

SIS6¹

SIR JOHN CHILCOT: I'll open this session with a welcome to [SIS6].

I normally recite a set of words, and I'm not going to this time. I'll, if I may, ask you to read them, but I'll draw attention just to one point in them. If evidence is given during this hearing which neither relates to classified documents nor to any of the categories set out in our Protocol on Sensitive Information, that evidence would in principle be capable of being published, subject to our letter. For the rest, I'll take it as having been said.

I wonder, could we start by your telling us very briefly the roles you held in relation to Iraq over the period. I think it's [REDACTED] when you started, up until the end of our period, which is July 2009.

SIS6: ² [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SIR JOHN CHILCOT: Thank you. Just for our benefit, [REDACTED]

¹ This officer is referred to as SIS6 throughout the Inquiry's documentation.

² The witness outlined his involvement in Iraq-related matters from 2006 onwards.

[REDACTED] involves what responsibility?

SIS6: [REDACTED]

3

SIR JOHN CHILCOT: Thank you. That's enough by way of background, I think.

Martin, can we turn to you straight away?

SIR MARTIN GILBERT: If I could start [in April 2006] [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] How would you describe the situation in Basra at that time?

SIS6: Well, the security situation in Basra was not good and getting worse. There was a bit of denial going on back in Whitehall about just how bad the situation was.

My predecessor, [SIS3]⁴, and then I, wrote a series of letters into Whitehall, to try and alert Whitehall to this because we felt it wasn't being taken sufficient notice of in policy deliberations.

SIR MARTIN GILBERT: Who at that time was causing the violence, and what did you see as the political objectives?

SIS6: It was essentially Jaish Al Mahdi. There was no Al Qaeda or Sunni element to this at all. It was Shia violence by people who were armed by the Iranians. I suppose [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] quite cautious about ascribing everything to the Iranians, but in retrospect it's pretty clear that there was very much -- it was Iranian arming, both with quite conventional munitions, but also subsequently with superior forms of IED, which made all the difference. People were ready to receive them, but it was Iranian arms which made the most difference.

SIR MARTIN GILBERT: I'll come on to the Iranian position in

³ The witness explained that the role was responsible for SIS in the Middle East.

⁴ This officer is referred to as SIS3 throughout the Inquiry's documentation.

a moment, but what degree of support did they have from Iraqi political figures or groups?

SIS6: Well, that was unclear [REDACTED] Certainly the penetration of the police by the militias shows that this was quite a deeply rooted political issue. Muqtada himself varied in his position. He had a ceasefire, and then he didn't, and sometimes the Iranians liked him and sometimes they didn't. But there were plenty of others, and it was obscure [REDACTED] exactly what the interrelationships were and who was backing the violence at what stages.

SIR MARTIN GILBERT: Did the obscurity become less obscure or did it remain a problem?

SIS6: Essentially it became less obscure, and it became Sadrist -- renegade or not so renegade Sadrists.

SIR MARTIN GILBERT: And in terms of the objectives of the attack, what percentage were against the Coalition? Did this again change over time?

SIS6: The attacks were on the whole against the Coalition. The police were intimidated or else parti pris. I remember reading about if you went around the police stations in Basra, each one would have an affiliation. So some of them would have pictures of Muqtada up and some would have pictures of Hakim, the ISCI leader. So each police station would be, as it were, dominated by a particular trend. So they weren't the subject of attack.

SIR JOHN CHILCOT: Martin, I think you are going to move on to Iran soon. Just before we do that, you mentioned the attempts that you and [SIS3] made to alert Whitehall to the reality of the situation, but we will come on to that later in this session.

SIS6: Sure.

SIR MARTIN GILBERT: What evidence did you have that the Iranians were supporting this insurgency in Basra?

SIS6: [REDACTED]

Finally, there was the forensic evidence from the munitions. That should be recorded, and of course that wasn't our business to assemble that, but the military did.

What you saw happening was that to begin with the Iranians were quite cautious, and the sorts of weapons they supplied were commonly available. So it could always be argued they were left over from the Iran/Iraq War, because of course there was a lot of ordnance left lying around, a lot of Iraqi arms dumps left lying around.

But as the thing went on, they became bolder and less constrained in what they supplied, and then eventually there were very definite types of weaponry which were only made in Iran and can be forensically linked to Iran [REDACTED]

SIR JOHN CHILCOT: Was the emboldening to do simply with the

Iran/Iraq axis, or was it to do with broader Iran politics and the situation?

