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D/PJHQ/PH4/5/8135/12/1

11 Mar 03

COSSEC

20030311_CJO_COSSEC - Phase 4A - UK - Response

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PHASE 4A - A UK RESPONSE

ISSUE

1. The UK response to the potential legal, security and humanitarian assistance demands of Phase 4(A).

RECOMMENDATIONS

2. COS are invited to note that:
 - a. The CFLCC main effort is success in Phase 3 (Decisive Manoeuvre), yet there is full acceptance that Phase 4 remains the (critical) phase of the campaign and that a pragmatic balance will be required.
 - b. The legal basis for the operation will flow from a further UNSCR, without which the decision to commit becomes a political one based on advice from the Attorney General.
 - c. The legal obligations placed on the UK as an occupying power in Iraq will be extensive. An aide-memoire clarifying legal responsibilities at the tactical level will be produced shortly, once the legal debate is complete.
 - d. The UK role in PW handling is important; it could be protracted if the US second tranche of military police battalions is not approved by SECDEF.
 - e. The ambitious US HA plan is gaining genuine substance and is now ready to provide limited immediate relief as forces advance. In recognition that demand will outstrip supply, NCHQ is also developing national contingency plans that would allow UK forces to provide early HA.
 - f. CFHQ is seized of the need to minimise and mitigate potential structural damage in the oilfields and has firm plans in place. By necessity the majority of oil expertise will be provided by civilian contracts; there will be a time lag before these can be activated.
 - g. NCHQ has analysed in-theatre capability in support of Phase 4(A) and could call forward additional assets, including the capability to open an APOD.

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- h. As the NCHQ develops national contingency plans for HA in Phase 4(A), funding is required; this issue is still unresolved.
- i. The US led CJTF (Consequence Management) has limited capability and that the UK may need to provide limited assistance.
- j. The US led Sensitive Site Exploitation (SSE) model as yet has no impartiality mechanism.

AFTERNOTE

3. Phase 4(A) is likely to be the decisive phase of this campaign. This is recognised by the US and considerable interagency planning effort has gone into creating structures and providing resources to deal with anticipated security and HA issues; we can have confidence in these plans. However, Phase 4(A) will not be the initial main effort; some political expectation management may be required.

{Signed for CHOtS}

J G REITH
Lt Gen
CJO

Enclosure:

- 1. D/PJHQ/PH4/5/8135/12 dated 11 Mar 03.

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PHASE 4A – A UK RESPONSE

(A paper by CJO)

BACKGROUND

1. Phase 4 is likely to be the strategically decisive phase of the campaign. It is here that the wider UK political objectives in support of the military campaign will be achieved. Success will also allow the reduction of the Coalition military presence in Iraq. The US view Phase 4 in 3 parts:

- a. Phase 4(A) – Stability. Phase 4A seeks to create sufficient stability to allow transition to follow-on forces and full engagement of civil agencies to take place¹.
- b. Phase 4(B) – Recovery. Phase 4B seeks to develop a secure and stable environment that supports the process of national recovery and allows the process of transition to Iraqi self-government to begin².
- c. Phase 4(C) – Transition. Phase 4(C) seeks to complete the transition from Coalition control to an enduring, peaceful, self-governing Iraq³.

2. The Prime Minister has demanded an 'exemplary' Phase 4. The key to overall success in Phase 4 is quickly to gain and maintain Iraqi support; we will achieve this by our actions in providing their security and well-being. 'Security' includes the imperative to gain control and the need to establish a safe and secure environment in which public order and safety is assured. 'Well-being' captures the wider requirements of humanitarian assistance (HA), relief and early reconstruction. These

¹ The US end-state for Phase 4A is 'a stable environment in which the territorial integrity of Iraq is intact; civil order is maintained; repairs to damaged civil infrastructure are underway; humanitarian assistance is provided by the civilian sector; and an interim administration is in place'.

² The US end-state for Phase 4B is 'responsibility for stability and security passing from Coalition military to responsible Iraqi institutions; rule of law is fully established; necessary civil infrastructure is functioning and economic development is underway; lessening dependence on humanitarian assistance; and a transitional civil administration is in place with increasing Iraqi participation'.

