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IRAQ: SECURITY ACTION PLAN

1. Introduction

At the Ad Hoc Group meeting on 4 September Ministers agreed that every effort should be made to improve security in Iraq quickly, based on the following principles:

- Iraqis must take increasing responsibility for their own security;
- Iraqi capabilities must be developed to undertake basic security tasks (eg guarding infrastructure) freeing Coalition forces to go on the offensive against terrorists;
- We should focus on the Iraqi Civil Defence Corps (ICDC) and the Iraqi Police as the most likely to produce quick results, while continuing to support the longer term development of the New Iraqi Army;
- Improved intelligence on the threats is essential and can only be provided by working with Iraqis.

This paper aims to identify and prioritise the key action points.

Developing Iraqi security capabilities

The key programmes, in descending order of effectiveness, are:

2. Iraqi Civil Defence Corps (ICDC)

Concept

- ICDC is being established by CJTF, initially for a single year. Following a three week course, ICDC units will undertake basic guarding and infantry tasks under Coalition military control. They will be used to reinforce the Facilities Protection Service, on the borders, and in eg the security operation for the forthcoming currency exchange. As their training and experience improve they should be able to provide a quick reaction capability.
- CJTF plans now call for an expansion of Iraqi security personnel, including the ICDC, by 30,000 in 60 days. If ICDC units prove effective, they are likely to be absorbed into the New Iraqi Army in the longer term.

Resources

- CJTF have provided basic weapons, uniforms, pay and rations. CPA agreed on 1 September to provide \$1.56m per battalion to cover communications equipment, vehicles and basic accommodation.

Timelines

- UK forces are now training 160 ICDC, expanding to 630 by 22 September and 1,700 by 3 November. Initial operating capability should be achieved by 13 October in Maysan and Basrah.
- After Ramadan there will be a requirement to train at least 2,000 more: 500 in the UK sector, and 1,500 in the Italian and Netherlands provinces (where training is

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already taking place). Battalions should be fully operational by the end of the year in all four provinces of the UK AO.

Action

- Additional UK Short Term Training Teams (STTTs) are needed to speed up training and allow the formation of additional ICDC units in the UK AO. Additional UK forces now being deployed into theatre will take on this task. **MoD must provide all necessary support for them in this role.**
- To make ICDC training effective, MND(SE) need a delegated operating budget (around \$10,000 per battalion) to meet immediate requirements (eg hired local transport for range/field training, badges of rank etc) **MoD or GCPP should provide;**
- CJTF and CPA central support must reach ICDC battalions in the UK AO: **IraqRep/ UK Deputy CJTF commander to pursue**
- We should agree that ICDC development costs will be underwritten nationally so that training is not held up by procedural delays in CPA: **IPU to pursue with OGDs.**

3. Iraqi Police

Concept

- CPA aims to establish an Iraqi police force of 70,000 within the next two years. 38,000 have so far been rehired and will need to undergo transition and in-service re-certification training (lasting three weeks);
- To achieve CPA targets, 1,350 recruits will need to be trained each month, with 2,700 recruits at any one time undergoing eight week basic skills training courses. This will require facilities accommodating 3000 trainees and a total of 600 full time international trainers (there is as yet no visibility on where the majority of these are to come from);
- The main **problem** in developing the Iraqi Police is the slowness with which CPA is developing its strategy, concept and timelines for reform. Without greater clarity potential contributors may not deploy. There is a critical requirement to strengthen the strategic planning resources in CPA's understaffed Interior Ministry (MoI) team (which is also responsible for borders, customs and immigration control and is preoccupied by operational issues):
- In the absence of a central strategy, we are pursuing **regional options**. The UK senior police representative in CPA South (DCC White) has submitted a proposal to re-establish the Regional Police Training Academy (RPTA) at Az Zubayr. The timescale of the project is November/ December and will require 21 international staff: one training manager at Superintendent/Chief Inspector level supported by twenty police officers.
- Security problems in Iraq mean that providing training in a third country is likely to be essential to secure international engagement. The Hungarian option has fallen through: CPA has therefore approached Jordan, where three training sites have potential facilities for up to 3000 recruits. Bremer has asked DCC Brand (senior UK police representative in CPA) to provide an immediate assessment.

