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2 March 2007

Margaret Aldred  
Defence and Overseas Secretariat  
Cabinet Office

Dear Margaret

### BETTER BASRA

1. The revised Better Basra Plan for 2007 has now been agreed with MND(SE). I attach:
  - (a) "Better Basra Mark 3", with an annex setting out key benchmarks (Mark 1 was the July 2006 Better Basra Plan and Mark 2 the expanded September 2006 version)
  - (b) Detailed work plans for each strand
  - (c) An assessment of progress against the December 2006 benchmarks
  - (d) An estimate of the costs of the proposed new projects for 2007/8.
2. For the first time we have got a fully integrated plan that has been drafted jointly by the Consulate, the PRT and MND(SE). I am grateful to Tim Foy for his work in kickstarting this process and to Daniel Korski for adding a number of further ideas. The political plan takes account of suggestions by Dominic Asquith.
3. We have also discussed it in detail with the Head of the US Embassy Regional Office in Basra, whose comments have been incorporated and who is content with the Plan (although he does not intend to clear it formally with Washington).
4. As Major General Shaw and I set out in our joint letter to you of earlier today, the Southern Iraq Steering Group will bring together the key parties to drive delivery.
5. The estimated cost of implementing this programme will be about £21 million. We have detailed project proposals which we will send directly to the key departments. A revised staffing plan for the PRT, including a request for additional sectoral specialists, will also be sent separately.

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6. As you will see, we have set detailed benchmarks for the end of March and June this year. For the project-based workstreams, we have additionally included March 2008 benchmarks to match the funding cycle. Work is already well underway to meet the March 2007 benchmarks.

Yours truly,

Rosalind

R M Marsden  
H M Consul-General, Basra

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## BETTER BASRA MARK 3: THE 2007 PLAN

### Introduction

1. The revised Better Basra Plan sets out a comprehensive strategy for bringing Basra to the point where it can transition to Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC). It includes a benchmarked implementation plan (Annex A). The aim is to ensure that all lines of operation are integrated under a single overarching political strategy.
2. We need a mechanism to ensure that we are planning coherently and implementing efficiently. There will now be a single coordination and implementation mechanism, led by the Southern Iraq Steering Group, to spearhead delivery of the Better Basra Plan.
3. In mid-July 2006, an outline for the Better Basra was endorsed by DOP(I). A more detailed Better Basra Plan, incorporating security planning and operations, was agreed by senior officials in September following discussion with Coalition partners. Progress made against the 31 December Better Basra benchmarks is set out in Annex B.
4. The revised Better Basra Plan (Mark 3) defines our strategic priorities for the next 6 months and sets revised benchmarks for April 2007 and new benchmarks for June 2007. The Plan takes full account of Operation ZENITH.

### The Political Plan

5. What will success look like? We have to be realistic about what we can achieve. With the time and resources available, we cannot address all Basra's problems nor every failing in its public administration and security forces. Better Basra seeks to address those identified as most critical to making progress against established transition readiness indicators.
6. A picture of success would include the following elements:
  - Iraqi leaders both at national and provincial level take the initiative in arguing the case for PIC, showing that they are able and willing to accept responsibility for managing security
  - the Provincial Government gains credibility bringing improvements to ordinary people's lives
  - a drop in the level of intimidation by vicious political forces of those within the provincial government and security apparatus so that local politicians have the political space to act as a positive force in Basra.
  - a reduction in malign Iranian influence
  - Iraqi Government control sustained after PIC with no breakdown of law and order

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7. This requires undercutting the influence of the most subversive groups, both alone and in co-operation with Iraqi leaders. Time and leverage are in short supply. Our capacity alone to change the political landscape or to neutralise vicious political influences is limited. Iraqi political forces in Basra and Baghdad are the ones who will ultimately shape Basra's destiny.
8. The key will be coopting local and national politicians to use their influence to effect the changes that will make PIC possible. We need to make as many groups as possible in Basra appreciate that there is a political reward on offer if they co-operate: the credit for taking Basra to PIC (though financial rewards are likely to be as uppermost in some of their minds). Violence is inevitable, but avoiding its worst excesses requires engaging national and local leaders in the transition process and persuading them to take public responsibility for what comes next. This means we will need to be flexible in our choice of allies, while recognising that they are temporary friends, who will work with us so long as they see political advantage in doing so.
9. The announcement of our planned withdrawal from MNF sites in the city centre has created a more favourable political environment in which to pursue this objective by showing that we are serious about transition. Early transition to PIC is important to some influential local leaders, who may be more willing than before to give rhetorical support to our transfer conditions. We also need support from the Central Government. Maliki's attention is currently focused on the Baghdad Security Plan. Engaging him on Basra will be difficult, but must be our objective.
10. Key elements of a political plan to support this approach include:
  - engaging the Provincial Council on preparations for PIC, making clear that, while the transfer of MNF sites in the centre of the city will proceed, completing the PIC process will depend on real evidence that they are taking responsibility for security. This means demonstrating that they can use their influence to stop IDF attacks and change perceptions of JAM/IDF activity (by making clear that IDF attacks are retarding not advancing the PIC process and hurting ordinary Iraqis more than MNF); and supporting strike operations against criminal elements.
  - keeping Governor Wa'ili as a key partner, but making clear that our engagement is conditional on his active participation in achieving our objectives. Maintaining our relationship with SCIRI/Badr will be important in this regard, and will send a dual message: we will work with all who support our goals; and all our eggs are by no means in one (Wa'ili's) basket. We should make this clear to SCIRI.
  - encouraging national political leaders in Baghdad to use their influence to help achieve PIC conditions by putting strong, independent and effective people into Basra's key security posts. Advisers close to Maliki, such as Dr Safa al-Safi, will need to be kept engaged and updated regularly on progress.

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- getting the national parties in Baghdad to crack the whip. More active co-operation from SCIRI/Badr in Basra will only happen if local political leaders are instructed to do so by their superiors in Baghdad. The Fadhila leadership in Baghdad also need to keep their members in line. Wa'ili is cooperating but.

Keeping the pressure on political parties by pushing for local elections by the end of the year (rather than letting the date drift to sometime next year) will help.

- trying to detach some elements of mainstream JAM from militants, in parallel with our withdrawal from MNF sites in the city centre. Encouraging political leaders in Baghdad-including Maliki-to support this effort will be crucial (the fall off in JAM activity in Baghdad).

Establishing direct contacts with JAM/OMS leaders who are willing to talk to us, and explaining our thinking to them, would also be useful, but it will require establishment of clear red lines for negotiation.

- supporting the moderates, whose vision of society is most closely aligned with that of the Coalition. The moderates are being outflanked by the Islamists and the militia, whose activities are underwritten by Iranian support. We should seek to create a level playing field for the moderates.
- establishing a stronger dialogue with civil society leaders, including tribal sheikhs and religious clerics, to build wider support and involve them in delivering our objectives. We should also encourage the provincial authorities to see the value of setting up an advisory council with civil society leaders to advise the provincial government and the Coalition through to PIC. If successful, it could continue its role beyond PIC.

#### Other lines of operation

#### *Security*

11. Our military actions should aim to create the conditions in which local politicians feel able to engage constructively to address Basra's problems. Our aim is to reduce the threat from illegal armed groups and Iranian proxies and to build the capacity of the Iraqi Army to take on militant JAM and conduct their own Strike Operations.
12. Operation SINBAD has put MND(SE) on the front foot and served to kickstart the process of transition. One of the major benefits of this operation has been the experience it has given the local units of the Iraqi Army in planning and carrying out joint operations alongside the Iraqi police and Coalition forces. The 10<sup>th</sup> Division of the Iraqi Army grew in confidence as a result of this operation to the extent that it was able to lead many of the later stages of the operation itself, with minimal Coalition involvement. This progress will need to be sustained. The 10<sup>th</sup> Division will certainly face stiffer tests in future.

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13. We therefore need to build on the foundations laid by Operation SINBAD to enhance 10 Division's capabilities by:
- deploying Military Transition Teams (MiTTs) with LA units. A dedicated Battle Group will provide the bulk of the training for the Iraqi Army through provision of 4 MiTTs, each comprising 5-6 people. They will carry out training at Divisional and Brigade level and mentoring as required in the city bases. By releasing our forces from guarding so many static sites in Basra city, our reposturing plans will free up additional sub-units to deliver training and mentoring up to and beyond PIC. Specialist UK military border transition teams, alongside similar US teams, will also mentor the Department for Border Enforcement at the four points of entry in MND(SE) in order to tackle smuggling.
  - providing further training through a new joint Leadership Academy (for 10 Division and the Basra police) at Basra Air Station and an Iraqi-led Divisional Training Centre at Shaibah Logistics Base
  - conducting more joint operations with the Iraqi Army, moving on to progressively more difficult tasks, including more complex strike operations. 10 Division is already involved in counter-IDF operations, guarding resupply convoys and some strike operations. Establishing Iraqi ownership and a relationship of trust with the Basra Emergency Security Committee (assuming the GOI want to maintain it) will be critical.
  - pressing the Iraqi MOD and the US to provide more equipment (particularly heavy weapons) for 10 Division so that they feel they have the firepower effectively to engage their opponents.
14. We will reduce the threat from illegal armed groups by putting an increased emphasis on operations against militant JAM, death squad leaders and Iranian proxies. MND(SE) will maintain a heightened tempo of targeted strike operations and conduct more joint operations with the ISF (including Iraqi Special Forces) in order to neutralise irreconcilables and death squads, and deliver the message that we cannot be bombed out of Basra. Military action can have a significant short-term disruptive effect but the impact will only be sustained if it is conducted in support of the political plan.