SIS6: I think it was to do with the broader situation, and also they got away with it. They were getting away with it. There wasn't much push back. [REDACTED] At the same time they wanted to have more effect. So they delivered higher tech -- more and higher tech.

SIR MARTIN GILBERT: Can you tell us something about the Iranian proxies or Iranian-led groups operating inside Iraq?

SIS6: [REDACTED] The question really for me was how closely directed they were by Iran, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SIR MARTIN GILBERT: What did that reveal in terms of who was providing --

SIS6: Well, it's the IRGC Qods force, which is the sort of special operations wing of the IRGC, set up to organise proxy forces abroad. So they are responsible for the relationship with Hizballah in Lebanon. Equally they were responsible for the Badr Corps, when the Badr Corps were in exile in Iran. Subsequently they retained links to the Badr Corps, but the Badr Corps went mainstream. They were subsequently responsible for links to rejectionist Shia groups.

SIR JOHN CHILCOT: Could you say a word for context and

background about the degree to which Qods force, and indeed the IRGC, is part of a unified or not unified governmental system?

SIS6: The IRGC is most certainly part of a unified governmental system. In the Iranian constitution the Supreme Leader is the Commander in Chief of the armed forces. So that heads of the armed forces report to the Supreme Leader. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SIR MARTIN GILBERT: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]?

SIS6: [REDACTED]

SIR MARTIN GILBERT: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]?

SIS6: [REDACTED]

[illegible]

SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Thanks very much.

On this question of counter insurgency, there's a broad question of your view of the counter insurgency strategy in MND South East [REDACTED]

████████████████████ Perhaps if you just give us your view of how
you saw it.

SIS6: I think for us there's always the issue of tactical and strategic, and how much effort to put into direct support for the military in tactical operations, and how much to put into strategic political work. In the early days of the campaign, when we were sort of better configured to do that, then we did quite a lot of it.

5 [REDACTED]

⁵ The witness described areas of SIS operational activity and working arrangements with both other intelligence providers and with one of the major 'customers' for that intelligence, the British military.

[illegible]

SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]?

SIS6: [REDACTED]? Well, we were [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] part of that
process. But I would say that we weren't -- at that stage there
were troops in different bases all over Basra, and the ground
truth element of information was not our responsibility. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: What was your assessment of SINBAD?

SIS6: Good idea, slightly emasculated [REDACTED] because
the detention, the hard end of it, was taken out.

Maybe it was over-optimistic to expect that development would
come in and there would be enough space for the development aid
to come in.

Also maybe it was over-optimistic to think that once you had
given people aid, they will stop shooting at you. It only needs
a few people to shoot at you, and I think the -- sorry, jumping
about a bit here, but the subsequent success of Charge of the
Knights showed actually that probably HMG was right in thinking
that the majority population of Basra wanted a calm city and
didn't particularly want to shoot at us. But you only need
a small number of determined men to completely derail that. So
therefore, if you can't win the consent of 100 per cent of
people, then you still have the insurgency problem.

SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Was this sort of where you were doing
new ground for SIS?

SIS6: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] by this period, 2006, there were very close working relations, and we had sort of got into the swing. We had quite a stable method of working with the military [REDACTED]

SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Are there any other lessons such as that that you would say you had learned from this particular experience of counter insurgency work?

SIS6: I think the unity of command thing is very important. It's easy for us. We are not trying to make policy. So we want a clear policy steer, and General Shirreff's notion of a single supremo for Basra, which didn't get anywhere, and people accused him of trying to empire build and so on, actually I think you've got to have some way of doing that, because I did just notice this tension between the Foreign Office, the MOD and Cabinet Office and Number 10. In the accounts of the Whitehall debates, you can see this coming through over and over again, who is in charge and what is the policy.

SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: That comes over in the --

SIS6: So, for me, that was -- in terms of SIS business, well, there's a resource question.⁶ [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

The other capability issue is having all the different elements you need [REDACTED]

⁶ The witness went on to describe SIS' Arabic-speaking capacity in some detail.

the line that any attempt to grip the security situation would require a scales of justice type operation.

That suggests that at least part of Whitehall had got the point that there was a problem here.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Did that correspond with your own view? Did you think that ministers were not being given the accurate harsh ground truth?