³ The US end-state for Phase 4C is 'a durable, secure and stable Iraq sustained by Iraqis, in which the rule of law is well established and civil order is maintained by Iraqi authorities; civil infrastructure is functioning and economic development continuing; lessened dependence on humanitarian assistance; authority had been transferred to an Iraqi national government'.

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conditions can only be achieved during Phase 3 / 4(A), and flow from a secure legal base.

3. Phase 4(A) activity will run concurrently in time and space with Phase 3 combat operations, only ending when stability, in the widest sense, has been established in Iraq. Thus Phase 4(A) cannot be fully accomplished until warfighting is successfully concluded. Balance between the potentially conflicting demands of combat and HA is important. CFLCC has stated that his priorities will be the military mission, support to the military mission and humanitarian relief – in this order. However, CFLCC has also issued clear orders for both Phases 3 and 4(A) to ensure continuity and uniformity of approach. He has also established a Phase 4(A) end-state and clear objectives, these are at Annex A.

AIM

4. The aim of this paper is to update COS on the intended UK approach to Phase 4(A), focusing on legal authority, security, HA and consequence management.

LEGAL AUTHORITY

5. The legal base for conflict should flow from a UNSCR. Without another UNSCR the decision to commit to operations becomes a political one, based on advice from the Attorney General. His advice is likely to depend on the circumstances under which the second UNSCR may have failed.

6. Assuming a secure legal base, the governing legal principles will be those provided in the Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War, the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, and the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. The responsibilities these obligations place on the Occupying Force are considerable and are set out at Annex B. This table links likely military tasks to legal responsibility; the implications are well understood in theatre.

7. CFLCC has issued Instructions for Exercising Military Authority. These stress the need to adopt a low key and pragmatic approach that balances the military imperative with the needs of the Iraqi people. Key tenets are:

- a. Direction that all commanders are to liaise with and monitor local administrations within their area of responsibility (AO), but are only to directly intervene in the administrative process when necessary to maintain public order and safety, or to prevent human suffering.

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b. Existing Iraqi government organisations should be allowed and encouraged to function as normal and that no attempt should be made to reorganise or replace existing structures.

8. To supplement CFLCC direction, NCHQ has produced an order covering the 4(A) period, with guidance covering 'the first 30 Days'. This sets a guiding principle of '*a short-term solution implemented with a long-term view*' and provides more in-depth advice on UK legal obligations. The J9 Legal Cell at the NCHQ will also provide in-theatre advice, with immediate reach-back to PJHQ.

SECURITY

9. The Rule of Law. Under international law the Occupying Force is legally obliged to "respect, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country." This is recognised by CFLCC; where there is a functioning administration it will be retained. However, detailed UK / US policy on the role of military forces in maintaining law and order, and the procedures to be followed for detaining civilians who commit crimes that threaten coalition troops, has not yet been agreed. The intention is to issue simple 'tactical' guidelines, in the form of an aide-memoire, to all commanders this week following legal direction⁴. This will compliment UK guidelines issued by NCHQ.

10. Prisoner of War (PW).

a. Captured / Surrendered / Capitulated Forces. Once Iraqi forces have been captured or surrender, they become PW and are entitled to the privileges and protections specified in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Prisoners of War. It is currently assessed that some 15,000(+) Iraqi personnel could become PW. All PW in the UK AO will be moved and processed, initially in the 1 MEF holding area and subsequently in the Theatre Internment Facility, as agreed in the UK / US / AUS developed MOU, now awaiting the approval of the UK Attorney General. The UK has earmarked a battalion for PW duties. The US intend to deploy a total of twelve Military Police battalions for PW duties, of which 50% will be complete in theatre by 24 Mar 03. US deployment orders for the remaining MP units are not yet approved by SECDEF. Without these units the UK commitment to PW handling may be protracted.

b. By-Passed Forces. The IO campaign, and potential activity, will seek to persuade Iraqi military units not to fight. In resource terms, local cease-fires are preferable to a formal surrender, as units are not classed as PW. Under such arrangements the Iraqis would remain combatants, retain weapons, and could be legitimately targeted if they broke the cease-fire. Military and legal procedures will be introduced to control them and it should be noted that UK Forces would endeavour to provide basic humanitarian support to such units. These units could be used to enhance local stability and security.