#### *The Rule of Law*

#### The Police

15. Some 11,500 police officers have received basic training at the Basra Police Academy at Shaibah. The Basra police have also been equipped with vehicles and weapons to a good standard. But there are still serious problems with militia infiltration and corruption. There are some good, honest, professional officers but there is a significant minority of criminal elements who are involved in death squad activity and a larger number who are intimidated by the militia. Investigations carried out by the Department for Internal

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Affairs in recent weeks have shown that members of the Basra Serious Crimes Unit targeted political opponents and Sunnis for arrest and detention within the Jameat prison facility and that the prisoners were subject to threat and torture. The current Provincial Director of Police is weak, ineffectual and corrupt and appears to be coming under increasing intimidation from JAM.

16. Our aim is to bring the Basra police to a "good enough" standard to transition to PIC. Basra's population have the right to expect more of its police. The police should be able to carry out basic policing tasks; Basrawis should feel that if they report a crime, it will be acted on; the police should not be the home of organised death squads (although it is unrealistic to expect zero corruption); and militia influence should not be at levels where it is the dominant force in the police stations. To this end, we will:

- tackle high-level corruption by :
  - supporting the Department for Internal Affairs (DIA)'s efforts to investigate corrupt and criminal elements with the Basra police, including members of the former Serious Crimes Unit. The DIA (which is based in a protected compound at Basra Air Station) is staffed by police officers from outside Basra and has a strong and effective Commander. But by the nature of its role it is a vulnerable organisation. A number of its officers have already been abducted and threatened by JAM. The more effective the DIA becomes, the more its enemies will try to undermine it. Eight British police officers will work with the DIA.
  - encouraging the pursuit of the 62 death squad leaders from the Serious Crimes Unit and the National Information and Investigation Agency on the "Wanted List" circulated in December (for whom MND(SE) hold sealed arrest warrants). MNF will continue to target them as and when actionable intelligence is available. So far three have been arrested, two by MNF and one by the DIA.
- strengthen IPS leadership by:
  - pressing Baghdad to replace the weak Provincial Director of Police with a strong, brave and independent successor.
  - improving cooperation between the Basra police and the Ministry of Interior in Baghdad at both the operational and political level
  - continuing intensive mentoring of the Provincial Director of Police and other senior IPS officers
  - add a specific focus on leadership and command and control training by opening a Joint Leadership Academy at Basra Air Station.

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- protect the gains by:
  - continuing our monitoring and mentoring work in police stations to raise operational standards and ensure transitional readiness targets are met. Resources will be concentrated on those police stations which are not yet performing to an adequate standard so that we can get 80% of Basra's police stations up to the required transition readiness level for PIC. Other police stations will continue to be monitored so that those that have already met this standard do not slip back.
  - encouraging the removal of unqualified and poor performers
- rapidly build specialist units, specifically:
  - establish a properly vetted, fully professional Criminal Investigation Department (CID). The main problem is preventing members of the former SCU from regrouping inside the new CID. Our efforts have been obstructed by the Provincial Director of Police (who is under pressure from JAM/former SCU death squad leaders) and a stand-off with Baghdad over the appointment of the new Head of the Criminal Investigation Department (which now appears to have been resolved in favour of Colonel Karim).
  - mentor the Basra branch of the National Information and Investigation Agency (a national initiative supported by the US) and try to ensure that criminal elements of the former Criminal Intelligence Unit (also notorious for death squad activity) do not migrate into the NIIA.
  - provide a forensic capability (forensic laboratory and training) at Basra Police HQ

#### The judiciary

17. The judiciary is weak and unable to prosecute serious crime. Basra's Chief Justice is impressive and there are a number of other competent judges in Basra who seek to uphold the rights of the individual. But militia influence and intimidation is a grave threat to judicial independence. Under Iraqi law, it is the police who instigate and conduct preliminary investigations of criminal complaints but they are subject to the authority of a magistrate during the ensuing formal judicial investigation. The Iraqi Police Service has subverted the relationship between the police and the judiciary. There appears to have been no judicial control over the detention of prisoners in the Jameat prison facility. Not surprisingly, Basra judges involved in combating corruption have expressed concern for their personal security. There has also been under-investment in judicial infrastructure and training over the past 30 years. Basra's judges are under-resourced and out of touch with the latest legal thinking.

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18. Our aim is to empower Basra's judges and prosecutors to tackle serious crime (particularly police corruption) in a more secure, less intimidating environment. Our priorities for the next 6 months are to:
- build the capacity of judges and others involved in the judicial process through continued mentoring, specifically through
    - the work of the Prosecution Mentoring Unit, staffed by two international prosecutors funded by Better Basra. The PMU will continue to work closely with Iraqi judges and judicial investigators to help them bring effective prosecutions in high profile police corruption cases
    - Establishing regional training programmes and links with regional legal institutions.
  - improve security measures at the main Basra courthouse. Following a security review by the US Marshalls Service of the main Basra courthouse, the US committed to providing enhanced electronic security measures. Construction is expected to begin in March. MND(SE) have already taken steps to bolster the perimeter security of the courthouse and Denmark has provided court furniture.
  - build an additional courthouse, using US Department of Justice funds, to speed up the administration of justice. The new courthouse is on course for completion by November 2007. A witness protection facility will be incorporated in the courthouse to provide security for witnesses in high profile cases.
  - provide scenes of crime and forensic training for investigative judges and judicial investigators who will conduct the primary investigation at police stations

#### Prisons

19. Basra's prisons are old, overcrowded and do not meet minimum international human rights standards. Much has been done to improve conditions but capacity problems remain. Convicted prisoners are sometimes held in police custody; and there is very limited capacity to house new prisoners who might be transferred from police custody suites or from UK or US detention facilities. There are no separate dedicated facilities for juvenile and female prisoners.
20. Our objective is to support the development of an Iraqi Corrections System that complies with Iraqi law and international standards regarding capacity, conditions of confinement and humane treatment of prisoners by focussing on:
- increasing prison capacity by building and commissioning a new US-funded Basra Central Prison. This new prison will provide additional space for 1,500 prisoners and allow existing prisons to be dedicated for female and juvenile prisoners. Ownership of the land has now been transferred to the Ministry of Justice and construction will shortly begin.

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- continuing to strengthen the capacity of correctional services staff by implementing a UK training programme (funded by Better Basra) for staff assigned to the Basra Central Prison and further mentoring of senior staff, including the Director of the Iraqi Corrections Staff in the South and the two Prison Governors.
  - continuing to monitor management of the two existing prisons.
21. Our prisons advisers will also provide ad hoc support for police-related work, including inspecting and advising upon the management of the Warren site Police Detention Facility and the NIIA Custody suite and the welfare of those being detained there.

#### *Governance*

22. A key indicator of success is a Provincial Council administering business effectively, providing better basic services and communicating with its electorate. We have tried to help the Basra Provincial Council to show that it is in charge and to accept responsibility for its role in improving basic services. There is no shortage of money available for Basra from Central Government but the latter is reluctant to release substantial resources because the Basra provincial government has limited technical and administrative capacity and a reputation for corruption. Our focus has therefore been on enabling the Council to plan for, access and spend resources in a prioritised, transparent and accountable way and develop an effective working relationship with Baghdad to ensure Basra gets its share of the budget.
23. This work has begun to bear fruit. In 2006 the Provincial Council adopted a Provincial Development Strategy and let over 300 contracts from the \$172 million allocated by Baghdad for provincial reconstruction and development. In February 2007, we helped the Provincial Government to send a high level delegation to Baghdad to publicise the progress it had made and seek further resources.
24. We will continue to help the Provincial Government to deliver services by:
- helping them to unlock Iraqi funds from Central Government by facilitating closer links between Basra and Baghdad. We will work in Baghdad with central Ministries to release the necessary funds in a timely way.
  - building capacity to account for these funds transparently
  - strengthening the capacity of the provincial government to spend its budget properly by establishing a Budget Execution Office in the Governor's office
  - strengthening mechanisms for monitoring project implementation
  - addressing local blockages to disbursement, including lack of technical capacity
  - separating the roles of the Provincial Council and Governor

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## Infrastructure

25. Basrawis have mixed perceptions on improvement to their quality of life since 2003. While access to potable water and sewage services has improved, the availability of electricity from the national grid has not. Much of Coalition's expenditure on reconstruction has been for refurbishment and replacement of existing services to prevent ageing infrastructure from failing, not on providing additional infrastructure. Added to which, increasing demand for services, particularly electricity, has compounded negative perceptions. There is considerable disappointment that the Coalition and the Provincial Council have not made more "visible" progress. Basrawis are encouraged by the lead that the Provincial Council are beginning to take and there is some recognition of our support to them in doing so.
26. Despite the challenges, our objective is to support the Provincial Council to deliver better services using Iraqi resources, while continuing to use CERP funding, where appropriate, to fund development of infrastructure, specifically:
- focusing infrastructure support on "last mile service provision" by:
    - upgrading and renewing the low voltage power distribution network in Basra, which will allow up to 1 million Basrawis to access power as the National Grid comes on line.
    - continuing to improve access to potable water to within 500m of 89% of the Basra population, in some cases for the first time.
    - improving sanitation and public health by continued replacement and restoration of the sewage systems and, in conjunction with the PRDC, expanding the network in order to provide first-time access to this facility.
  - supporting the Provincial Council and the Council's Provincial Reconstruction and Development Committee to deliver a range of targeted public works, primarily improvements to roads and drainage, and upgrading irrigation capacity.
  - building the Provincial Council's ability to manage and maintain public utilities.
  - increasing Iraqi buy-in for Coalition-funded projects by ensuring that the Provincial Council is consulted.
27. In addition, DFID's £40 million infrastructure programme will be completed over the next nine months. Once finished, these projects will have employed around 450 people, generated almost 100,000 workdays and secured around 17,000 workdays per year for operation and maintenance. They will have added or secured enough power to supply the equivalent of 24 hour electricity for around 1 million people and improved access to water for one million people in Basra.