SIS6: That was my impression [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] reflected

[REDACTED]

to Tim Dowse, copied to John Sawers, Dominic Asquith, Margaret Aldred and so on.

So we did reflect these views [REDACTED] into Whitehall, and then subsequently, quite soon after that in fact, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] -- there was another letter

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. And of course we were going to meetings as well and projecting our view into meetings.

SIR RODERIC LYNE: Did SIS have to provide this sort of frank

and very extensively argued input, which is about the policy, because those who should have been reporting from the ground politically were simply not doing so, were not doing so accurately, and I have in mind in particular, obviously, the embassy and the consulate general, and also the military down their reporting lines?

SIS6: I think it's very difficult. If you are marking your own homework it's quite difficult to give yourself a bad mark, and to say, well, this was the plan, we all agreed it, but it's not working. That's quite a difficult thing for anybody to say, and SIS wouldn't be excluded from that. It's just that we weren't -- it wasn't our -- because we're detached, we were able to do it.

So I think there was some wishful thinking going on. Also, having skimmed the papers again, there was a dichotomy -- Nigel Sheinwald certainly got it -- so is the situation as rosy as the MOD say it is? No, but at the same time I want you to reduce troop numbers. So that puts the MOD, I would say, in a pretty difficult position. They know the plan is not working, but they have got to reduce troops at the same time.

SIR RODERIC LYNE: Yes. The essence of this argument is indeed about the transitional strategy. The GOC was under instructions that that was what he was to effect, and [SIS] was actually questioning whether this was right.

Now, the core argument that the military were making, and they have made in public evidence to us, to justify the withdrawal that they were working towards from Basra City to the airport, was that we had become the target.

Was that an argument that SIS agreed with, or was it a convenient argument to justify the withdrawal?

SIS6: I think we had become the target, and we had become the

target because we had -- [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] If you look at: what's the success of Charge of the Knights? Actually it's large numbers of Iraqi army coming down to Basra, dominating the ground and so on.

[REDACTED] the army didn't really have, from my impression, a very close relationship with the Iraqi army, which in any case wasn't very capable in Basra.

Then that just leaves the police, and the police were completely infiltrated. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] We had quite a good picture on how the police really worked and all that.

So had we become a target? Yes, I think we had. Were we doing anything useful by spring 2007? Well, hard to say. Essentially we were fixed.

SIR RODERIC LYNE: But the implication of this correspondence is that SIS at least felt there was an alternative to simply scuttling to the airport, that there were things that we should be doing to improve the situation before transition.

You disagreed here. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] So in a sense you had a package of things that you felt should be being done, but it wasn't happening.

SIS6: Yes, and they were things which were not really for us to do either. Some of them might have been for us to do.

SIR RODERIC LYNE: No, but you had somebody [REDACTED] who could look at it and make constructive suggestions. But this didn't -- you said Nigel Sheinwald was aware of the situation, but it didn't change the policy. Why didn't it change the policy? You were making good suggestions here.

SIS6: Well, I suppose because politically, in domestic political terms, it was an unpopular war, and the government wanted to get out of it, and reduce and leave. So all the things we proposed would have meant longer engagement, more commitment, not reducing troops, maybe even increasing. If you are going to clear out the police, how are you going to do that? It's all -- it would be ramping up effort, rather than reducing effort, and there was just a very clear -- for me it just came through very clearly, it was all about how are we going to get out in a sort of neat way which looks as though it's okay?

SIR RODERIC LYNE: There's a statement here also that:

"They ..."

[REDACTED]:

"

[REDACTED]."

Did you feel that we were robbing Iraq to pay Afghanistan?

SIS6: Certainly. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] --

SIR RODERIC LYNE: [REDACTED].

SIS6: But the decision to shift effort to Afghanistan was a key part of the argument.

Again I don't know if it's in the documents anywhere, but as I understood it, the MOD wanted to ramp up in Afghanistan, and

to use that to say to the Americans that we are going to do Afghanistan, and therefore we need to reduce in Iraq, and you need to -- and therefore we will ramp down in Iraq.

SIR RODERIC LYNE: We have been told that the Americans had actually agreed to our transition strategy in MND South East. Was that what you heard?

SIS6: Yes, but I --

SIR RODERIC LYNE: Had General Casey -- was he content with it? It would suggest otherwise that he was not very happy with it.

