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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
ROOM 205, OLD WAR OFFICE BUILDING
WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2EU

1 cc
PS/PU
William Elwood

Telephone
Fax:
E-mail:

SECRETARY OF STATE

MO 6/17/15C

Peter Rulley
Edward [signature]

29 January 2003

Dear Matthew

2. Foreign Security

PRIME MINISTER'S BRIEFING - IRAQ

As requested, I attach briefing for the Prime Minister's visit to Camp David.
The briefing comprises a general update, plus sections on:

- Targeting and military objectives;
- Aftermath;
- Saddam's options:
 - including Fortress Baghdad.

I am copying this to Simon McDonald (FCO) and Desmond Bowen (Cabinet Office).

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detail of

[signature]

DC - see pp 5-7 in Appendix

M J WILLIAMS
Private Secretary

PH - see Annex on status of briefing requests

An important paper for understanding
current state of MoD thinking

& back to me

(31)

Matthew Rycroft Esq
10 Downing Street

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(11)

UPDATE ON MILITARY PLANNING AND PREPARATIONS

Line to Take

- UK deployments moving ahead. We aim to have our Special Forces, maritime and air forces in place in mid-February, land force by mid-March. But you will be aware of the reticence of some states on basing.
- We expect to be ready in line with current US planning timelines. If practicalities force a slight delay, we would exploit that to make our forces better prepared.
- h • But if operations are delayed beyond April/May, we will struggle to put together this scale of force again for the autumn, especially if the fire strike continues.
- h • So militarily we could bear some delay but not too much.

Background

- Deployment of UK forces continues:
 - Maritime: in addition to existing forces in theatre, our Amphibious Task Group (3 Commando Brigade and 16 ships led by ARK ROYAL) is about to transit Suez en route to the Gulf.
 - Land: deployment of HQ 1 (UK) Armoured Division, 16 Air Assault Brigade and 7 Armoured Brigade continues. On current plans, 16 Air Assault Brigade will have completed deployment to Kuwait by 20 February, and 7 Armoured Brigade by 10 March. A period of training and integration with US forces will then be needed.
 - Air: about one-third of our air package (68 fast-jets and 41 supporting aircraft) is already in the region, on routine deployments or exercises. We aim to deploy the remainder in the first half of February, and to announce the air package to Parliament on 5 February. But there remains some uncertainty over basing for large elements of the package: we await responses from Qatar and Saudi Arabia (and the US are similarly waiting for Saudi agreement).
- Timelines. Current assumptions about timelines (air campaign c.3 March, initial ground operations around the same time or shortly afterwards, main ground effort c.19 March) may prove a little optimistic: US ground deployments are a few days behind schedule. A slight delay would be beneficial for us, giving more time for

TARGETING AND MILITARY OBJECTIVES

Lines to take

- As military action is becoming more likely we are working up our strategic objectives for a military campaign. We need to relate this to the legal base we establish.
- Very important that UK and US objectives are aligned soon and in advance of commitment to action so that we can come to a clear and common understanding on **targeting issues** and the **information campaign**. This will be particularly important in the event of an early "ugly" start.
- Clear this will need careful handling domestically. Current thinking is that we would publish objectives close to, or at the start of hostilities.

Background

1. Existing published UK Policy Objectives state that "our prime objective is to rid Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their associated programmes and means of delivery...." The only reference to UK participation in military action is an intermediate priority to "continue to make military plans and preparations in case military action is required to enforce compliance by Iraq with its WMD/BM obligations".
2. Although we have not yet adopted a formal position legally endorsed, on what military action is required to enforce compliance, we have been involved in joint contingency planning with the US, to keep UK options open to provide a significant military input to a US-led plan aimed at "regime change". In advance of any military action we need to set out UK military objectives to enable us to:
 - a. satisfy ourselves that they represent minimum use of force as required by international law;
 - b. construct a CDS directive indicating what military missions are legitimate, including the targeting directive setting out what targets we can legitimately attack from the air; and
 - c. plan Information Operations.
3. Military planning has already reached the stage where a common understanding of military objective required for resolution of the practicalities of the targeting process for the air campaign is becoming important. The political reasons for alignment of military objectives are obvious. But in an intense, integrated air campaign there is a practical reason also: that it could prove militarily incoherent to disentangle the bombing and support elements as a case by case Ministerial choice in London once a campaign is under

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way. A single target which the UK could not clear would, for example, derail UK participation in an entire air package. If the UK contribution is fundamental to the package (as it likely in intense operations where UK would provide niche capabilities), the withdrawal of UK support could undermine the overall mission. Although the process of target clearance between allies involved the parties in bringing to bear influence over each other, it would be wrong to suggest that this could mask fundamental differences in interpretation of what targets were legitimate.

