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PM/03/045

PRIME MINISTER

Iraq: Winning the Peace

1. Your meeting on Iraq on 3 June commissioned a number of pieces of work (recorded in Nick Cannon's letter of the same date).

2. The Iraq rehabilitation ministerial meeting, which I chaired this morning, also discussed the latest developments in Iraq. We fully shared your view that an enormous amount of work remains to be done. We were concerned that the US was not showing the same energy, focus and drive in the reconstruction effort that they did in the military campaign.

3. Colleagues also felt strongly that the US must not be allowed to take UK support for granted. Otherwise, as the US ultimately called the shots, we risked being caught in a position of sharing responsibility for events in Iraq without holding the corresponding power to influence them. In that context, the Treasury expressed worries about the provisional arrangements for disbursing oil revenues from the Development Fund for Iraq. Peter Goldsmith was particularly concerned on the wider point that we should be able to veto initiatives which we considered went beyond the legal powers available to the Coalition under the Geneva Convention, the Hague regulations and UNSCR 1483.

... 4. I now attach the following papers:

(a) A short paper setting out what needs to be done to make reconstruction work, containing ideas which would make a big difference to the people of Iraq.

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(b) The two fundamental issues are to prevent looting and criminality (which remain a very serious problem even in Basra) and to turn the Coalition Provisional Administration into an efficient, functioning organisation. Unless we put these two foundation stones in place, reconstruction will continue to falter.

(b) A note, agreed with Sir Jeremy Greenstock, on what we would like Sergio Vieira de Mello's role to be.

(c) A paper on incentives for Iraqi WMD scientists and officials, which you can send to President Bush.

(d) A paper setting out a policing strategy, which will be key to achieving lasting security.

(c) A list of projects which urgently need to be taken forward in and around Basra. DFID have a mission in Basra now. Valerie, Geoff and I are keen to get officials cracking on this list.

5. On improving the Iraqi media, Alastair Campbell has been involved in this and will have suggestions to make, including ways in which the UK can become more engaged. John Buck, the head of the CIC, is in Baghdad now studying the situation and will make recommendations shortly on the way forward.

6. In addition to the points in the paper in paragraph 4 (a) above, colleagues this morning wanted you to raise a number of other important issues with President Bush in your telephone call on Friday.

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(a) Sharing intelligence in Iraq.

John Sawers is not allowed into Bremer's daily intelligence briefings.

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is unacceptable.

(b) Bremer is changing the rules of the political process quickly. Patricia senses he is not completely sound on boosting the involvement of women. It would be helpful if you could get President Bush's agreement to a good number of women, we think 20%, in Iraq's new political institutions.

(c) Patricia is also keen for you to lobby the President on behalf of Siemens UK whose bid to supply power to Baghdad and Basra has been stalled in Washington by counter-lobbying by GE. (The point is covered in the paper mentioned in paragraph 4 (a)).

7. I am copying this minute to the Chancellor, the Defence, Development, Trade and Industry Secretaries, the Home Secretary, the Attorney-General, 'C', Desmond Bowen and John Scarlett (Cabinet Office).

(JACK STRAW)

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

5 June 2003

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IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION: 30 DAY PRIORITIES, 5 JULY 2003

If we are to achieve our goals in Iraq we need:

- To get things moving. There needs to be a dramatic, early improvement in the quality of life for ordinary Iraqis: i.e. security and basic services.
- To communicate to the Iraqi population what we have already done and what we are trying to achieve.
- To get the Coalition as a whole working as effectively in the post-conflict phase as it did during the conflict.

If we are to get this right, we need to short-circuit the bureaucracy: Bremer must be directly responsible to you and me, and be able to act on our express authority. We need:

- A clear, coherent strategic plan.
- A timetable for delivering it.
- Regular contact between you, me and Bremer to review progress and agree next steps.

Set out below are some specific targets we should now set ourselves, for delivery within 30 days.

1. Restore security

We must replicate in Baghdad the Coalition's successes in the north and the south.

- (a) Coalition forces in Baghdad out of tanks and patrolling on the ground.
- (b) Deploy international armed police to work with Iraqi force; and convene Police contributors' conference to discuss medium term support. We can push the EU to make a major effort (on this and in other areas where the EU can help).
- (c) A scheme for re-employing ex-servicemen to provide static guards for infrastructure, ministries and other government buildings to prevent looting. This is not a job for Coalition forces.

