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**SECURITY SECTOR REFORM: FUTURE IRAQI ARMED FORCES**

I attach an MOD paper which discusses SSR issues in post conflict Iraq and is designed to inform UK policy making and assist in advancing US thinking on these topics.

What the paper seeks to do is:

- establish generally applicable principles of SSR from experience to date;
- set it within an analytical context potentially familiar to the US to assist future discussions;
- identify the wide-ranging nature of SSR programmes that would be involved (many of which would not require a MODUK involvement); and
- make some broad assessments of possible areas of UK military involvement and total resources required to which HMG might make a contribution.

Inevitably, with the uncertainties that attach to this subject, the paper has necessarily to be broad brush. It cannot be definitive and its conclusions concerning costs – whilst based on existing examples of SSR interventions - should be treated with caution.

No two SSR programmes are alike and emphasis and content depends on the particular circumstances and context of each case.

The paper is still under consideration by MOD specialists, and at this stage is circulated internal to IPU for information only.

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## Security Sector Reform (SSR): Future Iraqi Armed Forces

### Executive Summary:

- SSR is a long term governance and development issue.
- It cannot be imposed but requires consent, involvement and ownership by the recipient state.
- Defence is but one part of the security sector; all must be addressed in a consistent and coherent fashion to achieve success as part of an agreed overarching strategy;
- A task on this scale ideally requires international burden sharing across state and NGO actors.
- Utilising the 'Post Conflict Reconstruction Taskforce Framework', which will be recognised by possible US interlocutors, possible areas of MODUK engagement in SSR tasks are: DDR; De-mining; FIAF/MOD reconstruction and reorientation. Coalition actions in the immediate aftermath of the conflict could help to facilitate certain downstream SSR activities.
- Total broad order costs for just those defence/military elements of a wide-ranging SSR programme, to which UK could make a contribution in cash or kind, are estimated at:

Activity	Cost (£M)
<b>DDR</b>	<b>400</b>
<b>De-mining</b>	<b>500</b>
<b>FIAF/MOD Reconstruction/Reorientation.</b>	<b>50</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>950</b>

These are large sums by any standard and the ultimate UK element, which would have to be subject to political decision, would be comparably significant.

- Potential costs are ultimately determined by the particular circumstances of each engagement and many imponderables attach to Iraq so estimates have only been possible in the broadest terms and should be treated with caution; early and detailed analysis on the ground will be necessary to accurately scope requirements and costs.
- A timescale of 6 years is the minimum necessary to achieve results and a self-sustaining indigenously owned programme of work, permitting significant disengagement.
- The realities of alliance politics, as experienced in Afghanistan, is that the UK can seek to influence, but at the end it has to accommodate to the plans of the senior coalition partner/international lead body and their intentions for SSR.

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## SECURITY SECTOR REFORM (SSR): FUTURE IRAQI ARMED FORCES

- References:   A.     LM from DOMAAD(ME) dated 26 Feb 03.  
                   B.     D/DFD/4/4 Future Iraqi Armed Forces dated 20 Feb 03.

### PURPOSE

1.     To provide a broad outline of likely coalition military engagement in the reform of the Iraqi armed Forces to inform UK policy making decisions and assist in advancing US thinking on SSR.

### BACKGROUND

2.     **What is SSR?**           SSR is, at heart a governance and development issue. Whilst there is no universally recognised definition of SSR, one that embraces the fundamental concepts of the approach would be:

‘to transform security institutions so that they play an effective, legitimate and democratically accountable role in providing external and internal security for their citizens. Transformation of the security sector requires broad consultation and includes goals such as strengthening civilian control and oversight of the security sector, professionalisation of the security forces, demilitarisation and peacebuilding and strengthening the rule of law.’<sup>1</sup>

To achieve this objective it is necessary to adopt a holistic approach. SSR has to dovetail with governance reform (new democratic institutions), public sector reform and will involve NGOs and Civil Society.

3.     **Definition of the Security Sector:**   This includes:
  - **Core security actors:** Armed Forces; Police; Paramilitary forces; Gendarmeries, intelligence and security services (military and civilian); Coast and border guards; Customs authorities; reserve or local security units (civil defence, militias etc.);
  - **Security Management and Oversight bodies:** The executive; national security advisory bodies; legislature and legislative select committees; ministries of defence; internal affairs; foreign affairs; financial management bodies (finance ministries, budget offices; audit and planning units); and civil society organisations eg. public complaint commissions;
  - **Justice and law enforcement institutions:** judiciary; justice ministries; prisons; criminal investigation and prosecution services; human rights commissions and ombudsmen; customary and traditional justice systems.

