in political affairs
  - professional
  - upholding the rule of law
  - inclusive of Iraqis from all parts of society and all communities
  - honourable leaders serving under civilian control and independent of external influence
- Nor can there be place for terrorists and those intent on halting with murderous violence the development towards democracy. We must persuade those who practise violence to renounce the gun and the bomb, and agree to participate in the political process.
- This will require reconciliation, requiring courage from both sides – ours and theirs.
- Nor can there be a place for militia groups outside the control of the government, pursuing political objectives of independent local or national leaders nor can there be weapons in the hands of other than government forces. [Reference to Sistani statement?]
- As the Iraqi authorities take on responsibility for the Provinces, so the presence of militias will have to be addressed. We need to reintegrate members of militias into society. Some may be incorporated into the ISF; others into civilian life. They need to renounce their loyalties to militia groups. We commit ourselves to putting forward a plan to seek the support and funding from the international community.

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## UPDATE ON PROGRESS OF THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES (ISF)

### Introduction

1. This paper outlines the current progress and shortfall in development of the Iraqi Security Forces and their Governance against the requirement for them to be able to deal with the threat.

### Summary

2. Over 80% (263,000) of the Iraqi Security Forces have been trained and equipped. This should be complete (325,000) by Dec 06. This programme is on target, less the forces in Al Anbar province and the Air Force and Navy capability.
3. Higher level command and control, logistics, equipment husbandry and intelligence are immature throughout the Iraqi Security Forces, placed deliberately at the back of the force generation process. Significant improvement is expected in the Iraqi security ministries during 2006 and additional investment in ministerial capacity building in the MOI would add value.
4. 50% of the Iraqi Army battalions and brigade/divisional headquarters are at the level set for transition (TRA level 2) or better. This is defined as '*A unit "In The Lead" is capable of planning, executing and sustaining counterinsurgency operations with ISF or Coalition support*'. There are no key shortfalls that are not in hand.
5. The police are some way behind but significant progress is expected during 2006. Equipment shortfalls are caused by Iraqi Ministry of Interior (MOI) recruiting beyond the agreed establishment. It is therefore for MOI to equip them. Sectarian bias (rooted in the MOI) remains a concern.
6. The equipment requirements of the Iraqi Navy and Iraqi Airforce are understood but, while the intent is that Iraqi Dinars buy the majority of their equipment, there is a need to build maritime capability to enable Iraqi protection of essential offshore oil infrastructure.
7. Some of the same issues of higher level command and control, logistics, equipment husbandry and intelligence are prevalent in MND(SE) Iraqi Security Forces but are less acute and will improve markedly during 2006. Equipment deliveries have resulted in 10 Division having 97% of their critical items with 100% achieved by Dec 06. Similarly, the IPS and DBE have both received 72% and 90% of key items respectively. Further funded OSIRIS<sup>1</sup> 2.5 deliveries will address current shortfalls.
8. The ISF in MND(SE) should be capable of managing the threat that they will face but could quickly be undermined by poor leadership. Despite the attraction of focussing on ISF equipment, their capability will depend at least as much on their training and leadership. More sophisticated equipment, whilst attractive, brings significant additional overheads in training<sup>2</sup>, sustainment and support.

<sup>1</sup> Project OSIRIS is UK's contribution to funding of ISF equipment and infrastructure in MND(SE).

<sup>2</sup> Both initial and ongoing refresher training both for operators and those maintaining it.

## Security Governance

J. National Security Governance is as undeveloped as the majority of other national government functions. The two principle foci for development are the output of the security ministries, which at the moment is immature; and the proper Government control of these ministries, which currently undermines their outputs.

10. The security ministries are developing, have demonstrated some promise<sup>3</sup>, and significant further improvement is expected in the 2<sup>nd</sup> half of 2006. These ministries present different challenges: one is being built from the bottom up while current practices are being transformed in the other<sup>4</sup>. A lack of ministerial capacity and an over centralised budgetary system<sup>5</sup> both need addressing. Delegation of authority to Officials by strong, non-sectarian ministers in the security ministries will also improve output. Under current planning, the Iraqi MOD is expected to be fully manned and partnered by Jan 07 and reach Full Operating Capability not before Jan 08. Increased and more targeted effort (eg extra Civilian Police in the Coalition Police Assistance Training Team) needs to be directed at the institutional development of the security and justice sector ministries. In total there are \*\*\* coalition personnel in the two security ministries, of whom \*\*\* are provided by UK.

