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**Coalition Provisional Authority
Interior Ministry**

**Iraq Police:
An Assessment
of the Present and
Recommendations
For the Future**

Baghdad

30 May 2003

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Mission Statement

The International Police Assistance Team, assigned to the Coalition Provisional Authority - Interior Ministry, will assist in the reconstitution and development of a new Iraqi police service that will protect the human rights and dignity of all citizens while constituting a police service that reflects the diversity of the country. Program initiatives will endeavor to increase citizen trust and confidence in law enforcement, and develop the institutional framework upon which a serviced-based police institution is founded. Training programs will be developed and presented in a manner consistent with the principles of democratic policing through an educational philosophy that is strongly based on international human rights standards.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Iraqi Police, as currently constituted and trained, are unable to independently maintain law and order and need the assistance and guidance of Coalition Force assets (or some appropriate follow on force) to accomplish this task. They have suffered years of neglect, coupled with a repressive command structure that prohibited training, proactivity, initiative and stifled attempts toward modernization of the police. Unless redesigned and redeveloped, the Iraqi Police will not constitute a suitable, viable, supportable or sustainable police service for a free Iraq.

Although the Iraqi Police Forces were only a part of the security apparatus used by Saddam Hussein's repressive regime, they are the only institution which remains intact following the conflict. In the opinion of many citizens the police are inextricably linked with a cruel and repressive regime and have been tainted by their association. Generally seen as part of the regime's mechanism the populace normally describes the police as corrupt, unprofessional and untrustworthy.

The police force was a quasi-military institution heavily steeped in military tactics, doctrine, discipline and philosophy – concurrently staffed with active military personnel who were tightly controlled from Baghdad. Because of this restrictive control, the Police Services languished for the last thirty years and now displays the results of poor standards, inadequate expectations of performance, absence of an understanding/appreciation for human rights, poor management and insufficient or inadequate training. Its *modus operandi*, weaponry and approach to human rights were totally unsuited to modern policing requirements.

Following the conflict, most of the police infrastructure was badly damaged, stolen or destroyed during the cathartic looting which succeeded the end of hostilities. As the public order situation improves, the police who fled Coalition forces are returning to work. More police return to work each week, not only within Baghdad but across the country. Their ability to operate effectively, in general, is hampered by their inadequate knowledge of basic police skills (patrol techniques, interviewing and crime scene investigation) and hampered by a substantial lack of equipment.

The Coalition Forces have been overwhelmed by the absence of training, lack of professional standards, ignorance of human rights and depleted initiative displayed by the Iraqi police. Though not the individual officer's failing, their lack of skills must be quickly addressed before demobilization of a peacekeeping force can be undertaken. In their defense, most Iraqi Police display a willingness to cooperate and work with Coalition police advisors concerning their future.

Establishing a sufficient, proactive, deterrent police presence remains the principle priority of the Coalition Provisional Authority. Once the Rule of Law has been established, the Iraq Police Service must be engaged in extensive capacity building and development for necessary to instill the knowledge base and appreciation for human rights necessary for a professional, sustainable and acceptable police service.

Before achieving these competencies, a thorough vetting of existing personnel is required along with extensive retraining of those who survive this attrition process.

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The simultaneous recruitment, screening and training of new recruits, untainted by the vestiges of the former regime can not be postponed or ignored. This infusion of new ideas, ideals and expectations will invigorate the Police Service while forcing existing personnel to challenge paradigms of behavior that have held them hostage throughout their careers. Complementing these ideas is the installation of a proactive, aggressive Office of Professional Standards that will hold officers accountable to a standardized set of internationally accepted policies, rules and regulations that will guide the Police Service long after international advising and police assistance have ended.

Criminal Intelligence and intelligence gathering legislation (in accordance with international standards) will have to be addressed quickly in the new police service. With the advent of the *de-Ba'athification* program there are many disenfranchised former governmental officials (political, military and police) who are poised through training and history to begin a new lucrative career as members of organized crime or anti-government groups. This coupled with Saddam's pre-conflict release of all incarcerated persons gives Iraq a plethora of criminal operations and organizations that will threaten its future.

The separation of regulatory from enforcement duties, which minimizes opportunities for corruption, should be encouraged. More importantly, administrative and regulatory tasks normally do not require the skill sets of a police officer and can be competently performed by civilian personnel within the Service and Ministry. Tasks that can be civilianized – particularly those in specialty areas, such as accountants, attorneys – should be identified and staffed with competent, capable civilians who are given career opportunities to support the police mission. Civilianization will free police from administrative duties and allow them to devote their time and expertise to crime deterrence, prevention and detection.

The reform of the police is a long-term program that will require considerable international assistance through financial, in-kind contributions and in terms of qualified police personnel to train, monitor and advise their Iraqi counterparts. Reform will take many forms: vetting, screening, training, deterrence, mentoring and monitoring.

A policy decision regarding the type of police service to reconstitute is the first step in the long process of development. Although the implementation will take time, the Iraqi people must be given a vision of their future police. Ownership of this process by civil leaders, religious leaders, politicians, the public and especially the police will be crucial to the success of this undertaking. Ownership of the process must be heartfelt by every member of this fledgling police service striving to reconstitute itself and gain acceptance from a distrusting and skeptical public.

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INTRODUCTION

The Police Assessment Team, attached to the ORHA/Coalition Provisional Authority Ministry of Interior office, comprised fifteen policing experts from the US, UK, Canada and Denmark.

It was originally envisaged that the assessment team, forming part of a wider Justice Sector assessment team¹, would have three to four weeks in which to conduct a scoping survey and make its report. However, the law and order situation was in a critical state of disarray and the ORHA priority was defined as establishing the police forces; therefore, the majority of the team were assigned to assist with this task.

A smaller team (five) carried out the assessment and its findings and recommendations were presented to the Ministry of Interior office for comment and revisions prior to release. Information available about the existing police forces came from various sources - Military Police, Civil Affairs, former/present Iraqi police, politicians and citizens - who had been working cooperatively to restore order.

The Assessment Team was based in Baghdad and traveled through Iraq to both Basra and Mosul. The process of assessment involved visits to police stations, interviews with Iraqi police officers and civilians, and debriefings by the Coalition Military Forces.

Time did not allow a visit to the Kurdish areas or ORHA Central South sector but written reports provided by the Coalition Forces indicate the overriding findings from the rest of the country are applicable to this area as well.

¹ An assessment on the judicial situation, courts and prisons is ongoing under the aegis of the Coalition Provisional Authority Ministry of Justice

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BACKGROUND

The Iraqi Police Force was formed in 1920 and operated as a civil force under a Police Law², akin to that of the civil service, until it was militarized by the *Ba'ath* regime in 1970³. Since this the police have been inextricably linked with the repressive regime of Saddam Hussein. In the eyes of the public they are not the worst human rights offenders of the last thirty brutal years but they were the most visible and accessible. Equally damaging to their present state was the fact that the police were not a security force favored by Saddam Hussein; consequently, they were poorly paid and educated. This led to endemic corruption which further eroded public confidence and trust.

Under the *Ba'ath* regime there were two strata of internal security within Iraq. The first tier comprised the security agencies that reported directly to the Secretariat of the Presidency and included the Muhabarat⁴, the Special Security Organization, the Directorate of General Security, the Fedayeen, the *Ba'ath* Party Militia and Special Republican Guard. The exact numbers of personnel in these categories are unknown but best estimates would place them at more than 30,000.⁵

The second tier operated under the Ministry of the Interior (see Annex A) and included the Police General Directorate, the Traffic Police General Directorate, the Civil Defense Directorate, Citizenship and Immigration Police Directorate, the Baghdad Police Academy and the Police Higher Development Institute. The Ministry of Defense was operationally responsible for the Border Guard but the Border Guard was administered, supplied and managed by the Ministry of the Interior.⁶ The Minister of the Interior had direct control of the police Emergency Battalions that were distributed across the country and used for quelling civil unrest across the country.⁷

The General Director of Police (see Annex A) also commanded the Headquarters of the Police General Directorate in Baghdad and the seventeen Governorate Police Directorates (Maysan, An Najaf, Al Muthanna, Wasit, Karbala, Babil, Al Anbar, Diyala, Salah Ad Din, At Tamin, Ninawa, Baghdad Resafa, Baghdad Karkh, Basra, Dhi Qar and Al Qadisiyah). Under the General Director of Police were four Deputy General Directors: Vital Institutions Protection (Railway Police, Oil Protection, Electricity Police, Check Points, Ministry guards, Airport guards, Embassy guards and the like), Technology and Development, Finance and Administration, and

² The last applicable law was Police Law No. 20 of 1943.

³ Decree No. 995 of the Revolutionary Command Council enacted Law No. 184 of 1970 as an Appendage to Military Penal Code No. 13 of 1940. Article 1 of the 1970 Law states that provisions of the amended Military Penal Code No. 13 apply to all those covered by Law No. 149 of 1968 on police service, security agencies and citizenship police. Source: Farouk Jawad Ridha, former Chief of Judiciary Police, in *Islamic Jurists Association Review* 2003

⁴ Internal intelligence service

⁵ Various sources, some classified

⁶ There was also a General Directorate of the Interior, under the Deputy Minister, which cut across several policing issues. It had Sub-directorates for Secret Affairs, Criminal Affairs, Borders, Traffic, Civil Defence, Clubs and Societies.

⁷ They had a distinctive blue-green uniform

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Criminal Affairs Operations. The Judiciary Police reported directly to the General Director of Police.⁸

The Governorate Directorates were organized more simply and consisted of Guards (Vital Institutions), Crime and Emergency Battalion Directorates, and others. Under their Headquarters were regional Directorates, each with departments and stations. The Chief of Police was appointed by the Minister of the Interior in Baghdad and could be directed in the province by the Governor and Mayor, both of whom would have been senior *Ba'athists*. Regardless of the appearance of local control, all police documents (arrest reports, for example) were copied to Headquarters in Baghdad, where tight control was retained over the provincial forces.

Included in the Ministry of Interior security forces were the Traffic Police Department who were responsible for vehicle registration, issuance of licenses and the control of traffic. The Civil Defense Directorate who was responsible for the fire service and natural disasters. The Citizenship and Immigration Directorate dealt with national identification cards and the registration of births, deaths, graves, marriages and divorces. Finally, the Border Police⁹ had three primary branches: Customs Police¹⁰, Border Police Stations and Border Guards. The Border Police patrolled the border while the Border Guards protected the 10 compounds which were located at the land points of entry into Iraq and the 264 Border Police Stations between them.

In 2003 the strength of the Iraqi Police Force under the General Director of Police was 58,006¹¹ and was exclusively male.¹²

TRAINING

There were three levels of police: Non-Commissioned Officers, Assistant Officers and Officers. The Non-Commissioned Officers possessed little formal education – normally only completing primary school. When hired they were trained within their provincial area in an unstructured training program that could last up to three months. Standards and length of training appear to have varied widely from province to province. Once they graduated from this training, these non-commissioned officers were responsible for most of the daily contact between Iraqi citizens and the police. Non-commissioned officers were the first responders to calls for service and were responsible for dealing with disputes and the maintenance of public order.

⁸ This is copied from a proposed structure received by ORHA from Lieutenant General Mohammed Habib Humadi, the fourth highest ranking officer in the General Directorate of Police, 11/5/2003. It has been compared with other sources and represents an accurate picture of the General Directorate as it was, less the nefarious security departments disbanded by ORHA – the Criminal Investigations Division and Police Security Office

⁹ Pre-war strength 500 officers and 3,000 ranks (excluding Customs Police) – figures supplied by Brigadier General Khalef, Iraqi Border Police, 27/05/03

¹⁰ Pre-war strength 198 officers and 2,202 ranks – figures supplied by Major General Ali, Iraqi Customs Police, 27/05/03

¹¹ Information provided by Lieutenant General Mohammed Habib Humadi

¹² Women were trialed as traffic police 1971-3, an experiment described by one senior officer as a 'disaster'. It should be noted that there are women police officers in the police forces of other Arab countries, such as Egypt, Jordan and Bahrain.