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<sup>1</sup> ‘Towards a better practice framework in SSR’ Occasional Paper No.1 August 2002: Clingendael - International Alert-Saferworld

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The breadth of the security sector dictates the need for coherence and consistency between donor nations, internally within donor governments eg, in the UK's case, between MOD, DFID and FCO and within the governments of recipient states.

4. **Some early SSR 'lessons learned':** Although a relatively new concept, there are nevertheless some emergent early lessons learned in implementing SSR strategies:

- SSR is a process, not an end point;
- it is long term, often requiring the transformation of state structures, operating procedures, legal provisions and cultural traditions, but also the need to change outlooks and mindsets;
- there is no one-size fits all template for SSR;
- shared local ownership of the process is essential to success;
- one of the key measures of success is the new-found trust that the people feel in their transformed security;
- local capacity has to be built so that reforms can be sustained and exit strategies successfully carried out.
- strategies have to reflect what is locally achievable; and
- SSR is usually more costly than originally anticipated given the complexity of the task, especially in post conflict settings.

Ignoring any of these aspects will result in a flawed process and failure to achieve the stated objectives.

5. **Why is SSR significant for post-conflict Iraq?** The risks of the Coalition losing the peace in Iraq are probably higher than the risk of their losing the war. One of the principal threats to successful post-conflict reconstruction of Iraq, and the achievement of the coalition end state (a peaceful, stable, democratic Iraq that is not a threat to its neighbours), is a systemic failure of the indigenous security sector of government. Of the many adverse developments that might separately or, more likely, in combination lead to systemic failure, the main risks are:

- inadequate or inappropriate top level command and control with parliamentary oversight;
- internal conflict as a result of Kurdish irredentism and or score settling between Shi'a and Sunni;
- inadequacy of local law and order leading to widespread general violence and lawlessness;
- violence stemming from political rivalry at local or national level between immature parties; and
- insurgency directed against Coalition forces and their nationals.

Continuing instability through the failure of the state security apparatus to effectively deal with such challenges undermines the potential for sustainable development.

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SSR FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS

6. **"Post-Conflict Reconstruction Task Framework"** : Bearing in mind the remit to assist in advancing US thinking on SSR at Reference A we have, in considering the phasing and scope of SSR interventions, based our analysis on a template designed for the "Post-Conflict Reconstruction Task Framework" project. This work was carried out by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) as a follow up to the 'Commission on Post Conflict Reconstruction'. The Commission included key members of the US Congress and its main objective was to enhance US capacities and maximize the effectiveness of American engagement in post-conflict reconstruction. In its outcomes, the model approximates closely to UK thinking on SSR constituents elements and the holistic nature of the approach required.

7. The advantages of using this template are:

- whilst not Administration policy, its key features have already featured in post-Iraq conflict analyses produced by the US Army War College;
- the framework provides a comprehensive generic guide to all reconstruction activities including SSR;
- the framework is not prescriptive because it recognises the need to ensure that solutions are individual to countries and specific circumstances;
- the framework is designed to provide a starting point for considering what *needs* to be done. The 'how?' and 'who?' elements of the framework for post-conflict Iraq can be populated with suggested lead UK organisations and potential UK 'value-added' contributions.

8. The US framework places the main tasks of reconstruction within a timeline that runs from *violent conflict* and the return to *normalization*. This intervening timeline is divided into three phases defined as: *initial response; transformation; and fostering sustainability*. Within this timeline the reconstruction activities are grouped into four pillars of:

- i. *security;*
- ii. *justice/reconciliation;*
- iii. *social/economic well-being ; and*
- iv. *governance/participation.*

9. **Potential SSR Interventions:** The four pillars embrace the key elements of SSR activities and milestones. These have been abstracted to produce the table at Annex A, which shows suggested 'lead' organisations and specific indications of what elements the UK MOD may undertake or fund. It must be stressed that any UK involvement would have to be as part of an overarching SSR Strategy agreed between participating donor/coalition countries and the Iraqi authorities and form part of the reconstruction

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effort spanning political/constitutional, social and economic reform. Within the UK DFID is the lead department for SSR policy.

