

DECLASSIFIED

UK CONFIDENTIAL

From:
Tel:

TOM DODD

NO. 0152

MATTHEW RYCROFT

ENHANCING IRAQI SECURITY FORCES

7 May 2004

In your record of the Prime Minister/Bush conversation of 27 April you asked officials to look again at progress with Iraqisation, particularly training and equipment, and how it might be accelerated.

2. The attached note, the output of consultations with MOD, IPU, DFID, and input from experts in theatre, seeks to provide an answer. Further work would be required to drill down in some areas. It only examines the main Iraqi security forces and prisons, and not the security sector as a whole. It does not cover the Justice Sector, the link between police and prisons. Some quick wins have been found. Some proposals could be funded by redistributing or accelerating the disbursement of existing resources, others would require additional funding not yet identified. The main points are:

- Depending on the locale, the benefit of handing over local security leadership to Iraqis as soon as possible, even where this involves a degree of risk. More ex Iraqi army (ex-Ba'athist) officers may be required as leaders beyond the 4-5,000 already planned to be recruited;
- Iraqi police are fully recruited. We should concentrate on expanding selective specialist and leadership training over initial training to achieve greater improvements in performance; nevertheless
- 10,000 Iraqi police are duds. Initial work suggests that £5m pa needs to be found to make them redundant, but this will require overcoming funding and political difficulties. We also need to;
- provide more police mentors. Subject to advice on deployability in the current security environment, we could consider lobbying internationally for more;
- accelerate the disbursement of new equipment for all Iraqi security forces and provide IT equipment for new Iraqi command structures; and
- get a wholesale grip of prisons policy and prisons management.

3. Clearly there is more work to be done on Iraqisation of security. This will need funds and personnel from across the Coalition.

4. I am copying this letter and the attachment to Kara Owen, FCO; Mike Naworynsky, MOD; Moazzam Malik, DFID; David Brummell, LOD; Martin Hilton, DTI; Mark Bowman, HMT and PS/Caroline Flint; Desmond Bowen, David Quarrey, George Fergusson and ; Ian Lee, David Johnson and Tim Lowe, MOD; John Buck and , FCO; Jim Drummond and , DFID; and Jim Acton, Home Office.

TOM DODD

DECLASSIFIED

UK CONFIDENTIAL

ACCELERATING IRAQIISATION

Objective

To accelerate the transfer of authority to a coherent well-structured Iraqi security system that is well governed, coherent and capable of delivering a secure environment to the Iraqi people.

Factors to Consider

2. In considering an acceleration of Iraqiisation, the following factors should be considered:

- Improved security is the basis for the success of the political process, reconstruction and economic and social development, but all these elements are mutually self-supporting;
- transferring security responsibility to Iraqis is a critical element of the return of sovereignty. It also provides a long-term exit strategy for the Coalition;
- the US recognise UK expertise in security sector reform (SSR). UK military and police officers are in senior positions in SSR structures in Iraq but some US officials and officers do not share our holistic approach and will be hard to influence;
- sovereignty will be returned to Iraq on 30 June. The Iraqi Defence and Interior Ministers are already making plans for Iraq's security forces. This is proper, but Coalition influence over their shape and form will correspondingly reduce from now through the transition. Iraqi political and military leaders will come to Iraqi solutions to security problems, which on some occasions, will fall short of Western practice;
- we judge the current target strengths of the Iraqi armed forces (35,000, fully trained by start 2005), ICDC (40,000) and Police (75,000, fully retrained by early 2005) to be correct. The key questions are ones of lack of leadership, retention and quality, not quantity;
- the Coalition works informally with a number of militias to provide security. Elements of militias have already been incorporated into Iraqi security forces. This process needs to be taken forward carefully and systematically with a view to the long-term cohesiveness of Iraq's security forces rather than on an ad hoc basis;
- Coalition actions in Iraq will affect recruitment and retention by the Iraqi security forces and, by association, their public credibility; and
- to be fully effective and to demonstrate Iraqi sovereignty, Iraqi security forces should operate under Iraqi command. At the same time Iraqi command needs to be integrated with the Coalition in such a way as to deliver an effective security campaign.

