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**CIVIL EFFECT**

I attach a paper by the Cabinet Office reporting the outcome of the Review which looked at the key changes necessary to strengthen the UK's civil effect capability and to meet the commitment to create a 1000-strong civilian standby capacity and subsequent discussions between the Cabinet Secretary and the Permanent Secretaries of the FCO, MOD and DFID.

Most of the recommendations in the Review have been agreed and the Stabilisation Unit is already pursuing a number. Personnel are being identified for an Implementation Team which should be fully in place before the end of February.

The enhancement of this capability is critical. It is a central plank of the National Security Strategy, to which the Prime Minister attaches particular importance.

Ministers will, therefore, wish to consider whether the proposals strike the right balance between ambition and realism; and that departments are well placed now to make rapid progress.

There will be an opportunity to discuss the paper at NSID(OD), chaired by the Foreign Secretary, on 21 January.

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I am sending a copy of this letter to Peter Ricketts (FCO), Paul Rimmer and Bill Jeffrey (MOD), and Minouche Shafik (DFID), Gus O'Donnell and Simon McDonald (CO), and to Jeremy Heywood and Tom Fletcher (No 10)

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STABILISATION AND DEPLOYED CIVIL EFFECT

*Paper for NSID(OD) by Cabinet Office Officials*

INTRODUCTION

1. The National Security Strategy (NSS) identified the need to strengthen the UK's, and international, ability to deploy civilian stabilisation experts. Announcing the Strategy on 19 March, the Prime Minister said:

*We must have civilian experts and professionals ready to deploy quickly to assist failing states and help rebuild countries emerging from conflict... Britain will... make available a 1000-strong UK civilian standby capacity.*

2. A Cabinet Office Review was launched at the beginning of June to make recommendations on the key changes necessary to strengthen the UK's civil effect capability, and to meet the commitment to create a 1000-strong civilian standby capacity. It reported to the Cabinet Secretary and FCO, MOD and DFID Permanent Secretaries on 1 October.

RECOMMENDATIONS

3. Following discussion between Permanent Secretaries, Ministers are invited to agree that:

- a) a Civilian Standby Capacity (CSC) should be established, from at least 1000 identified civilians and a further 500 police, to provide a capability continuously to deploy at least 350 pre-trained personnel, at appropriate readiness levels, to a range of coalition and multilateral stabilisation missions;
- b) the Stabilisation Unit (SU) should be expanded and refocused, under Director-level leadership, to become the single HMG delivery unit for civil effect with an enhanced planning capacity and rapid response capability;

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- c) DFID should take increased responsibility for the SU and the CSC, pending agreement on the exact form 'ownership' should take in the next spending round;
- d) the SU should lead delivery of the national civil effect effort on operations, but conflict and regional policy should remain a joint CO/FCO/DFID/MOD responsibility;
- e) the number of effective personnel on the SU's database of deployable civilian experts should increase to 800-1000; supporting an increased deployment of at least 150, rather than the current 80, personnel;
- f) a cross-Whitehall Civil Service Stabilisation Cadre (CSSC), initially of at least 200 personnel, should be established;
- g) a new International Police Assistance Group (IPAG) should, subject to the agreement of the ACPO-chaired Board, develop more robust arrangements for delivering police capabilities for civil effect under joint National Police Improvement Agency/MOD Police leadership;
- h) a Stabilisation Volunteer Network (SVN) should be established substantially to widen the range of potential volunteers available;
- i) MOD should rapidly identify members of the Armed Forces Volunteer Reserves with relevant skills, who would be available to deploy as part of the CSC;
- j) progress on these new arrangements should be reviewed before the publication of a refreshed NSS before the Summer Recess; and
- k) further enhancements to capability should be examined in the next Spending Review.

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4. Ministers are invited to note that:
- l) an Implementation Team to take forward these recommendations will be established before the end of February, for 6-8 months, with personnel from DFID, FCO and MOD;
  - m) the additional administrative costs of these new capabilities (ie excluding deployment costs) should be no more than £7M in 09/10. DFID, FCO and MOD will find these costs.