2. Agree and Implement a Strategic Plan for the CPA

- (a) Agree specific targets for reconstruction direct with Bremer, and agree the resources needed to deliver them. And then let him get on with his job.
- (b) Agree with Bremer and implement a strategic communications plan, and the means to deliver it.
- (c) Give Bremer and the CPA the means to do their job:
 - Communications – telephones, computers and email for all CPA staff. If the contractor cannot deliver, call on military resources.
 - Personnel: the right people with the right skills in the right place at the right time, with clear responsibility and accountability. And with proper administrative support.
 - Proper management systems, procedures and structures.
 - Better working and living conditions.

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- (d) Make the regional network of CPA offices function – with access to funds, good communications, inputs into central policy making.
- (e) Improve the capacity of Iraqi Ministries to deliver services:
 - Refurbish wrecked offices, and guard them.
 - Recruit staff.
 - Establish budget procedures and priorities for expenditure.

3. A clear, transparent Coalition decision making process

- (a) Coalition decisions need to have your and my authority. There needs to be a clear, transparent means for taking them, and direct accountability to us for those responsible for implementing them.
- (b) Development Fund for Iraq: we must get the decision making right. We are jointly responsible for this, legally and politically. Potentially the biggest resource for Iraq's reconstruction. But also where Iraqis – and the world – will judge our intentions and performance. **Need transparent and accountable mechanisms for setting Iraq's budget, priorities for expenditure, and procedures for disbursement** – not just post facto auditing.

4. Power, water and sewage

Repairs to essential infrastructure, and provision of essential services, must be top of CPA's agenda. We need to speed up the decision making process and awarding of sub-contracts. For example:

- (a) **Baghdad needs an extra 400 MW of power capacity now. Siemens UK can put in 170 MW in a few weeks – all they need is a letter of intent.** This seems to be stuck in Washington.
- (b) Improvements urgently needed to the 400kV transmission system throughout Iraq.
- (c) Bechtel has the contract for this work. But the need far exceeds their capacity to deliver. Explore with UNDP and UNICEF the scope for expanding their operations on power and water. Offer them technical help and funding, and take the initiative in co-ordinating with them.
- (d) See list of separate infrastructure projects for Basra.

5. Restoring normal economic life

- (a) Need a short-term fix to increase cash in circulation before there is a cash crisis. Need to do this right now. The answer is to print more "Saddam" dinars – with his head expunged and better security features.
- (b) Need to get a rudimentary banking system up and running. Our own banks can help with this.
- (c) Need also a strategy for currency reform. But this can come later.
- (d) Start job creation schemes – eg workfare projects to demolish bombed buildings and clean up after the war. Should be a joint effort between CPA, UN system, and NGOs.
- (e) Appoint someone in CPA with specific responsibility for generating short-term incentives for inward investment.
- (f) Open the airports to civil flights.

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7. Security sector reform

- (a) Restore pension rights to ex-servicemen.
- (b) Announce the start of retraining scheme for ex-servicemen.
- (c) Press ahead with plans for rebuilding the Iraqi army.
- (d) An effective weapons collection programme.
- (e) A pragmatic approach to dismantling the Baath Party and the security apparatus.
We need to destroy the **system**, not the **people**. Need to give people reasons to work with us, not against us: the prospect of work, of a basic income, the chance to find a place in the new Iraq.

Iraq Policy Unit

5 June 2003

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ROLE OF THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL'S SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE IN IRAQ

1. Vieira de Mello arrived in Baghdad on 2 June and soon after met Bremer and John Sawers. The initial meeting was encouraging with Bremer and Vieira de Mello striking up a constructive relationship. However, this is likely to be tested as Vieira de Mello gets to work in the coming weeks. We should encourage the US to take a constructive attitude towards working with him and allow him the leeway he needs to fulfil his mandate. His previous experience in East Timor will be helpful to the CPA.
2. We would see the following as key immediate priorities for Vieira de Mello:
 - a) Forming a close and productive working relationship with Bremer and the CPA involving:
 - Regular dialogue with Bremer to ensure good communication and build up mutual understanding and trust.
 - Ideally consultation with Vieira de Mello on CPA regulations as they are drafted, particularly as they touch on areas of UN involvement.
 - b) Ensuring an active role for the UN in the political process by:
 - Engaging with a wide range of people involved in the political process. Long term political stability in Iraq will depend having on political parties which are not drawn up wholly along ethnic/religious lines. Ensuring this will be a difficult task, but Vieira de Mello has valuable experience from his time in East Timor, and will also be able to draw on the UN's experience in Afghanistan.
 - Chairing and attending meetings as appropriate, including meetings of the Iraqi interim administration.
 - Advising the interim authority on establishing a politically neutral environment conducive to holding elections in free and fair conditions, and assisting in the process to transfer power from the interim administration to a representative government.
 - c) Assessing the contribution the UN can make towards rebuilding Iraq's civilian administration. We believe the UN has a prominent role to play here. They are likely to be more acceptable to many Iraqis than the Coalition are. Vieira de Mello will be able to draw on his experience from East Timor in matters such as:
 - Forming processes for establishing a functional civil service, including paying salaries.
 - Recruitment and training for the civil service. In East Timor Vieira de Mello's work in this area was instrumental in establishing interim Health and Education Authorities and border control services.
 - Assisting where possible in the implementation of our policing strategy.