4. A publicly agreed set of aligned military objectives would greatly enable our ability to participate joined up **information operations campaign**. It is quite clear that the US will adopt clear messages to combatants and non-combatants alike setting out what they should do to shorten the conflict. The impact of such messages is arguably far greater than messages limited to "disarmament" which to the average Iraqi might appear abstract or irrelevant. For the UK to adopt this tone publicly clearly presents presentational challenges, but conversely working as a junior coalition partner, with seemingly incompatible public lines also has its downside.

5. The Cabinet Office is leading on revising the UK objectives to incorporate the objectives of a military campaign. We understand the Prime Minister will receive a draft of this document from the Cabinet Office before the Camp David visit. In support, the MOD is working up a military assessment setting out what military objectives would represent the minimum necessary use of force. This assessment will need to be agreed with other Departments and put to the Attorney General. Once there is a clear UK position this will provide a basis to engage in further dialogue with the US

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IRAQ – AFTERMATH

Lines to take

- Clear that "the day after" is the key issue. Have no doubt about coalition ability to "win the war". However, equally certain that we face a risk of "losing the peace".
- The UK is keen to contribute to "Stage Four" tasks and to know more about where UK can most usefully contribute to the US plan.
- However, we do have significant concerns about the aftermath.
- Any honeymoon we may have of being greeted as "liberators" will be brief, if it exists at all.
- In our view this means that:

The shift from military control to some form of transitional administration must be as rapid as possible.

We must do all that we can to avoid any perception that what follows initial military action is in any way an American/western "occupation" of Iraq. We must do all that we can rapidly to internationalise involvement in the aftermath.

We must be up-front and explicit about timescales, to give both the Iraqi people and the international community confidence about the transition to a new Iraqi government.

Whatever sort of transitional administration is put in place, it must be possible to describe it as truly international and independent. It would help to give it a UN stamp of approval; *this does not imply a UN administration.*

- Know that at the operational level the US has done a tremendous amount of work to develop very detailed plans for managing the "aftermath" – including the humanitarian aspects.
- But we need rapidly to answer strategic questions about the future governance of Iraq. These are not academic issues; as soon as our personnel enter Iraq they will become pressing and practical. [Eg. With whom should we do business? Who owns resources? What laws apply...?]
- We know from hard experience in the Balkans and elsewhere that choices made very early in the campaign can shape – often irrevocably – our options months, even years later.

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Thus we must take decisions now about the big questions if we are not to find ourselves in difficulties later on.

As we go about making our case over the next weeks our chances of success will be much greater if we can set out coherent answers to these difficult questions.

Background

US planning for their campaign has been done on the basis of their worst-case assumption that they will have to conduct it "alone and unafraid", ie without coalition participation and without the blessing of a second UNSCR. As a consequence their operational planning for the aftermath is extremely detailed and thorough (Though that is not to say that they will necessarily be successful; many US planners are acutely aware of the possibly overwhelming scale of the task they may be taking on).

The US planning structures are broadly in place, but still developing. The UK is fortunate in having staff in key positions. We already have people in the relevant CENTCOM headquarters and are planning to put people into the new 'Office of Post-War Planning' being set up in the Pentagon under Lt Gen (Retired) Jay Garner). The relationship between this inter-agency office and CENTOM is not yet clear.

US planning divides the aftermath into three stages: 'Stabilisation', 'Recovery' and 'Transition to Security'. The transition between stages will be events driven. In outline the 'Stabilisation' stage is expected to last three to six months and run under military direction, with effectively a US military government in charge. A 'Recovery' stage is expected to last 18 months to two years during which the military would remain in force and work in concert with some form of (US or international) 'civilian administration'. A 'Transition to Security', under an Iraqi administration, would follow as a third stage

Specifically because they have been directed to plan on a unilateral basis US planners have not taken any account of plugging coalition contributions into their plan. They are more than willing to do so – they appreciate all the advantages of doing so (burdensharing, internationalisation etc) – but the detail of how to do so remains to be decided.

Of greater concern, while focussing on the detail, continuing inter-agency debate in Washington means that there has been a lack of strategic direction given to the planners. This carries three principal dangers for us.