Assistant Officers completed secondary school education, usually from the Police High School, and then underwent on the job training. They were normally assigned to various administrative functions within the Iraqi Police Force and would only respond to serious crime for supervision only. Their duties usually consisted of administrative work assisting the Officer corps.

Officers were secondary school graduates who were further educated at the Police Professional College in Baghdad undergoing a three year course of instruction. Upon completion of training the Officers received the equivalent of a Bachelor's degree in Police Science; however, the curriculum was heavily steeped in military doctrine and training. After graduating the academy Officers were posted arbitrarily and normally served in the assigned region for the rest of their careers. Initially commissioned as Second Lieutenants, these candidates were eligible to apply for promotion every four years. The criteria for promotion were seniority, a good record, specialized training and a written exam up to the rank of Colonel. Officers were be allowed to attend the Police Higher Development Institute in Baghdad where they attended courses, conducted research and could be awarded post graduate degrees, including Doctorates. However, traditional supervision, management, command and staff level training and development did not exist within any of their training mechanisms.

SALARIES

The Iraqi Police Force did not attract quality recruits because the status of police held a position in society that was lower than the military resulting in poor pay and resources. The salaries (including bonuses) ranged from 80,000 Dinars (US \$40) a month for the lowest grade to 185,000 Dinars (US \$90) for a Major General. Those police officers who could, left the police and joined one of the Level One security agencies, where attendant privileges could be gained. One Iraqi Police General believed that his police salary of 40,000 Dinars could have been as high as 300,000 Dinars had he joined the Special Security Guard.

UNIFORMS

The uniforms of the General Directorate of Police – except traffic and emergency battalions - were olive green, with black berets. Traffic Police wore white shirt and blue trousers, while the Emergency Battalions wore distinguishing blue-green uniforms. The ranks were military and those from Major upwards incorporated the Iraqi eagle. Discipline was enforced through the Military Penal Code and enacted by the Military Courts.

WEAPONS & EQUIPMENT

The weaponry was distinctly military and Police station armories would store pistols, AK-47s, Light Machine Guns, Rocket Propelled Grenades, mortars and hand grenades. Iraqi Police normally carried AK-47s and pistols; however, they did not possess any other traditional police equipment, even handcuffs. There were no

intermediate levels of force available and within their arsenal there were no less-than-lethal options, which severely limited their approach to dealing with the public.

CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS

Like the patrol function, the Investigators had a bifurcated system of control and responsibilities. Detectives were divided between traditional police investigators and Investigative Judge investigators. Regardless, investigators rarely left the office and attended the crime scene unless directed to attend for specific tasks. It was the responsibility of the patrol, police officers and crime scene/evidence technicians to bring all evidence, witnesses and suspects to the investigators. When enough evidence was collected to present to an Investigative Judge, the information was then transferred from the police investigators to the Investigative Judge's investigators who would follow up on interviews and evidence collection necessary for a prosecution. Their methods of extracting information were rather draconian and their access to traditional investigative tools and equipment was limited or non-existent.

LAW

The applicable laws that governed the police's operations were the Penal Code with Amendments 1969 and the Law on Criminal Proceedings with Amendments No. 23 of 1971.

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CURRENT SITUATION

ACROSS IRAQ

The present law and order situation varies across Iraq. Baseline data of the crime situation before the conflict is not available because it was either destroyed or secreted; therefore, it is impossible to compare the current situation or to undertake a detailed study of investigative abilities or specialized departments¹³. An additional problem rests with the gathering of current crime information from Coalition military sources that is classified and can not be shared in this forum.

Regardless of the lack of empirical data, the Coalition Force's priority remains law and order and getting the available police back on the streets. As noted above, much of the police's infrastructure and equipment had been damaged or pillaged during the immediate post conflict period. As in all post conflict situations though weapons of all types are readily available within the country, the *Rule of the Gun* is being replaced by the Rule of Law stemming from the concerted efforts and ingenuity of Coalition Forces working in concert with Iraqi Police.

On 2 May 2003 the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) called all Ministry of Interior employees of the Police Force, Civil Defense Force, Vital Institutions Protection Force (actually a part of the Police Force) and Traffic Police in Baghdad back to work for 04 May.¹⁴ A similar call was issued outside the incorporated area by individual Coalition Force Commanders as their areas were secured. The announcement did not recall members of the first strata of Iraq's previous security apparatus and effectively disbanded these organizations.¹⁵

All members of the police forces were provisionally reappointed to the posts they occupied before the war. In the areas outside Baghdad, the police were stood up by the Coalition Forces under localized arrangements. In most areas the Chiefs of Police were appointed by provisional Town Councils. Some basic training by Coalition Forces has taken place but this has varied from area to area, as have the *modus operandi*. Encouragingly, the Iraqi police are cooperating and demonstrating a willingness to work alongside the Coalition Forces in order to address the law and order situation.

As of 30 May 2003 the Border Police have not been called back to work. While assessments concerning their future are currently being undertaken, a plan to open both the Umm Qase seaport and Baghdad International Airport have prompted Police

¹³ The Criminal Identification laboratory in Baghdad has survived the looting, as has the Crime Bureau database. The laboratory is reflective of the 1980's technologies but contains sections for ballistics, fingerprinting, casting, crime scene photography, blood sample analysis and counterfeiting. It has 700,000 fingerprints on both cards and computer. Most of the personnel were trained in Egypt, Jordan and India.

¹⁴ ORHA Announcement on Return to Work of the Police 02/05/03

¹⁵ Named as 'Intelligence Services, Public Safety Directorate, Military Intelligence Department, Special Guard Directorate and Emergency Brigade'

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Advisors to recruit some former Border Patrol to staff these two points of entry. Border patrolling will soon be conducted by the Coalition Forces.¹⁶

SOUTHERN IRAQ - BASRA

The situation encountered by the Coalition Forces in Basra, the largest city in southern Iraq, was repeated as the advance continued through Iraq: the senior *Ba'athists* fled, the police forces faded away and widespread looting followed the collapse of law and order. All police stations were stripped of equipment, supplies and weapons and then the majority of the stations – sometimes up to 60 per cent – were subsequently damaged by fire. Most of the damage was caused by looters; however, some could be traced to former police who were attempting to destroy incriminating records. An assessment of refurbishment costs for the destroyed and missing police equipment and stations is ongoing.

Prior to the war the Basra police force numbered some 6,000 to 8,000 for a population of 1.4 million. Soon after their arrival, the Military Police Battalion did not have an adequate civilian police force and, as a stopgap measure, recruited auxiliary policemen in order to fill the void. The employment of auxiliaries (though they received on the job training) was seen as unsustainable in the long term and the priority shifted to again attempting to entice back the former police while attempting to reopen damaged police stations. In an effort to visually separate the returning police from the former regime an interim uniform¹⁷ was devised, which met with cultural objections¹⁸ and has been replaced with a new uniform that is currently being issued.

In the middle of May, the four main police stations in Basra were handed back to the police, under close supervision of the Coalition Forces. The Provost Marshal of the Division occupying the Southern Region has remained as the *de facto* Chief of Police in Basra, with the authority to retain or dismiss personnel¹⁹. Initially, Military Police collocated within the police stations alongside local Iraqi police as mentors and guides, until the military disengaged from the stations. Presently, the Military Police perform joint patrols with and continue to do field training of Iraqi police officers.

The Military Police officers frequently comment about the apparent lack of training and absence of proactivity of the former police force. Noted by the MP staff is the lack of appreciation for basic, mundane police behaviors such as carrying a notebook to record information. More serious, Iraqi police do not appear to be trained in even the most basic patrol tactics and techniques.

¹⁶ Brigadier General Khalef told the assessment team that, of his pre-war strength, he has 95 officers and 2,324 ranks available 27/05/03. Both they and the Customs Police are asking when they will return to work.

¹⁷ The police were not permitted to wear their former uniforms and ranks. Instead they wore white shirts and dark trousers.

¹⁸ The white shirt is perceived by the police as specifically denoting a nurse and the police felt that wearing white shirts was degrading. The decision to utilize white shirts was made unilaterally by Coalition command without consultation with Iraqi police.

¹⁹ All police positions are provisional appointments and will remain "at will" until an Iraqi civil administration takes authority within Iraq.

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Also lacking are any verbal de-escalation or negotiative skills. Under the old regime a police officer's word was not to be questioned. Whenever a citizen made the grave mistake of questioning a police officer's authority or intent the officer's response was the application of force, most often liberally and viciously applied. Currently the Military Police provide close supervision to dissuade and prevent these behaviors.

The law and order situation in Basra has calmed since the post conflict looting and there continues to be a decline in the number of murders, assaults and thefts. The lack of crime statistical data makes it impossible to determine if this post conflict crime trend has changed since pre-conflict days. Nevertheless, nightly gunfire continues within Basra and attests to the proliferation of weapons through the country. Various explanations can be attributed to this firing: celebratory fire, weapons testing, gang warfare or looting prevention. Regardless, the local police continue to conduct day and night foot patrols alongside the Coalition Forces in order to seize illegal weapons, deter crime and reassure the public.

In a rural police station near Az Zubayr 15 former policemen and 19 auxiliaries have been trained by the Military Police and appear to be responding well. As with their municipal counterparts it was evident that these rural police were used to acting only upon orders and they exhibited little, if any, initiative. The prevailing police culture was to sit in the police station until something happened and then attend the scene only if an arrest was ordered or an investigation was necessary. Investigations, however, might require money to change hands, particularly if an arrest was anticipated at the conclusion of the investigation.

Another police station that the team visited, in the small town of Al Uzyr (a very rural area) near Al Amarah in Maysan Province, was manned by the Coalition Forces and a newly established force. The former police had disappeared and had been replaced by 64 civilians nominated by the provisional Town Council. These 64 received basic training and supervision from the inherent military force, were representative of the local population and were well received by the public. There had been three recent murders but one had not been designated as such by the locals because the victim was female.²⁰ This failure to recognize the willful killing of the female underscores some of the sensitization that will be necessary within the country and its' police force.

In Al Amarah itself (population 351,000) the police were returning to work also to the staffing of the pre-war numbers, but as with their counterparts throughout the country they did not appear to hold much public confidence. The Deputy Commander, General Sabeeh, assessed that the fundamental changes necessary were the need for new uniforms in order to dissociate the police from the previous regime and new training for the officers.

CENTRAL IRAQ - BAGHDAD

Baghdad, the sprawling capital of over five million inhabitants, witnessed unprecedented levels of looting and wanton destruction during the cathartic uprising following the Coalition entry into the city. Its sheer size and its position as the heart of

²⁰ Possibly in line with tribal customs on 'honor' killings

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the *Ba'athists* regime has made the imposition of law and order on such a metropolis a fundamentally different challenge to other areas of the country. Because Baghdad contained the majority of Level One security agencies, it is within the corporate limits that the inherent weaknesses and ineffectiveness of the Iraqi Police Force have been most apparent.

Baghdad was split into two police districts, delineated by the Tigris River, Al Rasafa (East) and Karkh (West). All 72 police and prison facilities²¹ located in the city were subject to the theft, arson and damage noted in other portions of the country. The levels of lawlessness and chaos witnessed within Baghdad led to a slow response by former police as they were called back to work. Due to the extent of the damage and the number of facilities damaged, it will take longer to reopen facilities in Baghdad when compared to other parts of Iraq.

In less than two months since Coalition forces entered Baghdad and 7,297 police (not including Traffic and Vital Institutions Protection) have returned to work (87 per cent of pre-war strength). 18 of the 72 police facilities have been re-established²² and a plan is being implemented to renovate some 40 looted and destroyed police stations and buildings in the coming weeks. More police continue to return to work and 14 days ago an international advisory/assessment team was deployed and started working directly with the police.

