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From: Dominick Chilcott, Iraq Planning Unit  
Date: 20 February 2003  
cc: PS/Mr O'Brien  
PS/PUS  
Peter Ricketts  
William Ehrman  
Iraq Policy

To: Private Secretary

**IRAQ: DAY-AFTER (PHASE IV)**

1. The Iraq Planning Unit has been in operation for nine working days. The PUS has circulated our terms of reference to other permanent secretaries (Flag A) – so far without encountering any objections. The Unit has a core staff (from FCO, MOD and DfID), a large room, and IT. We are able to work well with other Whitehall and FCO departments and have successfully contracted out a lot of work. I attach our work programme (Flag B) which indicates the range and detail of our activity.
2. We have good relations with the UK military planners in MOD and PJHQ. The next step is to strengthen the link with the UK planners embedded in the US planning machinery. We have an opportunity to do this at a US army phase IV wargame exercise (a so-called “rock drill”) which is taking place tomorrow and Saturday in Washington. Two members of the Unit will take part.
3. Our key counterpart in Washington is emerging as the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs. This is an embryonic ‘civilian government’ for Iraq. It will be headed by a retired senior US general. Our key secondee to ORHA is Major-General Tim Cross, a serving senior British officer. (You would be forgiven for asking where the civilian character of this organisation manifests itself.) General Tim Cross and the Unit regard ourselves as two sides of the same coin and will work increasingly hand in glove.

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4. The rock drill will look at the organisation and activities of the immediate first days after the conflict in Iraq. One of its main objectives will be to reconcile the tensions between different parts of the US administration over who has ownership of a variety of activities. A key question is whether the head of the civilian administration reports to the head of the coalition forces or vice versa.
5. There is barely any mention of the UN in the CENTCOM plans we have seen for phase IV (post-conflict) to date. But there are gaps in the plan, which is still fluid and which we have the opportunity to influence. We shall encourage the US players at the rock drill to draw the conclusion that the job of administering Iraq is too large even for the US to undertake, that putting together a large coalition - drawing on Arab countries - is the key to success, and that this can only be achieved by getting UN authorisation for phase IV.
6. I attach a short paper setting out the framework for guidance to the UK officials attending the rock drill (Flag C). This has been agreed with William Ehrman, and with MOD (who are putting it to Mr Hoon for information) and Cabinet Office.

Dominick Chilcott  
IPU  
Tel:  
Fax:

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Iraq Planning Unit work programme (15h00 Thursday, 20 February)

We have the following work in hand.

- (a) A paper addressing about **management of the Iraqi oil sector**. In second draft. To be circulated in Whitehall. -- IPU / DSI
- (b) Advice on **UK commitments**, and in particular whether there should be a UK sector, for Number 10 after the rock drill this weekend.
- (c) A paper on **whom UK forces should work with in Southern Iraq**, being prepared by FCO research analysts and MOD.
- (d) A paper on the UK's settled policy on the continuing role for UN inspectors in '**sensitive site exploitation**'. IPU/NPD.
- (e) HMT/MOD/IPU to share work on important **Iraqi economic assets** to be seized in Southern Iraq.
- (f) FCO researchers are revising a paper on a '**Bonn process for Iraq**'.
- (g) We are in touch with TPUK who are drawing up an **inventory of British firms who have supplied equipment to Iraq**, with a view to working up a plan to help them win business in due course.
- (h) HMT / FCO / MOD / DFID now working on **financing**

We have completed the following work.

- (i) A paper on '**The first 48 hours**', designed to highlight the issues that UK military commanders will confront immediately on entering and occupying Iraqi territory.
- (j) **EU-Iraq**. Updating an earlier FCO paper.
- (k) **Advice to the PM on the role the UN must play** -- for the PM to use in discussions with President Bush.
- (l) A paper on the **downsides of not having UN authorisation** for phase IV.
- (m) **Guidance for officials at Rock Drill** on UK commitments in Iraq, provided to the team.
- (n) An initial appraisal of US planning for **humanitarian operations**, with proposals for improvements and ways the UK can add value in its sector: IPU/DFID.
- (o) With UND, we are dealing with a request from the US for the UK to take the lead on **police and judiciary reform** and have sent the US side an assessment of our capabilities in this area. A draft submission is in preparation, but awaits greater clarity on UK commitments / a sector.
- (p) We have responded to a Chiefs of Defence Staff request to know **whose law is to be administered in Iraq by the coalition**. Paper passed to MOD.

