

DECLASSIFIED

ACTION OFFICER:

ZCZC

LNMC DN 9427 MAMIAN 5395

RESTRICTED

OO ATHEN BUCHA CAIRO CANBE

OO COPEN DUBLI HELSI ISLAM KULUM LISBO MADRI

OO NEDEL OSLOO OTTAW PRAGU ROMEE STOCK

OO VIENN

FM FCOLN TO ROMEE

101015Z APR

GRS 907

RESTRICTED

FM FCO

TO IMMEDIATE ROME

TELNO 33

OF 101015Z APRIL 03

AND TO IMMEDIATE ATHENS, BERNE, BUDAPEST, BUCHAREST, COPENHAGEN

AND TO IMMEDIATE DUBLIN, HELSINKI, LISBON, MADRID, OSLO, OTTAWA

AND TO IMMEDIATE PRAGUE, STOCKHOLM, VIENNA, WARSAW, KUALA LUMPUR

AND TO IMMEDIATE JAKARTA, CANBERRA, MUSCAT, BAHRAIN, DOHA

AND TO IMMEDIATE ABU DHABI, VILNIUS, LJUBLJANA, TALLIN, SOFIA

AND TO IMMEDIATE BRATISLAVA, ISLAMABAD, DHAKA, MONTEVIDEO

AND TO IMMEDIATE BUENOS AIRES, SANTIAGO, RABAT, CAIRO, THE HAGUE

AND TO IMMEDIATE RIGA, NEW DELHI

INFO IMMEDIATE AUCKLAND, EU POSTS, NATO POSTS, CABINET OFFICE

INFO IMMEDIATE MODUK, PJHQUK, UKMIS NEW YORK, UKMIS GENEVA,

INFO IMMEDIATE DAMASCUS, , SKOPJE, TIRANA, TEHRAN, KUWAIT

INFO IMMEDIATE AMMAN, RIYADH

SIC

SUBJECT: PHASE IV MILITARY CONTRIBUTIONS: LOBBYING INSTRUCTIONS

SUMMARY

1. Maintaining security and stability a key priority for Phase IV.

Military contributions from other countries sought to help support this in the UK sector. Instructions to discuss with host governments.

Detailed requirements being sent separately to DAs. Tight deadline.

DETAIL

2. Maintaining security and stability in Iraq will remain a key task for coalition forces during Phase IV, allowing for the humanitarian reconstruction of the country post-conflict, until a new Iraqi administration is able to take control. The precise scope of the UK's role in Phase IV is yet to be fully determined, but it seems likely that we will retain the current Area of Operation in the three provinces centred on Basra in Southern Iraq. Our aim is to encourage

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

other countries to contribute militarily to this effort under overall UK Sector Command.

3. The widest possible participation in both the military and civilian aspects of the post conflict effort is important in political terms to broaden the coalition and to help sustain the UK's own military commitment. For your own information, we hope that the evolving situation during this period will allow the UK military deployment to be reduced to a third of the current strength of 45,000. But please base your approaches on the need for widespread international support for consolidating security and stability and getting Iraq back on its feet, which should be a more powerful argument for potential contributors than offsetting the effects of a UK drawdown.

4. We intend to continue to provide a discrete self supporting military capability in the UK area of operation, allowing maximum flexibility to cope with whatever role we assume in Phase IV. From about September, this requirement in the UK area of operation is likely to be a 2 star divisional headquarters with three supporting brigades (these requirements may change as the situation develops). We will be able to provide the headquarters and one of the three brigades, and we would like to make up the remaining two brigades through contributions from other nations. That is the purpose of this approach to host governments. We have agreed with the US that we will make bilateral approaches to a range of countries on the requirements for our Area of Operation: the US are making similar approaches for their areas of responsibility.

5. MOD are sending to Defence Attaches specific information on the contributions we are seeking. Clearly the more substantial and self-sustaining the offer, the better. But smaller contributions and associated enablers such as logistics, medical and engineer commitments could also be very useful. Whether or not we can absorb all offers will depend on individual circumstances and the shape of the overall force. Some potential contributions could also have a role on a later time frame than September. But the immediate objective is to encourage early offers from as wide a selection of potential contributors as possible. Any overlaps can be sorted out in due course.

6. Unless you judge this would be seriously counterproductive (in which case please report why), would action addresses please now swiftly approach your host government about the possibility of a military contribution to Phase IV, drawing on the above and, in liaison with your DA, highlighting specific requirements as set out in MOD's parallel telegram to DAs. Some of you have already discussed specifics with host governments - please pursue these further. We would be grateful if in reporting responses you could advise whether early follow up by senior military figures would be useful. As some addressees are aware, CDS-designate General, Sir Michael Walker, may be able to make early visits to pursue any particularly firm or encouraging reactions. We would be grateful for responses by COP 11 April if feasible, or as soon as possible thereafter.

7. We are not/not approaching the regional neighbours, almost all of whom (Jordan, Turkey, Iran, Kuwait) have complicating historical baggage. Involving Iran, Syria and Turkey would be particularly problematic, and it would be hard to invite some without inviting others (we followed the same principle of not inviting the neighbours

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

to contribute militarily in constituting ISAF in Afghanistan).

8. For Paris, Berlin, Brussels, Auckland: no action for you either at this stage, given the approaches of your host governments during both Phase III and the preparations for Phase IV. The US are not approaching them either. If any other info addressees think they should/should be asked to take action, please check with us before doing so.

9. For Washington: please brief the US.

Contact: Pol-Mil Section, Emergency Unit

STRAW

MAMIAN 5395

NNNN

DECLASSIFIED