## Iraqi Army

11. The Iraqi people have trust in the Iraqi Army, holding it generally in high regard. The main areas for development remain logistics, higher level management and administration: including pay, leave, drafting, conditions of service, complaints procedure, promotion etc. Much effort is put into the professionalisation of the Iraqi Security Forces through the establishment of special to arm training schools and courses. Generation of key Army enablers for logistics, command and communications are planned to be complete by July 06. Currently 50% of the Iraqi Army battalions, brigade and divisional headquarters and 30% of the logistic enablers are at TRA level 2<sup>6,7</sup>. The Iraqi military are increasingly leading in operations and the Ground Forces Command in Baghdad is expected to take command of some of the Iraqi Divisions in late summer/early autumn.

## Iraqi Police Service

12. The Iraqi Police are discharging their basic duties in most provinces, however, their effectiveness rests on the credibility they have with the Iraqi people, which is increasing but remains an issue. There is a significant effort to man, train and equip the agreed establishment of 135,000 Iraqi Police, including enablers, by the end of 2006, which, with the exception of Al Anbar, is likely to be accomplished. However, there has been over-recruiting of police forces across Iraq, authorised and funded by the IMOI, reportedly to combat unemployment<sup>8</sup>. This has led to equipment shortages and the extra personnel have limited training and supervision and are judged to only be capable of carrying out rudimentary tasks.

13. Sectarian bias (rooted in the MOI) remains a concern, but the pernicious elements are relatively small but influential and their removal would leave a force capable of reform.

<sup>3</sup> E.g. Successful planning and execution of the security operations for the referendum, elections and in the aftermath of the Golden Mosque atrocity

<sup>4</sup> IMOD and IMOI respectively.

<sup>5</sup> E.g. The MOD is spending \$472m on life support, but through an unwillingness to take responsibility, corruption and incompetence, it has stalled on spending money on construction and equipment procurement.

<sup>6</sup> Transition Readiness Assessment level 2 – the level at which transition can occur.

<sup>7</sup> MNF-I ISF Update dated 15 May 06.

<sup>8</sup> Possibly 9,000-10,000 additional police in the south alone.



Action to effect this change needs to be driven from Baghdad, where the selection of non-sectarian leadership in the MOI would dramatically improve public perception and leave a capable IPS force; action is already underway in MND(SE) through Operation CORRODE (detention of corrupt Police elements).

### **Iraqi Navy**

14. UK work with the Iraqi Navy and Marines will only lead to successful handover of responsibility for the security of the offshore oil platforms (which are of critical importance to the national economy) if the Iraqi Navy is equipped with appropriate vessels (Off Shore Support Vessels (OSVs) and Patrol Boats). A significant coalition warship presence (including one permanently assigned Royal Navy Ship) is required to safeguard this essential infrastructure, in the absence of suitable Iraqi Naval vessels, which the Iraqi Ministry of Defence has consistently failed to procure, and which would cost significantly less than the ongoing coalition presence. Our efforts to encourage MNSTC-I to provide the financial support for development of the Iraqi Navy have fallen short and MNSTC-I does not intend to fund naval procurement. Plans are in place and Iraqi funding is available to deliver the OSV capability, but not before 2008. At a cost of £2.7m per year, this capability gap could be filled with a UK leased vessel operated jointly with the ISF. This would facilitate Iraqi protection of the oil platforms and accelerate the handover of maritime security responsibility.

### **Iraqi Air Force**

15. The Iraqi Air Force (IzAF) aims to provide the following capabilities in 06/07: Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance, battlefield mobility (including medical evacuation and Search and Rescue) and transport. Progress has been made in some areas, notably the adoption of new structures and procedures, but other areas, mainly equipment procurement and sustainment, have proved a challenge. The IzAF is now operating from 4 bases, Kirkuk, Taji, New Al Muthanna and Basrah. Operational tasks are currently limited to reconnaissance and air transport. However, none of the reconnaissance aircraft are military aircraft, they have been beset by engineering problems and are unsuitable for the reconnaissance task.

16. The future modernisation priorities of the IzAF in 06/07 are: surveillance aircraft, VIP transport, air traffic control systems, light transport aircraft, helicopter medical evacuation capability, additional air transport, and a search and rescue capability. Implied in the growth of the IzAF is the need to recruit high quality English speaking aircrew candidates to attend overseas flight training as the IzAF cannot develop indigenous flight training programmes for several years. MNSTC-I does not intend to spend any money on aircraft procurement while the Iraqis have their money to spend. It is not yet clear how shortcomings in the development of the IzAF will affect wider ISF capability in combating the insurgency and the corresponding requirement for ongoing coalition support.

