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ANNEX C: IRAQ - SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

Issue

Influencing and shaping coalition Security Sector Reform (SSR) activity in post-conflict Iraq. There is, in particular, an urgent need for ORHA to address key aspects of SSR, notably law and order and demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) of the armed forces. This paper sets out options for immediate UK engagement in the security sector and implications for the medium term.

UK Objective

Reform across the full range of security activities (armed forces, intelligence agencies, justice and law enforcement institutions) is an essential element of the overall Coalition strategy to establish a united and representative Iraqi government and to create the conditions under which the Coalition can eventually disengage.

The objective must be the transformation of Iraq's security institutions so that they play an effective, legitimate and democratically accountable role in providing external and internal security for Iraq's citizens. The approach should reflect international consensus on the key principles of SSR, and must be led by a properly representative Iraqi Authority supported technically and financially by Coalition actors. UK experience suggests that a coherent strategy will need effective burden sharing and realistically will also require the extended involvement of NGOs and other SSR actors. Immediate decisions and urgent action is needed to deal with the potential problems of unemployed and disaffected military and security service personnel.

US Approach

The US approach is embryonic, and differences of opinion in their administration are readily apparent. Nevertheless, it seems likely that the US favours a narrow approach to SSR. The recent IPU led visit to ORHA established that US planning for SSR was split across ORHA's different strands. Their approach sees SSR elements implemented through different

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'pillars' and, in common with the US policy, utilises contractors such as MPRI. Worryingly, current plans also envisage a role for the Free Iraqi Forces. This reflects current US doctrine, which tends to approach elements of the security sector separately – perhaps reflecting US inter agency tensions.

Walt Slocombe (ex DoD), and his Spanish Deputy (General Louis Feliu), are currently assembling a team (Total 86. 49 US/Coalition and 37 Contractor) to deploy to Iraq on 25 May. The team will establish the *'Office of the Senior Advisor for the Ministry of Defence Iraq, and the Iraqi National Defence Force'*. Slocombe is actively seeking Coalition partners to join his team and a number of key posts within the organisation have been identified for possible UK secondees.

Police and judicial reform (including prisons) is being planned and potentially executed by the Interior Ministry and Justice Sector / Civil Administration Pillar in ORHA.

Accordingly, we must recognise that influencing US views may prove difficult, and will undoubtedly require considerable resources and sustained effort. There is concern that:

- a. The US approach lacks strategic vision across the security sector.
This could hazard achievement of the conditions that would allow the Coalition to reduce its presence in Iraq; and currently
- b. We are poorly positioned to influence the US decision-makers.

UK Immediate Priorities

Immediate Priorities are to:

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- a. Encourage the US to adopt a broad, and hence coherent conception of SSR in Iraq. This must include immediate action to address the effective demobilisation, and reintegration of former combatants;
- b. Contribute personnel and expertise with a view to informing US decision making , establishing basic facts and information about residual Iraqi systems and capacity;
- c. Facilitate wide support for participation in SSR issues, particularly from the UN and IFIs. This will avoid fragmentation and bilateral donor leads; and
- d. Identify and advise the Iraqi institutions that will be responsible for co-ordinating an overall security architecture.

UK Options: Near Term

Ministers have already agreed to UK engagement in ORHA and a significant deployment of officials is now in hand. Contact with US officials suggests that the UK will neither be required nor able to develop an independent policy on SSR in Iraq. A pragmatic focus must therefore focus upon refinement of US plans. UK military SSR scoping studies have been fed into CENTCOM and it is recognised that we have substantial practical cross-government experience to offer. In line with our policy of engagement with ORHA we should, as a minimum:

- a. Seek to take up a senior appointment within Slocombe's organisation to ensure adequate UK oversight of the military process,
- b. Continue to maintain UK staff within ORHA's civil administration pillar; and
- c. Enhance our links with the US intelligence agencies on SSR issues.

While such an approach would maintain UK visibility of ORHA SSR activity it would not ensure delivery of effective re-training or cultural change in the Iraqi security sector. Nor would UK defence export opportunities be fully exploited.

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A more substantial commitment at an early stage may deliver these deeper effects, and would require a concerted effort to ensure coherence across ORHA. Clearly, this argues for a strong policy lead above the ORHA pillars. Accordingly, it may be prudent to deploy a small team of senior experts to support the UK Head of Delegation in ORHA on SSR issues. By sitting above and separate from staff embedded in the pillars this team would be well placed to provide objective and coherent guidance to the UK head of delegation. Additionally, subject matter experts will be needed at working level within ORHA's pillars, as well as support at the operational and tactical level. Whilst the Defence Advisory Team will continue to support UK efforts in Iraq it must be recognised that the posts envisaged in ORHA are beyond the scope of DAT and will have to be met from across government. Finally, it should be acknowledged that these initiatives would be enhanced by a willingness to engage Washington on SSR issues of substance.

Iraq Planning Unit

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