The police presently have 67 cars at their disposal, with another 50 due by the end of the month. Stolen police and government cars continue to be confiscated from the public by the Coalition Forces and the Iraqi police. The Coalition Forces have made significant efforts to re-equip the police. To date, Coalition Forces have issued over 4,000 9mm pistols and 1,766 AK 47s to replace those weapons stolen or discarded upon the arrival of Coalition Forces. New uniforms – the first 20,000 – consisting of light blue shirts and dark blue pants have arrived and have begun to be issued. Radios - 2650 handsets - and 3,101 sets of body armor have been ordered and will arrive shortly. The US Military, in conjunction with Motorola, is developing a police communications network across to serve Baghdad's emergency services needs.

The police have reported to their stations and joint Iraqi Police and US Military Police patrols began and have been expanded to cover day and nighttime operations. To improve communications the first-of-its-kind Iraqi Police-US Military Police Joint Operations Centre was established within the confines of the Police Academy.

Prior to the conflict, the police and patrol divisions had little contact or communication. These two functions have been merged as the Coalition begins to establish the structure of the new Iraq National Police Service. As with their rural counterparts, local Baghdad citizens expound upon the police's worst traits: reckless driving, excessive use of force and lack of positive interaction with the public.

²¹ This figure includes the Police Academy and Higher Development Institute

²² Source: 18 MP Brigade Briefing Document 26/05/03

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Generally, the citizens of Baghdad view the Iraqi Police Force as corrupt²³, unskilled, unprofessional and unresponsive²⁴.

Currently, the security situation in Baghdad is still difficult. Sporadic gunfire is a nightly occurrence, while murder, carjackings and kidnapping continue to be the public's greatest concerns. The public is wary to venture out after dark and public confidence in the law and order situation in general is low.

NORTHERN IRAQ - MOSUL

Mosul, the largest city in northern Iraq and the centre of Ninawa province has proven to be a more benign environment. The population totaled 2,339,680 prior to the war, of which 1,345,000 were to be found in Mosul itself. The pre-war police forces numbered 3,665 for the city and 1,758 for the remainder of the province. The area was not heavily involved in fighting during the conflict, many of its structures remain in place and with the arrival of Coalition Forces it was possible to stand up the police forces within a short period of time.

To date the Headquarters and 14 sub stations have been reestablished. 2,017 police have returned to work in Mosul and 1,716 in the rest of the province²⁵. These are all former police officers and there has not been a recruitment of new police or auxiliaries. The Traffic Police reported back in great numbers, working out of six stations reestablished by the Coalition forces, and are highly visible in Mosul.

There were also 2,296 guards (Vital Institutions Protection) pre-war with responsibility for communications facilities, banks, factories and buildings such as *Ba'ath* Party Headquarters. These members of the VIPF have not returned and political party buildings are being protected by the party's own armed guards.

The Chief of Police of Ninawa province, General Akram, left the area along with other senior *Ba'athists* during the conflict. The current Chief of Police, General Aziz, was a former Chief who had been retired by the former regime and re-appointed by the provisional Town Council, in consultation with religious and tribal leaders. The returning police are wearing their pre-war uniforms and ranks but this does not appear to present a problem either to the public or the police.

All police stations were stripped during the looting but are structurally intact. Some have suffered fire damage. As has been found elsewhere, the police's weaponry has all but disappeared and the current inventories indicate the extent of missing weapons:

²³ Credible sources have reported that police officers are selling ORHA issued fuel on the black market and there is an MP belief that not all confiscated cars are making it to the compound at the police academy.

²⁴ Source: 709 MP Battalion Briefing 21/05/03. These perceptions were borne out during the assessment team's visit to the Patrol Police's current operating base (the Police Academy). The situation approached chaos. It was difficult to identify the police from the criminals they brought in. Prisoners were witnessed being punched and kicked. At the issue of weapons, basic handling drills were dangerously non-existent. Command and Control appeared conspicuously absent.

²⁵ The Military Police Battalion is currently undertaking a survey as to how representative this force is

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Pistols 43 of 868; AK-47s 38 of 3,223; and light machine guns 30 of 99²⁶. The disparity in pre and post-war numbers is attributed to police officers retaining weaponry at home for personal protection, weapons being looted and weapons being sold on the black market by the police and others. The vehicle situation is better than found in Baghdad, 126 out of 206 vehicles remain.

The law and order situation in Mosul is generally stable but there are a number of shooting incidents during the hours of darkness. This is attributed to infighting between rival gangs. Life goes on pretty much as normal during the day. The local police are conducting joint patrols with the Coalition Forces during daylight hours and the military are patrolling by night while the police remain in their stations. The less than proactive nature of the police was again evident in Mosul where the *modus operandi* was to congregate in the police station until something happened. As in other parts of the country, the public's view of the police was that they are corrupt and incompetent. Those members of the public spoken with expressed a desire for a completely new police force.

Tallkayft, ten kilometers from Mosul, is in a rural area and the police station has four sub stations in the surrounding villages. The town was occupied for one month during the conflict by the PDK and then the police were re-established within seven days with Coalition Forces assistance. The former Chief of Police, Colonel Mohammed Kasim, resumed his position with the approval of the provisional Mayor, tribal and religious leaders. The law and order situation differs little from pre-war days and is considered good. Car theft, tribal fighting and smuggling continue as the major crime problems. The police patrol of their own accord in this area, on foot, without Coalition Forces support. The congregation of police in the station was again observed and numbered some thirty when the team visited.

The Military Police Battalion responsible for the Northern Region is undertaking a basic modernization and restructuring of the Mosul Police. The program is split into four phases: (I) Accountability and Training (some of which is underway and includes a *per capita* estimate of the Mosul Police Force based on a one police officer per 300 population²⁷), the creation of bilingual police reports²⁸, Guard Mount/Shift training, a new police structure and reorganization of the detention facilities; (II) Centralised Training (commenced 26 May and consisting of seven day courses covering basic policing); (III) Purging and (IV) International Certification²⁹.

²⁶ No figures were available for the 28 RPGs and 618 Hand Grenades held pre-war. The police are also holding four flare guns and some sniper rifles.

²⁷ Ratio recommended to MP Bn by Coalition Forces Land Command Centre, Baghdad. It envisages a force of 6,000 including civilians

²⁸ Based on Department of the Army forms

²⁹ These last two phases are envisaged for the future. Phase III (Purging) begins when a National Police Academy is open and producing quality recruits. The recruits would receive further on the job training in Mosul and then replace current underperforming, incompetent or corrupt members of the Mosul Police Force. Phase IV (International Certification) envisages: 'United Nations or other international organization completes an assessment and offers the Mosul Police Department with certain conditions to be met to become an internationally recognized police force with regard to meeting international standards of police work. Source: MP Bn briefing document *Proposed Restructuring Plan for the Mosul Police Department* 24/5/03

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KURDISH AREA – NORTHERN IRAQ

For logistical reasons it was not possible to visit the Kurdish areas. It was noted, from the Coalition forces, that there are Kurdish checkpoints in the hinterland south of the Kurdish area.

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CURRENT INITIATIVES

STANDARDS FOR INTERIM POLICE SERVICES

Guidelines have been developed (see Annex B) and issued by the Police Assistance team through the ORHA Office of the Ministry of Interior to ensure that a standardized approach is utilized while re-organizing the police within each military area of responsibility. The guidelines address the structure of the police in the immediate post-conflict phase.

Specifically enumerated is the unification of the patrol, police and investigative divisions into a single organizational entity within the Iraq National Police Service (INPS). The Traffic Police will remain a part of the Iraq National Police Service; however, they lose their executive law enforcement powers and will concentrate on traffic movement and accident investigation. Disassociated from the INPS, the Vital Institute Protection Force has been renamed as the Facilities Protection Service (FPS), and like the Traffic Police will carry a weapon but exercise no executive law enforcement powers. All further development for police and public safety in the post-conflict phase will be established in accordance with the philosophical framework enunciated within the *"Principles of Policing in a Free Society."*³⁰

Criteria for vetting existing and screening newly recruited personnel have been established to complement the new minimum standards for selection. Also included in the general guidance is advice on the use of insignias of rank and identification cards. A program of instruction to re-train all existing personnel is being formulated and the material will be complete by mid June 2003. A program of instruction for new recruits is being drafted to the same timescale. Finally, a clear policy statement has been articulated concerning the police use of firearms and force – including the introduction of the concept of the use of reasonable and necessary minimum force commensurate with respect for human rights.

PRESENT SALARIES

The Coalition Provisional Authority has set four salary levels³¹ for public sector employees across Iraq, from 100,000 to 500,000 Dinars per month, at 100,000 Dinar intervals.³² These represent pay rises for the Iraqi Police, and especially for the officers³³: Non Commissioned Officers and Assistant Officers will receive 100,000 Dinars as compared to 85,000 Dinars; Lieutenant to Captain 200,000 Dinars as compared to 105,000 Dinars; Major to Colonel 300,000 Dinars as compared to 125,000 Dinars; General 500,000 Dinars as compared to 185,000 Dinars.

³⁰ Department of Justice, International Criminal Investigation Training and Assistance Program 1999.

³¹ 100,000;200,000;300,000;500,000 Dinars

³² First payment of new salaries is scheduled for 01 June

³³ Police scales decided by ORHA Ministry of Interior team

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DE-Ba'athification

The Coalition Provisional Authority has issued an order banning senior members of the *Ba'ath* party from employment in the public sector. Vetting of senior police officers is underway.³⁴

³⁴ Order of the Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority *De-Ba'athification of Iraqi Society*
16/05/03

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ASSESSMENT RECOMMENDATIONS

- The Iraqi Police, as currently constituted and trained, are unable to independently maintain law and order and need the assistance and guidance of Coalition Force assets (or some similar follow on force) to accomplish this task. This is a result of years of neglect, coupled with a repressive command structure that prohibited training, proactivity, initiative and stifled attempts toward modernization of a police force. Unless redesigned and redeveloped, the Iraqi Police will not constitute a suitable, viable, and sustainable police service that can engender public trust and confidence. The Iraq National Police requires reform and restructuring. The previous philosophy, training, expectations and structure are fundamentally unsuited to a new, free Iraq.
- Nullify existing legislation that placed Iraq police under the military discipline system which essentially provided them with civil and criminal immunity, while enacting legislation for minimum standards, training, continued professional retraining, appropriate criminal/civil liability, certification and decertification for members of the police service.
- The current focus should remain reconstituting the Iraqi Police from previous members who have been properly vetted in order to enhance the established Rule of Law. Inherent in this undertaking is the establishment of an aggressive Office of Professional Standards investigative and disciplinary process that ferrets out corruption while immediately addressing unprofessional, unethical or criminal behavior within the Service.
- The police service should be restructured to remove the vestiges of Saddam's militarization of the police force including philosophy, rank structure, weapons, uniforms, expectations, training and approach to human rights.
- Develop and codify a standardized policy and procedure manual based upon the concepts of policing a free society, which also incorporates the principals of respect for human rights. This manual should encompass administration, training, disciplinary, procedural and operational guidelines for the police service.
- Implementation of the three-week Transition and Integration Program (TIP) for all Iraq Police Service personnel complemented by an accompanying Senior Level Management TIP for all Iraq Police supervisors and management personnel that will establish the foundation of policing in a free society.
- Once the introductory training has been completed, a long term capacity building and training program – which includes monitoring and mentoring - should be undertaken for every Iraq police officer that addresses all aspects of policing (basic police skills & tactics, respect for human rights, use of force, interviews and criminal investigation amongst others) – which incorporates mentoring and monitoring - until an effective, locally acceptable police force

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is established that incorporates principals of community policing and full respect for the human rights of individuals.