⁴ A translation of the Iraqi Penal Code has yet to be completed. This has delayed decision. This Aide Memoire will complement the guide already produced by DIS.

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11. Oil. The early export of oil is essential to the Oil for Food Programme (OFF)⁵. This provides support to some 60% of the Iraqi people. The focus for UK operations is the Rumaylah South oil complex that covers an area the size of southern England, and produces 60% of Iraqi oil from some 150 wells. The intent is to secure critical oil infrastructure nodes early in the operation with ground forces. UK EOD and specialist engineer teams, working in conjunction with the US, will also gain access and facilitate the work of the Logistics Civil Augmentation Programme (LOGCAP) contract teams. These are due to deploy forward to Kuwait shortly, where key equipment is already pre-positioned, and they are prepared to fight well-head fires, assess damage, control environmental pollution and restart oil export operations. NCHQ is content that US plans are both well-developed and well-resourced.

12. Sensitive Site Exploitation (SSE) Coalition plans for SSE are now well developed; the UK is making a significant contribution, as endorsed by COS⁶. However, the US has yet to put mechanisms in-place to guarantee the impartiality of evidence gathering which would pass scrutiny by the international community (IC). Progress in this area is hampered by an understandable lack of clarity over the future role, if any, of UNMOVIC.

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE (HA)

13. US Concept. The US concept for HA during Phase 4(A) is to provide relief, as forces advance, establishing a secure environment and transferring responsibility from the military to the US AID established Disaster Assistance Relief Team (DART - USG civilian interagency team) and subsequently to IO, NGOs - and potentially the UN. The DART has recently surged into Kuwait and expects to be 'ready' this week. DART has stated that it has 'immediate' HA relief medical supplies (for 500,000) and food (1,800,000 Humanitarian Daily Rations) in the JOA, with contracts guaranteeing delivery to the Kuwait / Iraq border. The US also assess that Iraqi households have stockpiled 30 days worth of food. The UK Division will link into the DART structure and resources, via the Divisional Civil Military Operations Centre (CMOC), which is supported by a US civil affairs battalion (-).

14. UK Contingency Planning Despite clear progress in US planning it is assessed that demand for HA will outstrip supply; CFLCC will be forced to set priorities. There is no guarantee that UK forces will receive early HA from the DART; NCHQ has therefore developed contingency plans to provide support to UK forces. This utilises potential spare capacity within the JFLogC, but is also dependent on the early release of funding.

15. NGO / IO Activity. Immediate NGO / IO activity in Phase 4(A) will be limited, despite the presence of OCHA in Kuwait and contingency planning by the UN and several other IO / NGO. The US have established an humanitarian operations centre (HOC) in Kuwait to corral IO / NGO activity, with an embedded UKLO at SO1 level. Early DfID advice is that more senior US / UK representation would

⁵ Under OFF the Iraqi National Oil Company produces oil under the supervision of the Oil Ministry. The oil is then marketed and sold by the State Oil Marketing Organisation (SOMO). All lawful Iraqi contracts are sent to the UN, which controls the prices and holds the monies generated in a escrow account.

⁶ D/COSSEC/40/1/2 dated 29 Jan 03 - OP TELIC SSE.

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secure greater NGO co-operation⁷; NCHQ is addressing this within CFHQ. It is also assessed that further DfID engagement would provide better visibility of planned and potential NGO / IO activity.