The most immediate is that without this direction it will be very difficult to give guiding instructions to our personnel on the ground in Iraq – eg. What laws apply? What should be their relationship with various organs of Government? How should they react to those people who are likely, unilaterally, to declare

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themselves de facto governors, mayors or, even, military leaders? The answers to these questions flow from the answers to a very few strategic ones: What is the legal basis for our presence? What is our plan for a transitional administration? What model of government for Iraq are we moving towards?

✓ Secondly, as the Coalition goes about making its case in the next few weeks we can expect others (for varying motives) to focus increasingly on aftermath issues. Our chances of persuading others of the case for military action will be damaged if we cannot answer their questions about the day after; leaders in the region will be nervous about the nature of an interim administration, the French, Russians and Chinese will want answers about the future of their commercial interests etc.

The third, and possibly greatest danger to UK interests if we have forces deployed in Iraq is the nature of the civilian administration in the second stage described above. There is a risk that the US may propose an administration run by the US. Even if civilian led, this is likely to be seen by the Iraqis as an agent of occupation, not of liberation. Any UK contribution would be tarred with the same brush. More likely to be acceptable to the Iraqis and far less likely to be destabilising in Iraq is an international administration.

This issue remains a point of debate in Washington – though the debate is polarised by those who view any suggestion of an “international” administration as being tantamount to a UN administration, which is anathema to the US administration. If the debate is presented as a choice between a “UN administration” and a US one, there is a strong possibility that the US would choose the latter, with potentially disastrous results. There is thus a real opportunity for the UK to suggest a middle way – an international administration that is legitimised by but not run by the UN.

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SADDAM'S OPTIONS

- Iraq has no hope of defeating coalition forces in conventional warfare. If Saddam is determined to resist, his aim should be to attack the Coalition's collective will to fight and carry on fighting.
- We have identified five broad types of action that he could take to do this. Each action is designed either to delay/disrupt or to shock:
 - Delaying/disrupting actions would be aimed at eroding public support for the coalition, by denying rapid success and maximising the human and other costs of military action.
 - Shock tactics would be designed to achieve the same effect at a stroke, to overawe the public audience, produce a wave of revulsion and convince them the price of victory is too high.
- The actions are:
 - **Weapons of Mass Destruction.** Could be used either to shock, or to delay/disrupt. The two are not mutually exclusive. Saddam could seek to provoke retaliation (eg from Israel), attack coalition support (eg use against Jordan, Kuwait), attack coalition forces, attack the coalition home base, or even his own people. Panic (eg from rumours of release in major cities) could be as disruptive as actual use.
 - **Environmental Disaster.** Fire oil fields, breach seaward end of Gulf oil supply line, or flood the southern marshlands. In either case the effects of pollution and disruption have the potential to slow the coalition advance.
 - **Human Shields.** Placing either voluntary (e.g. members of peace groups) or involuntary (hostages) human shields alongside high value regime targets.
 - **Retreat to Urban Areas.** Fall back on urban areas (main cities including Baghdad) and avoid fighting in the open. Set up static defences and use time to erode coalition will.
 - **Attack a major military capability.** Cause a large number of casualties, by successfully attacking a major military capability such as a major warship, ship taken up from trade, or transport aircraft.
- In addition, there is the potential for **inter-ethnic, or inter-tribal violence**. This is most likely to occur if Saddam's authority begins to weaken and differing groups begin to pursue their own agendas, or simply revenge attacks on the Sunni minority.

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WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD)

Threat

- Saddam could use Biological, Chemical or Radiological weapons on UK or US forces, his own civilians or a neighbouring country. Although the current dispersion and concealment of WMD would make it more difficult for Iraq to operationalise the threat, we cannot assume that this will not happen.

Deterrence

- WMD are designed to engender fear, their use is unpredictable, and the effects they deliver highly variable. To counter the use of WMD we have in the past relied upon deterrence. Our current policy formula is that "use of CBW against us will not be allowed to secure political advantage but on the contrary will invite a proportionately serious response and that those at every level responsible for a breach of international law will be held personally accountable".
- A key issue is whether this is sufficiently robust to deter Saddam, or those to who he has delegated authority to use WMD, from using his arsenal.

Prevention

- In order to reduce the risk from WMD an early focus of military activity is the finding and destroying of the associated command and control, and launch and delivery systems. Information operations will also emphasise that Iraqi personnel implementing orders to use WMD will be held personally accountable.

