

20 March 2003

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Foreign &  
Commonwealth  
Office

London SW1A 2AH

20030320-FOU-N020-Phase 4-Core Script

Dear Matthew

Iraq: Phase IV: Core Script

... I enclose a Core Script for Iraq Phase IV, the post-conflict situation, as commissioned at this morning's COBR(R). Ministers and officials may wish to draw on this when discussing Phase IV, in which Parliamentary and media interest is likely to grow rapidly in the coming days. Until now we have been reluctant to discuss openly how we see Phase IV unfolding. As military action begins, we shall wish to ensure that our ideas for Phase IV – the means by which we shall deliver our “Vision for Iraq and the Iraqi People” – are given greater prominence. We are circulating a version of this paper to overseas posts for them to draw on in briefing key contacts.

I am copying this letter to (Chancellor of the  
Exchequer), Jonathan Sedgwick (Home Office), Peter Watkins (MOD), Anna  
Bewes (DFID), (Cabinet Office), PS/“C”,  
(GCHQ) and PS/DG (Security Service).

(Kara Owen)  
Private Secretary

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## IRAQ: CORE SCRIPT – PHASE IV (POST-CONFLICT)

This paper sets out the Government's thinking on the likely evolution of events following military action - known as Phase 4. There is increasing Parliamentary and media interest in this. Until now we have been reluctant to discuss openly how we see Phase IV unfolding. As military action begins, we shall wish to ensure that our ideas for Phase IV – the means by which we shall deliver our "Vision for Iraq and the Iraqi People" – are given greater prominence.

This is subject to the caveat that this paper represents the current state of our thinking but not necessarily agreed coalition policy in all respects, that it will evolve in the course of any military action and that Phase 3 (decisive combat operations) and Phase 4 ("day after") may overlap. As Coalition forces advance into Iraq, and begin to assume control of parts of the country, Phase 4 (the "Day After" phase) will begin to take effect in those areas that have been liberated. At this stage it is impossible to predict for how long this overlap will last, or to how much of Iraq it will apply.

Our aim is to disarm Saddam of his weapons of mass destruction. If military action is necessary to do so and it results in the collapse of Saddam's regime, our goal will be to transform Iraq along the lines set out in the UK's "Vision for Iraq and the Iraqi People", launched at the Azores Summit (available at [www.number10.gov.uk/output/page3280.asp](http://www.number10.gov.uk/output/page3280.asp).)

During and immediately following military action, a high priority will be to mobilise the international community to provide emergency humanitarian relief. DIFD have already committed £20m to immediate preparations, with a further initial £60m earmarked for humanitarian operations. And UK forces will have £30m for humanitarian purposes in the first month, with £10m for quick impact projects.

An early priority will be to obtain a UN Security Council Resolution enabling Oil for Food to continue in the absence of a functioning Iraqi government. We envisage a temporary transfer of authority to the UN Secretary General allowing him to reprioritise existing contracts and enter into new contracts for food and essential humanitarian supplies. The purpose of this would be to continue to use the resources and existing supply networks of OFF, where possible, in support of the immediate humanitarian needs of the people of Iraq.

We are also discussing with the US the details of a further UN Security Council Resolution providing overall UN authorisation for transitional arrangements in Phase 4. Such authorisation is necessary to provide the framework in which the IFIs, we and other international bodies can participate in Iraq's

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reconstruction. This might include establishing a UN Assistance Mission for Iraq headed by a UN Special Co-ordinator to bring together the various strands of international and bilateral assistance. We also hope that the UN would, in the same resolution, endorse arrangements for the post conflict administration of Iraq that would involve a rapid but phased transfer of authority from the Coalition to the Iraqis.

Having an authorising UN Security Council Resolution would enable us to build a wide coalition of international support for the reconstruction of Iraq, including drawing on the resources and expertise of the EU, IFIs and UN agencies in managing transition. It would also enable us to broaden the pool of countries contributing forces to the coalition, which will remain essential to provide security in what may still be an uncertain environment.