Leadership

3. Discussions continue in Washington and Baghdad on the appropriate form of command and command integration between the MNF and Iraqi security forces. A Joint HQ is being established and will link down through subordinate HQs to Joint Co-ordination Centres at local level. 4-5,000 former Iraqi Army officers are being recruited to fill these structures. On a national basis, public safety committees will be established of local notables to which police chiefs will report in an effort to improve police/community links. In

order to demonstrate Iraqi leadership and to make it effective, we should advocate:

- Recruiting more ex-Iraqi officers as required beyond the current target. More Ex-Ba'athists, carefully vetted, will need to be recruited, despite the risk of political backlash;
- planning and executing security operations with Iraqis, with transfer to Iraqi lead area-by-area as soon as possible, starting with operations with a high degree of success. Joint Co-ordination Centres should become Joint Operations Centres;
- giving Iraqi staffs access to Coalition intelligence and encouraging more reciprocation of information; and
- taking risks. Depending on the locale, Iraqi leadership, imperfect and messy in outcome, may be preferable to continued Coalition street presence and leadership.

Training

4. The **Iraqi Armed Forces** are planned to grow at a rate that is judged to be correct in turning out a sustainable and competent force. (The Iraqi government, in due course, is likely to want much larger armed forces.) To meet the current target, the strength of Coalition military training teams needs to be maintained. Formally co-opting tribal militia or untrained former Iraqi army units, as the US have undertaken in Fallujah with the Fallujah Brigade, may be a good local fix. However, this must be done very carefully with a view to their long-term incorporation in Iraqi security force structures. Otherwise, there is a risk a lack of political accountability and undermining the cohesiveness of Iraqi security forces as a whole, which will only encourage Iraq's fissiparous tendencies, particularly as the Coalition withdraws.

5. **ICDC** units in MND (SE) are fully trained and on course to operate autonomously by 30 June. ICDC units outside MND (SE) are generally less competent, and the recent deterioration in security has reduced turn-out. ICDC training has been a matter for individual Coalition contingents and in some cases has been poor. Other Coalition partners could be encouraged to increase their vigour in ICDC training. In some cases, this would require additional troop deployments which are largely unlikely in the current political or security climate. For our part, taking on the two additional governorates of Najaf and Qadisiyah would require more troops to train local ICDC units.

6. The target of training 50,000 **police** could be speeded up but this would require significant increases in troop numbers (military are responsible for training the vast majority of Iraqi police in Iraq itself, other than in Basra) as well as commissioning of additional training sites. It is unlikely that such infrastructure could be completed to speed up the output significantly. The throughput of the **Jordan school**, currently 1000 new recruits per month, could in theory be increased with additional trainers and expansion of the site, but this will take time. As the new Iraqi government is also likely to want to repatriate police training, the school's life is limited. Instead, efforts are being focussed on doubling new recruit training at the Baghdad Academy to

2000 per month this year and to 4000 by mid 2005. In the south, there are questions about the long-term viability of the **Az Zubayr Academy**, near Basra, which is isolated and exposed (as recent suicide bomb attacks underlined). Establishing a more permanent school in a more secure location in Basra as a regional training academy would be a major contribution to building capacity in the South. This could cost between £5-10m. This is not resourced and in any case would take time to construct.

7. There is a separate issue of **specialist police training**. We could do more to improve the performance of middle ranking officers by creating police staff and leadership colleges. One college is currently planned for Baghdad. Courses should start shortly even if the project is two months late. More colleges would be useful but are not currently resourced and, as above, would take time to construct and man. The UK might offer to take on a particular leadership course. For example, a course for Chief Superintendents could cost £1-2m per annum. This project would need to be scoped and funding identified. At the Az Zubayr school, the wind down of initial retraining will allow existing resources to be diverted to management and specialist courses. A high priority is for proper riot control units. Trainers for them are probably already available in Iraq. But \$10-15m, not identified, is needed to meet the barracks refurbishment costs for three 400-man public order battalions (for whom equipment has already been bought).

Mentoring/Monitoring

8. Training is wasted if not consolidated by monitoring and mentoring. Mentoring of ICDC battalions outside MND (SE) is often poor. Resource competition in the police programme has meant that the numbers of International Police Advisers has been reduced countrywide to 500 from the initial optimal figure of 1000. To make up the shortfall would need a further injection of around \$45m for US-hired mentors. But it must be borne in mind that deployability is dependent on security. The recent deterioration in some parts of the country means that for now a hugely increased number may not be able to operate effectively. Nevertheless, if circumstances were right, we should consider lobbying again for non-US police mentors. Other than from the UK, there are none.