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28. By mid-April, DFID will have:

- refurbished a reverse osmosis unit at Az-Zubayr, providing drinking water via vendors for around 500,000 additional people per day in Basra
- refurbished the Al Hartha Pump Station, improving the water supply for 500,000 people
- installed a new gas compressor in Dhi Qar, providing enough additional electricity to supply 200,000 people with 24 hour power.

29. By the end of 2007, DFID will have:

- completed the construction of three water towers and reservoirs in the Al Hayaniyah district (Shia Flats), one of the poorest and most difficult areas of Basra, which together with work being done by MND(SE) to enhance water network connections, will improve water supplies to the homes of around 250,000 people
- provided new turbine blades at Khor Az Zubayr power station, adding or securing enough electricity to supply around 200,000 people with 24 hour power.

#### Economic Development

30. Iraq has the world's third largest proven oil reserves, two thirds of which are in Basra province. The major oil companies are poised to invest in Basra once the security situation improves and the new Hydrocarbons Law is in place. Basra is Iraq's outlet to the Gulf with a large port at Umm Qasr (which, if modernised, could offer significant regeneration and employment prospects). There is also talk of a new grand port project (which would be the largest in the region). Discussions may be about to begin with Iran about dredging the Shatt al Arab Waterway. Basra also has a lot of potential in its agricultural and food-processing sector.
31. The main engine for economic recovery will be private sector investment. This will depend on improvement in the security situation and the regulatory framework (where the passage of the new Investment Law should help). Basra also needs help in boosting employment, especially in the agricultural sector, and through assistance to faltering state-owned enterprises; better credit facilities for small businesses; and the abolition of bureaucratic barriers to business development and trade.
32. The PRT have provided training for 60 Agricultural Directorate staff and 1,000 people in business and enterprise skills. More than 400,000 work days have been created through CERPS-funded reconstruction projects; and MND(SE)'s date palm regeneration project has created thousands of jobs.

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33. Going forward, our priorities will be to boost job creation; lay the foundations for more entrepreneurial activity and cross-border trade; support the agricultural sector; and build the provincial government's capacity to support economic development. Specifically, we will:

- help the GOI to set up a Provincial Development Agency in Basra
- establish a Basra Development Fund to provide credit for SMEs
- create a Bankers' Forum
- oversee the production and publication of a Basra Investment Guide
- work to reduce barriers to trade, including through organising a tomato exporters' visit to Kuwait and a Regional Economic Conference
- implement the second phase of the Date Palm Regeneration Project (creating 3,000 jobs) and restore irrigation and drainage infrastructure
- provide vocational training in the agricultural sector
- support the establishment of an "Oil Academy" at Basra University as a technical centre of excellence
- help the provincial administration to work with the Central Government on key economic issues for Basra including special economic zones and the future of state-owned enterprises.

#### *Strategic Communications*

34. The political plan needs to be supported by a co-ordinated information campaign (co-ordinated by the Media Issues Group). Wherever possible, we need to get Iraqis to deliver key messages on our behalf.

35. We need to enlist Iraqis to get out the message that:

- the Coalition is serious about transitioning the security file
- Iraqi leaders are responsible for the pace of transition to PIC
- the sooner the security environment improves, the sooner we can move to PIC. Attacks against MNF will only slow the process down; and kill Iraqis. IDF harms Basra, its people, its capacity for wealth and threatens its future.
- the purpose of strike operations is to target criminals and malign Iranian influence, not the local population.
- Basra's provincial authorities are spending their reconstruction budget to make Basra better and the Coalition is helping them to achieve their ambitions both through capacity-building and support for reconstruction.

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36. The PRT should help to build the capacity of the Provincial Council to communicate more effectively what they are doing to help Basra and what the PIC process involves (eg by appointing a spokesperson; producing a coherent communications strategy; and producing appropriate materials). In parallel, the PRT should also support the capacity of local civil society groups to hold the Provincial Council to account.
37. While trying to reach our audience through Iraqi opinion formers, we should continue to deploy our messages through local press briefings, interviews and articles in the most popular local news outlets and by a targeted programme of media visits, particularly focused on key events such as the fourth anniversary of the invasion in mid-March. We need to intensify information operations to publicise the nature and extent of Coalition assistance in Basra.

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Better Basra Annex A

## KEY BENCHMARKS FOR 2007

### Political

#### March 2007

- Opening of regular dialogue with Provincial Council on security, reconstruction and governance issues. Boycott of MNF lifted.
- Local politicians publicly criticise IDF attacks
- Political support maintained for targeted strike operations
- Tribal Council established to work with MNF
- Initial contacts established with some elements of Basra OMS/JAM

#### June 2007

- Visible improvement in cooperation between MNF and the Provincial Council based on perception of growing convergence of interests in run up to PIC
- Some elements of OMS/JAM detached from militant JAM

### Security

#### March 2007

- Growing confidence of Iraqi Army sustained. Engaged in operations against increasingly harder targets
- Iraqi Special Forces conducting strike operations against JAM
- Level of IDF attacks against MNF sites reduced
- New and more effective Chairman of Emergency Security Committee
- Some key death squad leaders from former Serious Crimes Unit and militant JAM commanders detained

#### June 2007

- Smooth transfer of MNF bases at Shaibah, the Old State Building and the Shatt Al Arab Hotel without any looting or JAM propaganda victory
- Level of IDF attacks against Basra Palace and the COB reduced
- Key militant JAM leaders, death squad leaders and Iranian proxies removed from circulation
- Basra Provincial Council members and security leaders no longer afraid to speak out because of JAM intimidation

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## Rule of Law

### March 2007

- New, more effective, Provincial Director of Police in place
- New Criminal Investigations Unit established (to replace the former Serious Crimes Unit) and mentoring started
- 80% of police stations at Transitional Readiness Assessment (TRA) Level 2

### June 2007

- Committals for trial in police corruption investigations, at least one high-profile conviction
- New (US-funded) courthouse 60% complete
- Joint Leadership Academy established at Basra Air Station
- Forensic Laboratory established at Basra Police HQ
- Electronic security equipment installed at Basra courthouse
- Regional training programme for Basra judicial personnel underway
- Building of new (US-funded) Basra Central Prison underway. Recruitment, vetting and training (UK-funded) of 1,000 Iraqi Corrections Officers started.

## Governance

### March 2007

- Provincial Council establishes a structured and effective working relationship with Baghdad
- Provincial Council demonstrates that it is spending money on improving Basra's basic services by publishing details of FY2006 and FY2007 provincial reconstruction budget allocation
- Impediments to spending Iraqi funds (including shortage of technical capacity) identified and flagged up to Baghdad

### June 2007

- Provincial Council convinces Baghdad that it is delivering on implementation of the FY 2006 and 2007 budgets and receives further funding in the June mid-year review
- Publication of Reconstruction Progress Review Report (listing all projects undertaken in 2003-06) and a Provincial Resource Statement for 2007
- Respective roles of Governor and Provincial Council in planning and execution of provincial reconstruction budget clarified in a charter based on new Provincial Powers legislation

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- UNDP project to establish Budget Execution Office in the Governor's Office underway
- 2008-2010 Provincial Development Strategy agreed with Baghdad taking account of wide public consultation exercise

#### Infrastructure

##### March 2007

- Reverse osmosis unit at Az Zubayr refurbished, providing bottled drinking water via vendors to 500,000 additional people
- Al Hartha Water Pumping Station refurbished, improving water supply for 500,000
- Gas compressor station installed in pipeline near Nasiriyah, adding 60 MW to the national grid

##### June 2007

- Khor-Az-Zubayr Power Station generator rebladed, increasing power available on national grid by 60MW and securing 40MW
- 200km of pipes repaired/replaced and new connections added: better water for 900,000
- New sewage system installed for 75,000 people. Sewage overhauled for 345,000
- Over one million work days created by infrastructure projects in first half 2007
- realistic plan with budget prepared for maintenance of water & electricity infrastructure

#### Economic development

##### March 2007

- Basra Investment Guide published
- Modalities for establishing Provincial Development Agency agreed
- Basra tomato exporters' visit to Kuwait organised and report sent to Baghdad
- Plan to establish Basra Development Fund agreed with GOI

##### June 2007

- Basra Development Fund established with USD20m from GOI
- Provincial Development Agency established, with 10 development projects in pipeline
- Investment secured for first tomato paste factory
- Bankers' Forum established
- Committee established to discuss roadblocks to business development with key business stakeholders and policy makers

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- Establishment of Oil Research Department at Basra University agreed with key stakeholders, including oil majors
- Plans in place to stand up/privatise one state-owned enterprise

#### Communications

##### March 2007

- Public support from Basra's political and security leaders for UK reposturing plans and MNF operations
- Provincial Council starts to communicate more effectively what it is doing to improve basic services in Basra
- Provincial Council publicly acknowledges international reconstruction effort in Basra
- More positive coverage of Coalition efforts in the local media
- A proactive media strategy for the 4<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the invasion, resulting in balanced international media coverage in Basra

##### June 2007

- Opinion polls show local opinion more positive about MNF
- Opinion polls show local opinion more positive about local governance

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## 1. Political Engagement

Strategic objective: Sustainable Iraqi Government control beyond PIC, able to resolve confrontations without serious violence and where other political forces can contain JAM.