16. HQ 1(UK) Armd Div Approach. The GOC has stated that the key objective for HQ 1(UK) Armd Div during Phase 4(A) is to, *'provide stable conditions, within which local structures can operate effectively to provide essential services to the local population, and to allow coalition, international and non-government organisations to enter and begin the process of reform, reconstruction, and delivery of humanitarian aid'*. In support of this the NCC has stated that all resources *'at my disposal'* will be used to best effect, without creating a culture of dependency. It should be noted that UK resources are potentially considerable:

a. In Theatre Resources. All troops could be deployed in support of HA according to the situation. At Annex C are those capabilities provided by in-theatre UK units / resources. Several have specific utility for Phase 4(A).

b. Resources On-Call. The option also remains to call forward additional resources from the UK on a case by case basis. For example STC has a force package at reduced readiness to deploy, able to operate and sustain a safe and secure APOD in Iraq. This could provide an IOC within 5 days of activation and a full military IFR capability within 30 days. This potentially provides NCHQ with the ability to open an airfield⁸ in support of HA operations.

17. Funding. Issues of funding of early HA, quick impact projects and Iraqi salaries are as yet unresolved:

a. HA Funding. The US plan is to provide funding for HA through the Humanitarian Operations Centre (HOC) to IO and NGO. However, it is unlikely that these agencies will be present or capable of delivering HA during the early stages of Phase 4(A). Thus there is a risk that UK forces will face a humanitarian situation for which they are not resourced. We need to ensure that there is a UK funded fallback plan. For this to work, DfID would have to agree for HA funding to be spent through military channels. This is not how DfID normally operates, and discussions are still underway to agree the mechanisms. Agreement is required urgently to ensure that an 'exemplary' Phase 4(A) is achieved.

b. Quick Impact Projects (QIP). Separately, we are seeking to ensure that NCC / GOC 1st (HQ) Armd Div have a 'pot-of-gold' (some £10m) for spending on QIP. This builds on the experience from Afghanistan and previous operations when this type of funding has been held at the discretion of DfID, whose criteria and objectives were necessarily different from those of the military force. This initiative is awaiting formal treasury agreement.

⁷ In discussion with NCHQ, DfID / remains an option if CFHQ do not react.

/ has suggested a UK 1* would be suitable. This

⁸ BASRAH International Airport (BIA) is the only airport in the UK AOR that is capable of receiving strategic AT, although there are other potential APODs at JALIBAH and SHAIBAH.

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c. Salaries. The salary for public sector workers in Iraq is around \$5-8 per month. These individuals will need to be paid if we wish to continue to use them. US plans also include the idea of employing PW at \$1/day in support of HA. How this system will work is unclear, and is linked to a decision on currency. The details of UK national responsibilities are still unclear and need clarification.

CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT

18. Concept. The UK has not deployed specific consequence management forces. However, in recognition that the Iraqi Regime may deploy CBRN weapons, the US has established a Combined Joint Task Force (Consequence Management). This works to COMUSMARCENT and is designed to *'conduct CM operations to reinforce Host Nation (HN) first response capabilities at a CBRN incident site and support HN follow on operations in order to save lives and reduce suffering'*. It should be noted that CTF-CM are not expected to provide the immediate response to an incident, but will have initial response forces (IRF) at an incident within 24 hours. Extended operating forces (EOF) flowing into the area from the 96-hour point would then follow the IRF.

19. Capabilities. The IRF is established, with the bulk of assets currently deployed in Kuwait. This includes forces assigned from both the Czech Republic and Germany. At 800 strong the IRF offers an initial capability in CM planning, rescue (including decontamination), security, medical, engineers and logistics). At full EOF capability the CM force increases to some 4200 personnel, building on these key functional areas. Despite this, CJTF-CM still lacks forces to provide security and medical support and has specific capability gaps particularly in the areas of detection and identification and EOD. In the event of a CBRN incident, CJTF-CM will certainly seek additional support from coalition partners, which we would need to consider, in the first instance, from resources already deployed.

{Signed for CHOtS}

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Annexes:

- A. CFLCC End-State and Objectives for Phase 4(A).
- B. UK Legal Obligations as an Occupying Power.
- C. UK In-Theatre Capabilities in Support of Phase 4(A).

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ANNEX A TO
D/PJHQ/PH4/5/8135/12
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CFLCC END-STATE AND OBJECTIVES FOR PHASE 4(A)

END-STATE

A stable environment in which the territorial integrity of Iraq is intact; civil order is maintained; repairs to damaged civil infrastructure are underway; humanitarian assistance is provided by the civilian sector; and an interim administration is in place'.