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- Calling on relevant experts from both private and public sectors to help advise the various Ministries.
 - Reinstating and reforming the legal and judicial systems, including, for example, training for prison service staff in areas such as human rights awareness.
3. The Special Representative's mandate also includes coordinating the work of the UN and international agencies in humanitarian and reconstruction assistance. Vieira de Mello will play a key role at a preliminary planning meeting on reconstruction to be held by the UN on 24 June which we hope will attract wide international attendance.
4. He is additionally tasked to facilitate the reconstruction of key infrastructure, promote economic reconstruction and conditions for sustainable development, promote the return of refugees and promote the protection of human rights. These are all functions which would fall to him naturally as coordinator of UN activities in Iraq and which he is well qualified to deal with.

United Nations Department
5 June 2003

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IRAQI WMD PERSONNEL

The problem

1. UNSCOM had a list of around 6,500 Iraqis who had been involved in Iraq's prohibited weapons programmes, including former scientists and technicians and administrators; the true figure could be considerably higher. There is now an urgent need to locate, de-brief and – in many cases – help find alternative employment for Iraqi personnel involved in prohibited weapons programmes, in order to:

- Ensure that unemployed Iraqi scientists and technicians do not sell their skills and experience to other countries of concern or terrorist organisations.
- Help locate the hardware associated with the programmes (production facilities, munitions), so we can verifiably disarm Iraq of its WMD.
- Establish the links between Iraq's programmes and foreign suppliers, to guide future counter-proliferation efforts.
- Uncover credible evidence of those programmes which will demonstrate beyond doubt the validity of our pre-war assertions.

2. To date, while a few high-ranking individuals have been captured by coalition forces, there has been no contact with the great mass of personnel connected with the WMD programmes. This should be a high priority for the Iraq Survey Group (ISG). We need to find ways to get Iraqis with information of interest to come forward. This requires a combination of carrots and sticks. It also requires practical arrangements on the ground in Iraq.

Incentives to come forward

3. **(a) Immunity from prosecution.** We believe that many individuals are deterred from coming forward for fear of arrest and prosecution. We should urgently consider a public offer of immunity from prosecution for anyone volunteering hard information on prohibited programmes. Such an offer would have to be handled sensitively, so as not to alienate those who had suffered as a result of Iraq's WMD programmes (e.g. relatives of those who died at Halabja).

We believe that this should pose no difficulties in the case of the vast majority of scientists, technicians and administrators: indeed, it is unclear whether many of the scientists concerned would have committed criminal offences in Iraq.

It is possible that some of the more senior personnel may be implicated in past war crimes (e.g. the chemical attack on Halabja, or on Iranian troops during the Iran/Iraq war): most senior Iraqi WMD personnel also had military rank. Some named individuals might therefore have to be excluded from the

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terms of any offer of immunity. In such cases, we should consider a system of offering plea-bargains whereby a lesser charge may be brought in return for co-operation with the coalition. This would probably have to be addressed on a case-by-case basis. Offers of immunity from prosecution or a system of plea-bargaining would almost certainly require a CPA order. To handle such cases, we might consider whether a "special prosecutor's office" should be established in Iraq. The CPA would want to co-ordinate the establishment of any such office with its approach to broader issues of prosecution of members of the former Iraqi government and armed forces for war crimes etc.

(b) Personal security. Some may be concerned (rightly or wrongly) about continued threats from the former regime. This is not an issue confined to WMD personnel (although they may feel particularly identifiable and vulnerable). Realistically, it will not be completely resolved until Saddam Hussein and his sons are captured or proven to be dead. Meanwhile, we need to be able to reassure at least the more senior of those that come forward that, if necessary, they and their families will be protected.