	Issue	Objective	Benchmarks		Lead	Support
			31 Mar 07	30 Jun 07		
1	Unlike the Governor, the Basra Provincial Council has not accepted that cooperation with MNF is an important condition for early transition to PIC	Basrawi political leaders make the case for PIC and take responsibility for meeting PIC conditions	Provincial Council's boycott of MNF lifted. Opening of regular dialogue with Provincial Council on security, reconstruction and governance issues.	More co-operative relationship established between MNF and Provincial Council	CG	GOC POLADS
2	MNF's withdrawal from bases in the city risks being exploited by JAM and the Iranians as a propaganda victory	Reposturing out of the city centre creates a more positive political dynamic in Basra	Positive response from Basra's political and security leaders to the Prime Minister's announcement	Opinion polls show more positive attitude to MNF  JAM unable to capitalise on reposturing	CG	GOC POLADS
3	Intimidation by subversive forces obstructs co-operation on meeting PIC conditions	JAM influence reduced, leading to drop in IDF and more political space for moderate politicians	Local politicians publicly criticise IDF attacks.  Leading tribal and religious sheikhs use their influence to contain JAM and stop IDF attacks  Initial contacts established with some elements of Basra OMS/JAM	Some elements of OMS/JAM detached from militant JAM  Moderate political figures willing to speak out publicly against corruption and criminality and to acknowledge benefits of cooperation with MNF	CG	GOC POLADS

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	Issue	Objective	Benchmarks		Lead	Support
			31 Mar 07	30 Jun 07		
4	Central Government and national party leaders not paying sufficient attention to Basra	Central Government prioritises decisions that affect Basra and takes action to help us meet PIC conditions	<p>Strong and independent security chiefs appointed</p> <p>Pressure on Basra Provincial Council from Central Government and national party leadership to cooperate with MNF</p> <p>Barham Saleh maintains pressure on Basra Provincial Council to follow up on their commitments at Basra Development Forum</p>	Maliki and his key advisers back our plans for meeting PIC conditions	CG	<p>BE Baghdad</p> <p>GOC</p> <p>POLADS</p>

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2. Security				
Strategic objective: Better security environment in Basra City as a result of improved effectiveness of Iraqi security focus				
	Deliverables	Benchmarks		Lead
		31 Mar 07	30 Jun 07	
1	Iraqi Army shows increasing confidence. Able and willing to take on JAM	Iraqi Special Forces engaged in strike operations against JAM Iraqi Army take on more demanding tasks.	Smooth transfer of MNF bases to Iraqi Army. No looting.	MND(SE)
2	Support ISF capacity building	Achieve TRA level 2 for IA, IPS and DBE. Mentoring IA, IPS and DBE at bn, bde and Div. Cull of malign IPS MiTT with 10 (IA) Div Jt Ops. ISF led Ops against malign influences. Open DTC. Over 60% public confidence in IA, IPS and DBE to discharge its responsibilities.	ISOF coy in Basrah FOC Open JLA. Mentoring IA, IPS and DBE at bn, bde and Div on request. Cull of malign IPS taken on by Gol and Provincial Council MiTT with 10 (IA) Div Jt Ops on request ISF led Ops routine Public confidence in IA, IPS and DBE to discharge its responsibilities over 80%.	
3	Public confidence in the Iraqi Army continues to increase or at least stay at current levels	80% of public have some confidence in the Iraqi Army in Basra	No less than 80%	MND(SE)
4	Defeat threats to UK/IZ security	Reduce or eradicate IDF threat to bases Minimise or neutralise IED and SAF attacks on MNF	Nil attacks against MNF	

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5	Disrupt militia activity Deny MND(SE) as a base to terrorists. Protect CF Freedom of Manoeuvre	Strike Ops. MJAM less capable to conduct aggression. Deny FoM to JAM and maintain FoM for MNF. Deny FoA to JAM and maintain FoM for MNF. Disrupt munitions supplies to MI.  Fracture JAM from base support.	Maintain the capability to conduct Strike Ops. MJAM less capable. Moderate Jam accommodated. Deny FoM to JAM and maintain FoM for MNF. Deny FoA to JAM and maintain FoM for MNF.	MND(SE)
6	PIC	Maysaan and Basrah to PIC.	N/A	
7	A reduction in the monthly murder rate and particularly in targeted assassinations	Maintain downward trend of reported murder rates	Ongoing through to June 07	MND(SE)

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3. Rule of Law

Strategic objective: help Iraqis apply the principle that all persons and institutions, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to publicly promulgated laws that are equally enforced, independently adjudicated, and consistent with international human rights standards.

Specific Objective 1: To empower Basra's judges and prosecutors to tackle serious crime (particularly IPS corruption) in a more secure, less intimidating environment.

Issue		Deliverables	Benchmarks			Lead	Support
			31 Mar 07	30 Jun 07	31 Mar 08		
1.1	Lack of capacity to investigate and prosecute cases of violent crime and corruption conducted by IPS.	Prosecution Mentoring Unit (PMU) enables development of DIA	Department of Internal Affairs (DIA) institutes police corruption investigations under authority of Basra Investigating Magistrate	i. Committals for trial ordered in DIA investigations  ii. At least one conviction in high-profile corruption case	Continued monitoring and mentoring of DIA processes through at least December '07	PMU	PRT
1.2	Basra central courthouse is insecure environment and judges live under threat of attack.	Improve security of existing courthouse.	Contracting process for electronic equipment complete.	Electronic equipment installed	post-installation review of security situation to determine if enhanced equipment required	PRT	FCO DOJ  US Marshals
1.3	Insufficient capacity in existing courthouse to process cases efficiently	Build new courthouse, complete with latest security technology	Construction 30 %t complete	Construction 60% complete	Construction complete	PRT	N/a

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Issue		Deliverables	Benchmarks			Lead	Support
			31 Mar 07	30 Jun 07	31 Mar 08		
1.4	Lack of training for judicial personnel and a need to develop forensic skills.	Design and implement appropriate training programme in at least one training institute.	Following work with the local judiciary, training needs and substance of programme identified.	Complete programme - 20 Judges trained	Complete study to review long-term impact of program	PRT	N/a
		Deliver forensic training for judges and investigators	12 personnel trained	24 Personnel trained – measurable improvement in forensics procedures	N/a	J7/SSR	PRT
1.5	Courthouse procedures and management skills need development.	In consultation with officials in the judicial system, design and implement a training programme for relevant judiciary members.	Hold initial consultations and training needs analysis.	Funding secured and training underway	Training complete	PRT	N/a

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Issue		Deliverables	Benchmarks			Lead	Support
			31 Mar 07	30 Jun 07	31 Mar 08		
1.6	Lack of equipment and materials, and programs to support development of the judiciary.	<p>i. Explore possibility of Danish/UNDP proposal to make Basra Central a "model courthouse" by provision of IT, library etc.</p> <p>ii. Improve University Law School through provision of essential resources.</p>	Needs analysis to determine essential requirements. Secure funding	Equipment and materials provided and installed.	Follow-up study to determine efficacy.	PRT	N/a
1.7	Lack of Permanent facility for Judicial Training in Basra	Establish "Judicial Academy" to promote advanced exchange and legal education throughout the judiciary.	Needs analysis to determine essential requirements. Secure funding	Site Secured through Iraqi funding. Establish curriculum and programs	Follow-up study to determine efficacy.	PRT	

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Issue		Deliverables	Bench marks			Lead	Support
			31 Mar 07	30 Jun 07	31 Mar 08		
1.8	Judiciary/ legal professionals have limited contact with regional colleagues	Establish working contact with judiciary/legal contacts in neighbouring Gulf states through joint seminars, information exchange, shared training and best practice.	Identify appropriate partners in neighbouring states and what they can offer	MOUs established. Planning for shared training and/or seminars in place. Information exchange in place.  Major judicial conference taken place	Follow-up study to determine if regional exchanges require further mentoring	PRT	N/a
1.9	Financial arrangements for funding of the Iraq Police Services and Judiciary are confused and lacking in transparency	An agreed structure and accountability framework, with clear procedures for determining provincial and/or national responsibilities for funding streams and operational budget requirements;	Initial functional analysis and agreed model structure complete	A fully Iraqi-owned and funded draft Strategic Plan agreed.	Analysis of efficacy of new systems and procedures.	PRT	J7, CPA, PMU

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Specific Objective 2 – Police: Institute programmes designed to develop law enforcement institutions that effectively maintain public order and safety, consistent with Iraqi and international human rights standards							
<b>i. Protect the gains</b>							
2.1	Operational procedures in some Basra city police stations below appropriate transition readiness standards	Provide the necessary mentoring and assistance to ensure 80% of police stations in Basra reach Transition Readiness Assessment (TRA) level 2	Levels achieved	Continued monitoring to ensure levels are maintained	N/a	CivPol / IPAs with SSR/J7	N/a
<b>ii. Strengthen IPS leadership</b>							
2.3	Leadership skills are lacking	Establish Joint (civ/mil) Leadership Academy PDoP and other senior officers have more effective leadership and command and control skills	Planning and tendering process underway.	Academy established and courses being run.	X# personnel have completed academy instruction	SSR/J7 with CivPol/ IPAs	N/a
<b>iii. Rapidly build specialist units</b>							
2.4	Limited capacity to investigate serious crimes.	Establish Basra Crimes Unit (BCU) Monitor the new Basra NIIA unit and mentor as necessary.	Basra Central Unit established. Mentoring programme for NIIA established.	Measurable improvement in Capacity to investigate serious crimes	N/a	CivPol / IPAs with SSR/J7	N/a

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2.5	Lack of coordination among law enforcement elements on major incidents	Establish IPS lead in Permanent Joint Coordination Cell (PJCC)	IPS can effectively coordinate major incidents	N/a	N/a	SSR/J7	CivPol/IP As
2.6	No capacity to effectively prosecute crimes by Iraqi police	Build capacity of and mentor DIA	Investigations underway and the conviction and sentencing in at least one high-profile case	Conviction-sentencing rates continue to increase in proper proportion to caseload	N/a	CPA	PMU
Specific Objective 3 – Prisons: Support development of a corrections system that complies with Iraqi law and international standards regarding capacity, conditions of confinement and humane treatment of detainees							
3.1	Prisons in Basra are overcrowded and do not meet all minimum human rights standards	Ensure Iraqi management of existing (improved) prisons maintains acceptable operating standards and human rights standards are observed.	Unannounced inspection visits find continued improvement in existing prisons	Complete study, based on inspection results, to determine if further mentoring required	N/a	UK HMP Prison Adviser	N/a

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		Build new Basra Central Prison with properly vetted and trained personnel	Statement of Works signed by GRS; contracts drawn up and put out to tender	Building of new Basra Central Prison underway. Recruitment, vetting and training programme for 1,000 Iraqi Corrections Officers will have started.	Prison construction complete, staff trained	US Correctional Service / UK HMP Advisers	N/a
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## 4. Governance

Strategic objective : Provincial Council together with the Provincial administration are more robust organisations capable of effective government, with more money to spend on reconstruction and better equipped and managed to spend it effectively in ways likely to increase public support for the Council.