OBJECTIVES

See below:

Lines of Operation	Objectives
Shape the Information Environment.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Positively influence Coalition, Iraqi population, regional and world opinion.- Build popular support for stability operations.- Promote unity of effort amongst Coalition partners.- Conduct successful Information Operations.- Support the Theatre and Strategic Information Campaign Plan.
Security	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Defeat remaining pockets of Iraqi military.- Maintain the territorial integrity of Iraq.- Conduct SSE operations.- Continue to locate, secure and document WMD.- Support Humanitarian Mine Actions.- Provide security for LOGCAP (oil experts) in order facilitate the rapid restoration of the Iraqi oil industry.- Identify and detain terrorists and war criminals.
Rule of Law	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Maintain public order and safety.- Dismantle Regime's internal security apparatus.- Enforce IAI laws.- Use and build local law enforcement.
Infrastructure Recovery	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Repair damage to mission essential routes / ports and airfields.- Clear oil infrastructure of mines, UXO and NBC contamination as necessary to facilitate repair.- Assist Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DART) to assess / repair / restore essential life support infrastructure.
Humanitarian Relief and Assistance	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Provide emergency HA.- Control IDP operations.- Support HA provided by IO/NGO.- Co-ordinate and monitor reconstruction efforts of the IO / NGO/ Coalition Government Agencies (CGA).
Governance and Administration	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Establish temporary military authority on a local / regional basis as the Regime collapses / as the tactical situation develops.- Establish IAI at national level following Regime collapse.- Use existing local administration where possible.- Initiate / monitor use of Iraqi military for both security and stability operations as required.

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ANNEX B TO
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UK LEGAL RESPONSIBILITIES AS AN OCCUPYING POWER

Key Military Tasks:	Responsibility
<p>Safe and secure environment</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Restore public order	<p>Art 29/47 GC IV and 42/43 Hague Regs – assuming responsibility for the occupied territory and its inhabitants. Exercising provisional and temporary control over territory and civilian population. Occupying force should declare a prospective date for the termination of occupation.</p> <p>Art 27 GC IV and 46 Hague Regs – civilians are entitled to respect for their persons, their honour, family rights, religious convictions and customs. Their private property is protected. They are to be protected from acts of violence - Art 13 and 27 GC IV and 46 Hague Regs. Reprisals against them or their property are prohibited - Art 53 para 3 GC IV and Arts 20 and 51 para 6 AP I.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Intern/detain resisting military factions/war criminals/terrorists	<p>No collective penalties or pillage Art 33 para 1 GC IV Art 47 HR. No hostages - Art 34 GC IV. Persons shall not be detained in an area exposed to dangers of war. Art 49 para 5 GC IV. Must be separate from POW camps. There must be proper medical facilities and facilities for intellectual and physical activities. Proper arrangements should be made for their personal property and financial resources. Civilian Convention Arts 83 – 98. For imperative reasons of security, the OP may subject individual civilians to assigned residence or internment. Art 78 para 1 GC IV.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Remove threat from UXO's• Locate and secure any remaining WMD	<p>Restriction of movement permitted if necessary for security reasons or for safety measures Art 78 Civilian Convention. NB curfews, blockades and closures affect other rights afforded pursuant to GC IV. Such measures must be capable of objective justification in terms of timings, duration, extent, proportionality and affect on population. Removal of individuals/groups from the territory is prohibited. Art 49 2GC IV. However temporary evacuation or specific areas is permissible for security of population or if compelling military reasons so demand. If evacuation is necess the OP will provide accom and will not separate families. Art 49 3 GC IV.</p>