### **MND(SE)**

17. Our work in training and mentoring the Iraqi Security Forces in the south continues; 9 out of 10 Battalions for the Southern Division of the Iraqi Army are formed and basic trained; 5 are assessed as being at the requisite transition readiness level (TRA Level 2), as are 2(of 4) of the Brigade Headquarters. We have also trained over 22,000 Iraqi Police out of an authorised establishment of 29,000. Shortfalls in infrastructure have hampered the Iraqi Army 10<sup>th</sup> Division's expansion plan, but the aspiration is to see the Divisional Headquarters and Divisional troops site complete ahead of schedule in late Aug 06. The aim is for the Division to be at full operating capability by the end of 2006 when all elements

will be at TRA Level 2 or better. Their ability to exercise command and control is being tested regularly with command study periods, exercises and Staff training. The delivery of the 10 Division sustainment/logistics plan remains the focus for military transition teams and is showing improvement. Equipment deliveries have resulted in 10 Division having 97% of their critical items with 100% achieved by Dec 06. Similarly, the Iraqi Police Service and Directorate of Border Enforcement have both received 72% and 90% of key items respectively. Further funded OSIRIS<sup>9</sup> 2.5 deliveries will address current shortfalls. Funding future sustainability will remain an issue.

18. The Governor of Basra also remains a major hindrance to our Security Sector Reform work in Basra and his replacement with a more cooperative governor would assist our work in the province. Lifting of the Provincial Council boycott has allowed reengagement at both the tactical and political level, although this remains slow at times. Joint Iraqi Police and coalition patrols have also re-started in Basra; these should provide a key means of influencing the city's security.

19. The threat to the ISF in MND(SE) after the MNFI has transitioned is two-fold. The greatest threat to them is that they are drawn into an intra-Shia political struggle for pre-eminence that strays into violent confrontation and thus makes use of official security structures in the course of this conflict. This will serve to undermine the force if it divides along party political lines and will undermine its credibility if this is brought into question by a loss of impartiality. The second, and more conventional, threat will stem from Sunni religious extremist elements operating in MND(SE) that will continue to target the ISF. This will comprise local groups already present as well as further attempts being made by larger groups like AQ-I who will seek to exploit links to local Sunni groups and use them as proxies in attacks against the ISF. This threat will still be relatively confined due to the demographics and the difficult operating environment in MND(SE) for such groups.

20. The progress to date and current plans for the ISF in MND(SE) should leave it capable of managing the 'tactical' and physical threats. Much does depend on continued progress in developing sufficiently capable and independent security governance that could otherwise undermine our efforts.

### Way Ahead

21. Continued support should be given to Project OSIRIS, which is seeking to address the final SSR impediments to transition in the southeast. Details are now being worked out for the funding required for ISF sustainment purposes. To date over £82M has been approved by HM Treasury for infrastructure and equipment proposals. At least £10M is also needed in the this financial year for Civil Effect Funded humanitarian relief and reconstruction assistance programmes which will help reduce the risk to coalition forces from dwindling consent. In addition, there are newly-identified shortfalls that we must be prepared for, e.g. in Iraqi Navy and Air Force capabilities that will, as things stand, prevent handover of responsibility for security of the oil platforms for some time. As the Iraqi security forces mature, Iraq's partners will need to put additional resources into areas such as, the judiciary and courts which have been relatively neglected but which are as critical to enforcing law and order as security forces. We need to caution against further growth in the size of the ISF whose size/shape has been designed to be affordable in the long run, and with the IA already consuming around 15% of the national budget, the danger of cost growth in an immature economy is clear; especially when taken against IMF guidelines which place clear limits on security sector expenditure.

<sup>9</sup> Project OSIRIS is UK contribution to funding of ISF equipment and infrastructure in MND(SE).

22. The UK is in a uniquely influential position in Iraq, holding many of the deputy positions in Baghdad HQ. On the whole, the advice of the UK personnel is appreciated by not only the US, but more importantly the Iraqis. We must build on this influence, without negating the current good work that is being planned and will soon be implemented in Iraq<sup>10</sup>. Additional resources (civilian official and extra CivPol) to aid ministerial capacity building, particularly in Ministry of Interior, would be a key place to add value.

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<sup>10</sup> We should concentrate on posts that directly affect transition, specifically looking to shift personnel into the IGFC MiTT and the JHQ TT and maybe the new MNF-I Liason and Partnership Detachment (LAPD).

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