Specific Objectives 1: Increase funds available to the PC for reconstruction

Issue		Deliverables	Benchmarks			Lead	Support
			31 Mar 07	30 Jun 07	31 Mar 08		
1	Basra's development requirements exceed currently available resources	Increase Basra's share of National Development and Reconstruction Funds from 2006 levels of Iraqi dinar 258 billion	Provincial Council lobbies for more funds during visit by high level delegation to Baghdad	Provincial Council secures additional funds in mid year review of the 2007 budget.	n/a	PRT	DFID (Baghdad)
		Increase Basra's share of spending by Iraqi national Ministries.	Provincial Council lobbies Ministries of Finance and Planning during visit by high level delegation to Baghdad	Agreed framework for regular interaction with Central Ministries	n/a	PRT	n/a
		Increase donor funding available for Basra in 2007 reflecting priorities in Provincial	Request for \$100 Million of CERPs funding approved	Request for 2008 CERP funds made	Basra continues to receive CERP funding	J9	PRT

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Issue	Deliverables	Benchmarks			Lead	Support
		31 Mar 07	30 Jun 07	31 Mar 08		
	Development Strategy	All Economic Support Funds (\$40 Million) committed to projects in Provincial Development Strategy	Application made by council for additional ESF funds	Council accessing additional ESF funds	PRT	n/a
		At least one Japanese project tendered	Work begins on at least one Japanese project and a further 2 are tendered	All 5 Japanese projects in the south begun	PRT	DFID FCO (Basra/ Baghdad/ London)
	Maintain coordination between all donors and the PC to maximise impact of donor support	The Southern Iraq Donor Regional Group starts to meet again	Group has met monthly	Group continues to meet monthly	PRT	n/a
Specific objective 2: Basra 2007 budget is adequately resourced and executed in a timely, transparent and accountable manner, delivering to poorer parts of Basra.						
2.1	Existing plans do not focus on the most disadvantaged areas. This is important to contribute to stabilisation and security.	Reinforce planning principles for 2008-2010 PDS focussing on consultation.	Provincial Council has established realistic service delivery levels in all sectors	Provincial Council has implemented a community consultation plan targeting disadvantaged communities	The PC has repeated the process for 2009-2011 to demonstrate sustainable capacity	PRT n/a

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Issue		Deliverables	Benchmarks			Lead	Support
			31 Mar 07	30 Jun 07	31 Mar 08		
2.2	Not enough of the Provincial Council's reconstruction budget is spent in the poorest and most disadvantaged areas	Persuade Provincial Council to direct more resources to "Sinbad red (ie low consent) areas"	A higher proportion of the 2007 budget allocated to red areas	Process continues	Process in train to repeat process in 2008	PRT	n/a
2.3	Delays in budget planning and execution	Identify and resolve spending blockages Secure MOF approval Publish 2007 budget	A fully resourced 2007 budget approved by MOF and published	Provincial Council initiates a formal review of 2007 budget, including the production and publication of 2007 provincial resource statement.	n/a	PRT	n/a
Specific objective 3: Provincial Council spends available money							
3.1							
	From 2006 Budget, PC has only spent 33 of 258 billion – MOF has extended the budget year to 31/03/07. PC should make best use of remaining 225 billion	Find and clear blockages to timely project implementation in Provincial Treasury and Accounting Office (PTAO) or elsewhere	GO identified and cleared delays in spending	GO agreed processes plan for PTAO and started to implement	Effective PTAO operational.	PRT	MND (SE), UNDP
		Build capacity PTAO	PTAO completes 2006 budget spending	PTAO have demonstrated 2007 budget spend is on track	n/a		

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Issue		Deliverables	Benchmarks			Lead	Support
			31 Mar 07	30 Jun 07	31 Mar 08		
3.2	Provincial Council and Governor's Office unable to provide accurate and timely information on spending	Secure access to central MOF Financial Management Information System (FMIS)	MOF agreed to provide fast-track FMIS installation	FMIS is installed and running	n/a	PRT	NCT
		Provincial Council publishes reconstruction progress report (2003-06)	Priority sectors (Power and Water) published	All sector report published	n/a		
3.3	Confusion of roles between Provincial Council and Governor and between the Provincial and National governments causing conflict between legislature and executive, duplication of effort and delays in budgeting and spending.	Clarify respective roles and responsibilities of the Provincial Council and Governor and of the provincial and national governments	Provincial Council and Governor agree a charter (based on the Provincial Powers legislation) clarifying their respective roles	Provincial Council approved new structure and implementation begins. Publication of first provincial charter and code of conduct.	Provincial Council and Governor's Office have completed implementation	PRT	n/a

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Specific objective 4: PC can account for its 2006 and 2007 budgets and use information to inform future budgets						
4.1	Lack of transparency in Provincial Council does spending	PC should prepare and make accessible annual financial statement and promotes its activities.	PC provides quarterly public update of activities	PC provides quarterly public update of activities	2007 Annual Report and Financial Statements prepared	PRT n/a

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5. Infrastructure and basic services
Strategic objective: Improve the quality of basic services in the poorer areas of Basra through labour intensive public works which generate significant numbers of jobs
Specific objective 1: Improve access to electricity

Issue		Objective	Benchmarks			Lead	Support
			31 Mar 07	30 Jun 07	31 Mar 08		
1.1	A significant percentage of the population does not have access to electricity	1. Improved access to mains electricity, through 'last mile' projects	Electrical Program 1 on-going, improving access to power for almost 1m people	Program 1 completed	N/A	PRT	
		2. Secondary effect of improved efficacy of water pump station and access to water	Electrical Program 2 commenced, improving power supply to 220k people	Program 2 completed			
1.2		Increase generating capacity at Khor Az Zubayr power station	Re-blading completed, with 150MW secure and increasing capacity by 35MW	N/A	N/A	PRT	
1.3		Improve gas supply to power stations	Gas compressor installed, with 38MW secure and increasing capacity by 20MW	N/A	N/A	PRT	

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Issue	Objective	Benchmarks			Lead	Support
		31 Mar 07	30 Jun 07	31 Mar 08		

## Infrastructure

**Strategic Objective:** Improve the quality of basic services in the poorer areas of Basra through labour intensive public works, which generate significant numbers of jobs

**Specific Objective 2:** Improve access to clean water

Issue		Objective	Benchmarks			Lead	Support
			31 Mar 07	30 Jun 07	31 Mar 08		
2.1	Access to clean water remains limited	Refurbish reverse osmosis plant at Khor Az-Zubayr	Work completed, improving access to clean water for 250k people	N/A	N/A	PRT	
2.2		Refurbish Hartha pump station	Work completed, improving water supply for 500k people	N/A	N/A	PRT	
2.3		Build three water towers in Al Hayaniyah	Work ongoing	Work completed, improving water quality for 250k people	N/A	PRT	

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Issue		Objective	Benchmarks			Lead	Support
			31 Mar 07	30 Jun 07	31 Mar 08		
2.4		Improve household access to water through 'last mile' water connections, by repair and replacing 200km of pipe	Phase 1 work ongoing – improving access to water for 900k people	Phase 1 work completed	Phase 2 completed	PRT	

## Infrastructure

**Strategic Objective:** Improve the quality of basic services in the poorer areas of Basra through labour intensive public works, which generate significant numbers of jobs

**Specific Objective 3:** Wider infrastructure improvements

Issue		Objective	Benchmarks			Lead	Support
			31 Mar 07	30 Jun 07	31 Mar 08		
3.1	Basra's storm water systems are degraded and ineffective	Improving drainage, to protect 100k homes from flooding	On-going work, improving access to clean water for 250k people	Project completed	N/A	PRT	
3.2	Basra's sewage systems are degraded and ineffective	Install sewage system, improving access for 75k people	Project commenced	Project completed	N/A	PRT	
		Rehabilitate old, degraded sewage system, through drainage diversion, benefiting 345k people	Project commenced	Project completed			