This resolution is likely to be more contentious than the OFF resolution. Much will depend on the assurances we are able to give about transferring authority to the Iraqis/the UN. Nevertheless, we believe that provided the UN is given a significant role, there will be support at the Security Council for this approach. We are in close contact with Washington and others over tactics.

Events on the ground in Phase 4 are likely to divide into three stages. In the first stage, immediately after the conflict, the coalition military will be responsible for the administration of Iraq. Their first task will be to stabilise the country and, working with the UN inspectors, to find and secure Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. The military's powers to administer Iraq will be limited to our rights as an occupying power under international humanitarian law. We shall also have obligations under international humanitarian law, including the Geneva Conventions, towards the Iraqi people.

The expectation is that UK forces would be responsible for an area focused on Basrah and key military objectives in the south east of Iraq, which could include around 20% of the Iraqi population. This area is proportionate to the size of the UK's contribution to overall Coalition land forces. The US military from within Iraq will exercise overall command. Once the initial period has passed and a major part of Iraq is stabilised, we would expect the numbers of forces to reduce, provided the security environment remained stable and permissive. We would also hope to attract new coalition partners to help with providing security.

When conditions in Iraq permit, the US Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs (ORHA) will move to Baghdad and take on the supervision of the civil administration of Iraq. When this happens they will call themselves the Interim Transitional Civil Authority (ITCA). We hope that the vast majority of the Iraqi public sector will remain in place and be able to carry on its work, albeit under ITCA's overall direction.

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For ordinary Iraqis, the urgent need in the first weeks is likely to be securing their basic humanitarian requirements such as clean water, sanitation, food, shelter and medicines. We expect the bulk of this work to fall to UN agencies and NGOs: the coalition's task will be to provide the secure environment within which relief can be delivered and to facilitate, though not control, the organisations delivering the aid.

After some weeks, the UN should appoint a Special Co-ordinator for Iraq and set out a mandate for the international community's presence in the country. We hope that the final arrangements will authorise the UN Special Co-ordinator, together with the Coalition, to facilitate the establishment of an Iraqi Interim Authority (IIA), an executive body that will operate under his light supervision. In the second stage, responsibility for running the Iraqi ministries will then pass, as soon as conditions permit, from the Coalition/ITCA to the IIA. No doubt, this will start with the transfer of less sensitive areas of public administration first.

As well as taking over the executive duties of government, the Iraqi Interim Authority would establish a constituent assembly that would work up ideas for a new constitution, along the lines of the Bonn Conference on Afghanistan. Those ideas would be put to a referendum and ideally would then lead to the third stage, the election of a broad-based, representative government.

Meanwhile, the international community will be involved in the overall effort to reform and reconstruct Iraq. Providing the conditions for success exist – a legal basis for action from the UNSC and a secure environment in which to act – we would expect all the traditional nation-builders to take part. The aim will be to introduce widespread economic and political reforms, as well as improvements in the functioning of the public administration.

The handling of the oil sector will be under the international microscope. The first tasks will be to repair and renovate existing oil fields. That could be a huge job if Saddam Hussein has sabotaged the oil wells. Even if he has not, Iraq's oil fields will require considerable investment to bring them up to international standards. Any far-reaching decisions about the oil sector, such as privatisation or the exploitation of new fields, will almost certainly be left for a new Iraqi government to deal with.

The emergence of a representative Iraqi government, committed to the long term political and economic reform of the country and to peaceful relations with the region, would allow the international community to withdraw much of its presence in Iraq. But the international community would remain engaged in Iraq's future through the IFIs, regional agreements, bilateral and multilateral aid programmes, and other political and practical support.

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An important objective for HMG is to ensure a level playing field for UK companies to compete for commercial opportunities that arise in the reconstruction of Iraq.

Iraq Planning Unit  
19 March 2003

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