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18 February 2003

Sir David Manning KCMG  
No.10

*Dear David,*

*DTT*  
*✓: JB*  
*MR*  
*DFH*  
*NC*

**IRAQ: WAY FORWARD IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL**

1. Following the Foreign Secretary's discussion with the Prime Minister this afternoon, he asked me to let you have the enclosed illustrative list of benchmarks. We are continuing to work on these with Jeremy Greenstock's team and the State Department. But they give an idea of the kind of specific tests which we could encourage Blix to propose alongside a simple draft resolution.
2. On the timing for tabling such a resolution, the Foreign Secretary still thinks on further reflection that it would be better to do this early next week with the aim of setting 14 March as the deadline for decisions in the Security Council, if that can be agreed with the White House. He notes that if we were to table at the end of this week, it would come immediately after the sequence of the 14 February Security Council debate; the 15 February demonstrations; the 17 February European Council and the Open Debate in the Security Council on 18/19 February. He thinks that a fire-break of a few days between these events and moving ahead with the resolution would help us presentationally.
3. It would also give us time to mount some initial lobbying of the middle ground opinion in the Security Council among the elected members. The Foreign Secretary plans to telephone his counterparts in a range of these countries. We are also planning to despatch FCO Ministers of State as envoys to visit the main swing voters, starting early next week.

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4. I am copying this letter to Jeremy Greenstock.

*Y*

*ever,*

*Peter*

**Peter Ricketts**

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## **IRAQ: POSSIBLE BENCHMARKS FOR BLIX**

### Issues

1. Blix has spoken about selecting benchmarks from the list of unresolved disarmament issues which UNMOVIC has drawn up (the cluster document). He accepts that Iraq might claim that the tasks are impossible (no documents, no witnesses etc) but nevertheless believes he could judge whether Iraq was providing active co-operation.
2. Blix has warned that it will not be easy to circulate the cluster document before 1 March. We may need to press him on this. We could propose possible benchmarks of our own as a way of getting Blix to focus quickly.

### Possible Specific Benchmarks

#### **BW:**

Iraq must provide [outstanding] documentary evidence and/or testimony from key personnel on all aspects of research in Iraq into the development of materials which could be potential BW agents, their weaponisation and delivery systems. This should include:

- Evidence for the production and destruction of the 8,500 litres of anthrax it claims was destroyed in 1991;
- Evidence of the purpose and use and possible destruction of the 650kilos of bacterial growth media which Iraq admitted possessing in February 1999.

#### **CW:**

Iraq must provide [outstanding] documentary evidence and/or testimony from key personnel on all aspects of research in Iraq into the development of materials which could be potential CW agents, their weaponisation and delivery systems. This should include:

- Evidence of Iraq's work on VX, including purification and stabilisation, weaponisation, the whereabouts of VX precursor chemicals and of the 1.5 tons of VX identified by UNSCOM;
- Evidence to account for the discrepancy in Iraqi figures of chemical bomb production which leave 6,500 bombs and the chemical agent they contained unaccounted for;

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- The destruction of the re-furbished chemical processing equipment at Al Fallujah.

#### **MISSILES:**

Iraq must eliminate, under UNMOVIC/IAEA supervision, all missiles, associated programmes, [and other items] identified by the organisations as proscribed. This should include providing:

- A full account of the Al Samoud and Al Fatah missile programmes and destruction of the Al Samoud engines and all associated infrastructure including test stands and casting chambers;
- A full account of the recent import of materials used in propellants, test instrumentation and guidance systems.

#### **DOCUMENTATION:**

All relevant documentation must be produced, including documents relating to key personnel, budgetary documents and funding requests.

#### **PERSONNEL:**

Testimony from key personnel must include unrestricted interviews, held inside and outside Iraq, without Iraqi minders, eavesdropping or attempts by the Iraqi authorities to intimidate potential interviewees.

#### Catch All

3. We might ask Blix to advise on whether the Iraqi response in these areas since 8 November 2002 amounted to the immediate, unconditional and active co-operation required by SCR 1441 (2002). But Blix will resist being put on the spot. We might, instead, highlight this question in our response to his comments on Iraqi performance.

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