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Issue		Objective	Benchmarks			Lead	Support
			31 Mar 07	30 Jun 07	31 Mar 08		
3.3	Municipal infrastructure is poor in lower socio-economic areas of Basra	Highway improvement, including repairs and re-surfacing of roads, kerbs and footpaths	On-going work	Project completed	N/A	PRT	
3.4	Inadequate irrigation to support date palm industry	Renovation of irrigation system, affecting 350ha	Project completed	N/A	N/A	PRT	
3.5	Al Ashar Bridge, on a significant thoroughfare, is in a poor state of repair	Repair bridge					
3.6	Municipal infrastructure in Jameat area	Replace Jameat IPS station with suitable community facility	1. Clear site to green-field status 2. In conjunction with PC, determine suitable purpose				
3.7	Facilities at Basra International Airport are inadequate to cater for commercial development	Renovate cargo facility	Project commenced	Project completed			
		Airfield operations limited by lack of ICAO accreditation	Project scoped	Project commenced	Project completed		

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Infrastructure							
Strategic Objective: Improve the quality of basic services in the poorer areas of Basra through labour intensive public works, which generate significant numbers of jobs							
Specific Objective 4: Build capacity of Governor's Office and Provincial Technical Directorates to manage and maintain utilities							
4.1	Provincial council lacks capacity to manage and maintain utilities	Develop team in the Governor's Office and in Provincial Technical Directorates, that are capable of managing and maintaining complex utilities infrastructure	Team created, with responsibility for managing utilities	Structured plan and budget prepared for maintenance of utilities	Plan being implemented and fully resourced	PRT	

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6. Economic development

**Strategic objective: Regeneration of Basra's economy.** To be stable Basra needs an economy that promotes legitimate enterprise, attracts direct investment from without, eases exports, supports a diversified agricultural sector and progressively raises the living standards of its inhabitants. Basra must improve access to credit, do away with needless bureaucratic barriers to business development and trade, re-establish its food-processing industry, and modernize its agricultural sector if its citizens are eventually to prosper. More immediately, Basra needs help in boosting employment, especially in the agricultural sector and through assistance to faltering SOEs.

**Specific objective: Stimulate sectors of the economy with big growth potential**

	Issue	Deliverables	Benchmarks			Lead	Support
			31 Mar 07	30 Jun 07	31 Mar 08		
1	Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) cannot access legitimate sources of credit	Establish Basra Development Fund (BDF) and basic capacity to manage the fund.	GOI agrees to establish Basra Development Fund  Governance structure and implementing agency agreed and in place.	\$20 m secured from GOI and others to establish BDF  Governance structure and implementing agency agreed and in place.	50 new investment projects supported by BDF	PRT	

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	Issue	Deliverables	Benchmarks			Lead	Support
			31 Mar 07	30 Jun 07	31 Mar 08		
2	Lack of development planning and coordinated use of financial resources to promote effective development and regeneration in Basrah	Establish a Provincial Development Agency (PDA) to promote development and attract investment to Basra	Provincial Council (PC) develops and approves proposal for creation of the PDA.	PDA established.  10 x non-reconstruction development projects in pipeline.	Priorities and approaches set for economic development, government spending and policy directions for a private sector led economy set.  Financial, technical, advisory and practical assistance provided to 100 investment projects.  10 x non-reconstruction development projects delivered.	PRT	PC

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	Issue	Deliverables	Benchmarks			Lead	Support
			31 Mar 07	30 Jun 07	31 Mar 08		
3	Basra businesses – particular agricultural based – unable to export to Kuwait because of arbitrary trade barriers.	GOI to reach agreement with Kuwaiti Government for removal of trade barrier.  Support business to access new opportunities.	10 Iraqi tomato farmers on export visit to Kuwait.	Regional Conference on trade barriers begins process of easing restrictions.	Removal of trade barriers.  100 x Iraqi companies trading across Iraq – Kuwait border – creating an estimated 10000 jobs.	PRT	PC/GOI
4	Large areas of the existing irrigation and drainage structure is malfunctioning thus resulting in heavy decline in agricultural production.	Restoration of irrigation and drainage infrastructure. (Part of the date palm restoration project)	Part one of project completed	Part two of project delivered	Full project delivered		
5	Basra date palm industry is neglected.	Establish second Date Palm Restoration project.	1000 temporary jobs created.	3000 temporary jobs created.	200-350 hectares		
6	Lack of developed food industry in Basra. This industry represents a huge potential for job creation and economic development for the Province.	Establishment of food industries.	Plans for the first tomato paste factory prepared.	Investment funding secured for the first tomato paste factory.	First tomato paste factory operating.  500 jobs secured.	Private investor. (Iraqi or foreign)	PRT, PRDC

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	Issue	Deliverables	Benchmarks			Lead	Support
			31 Mar 07	30 Jun 07	31 Mar 08		
7	Lack of coordination amongst bankers regarding credit management and credit facilitation.	Bankers Forum established.	Plans for Bankers Forum finalised.	Bankers Forum established with space, staffing and financing in place	New credit facilities agreed and implemented. Banking services modernized.		
8	Lack of data of Basra economy.	Available data of Basra economy. Baseline database established.	Basra Business and Investment Guide (BBIG) published.	Proposal for Basra baseline survey made. BBIG website created and maintained by Basra PC	Economic database containing data from baseline survey established and ongoing updated.		

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	Issue	Deliverables	Benchmarks			Lead	Support
			31 Mar 07	30 Jun 07	31 Mar 08		
9	Lack of Iraqi engagement and capacity to administer programs and take lead on economic development.	Examples of Iraqi engagement in planning & administering economic development programs and initiatives.	<p>Iraqi farmers engagement with government officials at home and in Kuwait.</p> <p>Iraqi Provincial Directorates of Agricultural Extension officers engagement with central MOA officers in relation to new role of extension through a study tour to Denmark</p>	More examples.	<p>Yet more examples flowing from work plan.</p> <p>Training of trainers for "farmer field school" activities and for training farm and agri business managers.</p>		
10	The Basra oil sector has a huge potential, but research and development facilities are poor and underdeveloped.	Oil Academy at Basra University sponsored mainly from international oil companies.	Plans for Oil Academy discussed in EconDev SWG. "Go or No Go" decision taken.	If Iraqi "Go" for Oil Academy – stakeholders are identified, plans are in development and PRDC is involved.	Oil academy established and operational at Basra University	Econ/Dev SWG/PR T	International oil companies /PRDC

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	Issue	Deliverables	Benchmarks			Lead	Support
			31 Mar 07	30 Jun 07	31 Mar 08		
11	A number of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in Basra, including the fertilizer and cement factories, have good prospects of being rejuvenated, creating large-scale employment and, in time, being privatised.	A number of Basra SOE's are up-and-running, increasingly profitable and in train to be privatised.	First draft of "Basrah Province SOE privatization" plan ready and discussed in Econdev. SWG.  'Rescue committees' established for major SOEs	All stakeholders identified, business analysis of SOE potential in Basrah province done. Decision by PRDC to continue taken. 'Funding identified.  Plans developed to rejuvenate the two major SOEs.	5 SOE's successfully rejuvenated. Operational and in the process of being prepared for privatisation.	Econdev SWG/PRT	PRDC/PC/ Relevant ministries in Bagdad.
12	Foreign and domestic investors can not establish operations in the current security environment. This is a serious impeding factor for private sector business development.	Special Economic Zones (FTZ) are established.	Concept of Special Economic Zones discussed in Economic Development Sector Working Group on basis of a pre-feasibility study	If the SWG decides to pursue the concept, relevant stakeholders in Basra and Bagdad, are identified and a feasibility study commissioned	Action underway to establish a Special Economic Zone in Basrah province.	Econdev SWG PRT	PRDC/Relevant ministries in Bagdad.

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	Issue	Deliverables	Benchmarks			Lead	Support
			31 Mar 07	30 Jun 07	31 Mar 08		
13	There are numerous impediments to private sector business development in Basra.	Committee established with key policymakers and business representatives to highlight and remove barriers to business development	Plans for Committee discussed with stakeholders including the Provincial Reconstruction and Development Committee, entrepreneurs etc.	Committee established and action underway to identify roadblocks to investment	100 'road-blocks' to investment removed.	PRT	PC

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## 7. Strategic Communication

Strategic objective: Greater public understanding in Basra that the Coalition is serious about transitioning to PIC; that Iraqi leaders are responsible for the pace of transition; that IDF retards the process; that strike operations target criminals and terrorists, not the local population; and that MNF and the Provincial Government are making progress on reconstruction.

Specific Objective 1: Consistent and regular communication of key messages by MNF and local opinion formers. Whenever possible Iraqis will convey or at least endorse this message.

	Issue	Objective	Benchmarks		Lead	Support
			31 Mar 07	30 Jun 07		
1.1	Majority of Basrawis unaware of MNF funded reconstruction projects.	More positive local and regional media coverage of reconstruction through press events on reconstruction work and facilitated visits.	Detailed and accurate coverage of MNF achievements around 4 <sup>th</sup> anniversary.	<p>Polling rates up from 24% to 40% of population able to name a project.</p> <p>Regular coverage of PC's reconstruction efforts. PC publicly acknowledging international reconstruction effort.</p>	PIC	CG BE Baghdad
1.2	Little understanding of PIC, credibility of British intentions to transition voluntarily, or faith in ISF readiness	Higher awareness of process and Iraqi role in speeding transition. Also, awareness of ISF capability and MNF effort to support ISF. Methods, press releases, interviews, op-eds events and leaflet drop.	Accurate debate on PIC issues in local media, with local politicians publicly taking responsibility and being held to account. Basra's political and security leaders publicly backing PIC objectives and UK reposturing plans.	Ongoing.	Info opps	CG

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Better Basra Annex B Workplans 24 February 2007

Specific Objective 2: To improve the PC's strategic awareness of communication issues and build its capacity to deliver a coherent and effective communications strategy