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Action

- We should press ahead with preparations already in hand for deploying UK police trainers:
- For a **third country facility** (eg Jordan), we are confident of being able to offer 100 unarmed police (a combination of serving and retired officers) by the end of October: **UND (FCO) with ACPO/ Home Office to pursue;**
- For **in-country training**, we should be able to deploy the 21 additional officers with firearms training required to make the RTPA operational by end of December;
- The UK's RTPA concept should be cleared with Bremer/ CPA MoI: **IraqRep/ DCC Brand to pursue;**
- We should identify sources of funding for the above. National resources may be required for quick results: **UND/IPU to pursue with Conflict Prevention Unit and OGDs;**
- The RTPA timetable should if possible be accelerated. **UND with ACPO/ Home Office to pursue;**
- De-Baathification needs to be applied flexibly so as not to exclude potential recruits to the Police (and the intelligence services – see below) unnecessarily: **IraqRep/ DCC Brand to pursue;**
- The Italians (Carabinieri), Dutch and other TCNs should be encouraged to contribute to the RTPA: **UND to pursue via Embassies;**
- We should stress immediately to the Jordanians at high level the importance of CPA having access to their facilities: **UND/IPU to pursue via HM Embassy Amman;**
- We should stress to the US/CPA at high level the urgent need to build CPA MoI **strategic capability** (eg via a Home Office secondment). We should challenge the assumption that the US will not accept UK leadership in the MoI and produce a good candidate if they will: **IraqRep and UND/IPU to pursue**

Longer term

- Only international engagement can deliver the number of trainers needed for a full police training programme. A new UNSCR should help. Any or all of the UN, the EU or the OSCE could play a major role: we should at once discuss further with all three their possible contributions. **UND/IPU to pursue**

4. New Iraqi Army (NIA)

Concept and role

- The NIA will be an essential to ensuring that Iraq's long-term stability is underpinned by high quality armed forces. This will take time: the NIA is not a quick fix.
- The US now plan to accelerate the development of the NIA to create 3 Divisions (40,000 men) within the first year. We have been asked to provide additional military trainers to implement the plan.
- Jordan may be willing to offer military training courses for officer level candidates. The UK has been asked to provide a team to validate the course.

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Action

- We should provide the additional UK military personnel (12 at Corporal level) to help speed up NIA training in Iraq. **MoD to pursue (outline approval has already been received from ACDS(OPS)).**
- We should agree to deploy a Training Needs Analysis Team as soon as practicable (no later than 3-4 weeks) to check the validity of the CMATT and Jordanian courses currently in existence. **MoD to pursue.**

5. Facilities Protection Service (FPS)

Role

- FPS is organised and recruited on Ministry lines (separate forces for oil, railways, electricity, ports etc), with the MoI supposed to set functional standards from the centre and deploying capacity to the Ministries as required.
- FPS is essentially an effort to apply central standards to a series of ad hoc Ministry recruitment exercises. Its personnel are paid less than those of ICDC or the Iraqi Police and it is unlikely to achieve their level of capability.

Action

- The two key issues for FPS are:
 - integration of security efforts across the Ministries and de-confliction with ICDC: in hand via Security Integration Office established under military leadership in Baghdad in early September;
 - Access to weapons, vehicles and communications equipment: way forward not yet agreed. We need to:
 - i. Ensure FPS in UK AO are included in central CPA FPS equipment programmes. **IraqRep to pursue with CPA;**
 - ii. Consider a UK nationally funded programme to equip FPS in our AO. **IPU to put to Ministers, subject to caveat above on FPS effectiveness and other calls on resources (eg ICDC).**

Additional action by the Coalition

In addition to improving Iraqi security capability the Coalition could do the following:

6. Border surveillance and interdiction

Requirement:

- The JIC assessment is that many of the key threats are from outside Iraq (Islamic extremists, Iranian agents, 'Mujahedin');
- Newly deployed UK forces will improve border surveillance capability, but neither US nor UK forces have sufficient assets to monitor the full length of Iraq's borders and provide a quick reaction capability;
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- Existing military requests for more Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) should be considered quickly: **MoD to advise**
- Immediate diplomatic pressure should be applied, with the US, to Iraq's neighbours, especially Saudi Arabia, Syria and Iran to stress the need for them to apply better control of their borders: **IPU to pursue**
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- CENTCOM are considering hiring commercial assets (eg light aircraft) to improve border surveillance: we should examine this option. **MoD to advise.**

7. Working with local leaderships

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- The Governing Council/ the Coalition should encourage neighbourhood security committees (already coming into existence spontaneously) and empower community leaders to create their own guard forces. We need a filter mechanism to guard against handing power to the wrong element: the key is a process led by Iraqis: **IPU to take forward with IraqRep, MoD and MND(SE);**
- These efforts to engage the wider Iraqi population need to be backed up by a credible Governing Council/ CPA Information Operations and media campaign: **IraqRep to pursue with Gary Thatcher (CPA Information Director).**

8. Improving intelligence effectiveness

- a fusion cell in Baghdad to integrate the intelligence and military efforts against threats to stability in Iraq. We must ensure HMG is properly tied in to the work of the cell:
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Iraq Policy Unit
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