10. The potential areas of MOD involvement can be brigaded into 3 areas of activity:
- Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR);
  - De-mining
  - Reconstruction of FIAF and MOD (ethos, structures and processes);

11. **DDR:** DDR is a long term process integrating security, social, legal and economic aspects of government. It involves the ability to generate and sustain the process of demilitarization and a return to productive civilian life - a massive challenge in a country that has been going in the opposite direction for 30 years. The DDR process cannot be resolved between commanders and officials in cease-fire negotiations. It takes commitment by governments across the board. DDR will also probably form a large part of any regional peace settlement and is likely therefore to be the subject of long drawn out international agreements. However, what happens in the immediate aftermath of operations will make a big difference as to how difficult, long drawn out and costly the long term settlement of DDR will be. We have therefore looked at actions taken in Iraq in the first few weeks and months after a cease-fire which could make a significant difference to the post-conflict rehabilitation of Iraq. These are set out in Annex B.

12. To give some idea of the scope of the task in prospect, and taking the DFD force structure at Reference B as an end point, the following table gives a very broad brush analysis of the numbers involved in any DDR process:

Unit	Start state S Day	S + 6 months	S + 12 months	S + 36 months	Notes
Regular Army (RA)	340,000	250,000	150,000	75,000	Say fifteen bdes with selective conscription. Includes part of former AD Force
RG and SRG	30,000	15,000	7,500	2,000	Incorporated back into RA ORBAT and de-politicised.
Militias	100,000	75,000	50,000	20,000	Remains at high strength because it serves as a transition for former regular servicemen. Numbers do not include Kurdish <i>peshmerga</i>
Air Force	30,000	15,000	10,000	7,500	Includes part of former AD Force
Maritime	1000	1000	2000	3000	Small coastal and MCM force
Total	501,000	356,000	219,500	107,500	

13. Intelligence and Security Agencies and Police. Iraq would retain a legitimate entitlement to internal and external intelligence services, run along internationally acceptable lines, but they would be much smaller than the 100,000 currently engaged in activities which permeate every area of Iraqi life. Elements of the Intelligence and Security agencies would therefore also have to be reabsorbed into civil life in addition to the numbers identified above. Some mitigation of the requirement may result from a

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need to build up civil policing levels, currently estimated at around 30-40,000. It is understood that many technical tasks, eg. forensics, are now performed in intelligence/security agencies and some transfer of resource and staff would be needed to create a policing establishment capable of more than the current rudimentary traffic functions.

14. DDR Costs. Looking at potential costs of any such programme, a broad extrapolation based on experience elsewhere<sup>2</sup> (Sierra Leone, Great Lakes Region, Afghanistan), and allowing for the existing level of development in Iraq, total programme costs of between **£300-400M** do not seem unreasonable.

15. De-mining : Mine clearance and making safe UXO are not strictly part of an SSR process but are sometimes associated with DDR, as a failure to deal effectively with this issue curtails the community's ability to perform economically and thereby absorb those previously employed in various elements of the security sector. In the confused conditions immediately after a conflict, such work is pressing and can assume a political significance far greater than the operational need. Clearance of mines and UXO should, where possible remain an Iraqi responsibility. A Mine Action and Clearance Authority has often been set up in other theatres of operations by the UN. In Iraq, if the machinery of government is at all capable, it should be under local control. Support should concentrate on clearance rather than education. Technical support, particularly for Coalition delivered UXO, will be needed.

16. De-mining Costs: Based on costs of de-mining in Kuwait and Afghanistan obtained from open sources a total figure in the region of **£500M** would appear to be appropriate.

17. Reconstruction of FIAF & MOD: Good governance aspects of the defence sector, both within the military and the civil institutions for its control, requires review under SSR. Iraq, even in defeat, should retain the structures necessary to regenerate necessary administrative capabilities. That said, no Ministry of Defence exists that we would recognise in terms of the standard roles and functions of such an organisation eg. defence policy formulation is performed within Ba'ath party structures.. A process of de-Ba'athification would inevitably remove those experienced in higher defence issues. It would take time to build institutional capacity within a reconstituted MOD. Although some technical training requirements might be required – especially for civilian staffs within the MOD with new responsibilities – a more significant consideration for all elements of the security community is likely to be the need for 're-education' and 're-orientation' to respect for the rule of law, international norms and human rights, together with recognition of the oversight rights of civil authorities and civil society organisations. The initial actions of coalition forces in the aftermath of conflict can contribute to this process in terms of the implicit ethical messages that they impart through their own behaviour. We would also suggest that it would be desirable to involve international NGOs in the re-education process for security sector personnel on such themes as humanitarian and international law and human rights. Delivery in this form helps to

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<sup>2</sup> DAT has figures available if needed

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emphasise that these are internationally recognised norms and not the imposition of terms by the victors.