	Issue	Objective	Benchmarks		Lead	Support
			31 Mar 07	30 Jun 07		
2.1	Provincial Council members lack awareness of strategic communications	Train and mentor key Provincial Council members in communications issues	Suitable training identified and set up.	Programme of training and mentoring agreed	PRT	CG PIC
2.2	Provincial Council has no effective communications strategy	i. Provincial Council develops communications strategy that emphasises progress & development	Communications working group established in Provincial Council	Provincial Council working group completes agreed strategy	PRT	CG PIC
		ii. Provincial Council appoints and empowers effective spokesperson	Spokesperson appointed.	Spokesperson appearing regularly in the media  Regular press briefings with Provincial Council members	PRT	CG PIC
		iii. Provincial Council regularly issues quality media releases and materials	With our support, Provincial Council identifies areas for improvement & plan to achieve this	PC is utilising best available media to push its messages	PRT	CG PIC

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Better Basra Annex B Workplans 24 February 2007

	Issue	Objective	Benchmarks		Lead	Support
			31 Mar 07	30 Jun 07		
2.3	Inadequate coverage of Provincial Government's achievements in local media	Provincial Government can identify good news stories & publicise them effectively using a range of communication tools.	More local media coverage of Provincial Government's role in reconstruction	Media coverage of PIC emphasises continuing service delivery by Provincial Government  Opinion polling shows that more Basrawis are satisfied with delivery of local services	PRT	CG PIC

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## BETTER BASRA PLAN BENCHMARKS REVIEW

ORIGINAL BENCHMARKS	BY WHEN	PROGRESS AGAINST 31 DECEMBER 2006 BENCHMARKS
<b>POLITICAL</b>		
▪ Supportive (or at least non-obstructive) behaviour by the Governor in relation to Operation Sinbad	December 2006	▪ Governor has been publicly supportive of Operation SINBAD and the MNF operation against the Serious Crimes Unit
▪ Central Government pressure on Governor maintained (e.g. another visit by NAM)	December 2006	▪ Governor has been increasingly cooperative on a range of issues, in pursuit of own agenda. ▪ Central Government pressure on Governor maintained by establishing the Basra Emergency Security Committee, excluding the Governor from responsibility for security
▪ Evidence of support by al-Sistani and influential local figures for Operation Salamanca	December 2006	▪ Al-Sistani's representative briefed on Operation SINBAD and generally supportive behind the scenes ▪ Senior tribal and religious figures supportive ▪ Increased levels of public consent for MNF
▪ More regular dialogue with the Provincial Council and acknowledgement by the Council of the support we are providing	December 2006	▪ After initially negative public response, Council gradually came on side but continued to complain that they had not been properly consulted about Op SINBAD reconstruction projects ▪ Relations with the Council deteriorated again after the destruction of the Jameat building and some elements of the Council imposed another boycott
▪ A more cooperative relationship with Fadhila	December 2006	▪ Significant improvement in relations with Fadhila following meeting in Dubai with senior Fadhila representatives from Baghdad and Najaf and the Wa'ili brothers. ▪ But Abu Salam's wing of the Fadhila party in Basra (which has fallen out with the Governor) remains hostile
▪ Governor replaced (if Provincial Council elections have been held) or his political influence eroded (if they have not)	April 2007	▪ Benchmark deleted
<b>SECURITY</b>		
▪ Better security environment in Basra city as a result of Operation Sinbad	December 2006	Improved levels of consent for MNF in all or part of 12 of the 16 Focus Areas into which the city was divided for Operation SINBAD

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# BETTER BASRA PLAN BENCHMARKS REVIEW

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ORIGINAL BENCHMARKS		DECLASSIFIED	PROGRESS AGAINST 31 DECEMBER 2006 BENCHMARKS
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A reduction in the level of attacks against MNF targets</li> </ul>	December 2006	Steady increase in IDF attacks against MNF sites in Basra. Further increase in IED attacks and signs of more sophisticated techniques being used.	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A reduction in the monthly murder rate and particularly in targeted assassinations</li> </ul>	December 2006	The reported monthly murder rate has declined from 130 in June to 29 in December. These figures are unreliable and incomplete but the trend is clear.	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Detention of leading death squad leaders</li> </ul>	December 2006	Strike operations continued against militant JAM and death squad leaders. The highlight was the arrest by UK forces in : and the arrest of two of the death squad leaders from the Serious Crimes Unit. But death squads have by no means been completely eradicated.	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A decline in sectarian violence</li> </ul>	December 2006	Level of sectarian violence has declined, as evidenced in the fall in the reported murder rate and the return of some Sunni families. But some targetted assassinations of Sunnis continue.	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Freedom of movement restored in Basra; MNF and civilian agencies able to move freely round the city</li> </ul>	April 2007	Freedom of movement for civilian agencies in Basra has sharply deteriorated.	
<b>RULE OF LAW: POLICE</b>			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Process launched to weed out unfit police officers</li> <li>Improvement in performance at mentored police stations, reflected in assessments</li> <li>70% of station commanders working to an adequate standard</li> <li>Reduction in IPS headcount, reflecting departure of unqualified and unfit officers</li> </ul>	December 2006    April 2007	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>56% of Basra police stations meet the appropriate transition readiness level</li> <li>Police effectiveness in performing basic tasks is improving as TRA levels rise though, overall, the police service remains unreliable and in parts actively criminal</li> <li>Biometric testing and interviews undertaken by Police Transition Teams at all police stations to collect the necessary data for weeding out unfit officers</li> <li>The Serious Crimes Unit disbanded and its headquarters demolished but many former SCU officers are still in circulation. New Basra Crimes Unit not yet established.</li> </ul>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Human rights passport for police and human rights posters distributed in most Basra police stations</li> </ul>	December 2006	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The passports printed and delivered. Distributed by Iraqis and Police Transition Teams.</li> </ul>	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Basra Security Co-ordinator sufficiently confident in abilities of IPS to recommend transition to PIC during 2007</li> </ul>	April 2007	Chairman of Basra Emergency Security Committee has not proved strong enough to get a firm grip on security problems in Basra. His weakness is now acknowledged by Maliki who is looking for a replacement.	

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## BETTER BASRA PLAN BENCHMARKS REVIEW

ORIGINAL BENCHMARKS	BY WHEN	PROGRESS AGAINST 31 DECEMBER 2006 BENCHMARKS
<b>RULE OF LAW: JUDICIARY</b>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Investigations launched by DIA into several cases of police corruption, leading to prosecution, and at least one judge in Basra willing to handle cases</li> <li>Convictions and sentencing in DIA cases, including at least one high profile case</li> </ul>	December 2006  April 2007	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>11 ongoing investigations into allegations of violent crime committed by Basra police officers</li> <li>Iraqi magistrate appointed and presiding over DIA cases</li> <li>Evidence gathering furthest advanced in Sheikh Yasun case (Safwan cleric); several other high-profile cases underway</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Prosecution and Mentoring Unit established</li> </ul>	December 2006	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Unit established and co-ordinating investigations with DIA and Basra Judiciary. Playing a key role in helping to mount prosecution cases.</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Contract let for the new Basra Courthouse</li> </ul>	December 2006	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Security and refurbishment of the existing Main Basra Courthouse complete</li> <li>Contract let and construction work underway, scheduled to be completed by December 2007</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Forensic training for judges and investigators underway</li> </ul>	December 2006	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Six officials trained so far</li> <li>New training location to be found</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Basrawi judges receiving professional development training in at least one regional training institute</li> </ul>	December 2006	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Not yet progressed because of withdrawal of Justice Adviser at time of staff redeployment in October. Progress awaiting his return.</li> </ul>
<b>RULE OF LAW: PRISONS</b>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Invitations to tender for building and refurbishment at Basra Central Prison issued</li> </ul>	December 2006	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Scope of work and site assessment completed on time, but tender process for contract slipped by two months due to bureaucratic delays by GOI in Baghdad over the transfer of land title for the site.</li> </ul>
<b>GOVERNANCE</b>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The \$40m provided by the Central Government to Basra for FY 2006 committed to high priority projects</li> </ul>	December 2006	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In excess of US\$100m has been committed by the PC, to date, 400 contracts have been let for priority programmes across 14 sectors</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The 2007 Provincial Development Strategy launched in a Public Outreach campaign</li> </ul>	December 2006	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Completed</li> </ul>

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## BETTER BASRA PLAN BENCHMARKS REVIEW

ORIGINAL BENCHMARKS	BY WHEN	PROGRESS AGAINST 31 DECEMBER 2006 BENCHMARKS
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A single programme and project list produced in support of the PDS</li> </ul>	December 2006	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Integrated FY2007 budget drawn up, reflecting PDS priorities</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Basra's Budget for FY 2007 (in support of Provincial Development Plan) endorsed by Ministry of Finance and MoPDC</li> </ul>	December 2006	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Budget is substantially complete but late MOF intervention will necessitate further work</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Initiation of UNDP pilot Project Implementation Unit</li> </ul>	December 2006	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Danes agree to part fund project but additional international donor funding needed for this to proceed. UNDP ready to implement, subject to funding.</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Project Implementation Unit established in Governor's Office</li> </ul>	April 2007	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Provincial Government has produced revised PDS 2008-2010, complemented by sector strategies that reflect realistic assessments of service delivery targets</li> </ul>	April 2007	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Lead-up process underway and on track</li> <li>The PDS review programme is now endorsed as a joint UNDP/PRT programme</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Structures are in place to properly manage projects in support of the PDS, including a Treasury and Accounting Office</li> </ul>	April 2007	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>RTI is lead on PTAO. Progress is slow because of delays by RTI in recruiting Iraqi staff to implement the project</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Financial Statements have been produced for FY 2006</li> </ul>	April 2007	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Updated budget reconciliation has been produced</li> <li>Reconstruction Review Report and Provincial Resource Statement are preliminary steps</li> <li>2006 budget extraordinarily extended to 31 March 2007</li> </ul>
INFRASTRUCTURE/SERVICES		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Last mile service provision by MND(SE)</li> </ul>	December 2006	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>11 power projects completed, costing about US\$12m and employing 600 people. About 35,000 people have benefitted from improved electricity distribution</li> <li>A US\$15m water project got underway, improving the water distribution network by repairing or replacing underground pipes and employing around 1,170 people. 800,000 people have benefitted from improved water supply.</li> </ul>