- Establishment of a comprehensive basic mandate and compulsory, complementary field training program for all police recruits that provides field application and training in core competencies necessary to make the student a successful police officer in a free society. The Basic Course curriculum should be framed within the philosophies and principles of policing in a free society and respect for human rights, and covers a wide variety of skills required for policing in a democratic society. The lessons of instruction should include, but are not limited to the following: policing in a democracy, constitutional framework, human rights, use of force, police ethics and code of conduct, policing in a multi-ethnic society, first aid, domestic violence awareness, gender issues, community policing, patrol procedures, arrest and detention, effective communication, traffic accident management, etc. International standards of human rights should be interwoven into all core subject matter, both in the classroom, practical exercises and throughout field training.
- A concurrent media and public information campaign – led by reformist Iraqi Police leadership – should be undertaken to rebuild the public's perception and expectations for the new Iraq Police Service. Within this framework, the new police service should strive for transparency throughout its operations and the public should be fully informed and have access to information concerning the rebuilding of their police and security structures. Inherent in this campaign is the transition from a police force to the mindset of a police service, focused on providing law enforcement services to the community.
- Work cooperatively with the Coalition Provisional Authority to restore and refurbish police stations that provide the Service with appropriate facilities to perform their jobs. These stations should be strategically located within neighborhoods to engender both the officer's and public's ownership of "their" new police.
- Enable legislation that allows the collection - including wiretapping and other clandestine collection methods, protection, and use of criminal intelligence information that are in concert with existing international standards. Establish a law enforcement criminal intelligence organization that is specifically focused on anti-terrorism, drug, organized crime and human trafficking investigations.
- Civilization of administrative and support positions within the police service. This initiative will provide more police officers devoted to law enforcement functions, while providing employment/development opportunities for citizens. This program must be buttressed with a professional training and development program for citizens that mimics that provided to police officers.
- Establish a recruiting policy that will encourage appropriate minority and gender representation within the Iraq police service.

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RESTRUCTURING

The Coalition Forces – by necessity - have been reconstituting and restructuring the Iraqi Police Service without an overall strategic direction or coordination. Each force, in the four Areas of Responsibility, was creating its own model. This effectively began the creation of four potentially different police forces in Iraq: North, Central, South Central and South. Strategic guidance is crucial.

ORHA guidelines have been issued (see above) but a policy decision is needed as to the end state of the police and issued to both Iraqis and Coalition Forces alike so that there is an overarching vision and focus. Above all, it would be a message to the Iraqis that their future will be secure and guaranteed by embracing the new standards, which are significantly different from the old methods of behavior.

Two models are available. One is the classic single national police force with specialized units at the center and decentralized administration. The second is a police force which reflects a federal government structure. The preferred model may closely resemble the other police organizations in the region – notably Jordan and those in the Gulf such as Kuwait.

Whichever model is adopted, it should include a transformation into a wholly civil institution signified by civil ranks rather than military designations. This situation is reinforced if the police rank structure aligns with the civil service grading arrangements – and the police personnel placed at the appropriate position in the spinal pay column which reflects their qualifications, training and skills. This can be useful to enable police to see how they are valued by the state. Proper pay scales will materially assist the fight against corruption in the police.

The demilitarization of the police, including the removal of the police from military law and police courts would represent a tangible break from the Saddam Hussein era. A change of uniform and ranks would be a visible sign to the public that the new force was different from the old and this is likely to attract more public confidence. There is also an opportunity to replace the incompetent and corrupt in the police force with new recruits and retrain current personnel who remain in the police.

Consideration must also be given to the political relationship between the Chief of Police and the Minister/Ministry of Interior. The Chief of Police should not be subject to political and operational control by the Minister of Interior, so that the Political Executive is not able to exercise undue influence over operational policing decisions made by the Chief of Police.

Institutions such as a Police Service Commission answerable to a national assembly with authority derived from the President of the Republic should be contemplated to establish a firewall between the proper political oversight and accountability over policing exercised by the Ministry of Interior and the Chief of Police. If there is no alternative to housing the police headquarters in the large Ministry of Interior building in Baghdad, then arrangements could be made to physically separate the Ministry of Interior and police HQ within the complex of the building.

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The size of the police force should probably be somewhere between 1:300 to 1:500 in terms of police:population ratio. New recruits could be drawn from expatriates as well as the indigenous population and former officers that were forced to retire by the previous regime. Regardless strict vetting must continue.

NATIONAL POLICE FORCE MODEL

This model is typified by a unified command structure with a single Police Commissioner wherein management authority is vested with the Commissioner, not the Minister of Interior. Police headquarters may then be comprised of the Police Commissioner and his deputies; however, there should only be one deputy who is empowered to act in the absence of the Police Commissioner. Other deputies function as assistants to the Police Commissioner. The Headquarters structure should be limited to those functions which are necessary to support the organization at the strategic level, and no public service delivery activities need to be located at this level beyond, perhaps, media and community relations, and national responsibilities such as counter-terrorism and diplomatic protection.

Characteristically, the following functions would be headed by a Deputy Police Commissioner within the headquarters structure:

- Operations – integrating patrol, police and traffic policing into one institution under a single command structure
- Intelligence³⁵ and Investigation – including crime statistics, scientific support and forensic services; and, any national investigation functions such as narcotics, anti-corruption, organized crime,
- Human Resource management – including recruitment, selection, training, certification as well as payroll services
- Finance and administration – including technical services (computers and communication), estate and fleet management
- Planning and Research – including legal services
- Office of Professional Standards – would also be a responsibility of a Deputy Police Commissioner.

Certain functions at the HQ level could be filled by qualified professionals – for example a civilian accountant as Director of Finance and Administration. A civilianization process can also be considered to free up police resources for those tasks which require the exercise of police powers, in areas such as clerical and administration processes, vehicle maintenance and other technical skills. Following this philosophy, functions such as petroleum and electricity police forces should become non-sworn police functions, as currently foreseen in the ORHA interim guidelines. In the long-term they can either be privatized completely as

³⁵ A decision would also need to be taken as to whether the police offer any operational support and on what basis to the internal security services which emerge from the transition to democracy.

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security/property guards companies, or managed and administered by government agencies.

Geographically the organization can be sub-divided into command units based at the Provincial level, but with policing remaining a national responsibility. These command units at Provincial Headquarters reflect the functions at national level: operations, intelligence and investigation, human resource management etc. This may be overlaid by regional or zonal command units, although these are not necessarily to be recommended unless it is quite clear what value they will add to provincial and state policing, and they should not simply be a mirror image of the functions at national and provincial headquarters. They could undertake an inspection function to monitor and support management performance of the provincial unit police forces. They generally function where they exist as communication channels between the provinces and HQ (again not necessarily recommended), and also retain certain functions such as mobile units of public order forces to assist the provinces in the event of major civil disorder.

Under this model it would be important to empower the provincial Chiefs of Police to manage their own affairs as far as possible, including delegated financial management authority, and promotions to certain ranks. The operational and political interface between the provincial police chiefs and the Governorates and Mayoralities also needs to be clarified in the new Iraq, including the role of the police vis-à-vis the judicial authority which might continue to be dispensed by the Governor/Mayor. However, the centre would continue to perform high level strategic functions such as developing national policing policies and the overall direction of policing (for example the style of policing to be adopted) as the force develops in a democratic dispensation.

FEDERAL (REGIONAL) POLICE STRUCTURE

If the new constitution decides on a federation based on regions, a police force which reflects this political structure would be a natural development. There are a number of options for such an arrangement:

- (a) Completely separate and independent institutions as discreet bodies of the federation as in for example the interim arrangements in Serbia and Montenegro, recruiting and appointing within their respective autonomies; with some sort of federal co-operation/joint task forces agreement at the national level to deal with certain issues – diplomatic protection, federal level anti-corruption and criminal investigations, and membership of Interpol, which only admits and signs international agreements with members as national entities. Thought would also have to be given to tasks such as maintaining and managing the national fingerprint collection and other nationally based indices.
- (b) Under the Basic Law policing becomes the responsibility of the Province/Region. At Provincial level police forces are recruited, appointed and trained locally. To ensure common standards are maintained it is then possible to provide the senior officers, including the provincial/regional CoP, through a national officer corps recruited and trained nationally – as in India and other British post-colonial police forces. The officers are then

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brigaded to and become members of the provincial/regional forces. At the federal level certain functions can then be undertaken such as Railway Police, Highway Patrol, and counter-terrorism; and police development can be managed at the federal level with an institute to set standards and provide a national research and development function.

There is also a need for institutions to set and monitor policing standards across the federation to ensure minimum standards of police service delivery and police behavior whichever model is adopted.

METROPOLITAN POLICING

Metropolitan policing has several distinguishing features from policing in the greater part of the country including such issues such as diplomatic protection and ceremonial policing. Whichever national model is adopted could be further refined by the establishment of separately organized metropolitan police institutions for the capital Baghdad and the other major cities of high population density. Large urban areas require a different style and approach to policing to cope with the volume of demand on police resources. It would be possible to encourage loyalty and corporatism in these urban forces by badging them differently and thereby identifying them as City Police forces – but with the personnel recruited and managed in exactly the same way as the other police in Iraq. Senior officers could be liable to transfers into and out of the metropolitan forces as part of career management and development within the overall police structure, but other ranks would be recruited and serve in the one area. This approach is practicable in a number of countries and appears to be successful.

ASSESSMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AS PART OF OVERALL JUSTICE REFORMS

Activities have typically focused on strengthening individual institutions such as police, prisons, prosecution, courts and the judiciary. A sector approach to appraising the strengths and weaknesses of the institutions in the justice sector identifies the crucial linkages between the institutions within the system. It is also important to assess the problems from the user's perspective (a demand side analysis rather than simply focusing on supply) – and particularly from the point of view of the poor and vulnerable groups, including women, children, the elderly and minorities. Their concerns are likely to highlight issues of safety and security and greater access to justice, both state and customary, alternative dispute resolution; and, the importance of reducing corruption.

In the context of Iraq the justice system is a mixture of Napoleonic and British common law, together with Sharia (family law). The role of the police is to function in this context. For example the prosecutors are members of the judiciary, with common recruitment, selection and training. They enter the judiciary or Prosecutor General's Office depending upon their performance in the training. The police undertake preliminary investigations into allegations of crime. The evidence gathered is inadmissible at this stage and the case is handed over to an Investigating Judge, who will re-investigate the case – and in this process the evidence becomes

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admissible in court proceedings. The role of the Prosecutor is to act for the State in criminal proceedings – however in Iraq relations between police and prosecutors are very poor and the prosecutor is often refused access to the legal papers – and may even have to bribe the police to obtain disclosure. In a process of reform it may be feasible to revise the role of either the Prosecutor or the Investigating Magistrate so that duplication in the investigation and case preparation is reduced in the interests of efficiency and fairness – both to the victims, witnesses and the accused.

The organization chart of the General Directorate is a typical police structure, but heavily dependent on the individual authority of the General Director. According to the chart each Deputy General Director reports directly to the General Director as do the provincial Chiefs of Police, as do all other departmental Directors. However such charts need to be treated with caution. They do not necessarily indicate how organizations actually work, but may point towards the power structures. Where they may be useful is to track the flow of resources through the institution.

Additional information is needed to better understand the role of the police in the justice system and how they interact with both the formal and non-formal justice systems. In reality they will engage in problem solving and conflict resolution mechanisms with both the formal and non-formal (customary) law systems. This may include discussions and negotiations with the Governors, Mayors, Tribal Leaders and Heads of Families – and the resolution based on the Sharia concept of compensation (“tahweedh”) between the parties.

RETRAINING

The situation within the Iraqi police is so dire that it is useful to view the changes that will need to occur if there is to be a sustainable police force in Iraq that truly protects and serves the people.