18. Costs of Institutional Reform. Given the timescales required for such reforms it is likely that a dedicated resident international civilian/military team, with continuing support from home departments (such as that which can be provided by the DAT) would be required. Total costs in the order of **£50M**, over three years of which the UK might bear a share, are possible. This estimate includes training courses on specialist subjects in country, such as those on defence management provided under the Defence Diplomacy Mission.

### Timescales

19. It is impossible to be definitive when addressing timescales for implementation of SSR interventions in post-conflict Iraq given the many imponderables involved. Nevertheless Iraq, which in organisational terms is not a failed state, should retain the 'institutional knowledge' necessary to rebuild the required security capabilities in an acceptable manner over the medium term. With this in mind, using the three phase approach described earlier, the following approximate timelines might be achievable:

Phase 1 Initial Response	Phase 2 Transformation	Phase 3 Fostering Sustainability	Transition to local rule
6 months	1 year	2 years	1-2 years

Accepting that plans inevitably change, greater complexities are usually encountered on implementation and that some transitional support on the way to normalisation will continue to be needed in addition to the phases previously identified, it would be prudent to plan on a minimum timescale of engagement of not less than 6 years. SSR activities would build gradually in phase 1, move into high tempo in phases 2 and 3, and then scale back in the normalisation period as the process moves increasingly towards self-sustainment. Continuing periodic engagement thereafter would also be required to prevent retrenchment, recognising the 'generational' change process quoted for SSR and the particular challenges implicit in changing ethos and attitudes through re-education in the aftermath of an all pervasive, neo-Stalinist, totalitarian regime.



## Risks

20. An initial high-level risk assessment for the success of an overarching SSR strategy, including the defence aspects identified in this paper, is:

- **International Risks**

- Lack of UN Mandate for post-conflict reconstruction activities placing legitimacy of SSR Strategy at risk.
- Lack of coherence between primary coalition partners over SSR Policy.
- Regional instability and hostility to new Iraq national security stance.
- Lack of sufficient funding and long-term commitment by international donors to SSR and other reconstruction activities.

- **UK Risks**

- Forces/MOD over-stretch in meeting long term SSR and other reconstruction commitments.
- Lack of coherence between UK Ministries and other key players in SSR delivery (DFID and NGO's).
- UK SSR efforts not co-ordinated with other international partners (UN/US/EU etc.)

- **Indigenous Risks**

- absence of ownership and long term commitment to SSR Strategy amongst Iraq transitional authority.
- Non-compliance by elements of ex-combatants in SSR/DDR process.
- Lack of clarity and agreement between stakeholders (military and political) over 'right-size' for post conflict Armed Forces

## Conclusions

21. SSR is a complex, long-term and expensive commitment requiring considerable financial and human resources. The magnitude of the challenge in Iraq is such as to require an international response and burden sharing, with a mix of state and NGO partners. Whilst the UK may try and influence the shape and content of such an SSR strategy, the reality is that it will have to accommodate to the plans of the senior coalition partner/lead international body and their intentions for this area of activity.

22. In attempting to influence US thinking on SSR, the CIS/AUSA 'Post Conflict Reconstruction Framework' at Annex A provides a useful basis for analysis. Utilising this model and extracting relevant SSR activities, produces a framework in which possible UK involvement can be analysed. Looking at the purely defence/military

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elements produces the following tasks and total broad order costs would be:

Activity	Cost (£M)
<b>DDR</b>	<b>400</b>
<b>De-mining</b>	<b>500</b>
<b>FIAF/MOD Reconstruction/Reorientation.</b>	<b>50</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>950</b>

These figures do not represent the UK contribution to such activities but the totality of resource required in just the defence sector. Such activities would also be performed in conjunction with other, non-defence, areas of the security sector which would be separately resourced but again entail significant costs for donors. Final UK contributions would be a matter for political decision across all sectors. Timescales for implementation are unlikely to be less than 6 years and will require continuing lower level engagements thereafter.

