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To: NYMIX - eTelegrams  
From: COMCEN Gateway 1b  
Subject: I:RR:CONF:PERSONAL FOR HEADS OF MISSION: IRAQ: THE  
ENDGAME:FCOLN/RIYAD 33:Id=0033614  
Sent: 12 March 2003 20:34:46 GMT

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LNNFCN 1927 MAMIAN 4115

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OO GEMIS HELSI HOSEE ISLAM KULUM LISBO MADRI NAIRO NEDEL OSLOO

OO OTTAW PARIS PRAGU ROMEE SANAA STOCK VIENN VIMIS

RR BEIJI NYMIS VIDEL WASHI

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TO IMMEDIATE RIYADH

TELNO 33

OF 121944Z MARCH 03

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PERSONAL FOR HEADS OF MISSION FROM DIRECTOR MENA

SUBJECT: PERSONAL FOR HEADS OF MISSION: IRAQ: THE ENDGAME

SUMMARY

1. Snapshot of a fast moving scene.

DETAIL

2. You have been receiving, I hope, plenty of guidance in the form of ministerial statements and reports from UKMIS New York on the negotiations for a second SCR. You might like a bit more of the flavour as we enter the endgame. Events are moving pretty fast, so do not be surprised if this is a little out of date by the time you read it.

Second SCR

3. All efforts from the Prime Minister downwards are focused on securing at least 9 positive votes for a second SCR. To help the middle ground of the Council, we have amended our original draft to include an ultimatum (currently 17 March, with a possibility of further softening) and are discussing some tests designed to show whether Iraq is prepared to make a strategic decision to comply fully with the Security Council's demands. These tests are a public statement by Saddam Hussein admitting past concealment of WMD programmes and committing to immediate and full co-operation;

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interviews of scientists outside Iraq; action on anthrax; completion of destruction of missiles, accounting for unmanned aerial vehicles and surrender of mobile CW/BW facilities. A final version was circulated in New York today, as a separate document (not part of the SCR).

4. The hope is that these objective tests, plus a short extension of the 17 March deadline, might deliver positive votes from Mexico and Chile. With their support, plus positive votes from Bulgaria (certain), the three Africans (reasonably secure) Pakistan (not so certain) we would have the 9 positive votes required. If it would help, Jeremy Greenstock has discretion to drop the Operative Paragraph of our current (7 March) draft setting an ultimatum, since this has been seen by some middle-ground countries as complicating their decision.

5. The threat of vetoes by France, Russia and perhaps even China is real. It remains to be seen whether they will take this step if they are convinced that 9 positive votes are in the bag. But Chirac has virtually committed himself to a veto in any circumstances, and the Russian line is firmly against any automatic recourse to force. The final denouement in New York will be before the end of this week - we will ensure the telegrams are copied widely.

6. Decisions on UK participation in any military action will depend on the outcome in New York and a debate and vote in the House of Commons, likely to be on 17 March.

7. This is all for your background: in any private conversation, even with trusted interlocutors, you should not speculate but rest for the moment on the fact that we are working flat out for a second Resolution which reunites the Council and puts the pressure back where it belongs, on Iraq. Any influence which other governments can bring to bear on the waverers would of course be welcome.

## Scenarios for Military Action

8. Success or failure with a second SCR will affect the timetable for military action. If a Resolution passes, and assuming the Iraqi regime fails the tests set for it (there is absolutely no sign of Saddam Hussein preparing a U-turn), we can assume military action would follow quickly after the expiry of the ultimatum.

9. If a Resolution fails to pass, the timetable is much more uncertain. The Americans will not want to delay long. But they will be conscious of the need for UNMOVIC /IAEA personnel to get out of Iraq (if Saddam Hussein does not play the hostage game) and for the evacuation of more US/UK nationals from countries in the region. As those concerned will know, the Foreign Secretary has decided we should not get ahead of US travel advice. This will squeeze the time available for UK citizens who want to get out.

10. We will of course aim to keep Posts directly concerned fully informed, within the limits of operational security.

## Day After

11. A major item of recent US/UK discussions. We have at last got the US Administration as a whole to agree that some sort of UN blessing for post-conflict arrangements (or Phase 4) is desirable.

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The detail of how much UN involvement remains to be tied down, but we are now at the stage of looking at a further draft SCR. Mike O'Brien went to Washington on 12 March with Dominick Chilcott (Head of the Iraq Planning Unit, a Whitehall pol/mil team formed to co-ordinate these issues) to carry this forward. Interference by neighbours, remains a major concern.

12. The Day After phase should offer opportunities to rebuild a degree of international consensus after the blood spilled over the second SCR. We will be looking for the widest possible international contribution to put Iraq back on its feet. We will issue separate guidance, but you can already stress to interlocutors the principles which will guide our approach to this phase. These will include immediate action on humanitarian needs, and a commitment to Iraq's territorial integrity, to a major UN role in post-conflict arrangements and to giving clear responsibility to the Iraqis themselves (not just the exiled opposition groups) to decide what new constitution/institutions they wish to develop for the new Iraq.

MEPP Angles

13. You will have noticed that the Foreign Secretary's statement in the House of Commons on 10 March included a passage on MEPP.

We are considering how to follow up to keep up the momentum.

14. Finally, we are likely to open the Emergency Unit before long, perhaps as soon as this weekend. Separate details of who will do what and the daily schedule of meetings, will follow.

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