#### CURRENT POSITION

5. Around 300 civilian personnel (including civil police) are deployed on stabilisation or similar missions (see definitions in Annex A). The UK's performance is improving as previous reforms and learning from operational experience take effect. For example, the SU played a substantial role in getting the new civilian-led Helmand Provincial Reconstruction Team up and running. It is improving its mechanisms for recruiting deployable civilian experts. The UK has a strong international reputation for the quality of its civilian contributions and the effectiveness of the cross-Whitehall coordination that supports them. We need to build on those areas of acknowledged strength.

6. Nevertheless, the Review identified a number of problems. Whitehall structures to deliver civil effect are currently fragmented. MOD, DFID, FCO and the Stabilisation Unit each deploy personnel to stabilisation and civil effect missions. Problems include the lack of single-point accountability for stabilisation policy, objectives, capability and delivery in Whitehall; multiple and poorly co-ordinated mechanisms for resourcing civil effect; no effective unified performance management of individuals; little effective measurement of the overall impact of civil effect; no cross-Whitehall register of available skills; limited UK civil effect planning capability; and a SU role that lacks clarity, focus and authority.

#### STRUCTURES AND GOVERNANCE

7. To address the problems of structure and governance identified, the Review recommended:

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- stronger and more explicit linkages between policy on stabilisation and civil effect and wider conflict and security policy and priorities;
- clearer responsibility and accountability for civil effect delivery and capability development;
- higher readiness and responsiveness both for joint UK civil-military operations and for contributions to multilateral requirements;
- streamlined, and where possible unified, arrangements for selecting, training, deploying and supporting civilians operating in stabilisation environments overseas;
- more effective engagement with multilateral organisations and other partners in capability development; and
- the SU's roles and responsibilities should be significantly enhanced.

8. Permanent Secretaries have now agreed the SU should take:

- overall responsibility for recruitment, selection, training and deployment of all civil effect personnel covered by the CSC. It is already responsible for a database of Deployable Civilian Experts (DCE), framework agreements with contractors, and is developing most of the components of the proposed Stabilisation Volunteer Network (SVN). It should be the customer for civil effect policing capabilities provided by the domestic police forces and the MOD Police (rather than the FCO), and for the proposed new civil service Stabilisation Cadre (CSSC);
- the lead in Whitehall for planning and delivering civil effect operations, both national and multilateral. It should also provide the main focus for encouragement of, and engagement in, the development of multilateral stabilisation and early recovery capabilities, working with partners to identify opportunities for

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specialisation or role-sharing and spreading best practice.

9. The SU is currently a shared resource, led at Deputy Director level reporting to DFID, the FCO and MOD, located for administrative purposes in DFID. The Review concluded that to inject greater pace and dynamism into the development of civil effect capabilities:

- the enhanced SU should be headed by a Director-level civil servant with staff from all three Departments;
- the SU should be fully part of DFID, reporting to the International Development Secretary; and
- governance and management arrangements for the expanded SU should be clarified and strengthened.

10. Subject to Ministers' views, the FCO and MOD would be content with that model, on the basis that DFID is well-placed to lead in terms of skills and capability, and on the understanding that DFID Ministers and senior management would regard the work as core business with a high degree of priority. DFID supports an incremental approach, immediately taking more active responsibility for the SU. DFID wishes to give further consideration to the management arrangements for the SU, and to consider detailed options for 'ownership' in the context of the next Spending Review. The FCO and MOD will retain a stake in the governance of the SU; setting its priorities, and supporting and monitoring its performance through the Director-level SU Board and the Permanent Secretary level PSA Delivery Board.

11. The approach assumes:

- policy direction and funding for individual deployments will be provided primarily by existing cross-Whitehall coordination and funding mechanisms, and from individual Departments, with the SU taking overall responsibility for delivering agreed outcomes;
- implementation of the recommendations in this paper, and in particular the establishment of an operationally effective CSC, will be pursued through a formal change programme, with an

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Implementation Team, led at Director level, established for 6-8 months comprising staff from the three Departments and accountable to the SU Board. (The chair of the Board will act as the SRO.)