23. The timescales and costings set out in this paper are inevitably speculative in nature and need to be treated with caution. All will require early and comprehensive re-evaluation once conditions on the ground permit analysis in country, which should take place alongside Coalition and Iraqi centers of decision making.

**Defence Advisory Team**

**March 2003**

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**POTENTIAL SSR ACTIVITIES: POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION TASK  
FRAMEWORK**

(Individual activities need to be set in an overarching SSR strategy and managed within a framework agreed at an early stage by contributing partners)

SSR ACTIVITY	INITIAL RESPONSE	TRANSFORMATION	FOSTERING SUSTAINABILITY	POTENTIAL UK LEAD/PARTICIPATION
<b>Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR)</b>  <b>UK Lead Departments</b> <b>ID</b> <b>DD</b>	Disarm belligerents  Reduce availability of weapons  Establish demobilisation centres.  Design Reintegration Strategy based on absorption capacity of economic and social sectors.	Establish and Enforce weapons control regimes.  Monitor and verify demobilisation.  Safe store/destruction of weapons.  Provide job training health screening and employment assistance.	Develop indigenous arms control capacity.  Decommission Demobilisation Centres  Full reintegration into society.  Follow-up monitoring.	1. UK to provide expertise to draw-up DDR Strategy and co-ordinate coalition efforts on DDR.  2. HMG to provide a significant element of reintegration funding and seek co/ordinate donor funding for DDR.  3. Fit DDR strategy into any handover to UN.
<b>Clearance of Unexploded Ordnance (De-mining)</b>  <b>UK Lead Departments</b> <b>MOD</b> <b>DFID</b> <b>NGO's</b>	Conduct emergency de-mining and UXO removal.  Survey, Map and Mark mine fields.	Initiate large-scale de-mining programme.  Promote mine-awareness and safe practices.  Train and equip indigenous de-mining elements.	Transfer de-mining and UXO removal operations to Iraq Govt.	1. UK to provide Army contingent for initial emergency mapping/de-mining in key transportation/residential areas.  2. UK to provide co-ordination expertise for international/ NGO de-mining action plan.
<b>Reconstruction of National Armed Forces.</b>  <b>UK Lead Department</b> <b>MOD</b>	Identify roles; missions and structure of future military forces.	Promote Civil Control of Military.  Professionalise armed forces.  Rule of Law and Human Rights central to service doctrines.  Establish transparent entry; promotion and retirement systems for armed forces.	Establish Ministry of Defence with capacity to deliver Defence Policy and play role in development of National Security Policy.  Foster commitment to international norms and standards.  Military assistance programmes.  Assist in design of appropriate Officer Selection and Training.	1. UK has already provided Force Development assessment for Future Iraq Armed Forces.  2. UK could take lead role in developing capacity within Iraq Ministry of Defence.  3. UK Forces to assist training and re-education process – drawing on experience in assisting with restructuring in Sierra Leone and South Africa.  4. Revisit Force Strength calculations in light of emerging Iraq security policy  5. Provide training on Civil Control and Civil/Military relations.