Protection

- Protection from CBRN attack is achieved through either destroying the weapon during its delivery with missile systems such as Patriot or Arrow (no UK capability), or through the use of individual protective equipment (IPE) or collective protective equipment (COLPRO). Military formations and equipment have both detection and IPE/ COLPRO, civilian populations (with the possible exception of Israel) are much more vulnerable.

Possible Iraqi Courses of Action (COA).

- If Saddam is not deterred from first use against the coalition there are five broad COA for use of WMD:
 - Attacks on regional states, in particular Israel, with the aim of provoking massive retaliation in order to make the link, gain international popular support, and attack the resolve of regional states () supporting the coalition.
 - Asymmetric attack on the US, UK or other Coalition country in order to bring the war directly to his enemies' populations. Though unlikely it is possible that Saddam could develop contacts with a suitably capable terrorist organisation.
 - Pre-emptive strikes against Coalition forces' points of access and concentration, with the aim of slowing down the operational tempo of a Coalition invasion.
 - Tactical battlefield use, particularly in urban areas if it becomes clear that the regime is unlikely to survive.
 - Attacks on his own population. Perhaps under the pretext of suppressing rebellion, Saddam might order attacks on Shia or Kurd population areas; or he might blame release of CBW on coalition targeting. In addition to the political value to him of significant casualties – for which many would blame the coalition, even if Saddam's guilt was obvious - this would have the benefit of generating a massive humanitarian crisis and slowing the Coalition operational tempo. Even the rumour of WMD use might achieve the latter effect.

Reaction in the Event of Use.

- The intention is to interdict any WMD attack before it is mounted. But if this should fail, the following issues arise:
 - Coalition Reporting and Response. UK and Coalition reporting procedures and responses will be aligned so that the strategic level reaction to use and suspected use is co-ordinated across the Coalition.
 - Pre-determined Response. The highly variable nature of a CBRN attack will not permit a simple menu of pre-determined responses, but the development of clear guidelines to allow a proportionate response to be delivered as soon as possible will be needed.

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- Protection. The planned levels of NBC Defence equipment for UK forces should enable all troops to withstand initial Biological and Chemical attack. In addition to the Primary Casualty Receiving Ship (PCRS), which has 50 CB capable beds, plans are in place to ensure an uncontaminated Role 3 Hospital (with a further 200 beds) can be available in theatre within 48 hours.
- Coalition medical facilities are unlikely to be able to cope with mass civilian casualties. More work needs to be done on this area.

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ENVIRONMENTAL DISASTER

Threat.

- A slow Coalition advance caused by an environmental disaster. Saddam may order the destruction of the Iraqi oilfields, the seaward supply lines in the Gulf, and/or flood the southern areas of the country. He may also attack Kuwaiti oilfields.
- The atmospheric or maritime pollution effects of such an operation could be hazardous to health in addition to the obvious effects of poor visibility, or fouling of ships' water supplies. The effects of inundation will be to reduce the Coalition's choice of axes of advance, and probably to generate large numbers of internally displaced persons.

Factors.

- The Iraqi oilfields are in two groups.
 - Those in the north are very isolated and outside the UK Area of Operations (AO).
 - Those in the south lie in the UK AO.
- There are two oilfields in Kuwait which provide the fuel for producing drinking water. Without these, supplying Kuwait and the deployed troops with water will be very difficult.
- *moment or large?* Operationally the destruction of oilfields could have two principal effects:
 - To slow down the tempo of operations.
 - To cause significant environmental hazard to deployed troops, the local population and neighbouring states. This hazard could last for many months, as the last Gulf War showed.
- ✓ 1 • Strategically a decision by Saddam to destroy the oilfields would be very significant since it would become impossible to resurrect the Oil for Food Programme. Deliberate destruction might be interpreted by Iraqis as a last-ditch act indicating that Saddam had accepted that his regime was doomed: fear of internal uprisings or a coup might deter Saddam from taking this step until he was sure he was finished.

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Pre-emptive and Preventative Action.

- In order for Saddam to guarantee destruction of the oilfields he needs effective communications and blind loyalty from his subordinates. Both of these are weak points which we can exploit.
- For the oilfields in Kuwait the US already has extensive Air Defence capability in place and significant ground protection in order to ensure their safety.
- The US has plans to secure the northern Iraqi oilfields either by means of air manoeuvre or with land forces delivered from the north (if Turkey allows).
- The US plan involves seizing the southern Iraqi oilfields at an early stage of ground operations. These will then fall within the UK Area of Operations.