The process of change will involve the following paradigm shifts:

Paramilitary/Enforcement From a Force → →	Democratic → → To a Service
From meeting the interests of the rich and powerful	To servicing the needs of all citizens
From centralised command and control and isolation from the community	To community consultation, participation and partnership
From secrecy and lack of democratic accountability	To local accountability and openness
From reactive	To proactive and responsive
From law enforcement driven	To the prevention of crime
From unsympathetic	To victim focused
From detachment	To integration with the other elements of the justice sector
From abuse of human rights and unethical behaviour – confession based investigations	To the protection of human rights and ethical policing practices – evidence based, methodical investigations

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The Iraqi police force will be unable to become a police force to serve a democratic society unless it receives significant retraining. It is also apparent that a large number of the personnel in the police force are unsuitable. Minimum standards should be ruthlessly enforced and the incompetent and corrupt retrenched. Those capable of serving in the new democratic force, new entrants and existing personnel, should be thoroughly trained on the basics of policing in an open society. Human rights must be mainstreamed into all training interventions.

Without wishing to prejudge the results of any basic criteria tests, it would appear that significant numbers of new police will be required and should be recruited as soon as possible in a new and transparent manner. It should be borne in mind that the police should be broadly representative of the people they serve.

There are divergent views on whether women should serve in an Iraqi Police Force. In Baghdad, the academic police officers at the Police Academy and Higher Police Institute favored the measured integration of women and suggested that they should concentrate, at first, on juvenile crime, crime against women and social work. The view in the provinces, however, was that women in the police would be totally unacceptable. It is assessed that the recruitment of women should be actively explored as there women serving in the police forces of other Arab countries.

As well as basic training, a need for strategic leadership development, management and specialized training has been identified. It will be necessary to change the mind set of the existing personnel that remain in any new force. Efforts to enhance the skills sets of supervisors, management and executive leadership are underway.

INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE

The Iraqi Police Force will be unable to reform without significant international assistance. Besides training and supervision, monitoring of the new police service should be considered and co-location of senior level international police officers with senior level Iraqi police officers for mentoring, monitoring and advising purposes should be initiated.³⁶

International assistance programs sometimes sacrifice long-term quality for short-term expediency. Measures such as rolling over personnel from the old security force into the new service, cutting down training periods, and pushing operational readiness faster than infrastructure and capacity can build, often limit the depth of reforms and risk long-term problems³⁷. In this environment of democratic reform in the police being a slow process, experience elsewhere indicates that private security forces (which are unaccountable and unregulated, but also often more numerous and better equipped) soon threaten the ability of the public police to operate competently.

³⁶ Interlocutors expressed a wish for US and UK police as trainers and supervisors. Consideration should obviously be given to a wider pool than this and should also include consideration of other Arab police forces. The police forces of Yemen, Jordan, Egypt and some other North African countries had training/academy links with the Iraqi Police Force before 1991

³⁷ *From Peace to Governance* August 2002, Melissa Ziegler and Rachel Nield, WOLA

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Regardless, foreign assistance cannot produce reform against the wishes of the police³⁸. Unless all police personnel are committed to reform it will not occur. Foreign '*experts*' tend to recommend what they are familiar with, regardless of its local applicability, and the most developed police systems are not necessarily the best models for a country such as Iraq.

³⁸ 'Democratizing the Police Abroad: What to Do and How to Do it' *Issues in International Crime*, David H Bayley, National Institute of Justice, US Dept of justice, June 2001

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CONCLUSION

- A major planning and design program needs to be started as soon as possible.
- A decision needs to be made as to how the new Iraq police service will be structured in the future and be best configured to meet the needs of the population in a free Iraq.
- Once this structure is decided, thorough planning and implementation for the new force should commence.
- Regardless of the decisions to the questions above, this will be a major international effort requiring considerable project management skills and resources.
- Above all, the Iraqi people need to be given a vision and reassurance about their future security and safety. The restructuring of the existing force remains a priority but, concurrently, major steps can be taken towards giving the Iraqi people the police service they deserve after the repression of the Saddam Hussein era.


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ADDENDUMS

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ANNEX A

STRUCTURE FOR THE FORMER GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF POLICE



ANNEX B

RECOMMENDATIONS AND STRATEGIES FOR “RECONSTITUTING” AN INTERIM POLICE SERVICE

Since the collapse of the Iraqi national government each BCT has found it necessary to install a rudimentary public safety organization within their AOR to restore order and ensure the public safety. The effort of these individual commanders has been commendable; however, we are now at a point within the process that some standardization must be imposed upon these organizations to ensure their eventual assumption into the appropriate national service.

1. STRUCTURE OF POLICE – POST CONFLICT

As the Coalition Provision Authority reconstitutes the Iraqi public safety services a series of structural changes are underway.

- The **Traffic Police** remain within the structure of the Police Service yet will become a dependent entity whose sole focus is the traffic control and direction. Traffic Police are authorized to carry a sidearm (pistol); however, they do not have executive law enforcement powers.
- The **Patrol and Police Divisions** of the Iraq National Police will be combined into one comprehensive Iraq National Police Service.
- Finally, the **Vital Institute Protection Force (VIPF)** is now the Facilities Protection Service (FPS) and the structure of the FPS is described in the military fragmentary order. The FPS is authorized to carry a weapon in the performance of their duties; however, like the Traffic Police they do not have executive law enforcement powers.

2. PHILOSOPHY OF POLICE AND PUBLIC SAFETY – POST CONFLICT

Due to the past practices of the Iraq National Police Service, as the force is reconstituted it will be formed and guided under the framework enumerated in the *Principles of Policing in a Free Society*³⁹.

- Considers *the individual citizen* as the *client of the police* rather than the state;
- Develops, maintains and encourages *adherence to organizational values* which, *without regard to race, religion, national origin, ethnicity, sex, age, social status or other non-behavioral human traits*;
 - *Honor* human rights and human dignity of its members and the general population;
 - *Support* the free exercise of available legal rights of all persons; and

³⁹ Developed by the US Department of Justice, International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program, June 1999

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- *Encourage the fair and impartial enforcement of those laws within its purview;*
- In all functional aspects *operates in strict conformance with legal requirements* contained in the nation's constitution, police act, criminal code and other applicable laws;
- Establishes and maintains an *organizational culture* in which *public service* rather than *public repression* is the *end product* of police activities;
- Maintains a proactive focus on *crime prevention* as a means to *foster public order, domestic tranquility* and an *acceptable quality of life for all persons within the country*;
- Where reasonably possible, enters into *partnerships* with community and other governmental organizations to *identify and solve community problems* which provide *opportunities for criminal conduct*;
- *Actively and effectively investigates* reports of criminal conduct with the objective of *identifying and apprehending* the perpetrator(s) *so that guilt or innocence may be properly adjudicated*;
- Forms *functional relationships* with other *key components of the country's criminal justice system* to ensure that persons introduced to that system are processed *lawfully, effectively and fairly*;
- Approves and encourages the use of *non-deadly physical force* by its members only under carefully defined circumstances to further a legitimate and lawful, societal objective, and the use of *deadly force* by its members *only to save the life of a ny person, including a member of the police, from a perceived threat of imminent death or serious injury*, or under other circumstances articulated in a local, public law;
- Develops, maintains and operates under a *code of conduct, rules, policies and procedures* which provide *reasonable guidance* to police personnel in their behavior and the discharge of their assigned functions while holding them *accountable* for the manner in which they perform their duties;
- Manages the institution in a manner which *rewards* adherence to organizational values, effective performance and personal growth of its members, and *discourages* non-conforming behavior;
- Readily accepts and thoroughly investigates complaints of misconduct against police personnel; and
- Appropriately disciplines police personnel who are fairly determined to have violated the established police code of conduct

3. VETTING OF CURRENT PERSONNEL

The purpose of vetting is two-fold: to remove unacceptable personnel from the existing public safety service while preventing the introduction of unqualified personnel into the reconstituted public safety service. Vetting consists of a two-stage process where, in order to pass, the applicant or current employee must meet both Basic and Advanced Minimum requirements, and not be found to be precluded from employment in accordance with the De-Ba'athification program enumerated in Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 1.

Basic Minimum Requirements for entry into the Iraq National Police Service, Traffic Service, and Facilities Protection Service are:

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- No affiliation with the *Ba'ath* party in accordance with the standards enumerated in Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 1.
- No reported history of Human Rights Violations or history of mistreatment or abuse of other persons;
- No criminal history involving violence, theft or violating the public trust;
- No reported history of a propensity to engage in violence or criminal acts;
- No reported history of immoral or unethical activity;
- Physically and psychologically fit to accept responsibilities,
- Each applicant's uncorrected vision must not exceed 20/200 in either eye and must be corrected to 20/20 binocular vision, with neither eye corrected to less than 20/40. Each applicant must be able to distinguish normal colors as determined by color plate test. Each applicant must be able to distinguish depth of field and possess sufficient peripheral vision to operate a motor vehicle safely and perform normal duties.

Each service has the below listed **Additional Minimum Requirements**:

Iraq National Police Service:

- Minimum Age 20; and,
- Completed Secondary School Education and ability to read, write and communicate orally in Arabic.

Traffic and Facilities Protection Services:

- Minimum age 18; and,
- Ability to read, write and communicate orally in Arabic.
- An applicant's military and/or special skills will be taken into consideration in the hiring process

Once an applicant is determined to possess both the Basic and Additional Minimum Requirements, the applicant will be submitted to a review under the CPA Order Number 1 criteria. The applicant will initially be required to fill out a complete a *de-Ba'athification* questionnaire. The questionnaire will be reviewed to determine whether the applicant or employee is, under CPA Order Number 1, authorized to be employed, absolutely disqualified from being employed, whether the applicant or employee will require a waiver in order to be employed.

The Administrator's Order Number 1 of May, 16 2003 on the *De-Ba'athification* of Iraqi Society (CPA/ORD 16 May 2003/01) criteria against which the applicant's or employee's background will be reviewed:

Absolute Disqualification:

- Former regime security organization affiliation (RG or worse);
- Senior *Ba'ath* party membership;
- Terrorist organization affiliation; or,
- Human rights violations and crimes against humanity.

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Waiverable:

- Criminal History (except violent crimes and a repeated history of crimes that portray a propensity to engage in criminal activity which must be reviewed on an individual basis);
- Familial relationship to former regime (must be reviewed on an individual basis);
- Non-Iraqi citizenship;
- Extremist organization contacts; or
- Financial situation.

At the operational level for persons already employed, the Vetting Process steps are:

- A. All current members of the Iraq Police Service, Traffic Service and Facilities Protection Service will be required to complete a *de-Ba'athification* questionnaire. Intentional falsifications or omissions to the *de-Ba'athification* questionnaire will be grounds for disciplinary action, up to and including termination of employment.
- B. Vetting of current members will begin with highest ranking personnel and work down through NCO level. Police Officers will be vetted upon their attendance at the emergency training courses or when other assets are available to perform the procedure.
- C. Cursory background investigations will be conducted on all ranking personnel and NCOs, which will be followed by a more in-depth background investigations as assets and personnel become available. Vetting of current employees will begin with a records check through the C-2 Intelligence function to determine if the person is on any of the *Ba'ath* party lists or if any other criminal/intelligence data could be discovered that would preclude their further service.
- D. Nothing precludes an in-depth investigation from being initiated, regardless of rank, should reliable and verifiable information reveals that an employee is in conflict with The Administrator's Order Number 1 of May, 16 2003 on the De-Baathification of Iraqi Society (CPA/ORD 16 May 2003/01).
- E. Applicants for Police, Traffic and Facilities Services will be fully screened prior to their appointment with their respective service.

4. Interim Appointment of all Personnel

All personnel, regardless of rank or position, will be appointed on an interim basis and can be dismissed from employment for any violation of rules, conduct or behavior. During this "*at will*" employment status, members of the Iraqi Traffic, Police and Facilities Protection Service are provided limited due process for any adverse personnel action.

Limited due process means the following: right to know the reason for the adverse action, a right to explain their action and a right of an appeal of an adverse employment decision to the next highest ranking officer (filed within ten working

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days). Nothing in this section provides any job protection or guarantees other than those enumerated above.