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## BETTER BASRA PLAN BENCHMARKS REVIEW

ORIGINAL BENCHMARKS	BY WHEN	PROGRESS AGAINST 31 DECEMBER 2006 BENCHMARKS
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Completion of projects by US Corps of Engineers</li> </ul>	December 2006	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In 2006, 82 contracts awarded, 88 projects started and 109 projects completed</li> <li>There will be 136 projects in progress in 2007, costing a total of US\$1,059m, and providing 4,605 short-term jobs, and 1,083 long-term jobs</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Essential service sector asset registers developed, sector capabilities identified, service levels agreed and sectoral gap analyses carried out</li> </ul>	December 2006	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Substantial review and analysis of all processes conducted.</li> <li>Basra Public Works Initiative established in partnership with GRS with first stage underway in Power and Water Sectors</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Completion of project to install a reverse osmosis unit at Az-Zubayr, supplying potable water to 250,000 people</li> </ul>	December 2006	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Over 95 percent of materials have been delivered to site and installed</li> <li>Some problems with security arrangements which has resulted in the short delay; commissioning will now take place remotely, probably from Kuwait</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Gas compressor installed in pipeline from Ramallah to Najaf, securing 40 MW and adding 20 MW to the grid</li> </ul>	April 2007	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Almost all civil works at project site (e.g. foundations for skids, hardstand for trucks, drainage pit, ventilation stack) completed</li> <li>Ship carrying gas pumping unit berthed at Umm Qasr port on 13 December; the unit was offloaded and the convoy, under military escort, reached the project site on 22 December</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Refurbishment of Hartha Pump Station completed, improving water supply for 500,000 people</li> </ul>	April 2007	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Procurement of high lift pumps being considered; guardhouse refurbishment will be completed ahead of schedule</li> <li>Contractor has employed some of the pump station staff to carry out works and engaged local people as security guards</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Generator at Khor-Az-Zubayr Power Station rebladed, securing 15 MW and adding 35 MW to the grid</li> </ul>	April 2007	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Re-blading of CR Unit 2 not yet (the first unit was re-bladed in July)</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Water Towers and Reservoirs in Al-Hayaniyah (Shia Flats) completed, improving water quality for 250,000 people</li> </ul>	April 2007	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Slow progress; piling and testing regime now scheduled in be completed early in new year</li> <li>Construction of superstructure(s) held up by delays to piling programme; an accelerated superstructure programme (faster than the expected 180 days) is being discussed</li> </ul>

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## BETTER BASRA PLAN BENCHMARKS REVIEW

ORIGINAL BENCHMARKS	BY WHEN	PROGRESS AGAINST 31 DECEMBER 2006 BENCHMARKS
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The PDS 2008-2010 has been developed, including essential service sector strategies which reflect realistic assessments of service delivery targets</li> </ul>	April 2007	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Satisfactory progress though timeline for completion has slipped to June 2007</li> </ul>
<b>JOB CREATION/PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT</b>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The Economic Development and the Agriculture SWGs are fully developed</li> </ul>	December 2006	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Both forums meet regularly and involve a wide range of Directorate, PC, PS and PSD stakeholders</li> <li>Key initiatives being developed inc. Basra Development Fund &amp; Govt. funding for enterprise support activities to follow on from Op Sinbad</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The Business Development Centre (BDC) has been established in Basra, offering advice, consultancy, business information, publication services and training</li> </ul>	December 2006	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>BDC is fully operational; key deliverables include: -</li> <li>Three business management text books researched and published</li> <li>200 plus business topic fact sheets produced</li> <li>230 staff and enterprise managers trained (Agricultural Directorate and Gulf Marine Academy) in management &amp; planning, ICT/IT and English language skills</li> <li>Business start-up and business growth advice/consultancy supplied to 400 plus businesses/entrepreneurs</li> <li>45 Business projects currently being supported</li> <li>7,040 workdays generated</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Working Groups have been set up to study Special Economic Zones and an Economic Development Agency</li> </ul>	December 2006	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Study visit to UK run to promote awareness of RDA/EDA activities, best practice, and contribution to development</li> <li>Economic Development Sector Working Group discussing options for creation of a Basra SEZ and an EDA</li> <li>Agreement on utility of SEZ and EDA as tools to promote development results in proposals for SEZ and an EDA in Basra</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A fully costed project proposal has been produced in support of the development of a Special Economic Zone at Basra International Airport, where this is consistent with Ministry of Transport policy</li> </ul>	December 2006	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>See above</li> </ul>

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## BETTER BASRA PLAN BENCHMARKS REVIEW

ORIGINAL BENCHMARKS	BY WHEN	PROGRESS AGAINST 31 DECEMBER 2006 BENCHMARKS
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>The PDS 2008-2010 includes economic development and sustainable employment strategies</li></ul>	April 2007	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Economic Development SWG, BIC, Basra University and ICSII representatives have individually stated that the next strategy document will contain a clearer strategy than the current document</li></ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>A Business Incubator has been established, co-located with the Business Development Centre</li></ul>	April 2007	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Work placements and study visits to established business incubators in the UK and Gulf have created capacity and networks of support to deliver a business incubator project</li><li>The 'Best Practices' in Economic Development conference will feature speakers on BDC and BI as tools for the promotion of MSMEs and local development</li><li>Land has been identified and local DGs have agreed to the reallocation and alternative use of the site</li><li>However, land and lease laws are currently in a state of flux and the transfer of the lease has been blocked by the Ministry of Higher Education pending a resolution</li><li>For this reason the achievement of benchmark is impossible in the present timeframe</li></ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>The Date Palm Regeneration Project has created short, medium and long term employment opportunities</li></ul>	April 2007	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>The project, the centrepiece of Op Sinbad, got underway in October</li><li>Some 70,000 date palm trees were planted during the autumn season and 6 irrigation contracts were let, creating around 5,000 jobs in total</li><li>So far, around US\$13m has been disbursed</li></ul>
OTHER DONORS		

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## BETTER BASRA PLAN BENCHMARKS REVIEW

ORIGINAL BENCHMARKS	BY WHEN	PROGRESS AGAINST 31 DECEMBER 2006 BENCHMARKS
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Japanese Bank for International Cooperation programmes at least \$1 billion in soft loans for investment in infrastructure in the south</li> </ul>	April 2007	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>JBIC have so far identified five loan projects for the south totalling US\$550m: -               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Port Sector Development Project (Umm Qasr - US\$260m)</li> <li>Irrigation Sector Loan Project (Al Muthanna - US\$80m)</li> <li>Samawah Bridges and Roads Construction Project (Al Samawah - US\$30m)</li> <li>Engineering Services for Basra Refinery Upgrading Project (Basra - US\$20m)</li> <li>Khor Al Zubayr Fertiliser Plant Rehabilitation Project (Basra - US\$160m)</li> </ul> </li> <li>JBIC is developing further projects, including a programme of around US\$200m to support improvements to Basra's water supply (tbc)</li> <li>No projects have been formally approved by GoI yet. However, DFID is working on unblocking loan bottlenecks in Baghdad</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The World Bank establishes a loan programme for at least one priority sector in the south</li> </ul>	April 2007	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The World Bank is finalising its plans to provide an IDA loan of up to US\$130m to support rehabilitation of units 2 &amp; 3 at Hartha Power Station</li> <li>The Bank and GoI are expected to approve the project by March 2007</li> <li>Construction will take 18-24 months and add up to 400MW to the national grid</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Australia provides up to \$10 million in support for the agricultural sector</li> </ul>	April 2007	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>AUSAID discussing with DFID and PRT an appropriate mechanism to channel AUS\$5m for the development effort in Basra; these resources need to be committed by June 2007</li> <li>Prospect of further 3 year programme funding</li> </ul>
COMMUNICATIONS		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>SISG partners have implemented Southern Iraq Communications Plan through Media Issues Group</li> </ul>	December 2006	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Media Issues Group established and started to function but work interrupted by withdrawal of Consulate's Arabic media spokesman and Press and Public Affairs Officer when FCO staff were redeployed in October.</li> </ul>

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## BETTER BASRA PLAN BENCHMARKS REVIEW

ORIGINAL BENCHMARKS	BY WHEN	PROGRESS AGAINST 31 DECEMBER 2006 BENCHMARKS
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>MIG has established robust processes and procedures for co-ordinating Better Basra communications effort</li></ul>	December 2006	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>See above</li></ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>MNF opinion polls show local opinion more positive about trends in security, services and jobs; and about Coalition role</li></ul>	December 2006	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>According to MND(SE)'s opinion polling for December 2006, 95% of Basrawis felt safe in their neighbourhood in December (up from 84% in July), although only 24% felt safe travelling outside their neighbourhood. 17% of families said they have been directly affected by violence in the last 30 days. The percentage of Basrawis who said they had no confidence in MNF had increased from 30% in September to 87% in December. Employment levels remained steady at 31%. Satisfaction with the provision of safe drinking water declined from 80% to 70%, with sewage from 26% to 20%. But the top priority remained better electricity provision.</li></ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>More positive coverage of Basra in local and international media</li></ul>	December 2006	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Limited progress- Sinbad made inroads. The "Today Programme" was a mixed bag, but overall positive for UK effort. ITN coverage was positive on police.</li></ul>

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