Reaction in the Event of the Oilfields Being Destroyed.

- Should Saddam succeed, in spite of every effort to prevent him, in igniting the oil wells, there is little that can be done. The potential environmental effects will be significant but, excluding the effect on ground water, short-lived (oil contaminated sand being the only significant pollution).
- There is a significant risk that oil fires could affect some of the UK Amphibious Task Group (ATG) missions in the south, by rendering the environment so inhospitable that troops cannot survive. This would slow down the operational tempo and prolong the campaign.
- Subsequently there is the issue of the medical effect on deployed troops, with the associated threat of Gulf War Sickness II.

12
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HUMAN SHIELDS

Threat

- Human shields may be deployed either voluntarily or hostages may be taken and used to protect key regime targets, or to create anti-Coalition images.

Pre-emptive and Preventative Action.

- Ensure that the IAEA and UNMOVIC are withdrawn in good time to prevent their being used as potential hostages.
- Travel advice for many years has advised against UK citizens travelling in Iraq. Advice may need to be broadened to caution all those travelling to Iraq that they do so at their own risk, and to make clear that coalition governments will not be blackmailed by so called "human shields".

Reaction in the Event of Hostages Being Taken.

- Hostage rescue in a non-permissive environment, such as Iraq, represents an enormous challenge (witness the disastrous US attempt to rescue hostages from Iran in 1980). Should a hostage situation develop, UK Special Forces would have to scope it in detail before being able to provide advice on courses of action.

RETREAT TO URBAN AREAS/"FORTRESS BAGHDAD"

Threat

- Saddam withdraws his most capable military formations into urban areas (such as Baghdad, Basra, or Mosul) in an attempt to force the coalition to enter the cities and fight a high-cost attritional battle.

Factors

- The degree to which such a course of action will be effective will depend upon the morale of the forces who have been placed in the city, and the willingness of the population to continue to stay and to sustain them.
- In order to complicate the task for the coalition, Saddam may order measures to compel the population to remain in the cities, although this is potentially a double-edged sword, as it would require Iraqi forces to watch their backs as well as defending against the coalition.

Prevention

- The initial coalition campaign is aimed *inter alia* at breaking the cohesion of the regime, deterring Iraqi forces from attempting resistance and encouraging them to capitulate/stand aside. Early demonstrations of the precision and power of coalition air/missile strikes may persuade Iraqi forces that hunkering down in urban areas will not improve their chances of survival.
- Information operations aimed at elite Iraqi military units and their commanders ("Saddam is finished but you need not be – don't throw away your lives trying to save him, get out now") will have a key part to play in minimising Saddam's ability to mount an effective defence of Baghdad.

Reaction to Fortress Baghdad

- There is, nonetheless, evidence suggesting that the regime is preparing to mount a determined defence of Baghdad in particular, with an inner ring composed of units closest to the regime. It remains to be seen whether those units will continue to be loyal in the face of a coalition advance clearly aimed at toppling the regime. But if they do, Baghdad will present a difficult problem.
- This is as much presentational/political as military. If the coalition controls the rest of Iraq, it can be argued that Saddam's control of Baghdad does not count for much. But the same was even more true of Kabul, yet its removal from Taliban control was symbolically very important. Whatever the military reality, the political reality is that the campaign will not be seen as a success as long as Saddam retains control of Baghdad.

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- The US military envisage that they would deal with this scenario by:
 - cordoning off the city
 - establishing NGO camps outside the cordon to deal with Iraqis fleeing Baghdad
 - using information operations to encourage the population to leave and to promote military defections
 - ultimately taking the city sector by sector, using a combination of special forces, conventional forces and precision strikes.

16
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LOSS OF MAJOR MILITARY CAPABILITY

Threat

- Loss of a major military capability could reduce military effectiveness in theatre and potentially undermine military and popular resolve.
- Loss of a major military capability includes a RN or commercial ship, a strategic airlift aircraft or a large number of land personnel (eg: BCW attack.). The political/presentational impact would be greater than the military impact.

Courses of Action.

- Using conventional military means, other than sea mining, the Iraqis are unlikely to achieve a success.
- However, using terrorist type tactics against chartered shipping or aircraft could give them a military success.
- Use of WMD could also render a land formation ineffective if it were caught off guard.

Pre-emptive and Preventative Action.