5. Rank

BCT commanders may allow returning Traffic, Police and Facilities Protection personnel to wear their former rank (after proof of the rank is provided) when use of this rank is necessary to instill order and control within the agency. It must be understood, however, that this former rank is temporary and may be removed or changed at a later date. BCT commanders should always be aware that local units will eventually be pulled back into a national structure.

6. Identification Cards

Identification cards for Traffic, Police and Facilities Protection personnel will conform to the Ministry Of Interior standards which are undergoing revision.

7. Re-Training Present Personnel

The program of instruction for the three week re-training of Iraqi National Police is being formulated and should be completed by 15 June 2003, with distribution to follow. The POI for retraining of Facilities Protection Service office is dictated within the Fragmentary Order released by the military.

8. Training New Personnel

The program of instruction for new recruits – for all services – is under development and should be available on or about 15 June 2003.

9. Weapons and Use of Force

The Services will adhere to the Coalition Weapons Policy as outlined below:

- Heavy Weapons are banned. Heavy weapons are defined as weapons capable of firing ammunition larger than 7.62mm, machine guns or crew-served weapons, anti-tank weapons, anti-aircraft weapons, mortars, artillery, armored vehicles, self-propelled weapons, high explosives including mines and hand grenades;
- Except as provided below, no person shall: Possess, conceal, hide, bury, trade, sell, barter, give or exchange heavy weapons with or to any person that is not an authorized representative of coalition forces or police, security and military forces in uniform under the supervision of coalition forces, and limited to the possession of only those heavy weapons which coalition forces expressly permit them to possess for the execution of their duties.

The Services are authorized to use force, up to and including deadly force, in the performance of their official duties as outlined in the draft policy below:

-
- I. Every individual member of the Iraqi National Police Service has a personal duty and responsibility to use no more force than is absolutely necessary in seeking to achieve a legitimate law enforcement objective. It is universally recognized that the proper application of force is a legitimate and often unavoidable part of a law enforcement officer's duties. Officers will inevitably be faced with situations which require them to use force, whether in restoring or maintaining public order, effecting arrests or otherwise ensuring public safety and the rights and freedoms of citizens. The application of any degree

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of force must be comensurate with respect for human rights. An officer may only apply force where it is necessary to attain a legitimate and lawful end and where the application of other non-violent means would be ineffectual in the prevailing situation. The essential principles for the use of force are those of lawfulness, necessity and proportionality. In all circumstances, officers are strictly prohibited from using any unnecessary or excessive force. There is no justification for a breach of this requirement.

PURPOSE

- II. This directive establishes the procedures to be followed by all members of the Iraqi Police when the use of force is necessary in performing official duties and clearly defines what level of force is acceptable. Members of the Iraqi Police Service should seek to achieve all law enforcement and public safety objectives through the application of non violent means. The use of physical force must be seen as a last resort. Whenever possible and without compromising their legal and moral responsibilities, members should seek to caution, warn, persuade, negotiate, mediate and simply to explain in order to obtain the objective sought, whether this is the arrest of a suspect or the quelling of disorder.

PROCEDURE

- III. Members of the Iraqi Police Service can resort to physical force only when all other available methods are ineffective or inappropriate and when it is strictly necessary to do so. Any resort to force must only be to the extent required for the performance of their duty. Police officers will use only that level of force strictly necessary to enforce compliance to legal directives and law, or to overcome the threat of violence directed at the officer or another citizen. Every police officer of the Iraqi Police Service will become thoroughly familiar with these procedures and will fully comply with this policy.

PROCEDURES FOR APPLICATION OF FORCE

IV. Levels of Force

- A. The use of force, up to and including deadly force, is authorized in the following circumstances but only where less extreme methods are insufficient to achieve these objectives:
1. To defend oneself or to defend others against the imminent threat of death or serious injury.
 2. To prevent the perpetration of a particularly serious crime involving grave threat to life.
 3. To arrest a person presenting a grave threat to life and who is resisting the officers efforts to stop such a threat.
 4. To prevent the escape of a person presenting a grave threat to life.
 5. To disperse violent assemblies when it is strictly necessary to do so in order to protect human life.
- B. In the dispersal of unlawful, but non-violent assemblies, law enforcement officers shall avoid the use of force or, where that is not practicable, shall restrict such force to the minimum extent necessary.
- C. The use of force, up to but excluding deadly force, is authorized to protect installations and special areas or goods designated by the Commissioner of Police, against any destructive or hostile act.
- D. The use of strictly necessary force, whether by non-lethal or lethal means, to achieve legitimate law enforcement objectives is authorized.

V. Duty to Use Minimum and Proportional Force

- A. Any force used must be limited, in its intensity and duration, to that which is necessary to achieve the legitimate objective. In some circumstances operational urgency may dictate the immediate use of force.

- B. The use of force must be commensurate to the level of the threat and should be balanced with the requirement to minimize human injury, damage to property, cultural objects and the natural environment.
- C. In all appropriate cases, consideration should be given to means other than force.

VI. Guidelines on the Use of Force

- A. Force is to be used only when strictly necessary.
- B. Force is to be used only for legitimate and lawful law enforcement purposes.
- C. There can be no exceptions allowed, or justifications made, for the unlawful use of force.
- D. The use of force must always be proportional to the lawful objective.
- E. Restraint is to be exercised in the use of force.
- F. Damage and injury are to be minimized.
- G. Indiscriminate pointing of weapons in the direction of any person is prohibited.
- H. Police officers will not shoot at a moving vehicle while in a pursuit situation. Police officers will not shoot at a moving vehicle unless the vehicle is being used as a weapon against police officers or other persons, or unless it is necessary to prevent serious injury or death from weapons being fired from the moving vehicle at police officers or other persons.
- I. The discharge of any firearm other than in approved and organized training sessions, or as otherwise authorized in this policy, is prohibited.

VII. Use of Non-Deadly Force

The use of less than lethal weapons may include any approved control, restraint or incapacitating device that is not intended or designed to be lethal when properly used by police officers. The force used in the application of such a device may be justified where an officer reasonably believes that he/she cannot affect lawful control, restraint or incapacitation without employing such an intermediate device.

- A. The baton or any other intermediate device should not be used against persons apparently, or known to be, under the age of fourteen, the elderly, or any incapacitated person including people who are obviously physically or mentally ill and women whose pregnancy is obvious, unless they directly endanger the life of the officer or other persons.
- B. The Coalition Provisional Authority authorizes the carrying and use of an approved police baton as the only striking weapon for members of the Iraqi police service. All members are strictly prohibited from carrying or using any other form of striking or punching weapon. Members who are equipped with a police baton must be certified in its appropriate use. The police baton may be used in quelling confrontations where physical violence is directed against members of the Iraqi Police Service or other persons, where higher levels of force are unnecessary or inappropriate, and where lesser levels are also inappropriate or ineffective.
- C. The police baton shall not be used to strike individuals who are already under effective control or restraint.

VIII. Use of Firearms

- A. The use firearms must be seen as a final resort in the exercise of force. This does not mean that it is always appropriate to have recourse to lower levels of force before employing firearms. Whenever the lawful use of firearms is unavoidable, police officers must exercise restraint in their use, seek to minimise damage and injury, and make every effort to respect and preserve human life. As far as possible, non-violent means shall be applied before resorting to the use of firearms. To this end, the application of the graduated response procedure set out below, is also intended as a deterrence to prevent escalation up to the actual use of firearms. as well as to provide a warning.
- B. **Identification:** The police officer is to identify himself or herself as a police official.

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- C. **Warning:** The officer is to give a clear warning and to allow adequate time for the warning to be obeyed.
 - 1. A warning may be given verbally or visually in as clear and as unambiguous manner as is possible;
 - 2. The warning should be repeated as many times as is necessary and is safe to ensure understanding or allow time for compliance.
- D. **Use of Force:** If the preceding steps are ignored, then the minimum level of force should still be employed consistent with the threat to the officer or others. This include non-lethal incapacitating weapons. Armed force may be used when all other warnings are ignored and there are no other choices available, then the necessary minimum armed force can be used.
- E. **The use of Firearms Without Warning or Without Adequate Time for a Warning to be Obeyed:** There is no requirement to give a clear warning where, in the circumstances, it is clearly pointless or inappropriate to do so. There is also no requirement to allow time for a warning to be obeyed where any delay would result in death or serious injury to the police officer or others.
- F. **Procedures During Firing:** Any use of firearms must be in accordance with the stated policy and procedures for use of force. When using a firearm against another, the officer will shoot at the target's center body mass. The officer will immediately evaluate the situation and may continue to place controlled fire against the suspect until the threat is terminated. It is the responsibility of the officer to reassess the threat level after each shot is fired and to adhere to the use of force policy on the use of a minimum level of force consistent with the threat present.

IX. After the Use of Firearms

- A. Medical assistance should be given to all injured persons without reasonable delay. In extremis and where requested spiritual/ religious support should sought and provided to the injured as is appropriate.
- B. The relatives or friends of those injured should be notified as soon as is practicable.
- C. Officers discharging their firearms must provide a full and detailed report of the incident on the appropriate form as soon as is practicable.
- D. The Iraqi Police Service will conduct an investigation into every incident in which an officer discharges his firearm. The officer concerned is required fully to assist such and investigation.

X. Permissible Firearms and Ammunition

- A. The Coalition Provisional Authority authorizes a limited range of approved police firearms as the only firearms which may be carried or used by qualified members of the Iraqi Police Service. All members are strictly prohibited from carrying or using any other firearm/s other than those issued to them by the Coalition Provisional Authority. All members are strictly prohibited from adapting, modifying or in anyway interfering with firearms issued to them. The Coalition Provisional Authority authorizes a range of approved police ammunition for use in officially issued firearms. All members of the Iraqi Police Service are strictly prohibited from using any ammunition other than that officially issued to them and are prohibited from adapting, modifying or in anyway interfering with the ammunition so issued.

XI. Definitions

- A. Force is the use of, or threat to use, physical means to impose one's will.
 - 1. **Armed force.** The use of offensive weapons, including lethal and non-lethal weapons.
 - 2. **Deadly force.** The level of force which is intended, or is likely to cause, death or grievous bodily harm regardless of whether death or grievous bodily harm actually results. This is the ultimate degree of force.

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3. **Justifiable force.** The control actions of the officer that are reasonable, necessary and proportional to the subject's level of resistance and the legitimate law enforcement need to control the subject's actions.
 4. **Minimum force.** The minimum degree of force, which is necessary, reasonable and lawful in the circumstances, to achieve the objective. The minimum degree of force is applicable whenever force is used.
 5. **Non-deadly force.** The force employed which is neither likely nor intended to cause death or serious bodily injury.
 6. **Non-deadly force techniques** are intended primarily to restrain or control an unarmed attacker or an actively or passively resisting subject.
 7. **Unarmed force.** The use of physical force, short of the use of armed force.
 - C. **Hostile act.** An aggressive action where death, serious bodily harm or destruction of designated property would be likely to result.
 - D. **Hostile intent.** The threat of imminent and direct use of force. Hostile intent is shown through an action, which appears to be preparatory to a hostile action. Only a reasonable belief in the hostile intent is required, before the use of force is authorized. Whether or not hostile intent is being demonstrated must be judged by the on-scene personnel on the basis of:
 1. The capability and preparedness of the threat.
 2. The available evidence which indicates an intention to attack.
 - E. **Officer** includes all police officers that exercise police authority that includes the powers of arrest and detention.
 - F. **Passive resistant** means the subject may offer a verbal level of noncompliance to the officer's requests. These persons may be talked into compliance; however, limited physical contact by the officer may be necessary.
 - G. **Proportionality.** The amount of force which is reasonable in intensity, duration and magnitude, based on all facts known to the commander at the time, to decisively counter the hostile act or hostile intent.
 - H. **Reasonable belief** means that an ordinary and prudent person with similar information and knowledge would act in a similar way under substantially similar circumstances.
 - I. **Resistance.** Verbal or physical actions by the subject to resist or evade lawful control actions of the officer.
 - J. **Serious bodily harm.** A physical injury, which creates a substantial risk of death, serious or protracted disfigurement, impairment of the function of any bodily organ or limb.
 - K. **Subject** as a term includes all persons regardless of citizenship, ethnicity, gender, age, religious beliefs or status, which are in contact with police officers of the Iraqi Police Service and its organizational units.
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10. Criminal Code and Procedure

The Criminal Code to be used within Iraq is the 1969 Iraq Criminal Code (with modifications), which will be released soon.