SIS6: Well, the military bureaucracy is so complicated, and so many people have so many meetings, I wouldn't like to say hand on heart exactly what the position was. I wasn't directly involved.

Of course the Americans didn't want -- the Americans in Iraq, I guess, didn't want us to reduce numbers -- why would they -- at that stage.

SIR RODERIC LYNE: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]?

SIS6: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] It wouldn't have been a subject for particular discussion.

SIR RODERIC LYNE: Just as a parting comment, I would simply say that the material [REDACTED] reads very well.

SIS6: Good.

SIR RODERIC LYNE: Thank you.

SIR JOHN CHILCOT: Let's turn to a quite specific topic, the so-called Basra deal.

BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: The Basra deal. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]?

SIS6: ⁸ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: [REDACTED]?

SIS6: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

⁸ The witness gave his perspective of the Basra accommodation, and his understanding of other government departments' views.

[illegible]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]?

SIS6: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

SIR JOHN CHILCOT: [REDACTED]?

SIS6: [REDACTED].

SIR JOHN CHILCOT: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]?

SIS6: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

SIS6: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

But that wasn't part of the -- we didn't say, "And we will move out of the middle of Basra". We wanted to move. Our military wanted to move out of the middle of Basra, but found themselves fixed there. When

they sent these re-supply convoys, it was absolutely awful. Every ten days they had to re-supply. There would be a great long convoy of tanks making a lot of noise. They would be ambushed all the way in, shot at all the way in, shot at all the way out, and they always took casualties.

SIR JOHN CHILCOT: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]?

BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]?

SIS6: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: [REDACTED]

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SIS6: [REDACTED]

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SIR JOHN CHILCOT: [REDACTED]

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SIR RODERIC LYNE: [REDACTED]

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SIS6: [REDACTED]

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SIS6: [REDACTED]

SIR RODERIC LYNE: [REDACTED]?

SIS6: [REDACTED].

SIR RODERIC LYNE: [REDACTED]?

SIS6: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED].

SIR RODERIC LYNE: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] What

happened to the ceasefire after the deal?

SIS6: It gradually broke down and we became subject to IDF. It wasn't at quite the levels that it had been at the height of IDFin'g in summer 2006, but it was sporadic, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

SIR RODERIC LYNE: To what effect was the combination of the deal of our withdrawal, the ceasefire, a turning point in the security situation in Basra?

SIS6: It was certainly a turning point from the point of view of our physical security.

SIR RODERIC LYNE: Overall?

SIS6: It made us -- the number of actual fatalities, British fatalities --

SIR RODERIC LYNE: I'm thinking about the security of the city. Did the level of violence return to the same level as before?

SIS6: I don't know.

SIR RODERIC LYNE: That's beyond your field of vision.

SIS6: [REDACTED]

SIR RODERIC LYNE: [REDACTED] --

SIS6: [REDACTED]

SIR RODERIC LYNE: -- [REDACTED].

Did you have a view on what Charge of the Knights told us about the level of competence of the Iraqi security services in MND South East?

SIS6: Yes. Charge of the Knights was really interesting because it's a fantastic political operation.

Maliki, turning up with two divisions of Iraqi troops, flooding the streets with large numbers of Iraqis, only he could have done that. [REDACTED]

SIR JOHN CHILCOT: [REDACTED]?

SIS6: [REDACTED]⁹ didn't have the levers to do it, and [REDACTED] made a fantastic quote to me, which was essentially: "If you arrest somebody, they are a hero. If the Iraqi army arrests somebody, they are a criminal". And that was our problem, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The Iraqi army weren't up to it, and the police were not co-operating with us and were infiltrated.

Once you had a proper central Iraqi organisation, even if not particularly competent, it just changed the political dynamic completely. And it ceases to be resistance against the foreigner. It's: resistance against our Shia Prime Minister? Well, why would we do that?

SIR RODERIC LYNE: Thank you.

SIR JOHN CHILCOT: Okay. We have just mentioned the Shia Prime Minister, Maliki. Martin?

⁹ The witness confirmed that there had been some military planning to do a similar operation.

SIR MARTIN GILBERT: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]?

SIS6: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

SIR MARTIN GILBERT: And his attitude towards us, his personal attitude?