(c) Financial security. Like any other Iraqis, former WMD personnel will be looking for ways to sustain themselves and their families. Their situation is worse than many others, because they can have no hope of being able to resume their former employment. We should urgently consider offering financial rewards for corroborated information. A sliding scale – with the highest payments going to those who reveal the physical location of WMD or associated delivery systems (whether complete or components), or authenticated documentary evidence of programmes – could be developed.

(d) Job security. We should also be prepared to offer co-operating former WMD personnel the opportunity of long-term secure employment in Iraq, if necessary after retraining. Since the end of the Cold War, the international community has built up considerable experience of Co-operative Threat Reduction projects, in particular in the former Soviet Union. We should look at similar projects in Iraq, such as establishing an International Science and Technology Centre (some EU member states have already expressed interest in this, raising the possibility of financial support from beyond the coalition). The task could be easier in Iraq, both because the numbers are much smaller, and because there should be greater demand for employment in rebuilding Iraq's shattered infrastructure; however, the incentives for leaving the country could also be higher.

All Iraqi WMD personnel employed by the military or the security apparatus, or who were senior members of the Ba'ath Party, will recently have been made unemployed and their pension rights revoked as a consequence of the CPA's de-Baathification policy and dissolution of Saddam's security apparatus. So a programme of incentives, quickly implemented, may be particularly attractive to these people. (Conversely, there is at present a strong perverse incentive for anyone affected by these measures not to co-operate with the Coalition.)

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Disincentives to hold back

4. **Threat of prosecution.** At the same time as offering indemnity for those volunteering information, we should consider the feasibility of making it clear that anyone concealing evidence of WMD programmes may face prosecution in the Iraqi courts. Individual scientists may have committed offences if, for example, they had been part of a conspiracy or worked with the knowledge that the weapons they were developing would be used to commit murder or to cause serious injury. It should be noted that the plausible threat of prosecution may in itself be sufficient to encourage WMD personnel to co-operate with the coalition.

We should consider the value of setting a deadline for taking up the offer of immunity – although the risks of doing so probably outweigh the benefits.

Practicalities

5. The first priority is a **public information campaign**. We must publicise the fact that the coalition actively wants to talk to former Iraqi WMD personnel – not just scientists but technicians, managers, administrators, drivers and other support staff. We need to publicise how those who want to come forward can get in touch. This requires a co-ordinated media campaign, using TV, radio, the press and internet, to ensure that we get the message across clearly to the target audience. Where possible, we should use local channels of communication.

6. We also need **facilities on the ground in Iraq** to permit reception, filtering and, if judged valuable, further exploitation of those who do volunteer. In particular, the ISG should:

- provide secure addresses for walk-ins.

We should look at establishing a secure address in other selected major population centres near to WMD facilities. Baghdad should be the top priority, given the large numbers of senior and middle-ranking personnel believed to live there.

- establish a confidential telephone line (and email address), to encourage individuals to contact the ISG anonymously with information. Such initiatives have been very successful in Northern Ireland, as well as the Balkans.

7. Finally: **information is highly perishable**. Already, looting and arson may have destroyed valuable evidence. So the Iraq Survey Group must be equipped to respond quickly to credible information on WMD programmes. Nothing succeeds like success. As the ISG achieves results, Iraqis should be more willing to come forward.

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IRAQ: SECURITY SECTOR REFORM: POLICING STRATEGY

1. The police assessment team in ORHA/CPA Baghdad has now completed an assessment of current and longer term policing needs in Iraq. Their report: The Coalition Provisional Authority - Interior Ministry's report: Iraq Police: An Assessment of the Present and Recommendations for the Future is attached at Annex 1. We have drawn on the CPA report to produce a framework strategy for the development of a new Iraqi Police Service.

First Principles

2. Before embarking on whole-scale reform of the Iraqi police, the CPA Interior Ministry (CPA-IM) must establish the framework within which reform can take place. The CPA report flags up the following pre-conditions:
 - to repeal existing police legislation and to adopt new legislation for minimum standards of conduct; training; appropriate criminal/civil liability; certification and de-certification;
 - to restructure and re-brand the police service in order to distance it from the previous regime. This would include: the eradication of the militarised rank structure; uniform change; rationalising weapons; public confidence building and a shift in philosophy to a Human Rights based approach;
 - to develop a standardised policy and procedure manual/handbook based on the concept of policing a free society which also incorporates the principles of respect for Human Rights.