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<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Interim military administration. Establish HQ and support systems in govt buildings/civil administration offices	<p>Movable govt property which may be used for military purposes shall become the spoils of war. Art 53 HR. This includes transport, weapons and food supplies. Such property cannot be confiscated, it can only be requisitioned – title does not pass. Compensation is payable. Art 53 HR. All private property shall be protected from permanent seizure except for commodities designed for consumption. Art 46 para 2 HR. NB. The property of municipalities, of institutions dedicated to religion, charity, education, arts and sciences shall be treated as private property. No confiscation. Art 56 para 1 HR. Requisition of cultural property is not permitted. Art 56 HR. Art 5 Cult Prop Conv. There is a duty to safeguard the capital accrued from properties and to administer them efficiently. The economy and where possible the currency should be supported. The OP can rely upon the local currency or introduce its own and have parallel currencies operating.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Infrastructure recovery. Secure and control freedom of movement by ground and air• Boundary/border control/support	<p>The provisions relating to protection of persons and establishing control of the territory legitimate such actions.</p>

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- Re-instate the rule of law

The national laws of the territory shall remain in force. Laws which serve the purpose of warfare in the territory or which constitute a threat to security or an obstacle to the application of humanitarian law, may be repealed or suspended by the OP. Art 64 GC IV/Art 43 HR. OP can enact laws of its own if there is a military necessity or where the obligation to maintain public order so demands. Must be in a language that the locals understand. Art 64 GC IV and Art 43 HR. The administration of the territory shall be given the opportunity to carry on its activities. The jurisdiction of the territory shall remain in force. The status of the judges and public officials shall not be altered although public officials may be removed from their posts. Art 54 para 2 GC IV. They cannot be compelled to work like the inhabitants of occupied territories – they can resign from their position. NB Art 54 para 2 GC IV – the OP may remove public officials but not judges from their posts. If Judges refuse to fulfil their tasks – the OP can appoint new justices. Courts of OP cannot prosecute for offences committed before occupation unless they constitute violations of international humanitarian law. Art 70 para 1 GC IV. Breaches of local law shall continue to be prosecuted by local courts unless local courts are unable to work in which case military courts shall have jurisdiction. Art 66 GC IV.

ECHR provisions and there application need to be considered. We don't do death even if GC IV does!

Any sentences passed will be executed in the territory. Art 76 para 6 GC IV. Visitation rights

protected under same para. NB Red Cross must be permitted to implement international law relating to belligerent occupation. Art 143 GC IV – ICRC have the right to go to all places where inhabitants of the occupied territory may be living. This includes all establishments where detained persons may be found.

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
Key Supporting Tasks:	
<p>Humanitarian Relief and Assistance</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Medical Aid/Hygiene and public health 	<p>The OP is obliged to ensure the provision of supplies to the civilian population to the fullest extent of the means available to it. In country resources will be used first and foremost with supplies from outside if necessary. Art 55 GC IV. Stocks and supplies may be requisitioned for use only if the requirements of the civilian population have been taken into account. Art 55 GC IV. Relief actions shall be permitted if demand exceeds supply. Art 59 GC IV. OP has the duty to maintain in co-operation with the appropriate authorities of the territory medical care as well as public health and hygiene. Adequate prophylactic measures shall be taken to prevent contagious diseases and epidemics. Art 56 GC IV. Red Cross and other international agencies will be permitted to carry out their activities for the benefit of the population. Art 63 GC IV. Civilian hospitals may only be requisitioned temporarily in cases of urgent necessity. Art 57 GC IV.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Repatriation/return of refugees 	<p>Every effort to assist international aid agencies. Obligation to forward information regarding the fate of protected citizens as well as POW's, wounded, sick, shipwrecked and dead ... Arts 136 GC IV, 122 GC III and Art 16 GC I respectively. A NIB shall be instituted for these purposes. Art 136-139 GC IV. There is a continuous obligation to search. Art 33 GC I. Discrimination on the grounds of race, nationality, language, religion, political opinion, social origin or position is unlawful. Art 27 GC IV.</p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ensuring adequate food supplies to fullest extent possible • Support/facilitate institutions dedicated to the care, welfare and education of children • Support to organisations investigating and prosecuting war crimes 	<p>Civilians under 15 cannot be compelled to work. They are to be provided for in terms of sustenance, shelter, education and religious welfare. Art 24-50 Civilian Convention. OP can compel civilians over 18 yrs to work to ensure provision of public utilities, food, shelter, clothing, transportation and health of the population. Work for military operations or which would lead to the mobilisation of workers in military or paramilitary organisations is excepted from this regulation. Art 51 paras 2 + 4 GC IV/Art 52 HR.</p>