11. Vehicles

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No standards have been released regarding either the number or type of vehicles to be used by any of the Services under the authority of MOI. As standards are developed they will be released.

12. Uniforms

The standard uniform for the Services under the MOI are as follows:

- **Traffic Service** – White Shirt and Navy Pants
- **Police Service** – Light Blue Shirt and Navy Pants with Brassard (IP)
- **Facilities Protection** – Light Gray Shirt and Navy Pants with Brassard (FP)

13. Communication

The Communications infrastructure is under development of Baghdad and the first 1,000 portable radios should be delivered before 15 June 2003. Development of further communications systems in the outlying cities and governances is under consideration.

14. Station Start Up Packages

Twenty-five station start up packages for Baghdad have been ordered. These start-up packages include computers, desks, chairs and office supplies necessary to begin rudimentary operations. The package contains the items listed below:

Number Needed	Item Description	Cost Per Item	Total Item Cost
	Desk Top Computers	\$1,000.00	\$2,000
1	Typewriter	\$100.00	\$100
2	Printers	\$150.00	\$300
1	Fax/Copier	\$200.00	\$200
10	Cases - Pens	\$25.00	\$250
10	Cases - Pencils	\$10.00	\$100
5	Boxes Markers	\$9.00	\$45
15	Staplers with staples	\$16.00	\$240
15	Tape Dispensers with tape	\$4.00	\$60
15	Telephone Sets	\$75.00	\$1,125
5	Tables	\$60.00	\$300
10	Desks	\$140.00	\$1,400
50	Chairs	\$30.00	\$1,500
2	Clocks (Wall)	\$12.50	\$25
2	Maps	\$25.00	\$50
2	Roll Acetate	\$15.00	\$30
5	Cases of Push Pens	\$80.00	\$400
25	Cases of Printer Paper	\$90.00	\$2,250
12	Extension Cords	\$8.00	\$96

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4	Surge Protectors	\$25.00	\$100
10	Scissors (Safety - rubber tipped)	\$5.00	\$50
5	Boxes Highlighters	\$5.00	\$25
10	Boxes 3.5 Inch Disketts	\$10.00	\$100
25	3 Ring Binders	\$5.00	\$125
5	Boxes Document Protectors	\$5.00	\$25
12	File Cabinets	\$125.00	\$1,500
5	Boxes of Manila Folders	\$5.00	\$25
5	Boxes of File Folders	\$5.00	\$25
2	3 Hole Punch	\$7.00	\$14
2	2 Hole Punch	\$10.00	\$20
10	Clip Boards	\$10.00	\$100
5	Boxes of Paper Clips	\$2.00	\$10
5	Dry Erase Boards	\$75.00	\$375
5	Boxes of Dry Erase Markers	\$5.00	\$25
50	Boxes of Trash Bags	\$10.00	\$500
10	Trash Cans	\$10.00	\$100
25	Boxes of One Gallon Zip Lock Bags	\$36.00	\$900
50	Laundry Bags	\$6.00	\$300
5	Boxes of Surgical Gloves	\$14.00	\$70
25	Flashlights	\$22.00	\$550
3	Cases of Flashlight Batteries	\$36.00	\$108
25	Pair Handcuffs	\$22.00	\$550
1,000	Flexcuffs	\$0.20	\$200
20	Packs of 3x5 cards	\$2.00	\$40
10	Packs of 5x7 cards	\$2.00	\$20
1	Digital Camera	\$500.00	\$500
5	Medium Security Locks (Series 5200 Type)	\$20.00	\$100
150	Feet of Medium Gauge Chain	\$0.50	\$75
3	Metal Foot Locker or Lock Box	\$40.00	\$120
1	Video Camera	\$450.00	\$450
25	Whistle	\$9.00	\$225
25	Reflective Vests	\$15.00	\$375
5	Brooms	\$7.00	\$35
5	Mops	\$7.00	\$35
5	Buckets	\$7.00	\$35
5	Gallon Detergent	\$5.00	\$25
1	Hammer	\$9.00	\$9
2	Boxes of Nails	\$2.00	\$4
5	Sponges	\$1.00	\$5
5	Scrub Brushes	\$8.00	\$40
1	5 Kilowatt Generator	\$1,200.00	\$1,200
1	Light Set (portable for generator)	\$250.00	\$250
10	Wall Lockers (Evidence Type)	\$250.00	\$2,500
5,000	Paper Bags	\$75 per 1,000	\$375
100	Rolls Evidence Tag	\$5	\$500
Total Amount of Request			\$23,186

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Each station @ \$23,186 and we have 26 Police Stations within Baghdad -
Total Needed:

\$602,836

15. Personal Equipment

Number Needed	Item Description	Cost Per Item	Total Item Cost
25	9 mm Service Pistol	\$500.00	\$12,500
50	Magazine for Pistols	\$33.00	\$1,650
25	Boxes of 9 mm Ammunition	\$19.00	\$475
25	Utility Belt	\$60.00	\$1,500
100	Belt Keepers	\$5.00	\$500
25	Holster for Pistol	\$80.00	\$2,000
25	Magazine Pouch	\$27.00	\$675
25	Bullet Resistant Vest	\$550.00	\$13,750
25	Handcuff Case	\$25.00	\$625
25	Flashlight Holder	\$15.00	\$375
25	Radio Pouch	\$40.00	\$1,000
Total Personal Equipment			\$35,050

Personal Issue @ \$35,050 times 26 police stations - Total Needed:	\$911,300.00
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ANNEX C

POLICY STATEMENT ON MINORITY RECRUITING

Iraq faces a similar problem that has been encountered in other post-conflict peacekeeping missions: assuring adequate ethnic and gender representation within the reconstituted police service. As we move towards recruiting adequate personnel within Baghdad, and eventually Iraq, we are finding that some ethnic/gender populations are not well represented or not represented at all within the Iraq police service. To engage minority populations in the policing system the following guidelines are recommended:

- Prior to any recruiting within non-majority areas the following should be accomplished: meetings with civil, cultural or religious leaders to garner support for the recruiting; an acknowledgement or acceptance by these same leaders that some non-majority officers will be assigned outside their neighbourhoods and some majority officers will be assigned within their neighbourhoods. Solicit their assistance in encouraging qualified applicants to apply for police positions. Finally, dispel the belief that non-majority areas will only be policed by non-majority officers.
- Recruiting for non-majority populations must follow the same standards and practices as required of the majority population; however, targeted recruiting for gender or within ethnic areas should be encouraged. During these targeted recruiting opportunities members of the non-majority population currently serving within the service should be utilized as recruiters (if available and competent).
- Vetting and selection criteria should remain consistent between both majority and minority populations.
- Minority populations should be trained in multi-ethnic academy classes with other cadets using the same instructional staff that trains all students. This structured, educational environment will begin the assimilation/sensitization for both groups for working within a multi-ethnic environment.
- All members of the police service – and community leaders – should be informed that non-minority officers will be assigned duties within both majority and minority areas. Solicit messages from the civic, cultural and religious leaders that encourage tolerance and acceptance of the population to these practices. Engage community leaders to be involved in focus groups, community meetings on public safety and other police events.

ANNEX D

PRINCIPLES OF POLICING IN A FREE SOCIETY⁴⁰

- Considers *the individual citizen* as the *client of the police* rather than the state;
- Develops, maintains and encourages *adherence to organizational values* which, *without regard to race, religion, national origin, ethnicity, sex, age, social status or other non-behavioral human traits*:
 - i. *Honor* human rights and human dignity of its members and the general population;
 - ii. *Support* the free exercise of available legal rights of all persons; and
 - iii. *Encourage* the *fair and impartial enforcement* of those laws within its purview;
- In all functional aspects *operates in strict conformance with legal requirements* contained in the nation's constitution, police act, criminal code and other applicable laws;
- Establishes and maintains an *organizational culture* in which *public service* rather than *public repression* is the *end product* of police activities;
- Maintains a proactive focus on *crime prevention* as a means to *foster public order, domestic tranquility* and an *acceptable quality of life for all persons within the country*;
- Where reasonably possible, enters into *partnerships* with community and other governmental organizations to *identify and solve community problems* which provide *opportunities for criminal conduct*;
- *Actively and effectively investigates* reports of criminal conduct with the objective of *identifying and apprehending the perpetrator(s) so that guilt or innocence may be properly adjudicated*;
- Forms *functional relationships* with other *key components of the country's criminal justice system* to ensure that persons introduced to that system are processed *lawfully, effectively and fairly*;
- Approves and encourages the use of *non-deadly physical force* by its members only under carefully defined circumstances to further a legitimate and lawful, societal objective, and the use of *deadly force* by its members *only to save the life of any person, including a member of the police, from a perceived threat of imminent death or serious injury*, or under other circumstances articulated in a local, public law;
- Develops, maintains and operates under a *code of conduct, rules, policies and procedures* which provide *reasonable guidance* to police personnel in their behavior and the discharge of their assigned functions while holding them *accountable* for the manner in which they perform their duties;
- Manages the institution in a manner which *rewards* adherence to organizational values, effective performance and personal growth of its members, and *discourages* non-conforming behavior;
- Readily accepts and thoroughly investigates complaints of misconduct against

⁴⁰ Developed by the US Department of Justice, International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program, June 1999

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police personnel; and

- Appropriately disciplines police personnel who are fairly determined to have violated the established police code of conduct

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ANNEX E

IRAQ Transition and Integration Program (TIP)

Purpose: The purpose of this training program is to introduce and improve human rights knowledge, democratic policing principles and modern policing techniques for the New Iraqi Police Service. The program will focus on International standards of human rights, modern police patrol procedures and techniques, and the applicable Iraqi criminal laws, procedures and laws of arrest and detention. This course is designed to introduce change in the philosophy, behaviors, actions and activities of all Iraqi police officers regardless of assignment or rank.

Goal: The goal of this training is to provide a foundation of new knowledge that paves the way for Iraqi police to deliver law enforcement service to the citizens of Baghdad in a more humane and dignified manner and to set standards by which the delivery of this service can be measured. The newly deployed Iraqi Police Service is expected to provide a legitimate security presence in the city of Baghdad, suppress crime and violence, restore peace and order and resolve citizen issues while respecting the human rights of all citizens, and abide the rule of law.

Course Syllabus:
(Tentative hours and core subjects)

Length	3 Weeks
Daily Classes	6 hours a day (staggered lunch)
Week Schedule	6 days per week
Total Hours	108

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Course Syllabus (TIP)

(Modules / Approximate Hours / Order of Delivery)

Course Introduction and Administration	2 hours
New Iraqi Police Mission, Philosophy and Role	4 hours
International Standards for Human Rights	32 hours
Human Rights Law	
Right to Life	
Principles of Non Discrimination-Women in Society	
Prohibition Against Torture	
Rights of Children	
Civil and Political Rights	
Liberty and Security of Persons	
Freedom of Thought, Conscience, Religion,	
Opinion and Expression	
Freedom of Assembly and Association	
Freedom of Movement	
Treatment of Prisoners	
Violations of Human Rights	
Domestic Violence	3 hours
Police Ethics and	5 hours
International Standards for Police Code of Conduct	
International Standards on Police Use of Force	4 hours
Criminal Law, Criminal Procedures	8 hours
Laws of Arrest	
Search and Seizure	
Policing in a Free (Democratic) Society	6 hours
Patrol Procedures	6 hours
Community Policing	
Dealing with Citizens/Complaints	
Communication Skills	
Responding to Crime Scenes	4 hours
Responding to Major Incidents	3 hours
Report Writing	4 hours
Note Taking	
Interviewing Victims, Witnesses and	6 hours
Suspects	
Officer Survival and Firearms Safety	6 hours
Searching and Handcuffing	4 hours
Building Searches	3 hours
Vehicle Stops and Vehicle Pursuit	4 hours
Review and Testing	4 hours

Total hours 108

ANNEX F

Iraqi Senior Level Management Seminar

Purpose: The purpose of this seminar is to introduce the new philosophy, mission and law enforcement responsibilities to the Senior Iraqi Police Leadership. A major focus will be placed on international human rights standards, and modern police supervision techniques. This course is designed to change the philosophy, behaviors, actions and activities of the Senior Iraqi Police Leadership and provide them with the tools and means necessary to lead a democratic policing organization that respects the dignity and human rights of all citizens - an organization that can properly provide appropriate police services in a free society.