SSR ACTIVITY	INITIAL RESPONSE	TRANSFORMATION	FOSTERING SUSTAINABILITY	POTENTIAL UK LEAD/PARTICIPATION
<b>Non-Military Security Forces and Intelligence Services</b>  <b>UK Lead Departments</b> <b>DFID/FCO</b>	Review scope and role of existing organisations.  Vet existing command structure and staff - appropriate action against those guilty of Human Rights abuse.	Establish constitutional and legal framework for existence and operational parameters.  Provide training to ensure compliance with acceptable norms and international standards.  Ensure appropriate command and control structures.	Develop democratic oversight capacity both within Government and through Civil Society and NGO's.  Ensure that outputs are co-ordinated and provide effective support to legitimate government security requirements e.g. establish National Security Council (NSC) or equivalent.	1. UK could take lead in establishing constitutional review of security and intelligence operations.  2. Provide support programme for NSC through Global Conflict Prevention Pool.
<b>Police and Law Enforcement.</b>  <b>UK Lead Departments</b>  <b>DFID</b> <b>FCO (IPU)</b>	Vet and reconfigure existing police force if appropriate.  Establish Police Academies.  Train; educate and equip to international policing standards.  Deploy Monitors	Develop investigative capability.  Secure funding to maintain police training.  Establish transparent entry; pay; promotion and retirement systems.	Provide continuing technical support and training.  Encourage relationships with relevant international law enforcement associations.	1. DFID SSAJ Dept to identify training assistance packages.  2. Offer funded places on Police Senior Command Training Courses in UK.  3. IPU to identify suitable UK monitors
<b>Border Control</b> <b>UK Lead Departments</b> <b>Home Office</b> <b>Customs &amp; Excise</b>	Establish international border monitoring mechanism. Prevent arms smuggling.	Develop indigenous capacity to control border/boundary.  Develop capacity to interdict contraband; arms smuggling and management of immigration/emigration.	Transfer border/boundary control functions to indigenous actors.	1. UK(Customs and Excise) to provide training and capacity building on interdiction skills.
<b>Judicial System</b>  <b>UK Lead Departments</b>  <b>DFID</b> <b>Home Office</b> <b>Lord Chancellor Dept</b>	Review existing court system. Establish list of legal professionals suitable for judicial appointment.  Review codes of conduct.  Review Penal System and Prison Service.	Prepare new legislation in consistent with constitution & protection of basic human rights.  Ensure judicial independence: Vet and train judges.  Establish law schools for education of next generation of legal professionals. Construct/refurbish court buildings/infrastructure.  Educate indigenous population on accessing judicial system.	Provide specialist and long term training and professional ethos to ensure viability and judicial independence.  Oversight and monitoring methods including NGO'  Provision of training for Prison Service staff and checks on minimum standards for prison conditions.	1. UK could take lead on conducting a review to establish judicial programme requirements.  2. Programme to be delivered in partnership with lead donor nation/UN.

## ACTIONS TAKEN IN THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH OF COALITION CAMPAIGN CONDUCTIVE TO SUBSEQUENT DDR REQUIREMENTS

1. In the few days after a cease-fire the Coalition forces will be engaged with recovery and reorganisation. Confusion and uncertainty is likely among Iraq's forces. Destruction and loss of essential records, the break-up of the chain of command and disintegration of units could be widespread. Such events would make eventual DDR very difficult unless Coalition commanders take measures to:

- preserve the command structure at unit level;
- keep Iraqi units, as far as possible, cohesive;
- allow at least transport (B vehicles) and possibly small arms to be retained; and
- prevent the destruction of personnel and equipment records;

2. To facilitate DDR, and in keeping with any general intention to regard Iraq as a 'liberated' as opposed to a 'defeated' state, some generally complimentary treatment within the military adapted and updated from the classic "honours of war" concept might be appropriate and well received by honour-conscious Iraqi middle ranking commanders. This would require the differentiation of units and formations of the Iraqi regular armed forces as follows:

- Units engaged and defeated in combat, now Prisoners of War;
- Units not directly engaged who can be offered 'honours of war'; and
- Units not directly engaged but who must be placed under Coalition control because of links to the regime.

Units of the SRG and RG should be quarantined. Militia units, if they do not melt away of their own accord, could be dispersed once disarmed, although the militia command structure, such as it is, should be preserved for use as a holding organisation for demobilised troops returning to their local areas.

3. Disarming Iraqi units should be carried out transparently and with no triumphalism. For example, it may be possible to take equipments out of use by denying combat supplies but allow Iraqi soldiers to maintain and husband it in Coalition controlled Equipment Collection Points.

4. No action should be taken which countenanced or encouraged desertion from the Iraqi forces which would feed the possible build up of banditry, guerrilla movement and possibly mujaheddin type units that could cause a security problem for Coalition and other international forces.

5. Pending the establishment of a full, internationally supported DDR process to provide funding to support salary payments etc. it will be necessary to provide food, shelter, medical support and transport to Iraqi forces. Stability in post-conflict Iraq, and

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the development of acceptable forms of government in Baghdad, depends crucially on the Armed forces being benign. Hungry, impoverished, disaffected and demoralised soldiers would be a significant threat to the Coalition's political aims.

6. Apart from the highest level of Saddam Hussein's regime, or flagrant breaches of international humanitarian law during the conflict, Coalition forces would be best advised not to undertake investigations of a political nature in line units of the Iraqi armed forces falling under their control. In the longer-term, de-politicisation is a matter for the Iraqis themselves.

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