- Coercive/deterrent strategy should pre-empt such Iraqi activity. Pre-empting any non-state actors may be less easy.
- Operational planning includes force protection routinely and reduces risk where possible. Incorporation of other agencies should be considered to reduce the terrorist threat. Coalition support effort should also be harnessed to approach the issue on a multi-national basis.

Reaction in the Event of Loss.

- It is not possible to prevent such a loss entirely.
- Options post loss include 'do nothing', punitive action, massive retaliation, or covert action.
- Reaction will depend on the type of incident, who has perpetrated it and how clear this is. In order to remain 'just', clear guilt should be declared and accepted by the international community prior to any response.

INTERNECINE WARFARE AND REGIONAL REACTIONS

Threat

- The loosening of Saddam's grip on power may give rise to significant levels of internecine violence.
- The fracturing of Iraqi society has in the past, and may again, occur along a number of different fault lines. Religious, ethnic, tribal, or political fault lines all exist and are just below the surface. It is difficult to predict the exact nature of any fighting as some may be due to the settling of old scores, others may striving for grander political ends such as the Kurds, or the more religious members of the Shia majority. In the first instance the violence will need to be contained so as to prevent the spread of any fighting, and to stop regional neighbours from feeling the need to intervene.

Pre-emptive and Preventative Action.

- The Coalition force (and its UK component) contain light forces to provide the high numbers of infantry required to mount effective 'framework' patrols in areas of tension. However, a severe breakdown in public order in a major city would be very challenging and require careful handling to bring it under control. Intervention in such a "non-permissive" environment will need to be addressed in the context of the situation and the balance of risks being faced by the Commander on the ground.
- In the event of major violence in Basrah (the major city in the UK Area of Operations), we would probably need US assistance.
- Through a variety of means, including putting forces on the ground, established militia such as the Kurdish Peshmerga will be "fixed" and dissuaded from taking advantage of the situation.

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CURRENT STATUS OF BASING REQUESTS - AS AT 2000Z 27 JANUARY

Country	Basing Requested		Current Status	Next Steps
Kuwait	ALI AL SALEM	12 X TORNADO GR4	Kuwait have agreed to UK basing requests.	Telegram from FCO to HMA advising of decision to deploy Harriers to Al Jaber rather than Ali Al Salem and an increase form 12 to 18 GR4s at Ali Al Salem.
	AL JABER	10 X HARRIER GR7		
	Basing for 25,000 Land Forces			
Turkey	INCIRLIK	8 X JAGUAR GR3 2 X VC10 4 X E3D	Approval judged to be unlikely. Contingency requests put in place. Still pursuing overflight approval	Final decision on overflight approval
Qatar	AL UDEID	18 X TORNADO GR4 8 X VC10 1 X HS125	Request made by HMA on 27 Jan. Await response from Amir.	Confirm with HMA that 6 GR4s will be moved to Kuwait reducing the requirement at Al Udeid to 12 and that the 8 VC10s will be based at PSAB.
	CAMP AS	NCC HQ (approx 400 personnel)		
Jordan	AZRAQ	8 X HARRIER GR7 2 X CANBERRA PR9	King of Jordan had given approval for basing within coalition ceiling of 5,175 during build up and 12,000 in final phase and during operations	None
	AL JAFR	Forward mounting base (947 personnel) 5 x C130 6 x CH47 3 x Lynx		

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Saudi Arabia	PSAB	20 X TORNADO F3 2 X CANBERRA PR9 1 X NIMROD R1 4 X NIMROD MR2 4 X E3D 8 X VC10 2 X HS125	US request made on UK behalf. Expect a Saudi response when relevant personalities return to Saudi Arabia in early February	US are acting as lead nation for request. Can the UK usefully assist in explaining urgency of our request?
UAE	Naval Forward Logistic Base at Al Minhad Airbase, Jebel Ali and Fujairah Ports and Fujirah Airport. (100 Personnel), ATG training at UAE ranges		UAE have approved our request and been very accommodating with our requests for training facilities	Ongoing liaison through DA to arrange training opportunities
Bahrain	MUHARRAQ	4 X TRISTAR	Permission given for 2 tristar. HMA has been instructed to confirm the additional 2 Tristars. Previous indications are that this will not create difficulties. Expansion of UK MCC has been agreed	Confirmation form Bahrian that the deployment of a second pair of Tristars is approved.
	UKMCC	(64 personnel)		
Oman	SEEB	2 X NIMROD MR2	Oman has approved the relocation of the Nimrods from Seeb to Thumrait	None

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