Goal: The goal of this training is to provide a foundation for "change management" within the Iraqi Police Service and encourage the senior leadership to embrace the principles of service oriented policing, accountability to citizen review and standards of conduct for all Iraqi Police Officers. In addition it will be the responsibility of the Senior Iraqi Police Leadership to supervise and manage the Police Service to suppress crime and violence, restore peace and order, and resolve citizen issues while respecting human rights and the rule of law.

Course syllabus (Tentative hours and Core Subjects)
5 days / 3 hours per day / Total Hours =15 hours

Each Participant will required to also addend the 3 week transition course

Lessons

New Philosophy, Mission and Values	3 hours
New Role as Police Managers	3 hours
International Standards for Human Rights	3 hours
Code of Conduct and Police Ethics	3 hours
<u>Service Oriented Policing</u>	<u>3 hours</u>
	15 Hours

ANNEX G

MANPOWER ALLOCATION TABLE IRAQ POLICE TASK FORCE (IPTF)

If the Iraq Police Mission is to succeed, the follow on force to provide both executive law enforcement assistance and training assistance must be of adequate size to properly train, mentor and advise Iraqi national staff, while assisting with some executive law enforcement functions. It is estimated that a requisite force would be comprised of 6,663 international police advisors. Based on a 3 person:1 vehicle ratio, IPTF would require the use of 2,211 vehicles. Other logistical matters include housing, food and pay – which must be consummate with wages offered in other mission areas.

Assignment: Headquarters	Number Advisor:
Advisor to Police Commissioner	1
Advisor to Deputy Police Commissioner	2
Advisor to Director Operations	1
Advisor to Director Special Operations	1
Advisor to Director Criminal Investigation	1
Advisor to Director Human Resources	1
Advisor to Director Communication	2
Advisor to Director IT Services	1
Advisor to Director Logistics	1
Advisor to Criminal Records Management	2
Advisor to Traffic	1
Advisor to Facilities Protection	1
Advisor to Forensics	1
Advisor to Criminal Intelligence	10
Advisor – Professional Standards	1
Professional Standards Investigation Team	50
Special Police Units (10)	2,500
Special Response Team (10)	200
Central Criminal Investigation	100
In-Country Training Team for IPFT Members	10
Operations Room (JOC) Advisor	5
Total for this assignment:	2,892

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Assignment: Regional Headquarters	Number Advisor:
Advisor to Regional Commander	1
Advisor to Deputy Regional Commander	1
Advisor to Director Regional Operations	1
Advisor to Director Regional Administration	1
Advisor to Director Regional Criminal Investigation	1
Advisor to Director Human Resources	1
Advisor to Director Communication	1
Advisor to Director IT Services	1
Advisor to Director Logistics	1
Advisor to Criminal Records Management	1
Advisor to Traffic	1
Advisor to Facilities Protection	1
Advisor to Forensics	5
Advisor to Criminal Intelligence	5
Advisor – Professional Standards	1
Professional Standards Investigation Team	10
Operations Room (JOC) Advisor	5
Total for this assignment:	38
Total for three (3) Regional Headquarters:	114

Assignment: Baghdad Police	Number Advisor:
Advisor to Police Chief	1
Advisor to Operations	1
Advisor to Special Operations	1
Advisor to Criminal Investigation (26) 10 Person Team	260
Advisors to Forensic	10
Advisor to Human Resources	1
Advisor to Communication	1
Advisor to IT Services	1
Advisor - Professional Standards	1
Advisor to Logistics	1
Advisor to Fleet Management	1
Advisor to Criminal Records Management	1
Advisor to Station Commander	26
Station Monitoring Team (26) - Twenty Person Team	520
Operations Room (JOC) Advisor	15
Advisors to Traffic	5
Communication (Dispatch) Advisors	50
Total for this assignment:	896

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Assignment: Basra	Number Advisor:
Advisor to Police Chief	1
Advisor to Operations	1
Advisor to Special Operations	1
Advisor to Criminal Investigation - 10 Person Team	10
Advisors to Forensic	5
Advisor to Human Resources	1
Advisor to Communication	1
Advisor to IT Services	1
Advisor - Professional Standards	1
Advisor to Logistics	1
Advisor to Fleet Management	1
Advisor to Criminal Records Management	1
Advisor to Station Commander	5
Station Monitoring Team (5) - Ten Person Team	50
Operations Room (JOC) Advisor	5
Advisors to Traffic	5
Communication (Dispatch) Advisors	10
Total for this assignment:	100

Assignment: Mosel	Number Advisor:
Advisor to Police Chief	1
Advisor to Operations	1
Advisor to Special Operations	1
Advisor to Criminal Investigation - 10 Person Team	10
Advisors to Forensic	5
Advisor to Human Resources	1
Advisor to Communication	1
Advisor to IT Services	1
Advisor - Professional Standards	1
Advisor to Logistics	1
Advisor to Fleet Management	1
Advisor to Criminal Records Management	1
Advisor to Station Commander	5
Station Monitoring Team (5) - Ten Person Team	50
Operations Room (JOC) Advisor	5
Advisors to Traffic	5
Communication (Dispatch) Advisors	10
Total for this assignment:	100

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Assignment: Kirkuk	Number Advisor:
Advisor to Police Chief	1
Advisor to Operations	1
Advisor to Special Operations	1
Advisor to Criminal Investigation - 10 Person Team	10
Advisors to Forensic	5
Advisor to Human Resources	1
Advisor to Communication	1
Advisor to IT Services	1
Advisor - Professional Standards	1
Advisor to Logistics	1
Advisor to Fleet Management	1
Advisor to Criminal Records Management	1
Advisor to Station Commander	5
Station Monitoring Team (5) - Ten Person Team	50
Operations Room (JOC) Advisor	5
Advisors to Traffic	5
Communication (Dispatch) Advisors	10
Total for this assignment:	100

Assignment: Tikrit	Number Advisor:
Advisor to Police Chief	1
Advisor to Operations	1
Advisor to Special Operations	1
Advisor to Criminal Investigation - 10 Person Team	10
Advisors to Forensic	5
Advisor to Human Resources	1
Advisor to Communication	1
Advisor to IT Services	1
Advisor - Professional Standards	1
Advisor to Logistics	1
Advisor to Fleet Management	1
Advisor to Criminal Records Management	1
Advisor to Station Commander	5
Station Monitoring Team (5) - Ten Person Team	50
Operations Room (JOC) Advisor	5
Advisors to Traffic	5
Communication (Dispatch) Advisors	10
Total for this assignment:	100

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Assignment: Provencial Teams	Number Advisor:
Advisor to Police Chief	1
Advisor to Operations	1
Advisor to Special Operations	1
Advisor to Criminal Investigation - 10 Person Team	10
Advisors to Forensic	5
Advisor to Human Resources	1
Advisor to Communication	1
Advisor to IT Services	1
Advisor - Professional Standards	1
Advisor to Logistics	1
Advisor to Fleet Management	1
Advisor to Criminal Records Management	1
Advisor to Station Commander	5
Station Monitoring Team (5) - Ten Person Team	50
Operations Room (JOC) Advisor	5
Advisors to Traffic	5
Communication (Dispatch) Advisors	10
Total for this assignment:	100
Total of 18 Teams	1,800

Police Academies and Training Sites	Number Trainers:
Baghdad Police Academy	150
Northern Police Academy	65
Basra Police Academy	65
Al Anbar Police Training Site	20
Mobile Training Teams (6 Teams)	60
Total for this assignment:	360

Customs and Border Police Functions	Number Advisors:
Customs Inspectors and Investigators	66
Immigration Inspectors and Investigators	90
Forensic Document Examiners	15
Total for this assignment:	171

Total Police Advisors Required to Staff IPTF:	6,633
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ANNEX H

SHORT AND LONG TERM GOALS (INITIAL – BASED UPON POLICE ASSESSMENT)

Short Term (0 – 3 Months)

- Recall Iraq Police Service officers to service country wide with appropriate deadline, which if missed results in job forfeiture.
- Stand up as much of an indigenous police capacity as possible.
- Collocate senior international officer with key IRAQ POLICE SERVICE counterparts.
- Reconstruct payroll and pay police newly established wages.
- Complete vetting / *de Ba'athification* process.
- Identify management capability in the senior management of IRAQ POLICE SERVICE
- Identify, select and appoint the a director general of the IRAQ POLICE/ SERVICE
- Develop and disseminate the MOI's standards and philosophy for the reform of the IRAQ POLICE into a police service that can function in a democratic society
- Develop strategic plan identifying needs, timelines, and implementation strategies to include roles and responsibilities of Coalition Partners (goods and services)
- Deliver Senior Management Reform Seminar to IRAQ POLICE SERVICE leadership
- Develop and begin delivery of 3- week Transitional and Integration Program (TIP for all police/patrol and traffic (regardless of rank) – this will span well into the mid-term
- Assist the IRAQ POLICE SERVICE in the modification / development of standard SOPs as necessary – for application nation-wide
- Development of FTO program
- Begin to assess and develop indigenous training capacity
- Begin refurbishment of academy
- Begin refurbishment of police stations in Baghdad
- Begin refurbishment of MOI quarters
- Identify and procure basic operational equipment needed for police operations in Baghdad
 - o Vehicles
 - o Weapons
 - o Comms
 - o IT
- Initiate procurement and delivery of Kits to outfit operational police stations in Baghdad
- Complete TNA for Basic Course and begin Course Development
- Begin to recruit/call back administrative/logistics Academy staff
- Develop Academy SOPs
- Develop students Database/records system
- Develop Motor pool capacity for East and West departments

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- Move JOC to MOI
- Secure Academy
- Complete mid-term TNA for In service / Recertification training for Police, Investigators, Traffic and Management
- Develop Police Code of Conduct base on accepted western standards
- Begin development and/or reform of OPR function
- Begin to outline FINAL plan for configuration of the new IRAQ POLICE SERVICE

Mid- Term (4 – 9 Months)

- Complete 3-week TIP for all police
- Certify all officers who pass TIP as permanent status
- Develop recruitment criteria and selection process for basic recruit training course
- Finalize development of basic course
- Recruit/select and begin basic training course (3month Academy/9 month FTO)
- Development of Personnel Development Record (PDR)
- Begin FTO course for International and IRAQ POLICE SERVICE officers
- Continue to develop indigenous training capacity both in Baghdad and on all other regions
- Continue to assess and develop indigenous training capacity
- Finalize complete refurbishment of academy
- Finalize refurbishment of police stations in Baghdad
- Finalize refurbishment of MOI quarters
- Finalize new organizational restructuring of IRAQ POLICE SERVICE
- Begun long term reform strategy for new IRAQ POLICE SERVICE

Long-term (10 – 18 months)

- Complete selection, recruitment and training of approximately 2000 new officers
- Selection and training of indigenous trainers sufficient to handle Baghdad and regional training requirements
- Begin implementation as necessary throughout country
- Begin and finalize transition of training academies to national staff drawing back to advisory role

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