CAPABILITY GOALS

12. The Review estimated that a capability delivering 5-600 continuously deployed personnel, from a pool of over 2000, could be achieved in the medium term; but concluded that would need to be approached in stages. Resources are constrained, and there will be significant implementation challenges in expanding the capability to deploy 350 effective personnel in the short term. Permanent Secretaries, therefore, concluded that the enhanced SU should focus on getting the basic mechanisms right and supporting current operations effectively.

DELIVERY MECHANISMS

13. The Review recommended a number of ways to improve the ability to generate deployable civilians, which Permanent Secretaries agreed in principle.

14. The most substantial was to establish a new **Civil Service Stabilisation Cadre** (CSSC), to improve the availability, readiness, and capability of Civil Service personnel to undertake leadership, management, mentoring and political roles. It would be an open, flexible structure, enabling civil servants and diplomats pursuing essentially conventional career paths to develop additional skills and experience relevant to stabilisation. The SU would set standards, select volunteers, provide training, monitor performance and provide support, aiming to align terms and conditions of service and duty of care arrangements. It would work with Departments to ensure participation in operations was seen, by them and by the best potential volunteers, as career enhancing. The CSSC would help to identify the relatively small group of senior civil servants who might be required to establish and lead field operations, and improve their career management.

15. A cadre of c.200 'active' individuals could generate c.50 continuously deployed personnel. Difficult boundary issues will need to be addressed by

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the Implementation Team. (MOD and DFID operate programmes which overlap with but do not duplicate the CSSC requirement - MOD's Support to Operations (S2O) programme provides civil servants to support deployed forces; but few are directly contributing to civil effect; DFID's Conflict Advisers Cadre manages a group of dedicated career professionals.) In the short term, the CSSC will need to add value to these and other existing arrangements rather than overriding or replacing them. In the longer run, it should be possible to identify scope for rationalisation.

16. The new International Police Assistance Board (IPAB), which brings together those with an interest in all international deployments of UK civil police, is considering proposals for an **International Police Assistance Group** (IPAG) to provide a stronger focus for planning and developing international policing capabilities, including for stabilisation operations. The Review recommended the IPAB should be asked to develop an international police cadre of around 500 officers, using targeted recruitment and training to develop international policing skills. While that should build on existing experience developed by the FCO and the MOD Police, domestic police forces need to develop a sense of ownership. The Review suggested the SU should take responsibility for ensuring that planning and operation of civil police contributions was fully integrated with the overall CSC. It should, therefore take over, from the FCO, the role of Whitehall customer for policing contributions for stabilisation and peacekeeping operations.

17. The SU is already improving the quality of its database of **Deployable Civilian Experts** (DCE), with better screening and more detailed information on individuals' skills, experience, readiness and past performance. (A large proportion of the experts previously recorded on the database are not now deployable.) Operating the database at a level where 150 personnel can be deployed will almost double the current capability. The SU will need to launch a new recruiting drive, which will need to continue as turnover of effective personnel is high. Individuals on the database need to be security cleared and subject to Hostile Environment Awareness Training (HEAT) before deployment. Those generate significant, but unavoidable, costs. Adequate resourcing of the DCE database will need to be maintained to ensure that it is more than just a list of names.

18. Personnel on the DCE database are largely professional contractors

who make themselves available to various potential employers for a range of overseas deployments. The SU has already taken the first steps towards establishing stronger links with a number of organisations, including the Local Government Association, Defence Career Partnering, RedR and Voluntary Service Overseas. The Review recommended the development of a formal **Stabilisation Volunteer Network (SVN)**, with a higher profile and a wider reach, to build more effective relationships with organisations and employers and draw in more people with relevant skills from beyond full-time conflict and development professionals. If initial recruitment and screening is carried out by the network organisations, rather than the SU, it will reduce the costs.