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ANNEX C
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PHASE 4(A)
In-theatre Capabilities



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Table 1: Summary of CAT A Capabilities for Phase 4A

NOTE	UNIT	LOCATION	CAPABILITY	TASKED THROUGH	REMARKS
COMMAND AND CONTROL					
1	CFH - J9	Asaliyah, Qatar	Theatre level C2 for HA	NCHQ	
2	Humanitarian Ops Centre	Camp Doha, Ku	US Organisation with UK LO	CFLCC	
3	UK Component HQs	JOA	C2 of specific HA forces and liaison with	NCHQ	
4	NGO/IO Liaison Cell	Arifjan, Ku	Primary C2 with NGOs and Ias	JFLogC	
SECURITY					
5	JF EOD Gp (LCC) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • TF 7 EOD • TF 14 EOD • 11 EOD Regt • 33 EOD Regt • 49 Fd Sqn RE (EOD) EOD (ACC) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • AEOD • AEOD • AEOD • AEOD EOD Tp MWD EOD Dogs	N Iraq W Iraq Azraq, Jo AAS, Ku KCI Ku Al Jaber, KU Akrotiri, Cyp Camp Doha Ku	Limited EOD/UXO assistance in sector	NCC	13 Feb 15 Feb 1 Mar 21 Feb 26 Jan 10 Mar
6	Div Sp Gp (DSG)	S Iraq / Kuwait	Limited movement sp and water delivery	1 XX	
7	Prisoners of War <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • [2] x Bns • RMP 	S Iraq	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Guard 13k PWs for up to 1 week; after up to 26k for 1 month • Limited route and security assistance 	1 XX	
8	SSE (H Sqn Jt NBC Regt)	Camp Udairi, Ku	1-3 UK SST and elements of	1 XX	
9	RN Vessels <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MCMs • ARK Royal • LSLs • FF/DD 	NAG & Umm Qasr	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Security of KAA • SH Sp • Secure escort to Basrah • Convoy/vessel escort 	MCC	

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10	EOD/UXO • FDS	NAG/Basrah	Assist with the disposal of waterborne UXO and demolition requirements	MCC	3 x 4 man teams
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND RECONSTRUCTION					
11	Civil Affairs Gp	S Iraq		1 XX	
12	MCTC	Arifjan, Ku	Prisoner handling and detention centre security	1 XX	
13	STRE • 516 STRE • 528 Works • 524 STRE • 529 STRE • 64 CRE	Arifjan, Ku	• Oil • Power • Ports, Roads and Bridges • Airfields • Quarries	Jt Force Eng	1 Mar 6 Feb 1 Mar
14	Water Development • 521 Water Dev Unit	Arifjan, Ku	• 2 x Water Dev Stores • Reverse Osmosis Plant • Sea Water Pumps	Jt Force Eng	15 Feb 1 Mar 31 Mar
15	ETS	Camp Doha, KU	Assistance in maintenance of Iraqi education system	1 XX	
16	Intra-theatre Air Sp • C130	Fujarah, UAE	Assist as required with HA aerial delivery in theatre	ACC	
17	Air Sp Sqn	Tbc	Enable the air flow of HA and supplies	ACC	
18	MTO/NCAGs	Umm Qasr, Iraq	Provide co-ordination and assistance for maritime forces	MCC	Bahrain initially
19	RN Ships • Grey Rover • ARGOS	NAG/Basrah	• Provide fuel sp to ashore forces • CAT III Med Sp alongside in Basrah	MCC MCC	
20	Charter Shipping	NAG/Basrah	Provide shipping assistance to aid agencies	MCC	
21	HRS	Arifjan, Ku	Delivery of Humanitarian relief supplies	JFLogC	
22	Movement Sp • Movement Control Centre • 15 Port and Maritime	Arifjan, Ku	• Assist with land RSOM of HA elements • Port RSOM	JFLogC	
23	Medical Sp • 2 x Fd Hosp	S Iraq	Limited Med Sp to PWs and DPs as req	JFLogC/LCC	

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