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*Let me to
pleak to GH.*

From: David Quarrey
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PRIME MINISTER

cc: Jonathan Powell
Nigel Sheinwald
Antony Phillipson
Charles Heatly

IRAQI-ISATION

We have been following up Allawi's request for help in delivering a rapid increase in the capacity of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). Allawi focused on four points when you met him at Number Ten on 19 September: two mechanised divisions, a Rapid Deployment Force, an effective counter-terrorist capability in the police and more rapid build up of intelligence capability. He said he would convene an IIG/US/UK conference soon in Baghdad to move this forward.

Bush told you on 24 September that, in response to Allawi's similar pitch in Washington, he had asked Condi to accelerate work on Iraqi-isation and that the US needed to deliver as quickly as possible with e.g. tanks and Humvees.

UK response

We have pressed MoD for a full and imaginative response to Allawi's request. The attached letters set out their thinking (the 30 September letter to me supersedes Geoff Hoon's to you of 27 September, on which I asked for more detail and a better focus on addressing Allawi's requests).

The MoD response effectively brushes aside Allawi's demands; emphasises the need to stick to the overall Petraeus plan; presents practical proposals relating mainly to the Iraqi National Guard (ie not the main counter-insurgency forces) and only for MND(SE); tells us nothing about US thinking; and says little about plans for the conference.

The MoD proposals carry a total price tag of around \$107m. The main suggestion (to provide 72 armoured vehicles, 120 light transport vehicles, urban assault equipment, night vision goggles, assault ammunition and weapons) would cost around \$53m.

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There is logic in the MoD position. Of course we do not want to undermine the Petraeus plan – you and Allawi specifically agreed that on 19 September. If that plan works, then we should in any case see a significant increase in the ISF's strike capability by the end of the year. And the ING has an important role to play in the counter-insurgency effort, taking on the lower end of the insurgency and taking responsibility for areas where the insurgents have been driven out and securing the peace.

But we cannot simply ignore Allawi's requests, e.g. on mechanised divisions. And we have to deliver on what he really wants – a more visible and effective presence in the front line of the counter-insurgency effort, including in the key battleground of the Sunni Triangle.

US response

We are not helped by a lack of clarity about US plans. MoD have not so far agreed a way forward with DoD (they seem to be waiting for Kevin Tebbitt's meeting in London next week with Wolfowitz). But it does not look like the US system is responding to Bush's demand for a swift response to Allawi.

The way forward

We need to move both our and the US systems to deliver more fully on Allawi's requests so that we are in a position to present a coherent US/UK plan at the conference in Baghdad, which is likely to take place in 2/3 weeks. The Tebbitt/Wolfowitz meeting next week should agree at least the outlines of that plan.

I suggest the following actions before your Africa trip to achieve this:

- i) you should speak to Geoff Hoon, emphasising the need for him to take a personal interest in this issue. MoD need to come up with ideas which come much closer to meeting Allawi's requests, and credible (to Allawi) reasons why we cannot meet all of them;
- ii) I will write to Geoff Hoon's office setting out our more detailed concerns – how do we help with Sunni Triangle, is there nothing we can do at the sharp end of the ISF's counter-insurgency capacity, the need to deliver a coherent US/UK response, for which Kevin Tebbitt

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and Wolfowitz should agree a framework, which you will want to see by next weekend. Nigel will speak to Kevin;

- iii) this should be top of the agenda for your VTC with Bush next Tuesday. We will alert the White House to your intention to focus on this;
- iv) MoD are adamant that they have no money available. The US are likely to resist using their supplemental funds for our ideas on boosting ISF capacity outside the framework of the Petraeus plan. If we pursue these ideas, you will need to support Geoff Hoon's request to Gordon Brown for a claim on the reserve;

Do you agree with this?

yes. But we can't make a reserve claim except for normal Iraq operations.

DAVID QUARREY

Surely we need
 (a) the U.S. to step up & deal with Alawi's main demands
 (b) the MoD stuff seems which separate to do with MSE(S).
 It may be right but its directly ad response to Alawi.
 Can you & NS sort out ASAP