Iraq Planning  
20 February

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## IRAQ DAY AFTER: GUIDANCE FOR OFFICIALS AT US ROCK DRILL

### Objectives

- UK objectives: "a stable, united and law abiding state, within its present borders, co-operating with the international community, no longer posing a threat to its neighbours or to international security, abiding by all its international obligations and providing effective representative government for its own people."
- For the US, this means an Iraq which:
  - No longer has WMD, nor wants to acquire them.
  - Has given up any support for international terrorism.
  - Adopts a constructive, peaceful approach to relations with neighbouring countries - including Israel.
  - Has been elected democratically.
  - Shows proper respect for human rights.

NB: US objective goes further than ours on democracy - akin to transformation of Central European countries.

### Phased Approach

- UK and US agree that there must be a phased approach to the 'day-after'.
- We have expressed this as (a) military administration, (b) a UN transitional administration and (c) hand-over of power to a new Iraqi government.
- The US refer to (a) stabilisation period, (b) recovery period and (c) transition to security.

### UK Area

- UK will have, in the very short term, to administer the area where its forces are at the end of hostilities. No commitment to administer divisional size area in the medium to longer term. More likely a small area around Basrah.
- No commitment to administering any part of Baghdad.

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- Where we are involved in administration, will want to be so in an exemplary fashion.

#### Why we need the UN and SCRs

- To legitimise our presence and provide a legal basis for restructuring
- To legitimise the civil administration of Iraq
- To legitimise taking forward a political process in Iraq, and for which a Special Representative of the Secretary General might be necessary
- To enable IAEA / UNMOVIC to validate WMD immediately, and to remain in Iraq when the coalition leaves for ongoing verification and monitoring
- To get others into Iraq with us (we are starting to talk to Italy, Spain and other sympathetic Europeans)
- For humanitarian assistance
- To continue OFF programme and make it work in new circumstances
- To legitimise oil management
- For funding (access eg to OFF escrow account; to maximise – and in some cases to permit at all – contributions from other countries, eg Japan)
- To provide an exit strategy
- To deter neighbouring countries from interfering
- If there is no second resolution, may be difficult to get a third

#### Use the Iraqis too

- We should maximise involvement of the Iraqis in most tasks, including: policing, lower level civil administration, judiciary, foreign affairs, finance, health, education, agriculture and some security forces

#### UN elements

- We need at least UN authorisation of the transitional administration, and ideally want a UN transitional administration. UN authorisation means a non-US figurehead. We need to explore further the right mix of US, UN and other elements to achieve a transitional administration which:
  - is acceptable to the Iraqis
  - gains UN Security Council support
  - looks competent enough for the US

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We should argue for:

- A UN executive administrator overseeing the international civilian transitional administration. Possibly a Central European, with a high preponderance of Americans beneath him.
- The UN supervising/mentoring the majority of Iraq's technical ministries - eg health, agriculture, finance, energy.
- A separate UN figure, supported by the international community and acting in close liaison with the US, overseeing the political process leading to a new constitution, a referendum and elections.
- The US-led coalition providing security, mandated by the UNSC but not answerable to the UN.
- The World Bank and IMF overseeing economic reconstruction, both the policy framework and the award of contracts above a certain threshold, under UN authority.

#### UK force

- From Large Scale (three brigades plus) to Medium Scale (one brigade plus) if possible by the autumn

#### Vertical sector

- No commitment, but UK could consider providing support for UN-led justice sector reform, provided we had the right UN cover.

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