9. UK has let a contract for 40 police advisers to act as monitors to police stations in MND(SE), at a cost of £5m for 6 months. This could be expanded (and may need to be if UK takes on Najaf and Qadisiyah as well), but would require additional funding. MND(SE) believe that with current security conditions 40 mentors are sufficient for the four southern governorates. (40 US police advisers will join them.) The highly successful deployment of senior UK police as mentors to police chiefs in governorates in MND(SE) could be expanded to other towns or expanded into MND (SC), at a rough cost of £100,000 per officer per year. But again, this is subject to security constraints and funding. UK has so far rejected the idea of putting officers in into other parts of the country due to concerns about differing security procedures.

Equipment

10. Adequate resources for full basic equipment of the Iraqi Armed Forces, Police and ICDC have been allocated and contracts placed by the CPA using US supplemental funds. Slow delivery has affected capability. But it is doubtful that letting new contracts now would speed the process up further, even if everything should be done to accelerate disbursement and supply. Further specialist equipment will be needed over time.

11. IT and communications equipment will be important to make new Iraqi command structures effective. Although resources should be available from the Supplemental, it is not clear whether this area has been scoped properly. The demands may not be huge. For the Ministry of Interior, a few hundred computers, servers and satellite links could have a major impact. A rough estimate of costs would be £275,000. Other funds could then be used to repeat the process at the regional and provincial level.

Pensions, Pay and Redundancy

12. We estimate that some 10,000 police officers are irredeemably defective and blocking the appointment of younger, better-trained recruits. Training duds is also a waste of resources. With a proper pensions and redundancy package in place, numbers of in-service officers needing to be trained could be cut dramatically and overall capability of the IPS improved significantly. The Iraqi Minister of the Interior is trying to introduce a pension system as quickly as possible, but has faced resistance from the Ministry of Finance because of the cost. Payment of pensions to 10,000 officers could cost around \$5m per annum (subject to more detailed work). It is not clear how and when funding for this could be established outside a wider scheme to reduce the bloated public sector, but the urgency of the problem with the police suggests action should be taken.

13. Members of the Iraqi Armed Forces and ICDC are paid less than the police. Given recruitment and retention problems, consideration could be given to further raising their pay. Although the police fare well, their payroll needs to be improved. Payroll policy should be streamlined and payroll computerised. This would also help reduce corruption and would be necessary for any redundancy scheme. The total cost of a specialist payroll adviser would be £200,000 a year, but more would be needed for IT.

Prisons

14. Recent revelations about Coalition treatment of prisoners have underlined the crucial importance of rehabilitation and Iraqiisation of the Iraqi prison sector. The prisons effort in Iraq has been very poor; there has been little success in improving available prisons, training staff and monitoring. \$224m of Supplemental funds has been agreed for the new build and refurbishment of penal facilities. Facilities are coming on stream but spending is slow and equipment procurement has been delayed. Overall Iraqi prison management is defective and has led to a steady departure of staff due to a hazardous working environment, and poor pay and conditions. The prison service has no Iraqi capable of leading a national organisation. Even

when commissioned, there is no proper programme in place to ensure that prisons function effectively.

15. The US military have been training some prison officers, but there is as yet no on the job training, follow up or mentoring. A further \$100m has been allocated for the provision of international prison advisers. Few have arrived. The solution would seem not so much new resources but a strong policy and management grip in Iraq. This has recently been attempted for the police by putting police training under military command. This would not be appropriate for prisons in the current climate. But real political effort in prisons policy is critical.

16. In Basra, the UK's relatively small prisons effort is about to be increased. RMPs are training prison officers at one of the Basra prisons, and we have 3 civilian prison advisers in Basra. A number of prison refurbishment projects will be completed over the next year. Bids to the GCPP to fund a further 6 prison officer monitors to follow up this training and 3 officers to conduct train-the-trainers courses are being made. This support could be expanded were further funds available for life support, secure transport and accommodation in Basra post-30 June.

Cabinet Office/IPU/MOD
7 May 2004