19. The Review considered the potential for a **Civilian Volunteer Reserve or Civil Reserve Corps**, along the lines of the nascent US model, which provide for compulsory call-up, formal employment protection, other supporting legal provisions, and provide facilities for a large number of personnel trained at a bespoke academy. In principle, they would be the only plausible route to generate much larger numbers of simultaneously deployed personnel. Standing costs are likely to be considerably greater than the proposed CSC/SVN model. There would also be significant political and legal challenges in going down that route, including a requirement for primary legislation. The Review concluded that the potential benefits would be outweighed by the costs and risks.

20. **Armed Forces' Volunteer Reservists** have already been engaged by the MOD in delivering civil effect, though generally in an ad hoc way. Using their civilian skills should be able to contribute more to stabilisation operations: their military knowledge would enhance performance in a challenging operational environment. Whether Reservists should formally be mobilised, raises legal issues. There could be circumstances where that would be necessary and appropriate. The Review recommended MOD should give priority to identifying individual Reservists' civilian skills, and their willingness to use those skills on civilian deployments, and link them into the proposed SVN.

21. The SU also maintains a number of **Framework Agreements** with contractors who provide programmes, rather than pre-determined personnel, on a call-off basis. Those arrangements work well but are expensive. Ideally,

therefore, they should only be used to fill short-notice, surge or specialised requirements where other less costly mechanisms are not available.

22. The Review also considered the potential requirement for a **rapid reaction or standing capability**, in addition to or instead of the capacity that the Stabilisation Unit currently provides by double-hatting its own staff. Rapid response is required in relatively limited circumstances, and is chiefly confined to early assessment, planning and short term augmentation of existing operations. The SU's ability to discharge its responsibilities has, however, been severely disrupted by the requirement to deploy core personnel. (An average of over 20% of the unit over the last six months.) The Review therefore recommended additional provision within the SU for a **Rapid Response Field Office**, of 8-10 staff on permanent standby, to carry out contingency planning or deploy when required. (Staff from the SU could cycle through the RRFO as part of a normal tour of duty on the unit, in order to develop or maintain exposure to operations on the ground.) That will be examined by the Implementation Team.

#### INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL REFORM

23. As part of the Prime Minister's initiative on International Institutional Reform, HMG is pushing for integrated leadership and strategy; faster and more flexible funding; and greater deployable civilian capacity for post-conflict stabilisation and early recovery. A capacity gap is one of the main issues hampering UN efforts to address early recovery. A significant UK commitment to develop enhanced national civilian capabilities, including a strengthened SU, will put us in a stronger position to argue for ambitious new capability targets for civilian deployable capacity, and to galvanise other contributions to improve the effectiveness of multilateral stabilisation and early recovery capabilities.

#### RESOURCES

24. Broad estimates for the costs of administrative enhancements are set out in Annex B. Assuming limited offsetting savings can be found, additional administrative costs should not exceed £7m in 09/10. Permanent Secretaries have agreed to find the resources required to take forward the recommendations in the short term; and that long term arrangements will be

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agreed within budgets set in the next SR.

25. The costs of current civilian deployments on stabilisation operations are estimated to be some £70M-£90M – see Annex C). (It has not proved possible to identify them more precisely.) Increasing the number deployed to 350 is likely to add up to **£20M-£30M**. The Stabilisation Aid Fund, Conflict Prevention Fund and Peacekeeping Budget will be the first source of funds, recognising that they are already under significant pressure and all elements will need rigorous prioritisation. (A separate paper is being prepared for NSID(OD) on 21 January on those issues.)

#### IMPLEMENTATION

26. Previous efforts to strengthen capabilities in this area have lacked the strategic drive, authority and resources to overcome the obstacles encountered. Priority short-term operational requirements, in Afghanistan and elsewhere, have inevitably diverted attention from medium-term capability development. A properly resourced **Implementation Team** is, therefore, required to take forward the agreed actions. That will be in place by the end of February. Progress will be reviewed before the publication of the refreshed NSS.