Strategy Objectives

3. The immediate objective is to stabilise the security situation by creating an effective interim police force with international civilian police working alongside Iraqi police and coalition military forces.
4. The longer term objective is to establish an effective, viable and sustainable police force within a fully functioning security sector.
5. The achievement of these objectives will depend on huge commitment from the international civilian policing community to provide the existing Iraqi police and those recruited in future by the CPA, with the training, guidance and mentoring necessary to restore and maintain law and order and to establish a new police service. There will also be a requirement to assist the Iraqi police force with logistics, communications and building/rebuilding facilities and equipment stocks.
6. We see our strategy developing through three main phases:
 - **Phase One (initial stage):**

Approach:

- an armed International Police Monitoring Force (IPMF) would deploy, initially to Baghdad and Basra, to conduct joint patrols with the current Iraqi police force and

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coalition military. The aim of this would be to provide 'on the job' monitoring and mentoring assistance to the Iraqi Police;

- This IPMF would be under the command of a Police Commissioner who would also take responsibility for taking decisions, in conjunction with the CPA-IM and Senior Iraqis, on the future structure of the Iraqi Police Force;
- running concurrently with the IPMF accompanied patrols, CPA-IM would begin refurbishment of the Baghdad training facility, providing capacity for the training of 300 personnel;
- as suggested in the report's recommendations, a three-week Transition and Integration Program (TIP) should be implemented through which all Iraq Police service personnel should pass, a similar Senior management TIP would be introduced for police supervisors and management personnel;
- at the same time a recruitment program could be established to bring new recruits into the Iraq police service (possibly as part of a wider DDR strategy) they could also be processed through the TIP before receiving additional training;
- both new recruits and officers being processed through TIP should also undergo a basic vetting aimed at ascertaining their suitability for service.

Requirements:

- approximately 3000 international police would need to be deployed in Iraq in order to facilitate joint patrols, provide basic training and carry out basic vetting;
- significant logistical support would be required. Firstly, suitable facilities will need to be provided for international police both in terms of accommodation and work space. Secondly, adequate communication, transport and, where relevant translation facilities will need to be provided;
- a refurbished Iraqi Police Academy in Baghdad and possibly additional facilities in Basra and Mosul would need to be refurbished for the purposes of the TIP.

• Phase Two (interim stage)

Approach:

- this stage could commence once the majority of police have completed the TIP and reached a basic standard of proficiency. The objective would be to establish a long term capacity building and training program which addresses all aspects of policing;
- included in this would be a specific focus on train the trainer programs aimed at equipping the Iraqi Police with a domestic training capacity;
- work could also commence on the establishment of an effective civilian administration for the Iraq police;

Requirements:

- a similar number of international police would continue to operate through this transition phase. At the same time, a number of training experts would be needed to begin rolling out more sophisticated training and train the trainers programs;
- facilities at the Iraq Police training centres would need to be improved in order to facilitate the more advanced training.

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- **Phase Three (consolidation stage)**

Approach:

- much like the EUPM in Bosnia this would focus on consolidating the training and capacity building carried out by the IPMF. A smaller group of senior police officers would work alongside senior Iraqi management in a mentoring role, offering advice and guidance.

Requirements

- in terms of personnel the numbers of international police required for this mission should be much smaller.

Next steps

7. Naturally although this model is extrapolated from the CPA-IM report, these are the views of HMG, we will need to discuss and adapt it to the views and experience of coalition partners.
8. Key questions still need to be resolved. In particular the model used to restructure the police force (i.e. National, Federal and Metropolitan), the extent to which the force continues to develop along Common Law lines and the number of personnel in the force.
9. Once we have reached consensus on the way forward, a donor conference, probably held in the region, will be needed to allow partners to commit to specific requirements as set out in the model. Both the EUPM through Solana's office and other states including the Jordanians have expressed an interest in co-operation.
10. We continue to stress the need for this strategy to be part of a wider strategy for the reform of the rule of law sector more generally. It is critical that the chronology of the reform of the police, judicial and prison service is complementary.

Timeline from 1 June up to commencement of Phase One:

By 14 June: CPA / Coalition agree strategy for reforming Iraq Police Force

By 21 June: Appointment of Police Commissioner to implement strategy

By 30 June: Police Contributors conference

By 14 August: Infrastructure in place for international police monitoring/mentoring force (IPMF)

By 31 August: Arrival of international police force (IPMF) personnel

United Nations Department
3 June 2003

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