SIS6: His personal attitude to the British is unfriendly. He doesn't like the British. It's been in the press that his grandfather was apparently arrested by the British in the 1920s, and when he became Prime Minister, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

SIR MARTIN GILBERT: And did we know anything about his view of our activities in MND South East?

SIS6: It always seemed to me that Basra wasn't central to Iraq -- wasn't a central political issue. It was -- if you look at the records of the governmental meetings and committees, and Petraeus' sessions and so on, the south isn't seen as particularly important because the big battle is against Al Qaeda, and the Sunni heartlands. That's where the really serious insurgency is going on, and that's what Maliki and

Petraeus concentrated on.

SIR MARTIN GILBERT: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]?

SIS6: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SIR MARTIN GILBERT: In terms of his reasons for launching the operation, was there information?

SIS6: What were the political dynamics in Baghdad? He was trying to -- forgive me. I can't remember what the political dynamics were. There was a reason why he wanted to make a splash and a success.

SIR MARTIN GILBERT: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED].

SIS6: [REDACTED].

SIR MARTIN GILBERT: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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SIS6: [REDACTED]

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BARONESS USHA PRASHAR:

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SIS6:

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BARONESS USHA PRASHAR:

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SIS6:

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BARONESS USHA PRASHAR:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]?

[REDACTED].

SIS6:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[illegible]

BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]?

[illegible]

BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: [REDACTED]?

SIS6: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

SIS6: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: [REDACTED]?

SIS6: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]?

SIS6: [REDACTED]

SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

SIS6: [REDACTED]

SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SIS6: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN:

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]?

SIS6:

SIR JOHN CHILCOT: This leads us neatly into the last questions, I think. Martin would like to ask about intelligence relations more generally.

SIR MARTIN GILBERT:

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]?

SIS6:

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

SIR MARTIN GILBERT: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]?

SIS6: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

SIR MARTIN GILBERT: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]?

SIS6: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED].

SIR MARTIN GILBERT: Thank you.

SIR JOHN CHILCOT: Just as we round on off, we have got one or two questions about [REDACTED] and SIS.

SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Just briefly, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

SIS6: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

SIR LAWRENCE FREEDMAN: Thanks very much.

SIR JOHN CHILCOT: I think we have come pretty much to the end, and just about in time.

I would like to ask, as we close, are there any reflections on the lessons that you and SIS more generally have got from the Iraq experience?

SIS6: Yes. What we want is clear structures. So that we know who to feed into in the sense of clear policy, because it's easy -- if there isn't a clear policy, it's difficult to know what to do to support it. I think maybe the new National Security Council structure goes some way to addressing that.

The other thing is the fusion of intelligence collection techniques. We are organised functionally because we specialise -- we do mainly Humint and GCHQ do mainly Sigint, and various other, you know, ISTAR and so on -- those are specialist skills, and they are organised like that so that you get good at them. But you need to fuse that effort, not just in terms of analysis, but in terms of collection, so that they are constantly -- the techniques are constantly informing each other, as I described for [REDACTED].

SIR JOHN CHILCOT: Have we -- "we" being the different British intelligence agencies concerned -- learned how to do that [REDACTED] [REDACTED]?

SIS6: It works really well [REDACTED] where people are

working close to each other, and where there's a very clear aim:

[REDACTED].

It doesn't work so well back in the UK because the issues are less urgent, there's less clarity about them. Geographical separation, and then all the sort of legal and policy issues start to intrude in a way that somehow, in the war zones, people work their way through.

SIR JOHN CHILCOT: [REDACTED] is this body of evolving doctrine articulated and written down? Or is it just in the experience of those who have taken part?

SIS6: It's an evolving thing. I should say that for the Security Service on the CT side, it is certainly fused. So that is a sort of similar issue.

We, SIS, are [REDACTED] and that's a very clear policy. I don't know where we will reach the limit on that, but it's getting much closer [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] So there's much more joint working.

There are some significant legal issues to do with [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and those sorts of things.

SIR JOHN CHILCOT: And conditions of service abroad and things like that?

SIS6: And things like that, yes.

SIR JOHN CHILCOT: Thank you. We are very grateful to you. It was a valuable session.

Can I remind you the transcript has got, I'm afraid, to be read and reviewed in this building when you find it convenient.

With that, I'll say thank you again and close the session. Thanks.

(The hearing adjourned)