ENDS

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### SCOPE AND DEFINITIONS

1. There is no single agreed definition of stabilisation or civil effect. The following Stabilisation Unit (SU) definitions have been used in the paper:

- Stabilisation is support to places emerging from violent conflict in:
  - preventing or reducing violence;
  - protecting people and key institutions;
  - promoting political processes which lead to greater stability; and
  - preparing for longer term development and non-violent politics.
- Civil effect is activity to build public confidence and support for an enduring peace and focuses on the 'survival functions' of a state:
  - public order and the rule of law;
  - basic public services; and
  - economic stability;

To succeed, civil effect needs to bring together the efforts of civilian agencies (including multilateral), military and local partners.

2. In practice, many of the issues around "stabilisation" have arisen where combat or counter-insurgency operations are still continuing (eg Helmand and Iraq) or where the security environment is very difficult (eg Sudan and the DRC). Multilateral discussions on stabilisation and peacebuilding address a wider range of post-conflict scenarios where the aim is to strengthen public institutions and enable states to function effectively (e.g. Bosnia, Moldova, Nepal).

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3. Civilians are deployed using a variety of sources. In July 2008, they comprised:

- DCE Database: About 50 deployed (managed by Stabilisation Unit)
- Framework Agreements: About 30 deployed (managed by Stabilisation Unit)
- Police: About 140 deployed (managed by FCO)
- Civil Servants: About 50 deployed (not centrally managed)

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**ANNUAL ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS**

**Current Budgets**

Stabilisation Unit	34 permanent staff	£3.4M
FCO/MDP police deployment administration	6-8 permanent staff and other costs	£0.8M
Security Sector Defence Advisory Team (SSDAT)	13 permanent staff	£1.3M

**Estimated Costs of Enhanced Capability**

Enhancement	Requirements	Annual Cost
Civil Service Cadre	12 permanent staff to establish and run the cadre (in Stabilisation Unit)	£1.2M
	Training	£1.0M
International Police Assistance Group	6 permanent staff (5 in IPAG; 1 in Stabilisation Unit) and training and ancillary costs	£0.6M
Improved and expanded DCE database, incorporating a Stabilisation Volunteer Network	3 permanent staff (in Stabilisation Unit)	£0.3M
	Training and other support costs	£2.0M
Enhanced planning	10 permanent staff	£1.0M

capability in Stabilisation Unit		
Enhanced senior leadership structure in Stabilisation Unit	4 permanent staff	£0.4M
Rapid Response Team	8-10 permanent staff and training costs	£1.5M
SSDAT	Reduce staff	Tbd
<b>Total</b>		<b>£8M</b>



**DEPLOYMENT COSTS**

1. Civil effect in support of stabilisation is primarily funded by the Stabilisation Aid Fund (SAF), Conflict Prevention Pool (CPP) or Peacekeeping Budget.

- **Conflict Prevention Pool (CPP)** - funds long-term conflict prevention activity targeted at achieving PSA30;
- **Stabilisation Aid Fund (SAF)** - funds stabilisation activities in countries where security obstacles prevent conventional development or conflict prevention programmes, an external military force is present, and the country is a high UK foreign policy priority. The SAF currently pays for much of the activity in Afghanistan and Iraq;
- **Peacekeeping Budget (PKB)** - funds non-discretionary assessed/common costs associated with international peacekeeping and field missions and International Courts and Tribunals; bilateral contributions to International Courts & Tribunals; bilateral support for regional peacekeeping; and the cost of deploying UK personnel to UN/EU/NATO Ops.

2. SR 07 allocated the following resources to those funds<sup>1</sup>:

		£M	
	08/09	09/10	10/11
CPP	112	109	106
SAF	73	73	123
Peacekeeping Budget	374	374 (tbc)	Not yet agreed

3. These provide about £45M of the estimated costs of £70-90M pa for

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<sup>1</sup> SR07 required £77M/79M/58M of CPP expenditure and £58M/58M/108M of SAF expenditure to qualify as ODA.

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deployed personnel. Departmental expenditure and the Reserve provide the remainder. The SU also has programme funds of £4M pa.

4. The structure of those funds and current pressures on high priority activity, due in part to the effect of exchange rates on assessed costs, will be discussed at NSID(OD) in January.

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