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Next Steps on Policing – Review

20 November 2005

Part I

Strategic Overview

1. Introduction

- 1.1 This document is intended both as a 6-monthly update for IPU and IPCPT on resource requirements/proposals up to June 2006 and as a pre-read document to inform Sir Ronnie FLANAGAN and his Review Team. Clearly any future commitments are dependent upon any recommendations or policy changes that come from Sir Ronnie's work.
- 1.2 This overview reflects the views of the current UK CPA-I based on experience gained during his deployment since January 2005. Whilst Part II contains the more resourced based considerations, I have taken the opportunity here to look at some wider options.

2. Future Opportunities

- 2.1 In addition to the UK making a decision about where it wishes to focus future resources i.e. Baghdad or MND(SE) there are significant changes already underway in both areas.

Baghdad

- 2.2 There has been a focusing since May/June of 2005 of ALL coalition led work with the MOI/IPS within CPATT/MNSTC-I. Any future development of UK police resources MUST be within CPATT, in agree with our coalition partners, notably US. There is both a real desire in the new CG MG Joe PETERSON to involve CivPol advisors AND a drive to make it more multinational. ALL UK resources, except UK CPA-I and Staff Officer are imbedded in CPATT, and have been for some months.
- 2.3 I have included in Part II some considerations about embedding my successor (ACC) into CPATT. This will require some further development and negotiation both with US and UK Military. Ideally this officer must be in the CPATT Command chain. There may be difficulties here with ACPO. It should also be remembered that when you join you must accept 'corporate decisions and responsibility'. Do we wish to totally align ourselves with, for example, US views on the deployment of the Police Special Commandos? The

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military have managed this. By embedding an ACC into CPATT he would be unlikely to be able to fulfill other co-ordination and strategic work currently carried out by UK CPA-I e.g. oversight of MND(SE), support to HMA etc. He might however take on responsibility for overseeing CPATT work in MND(SE) as distinct for working with UK Military within MND (SE). This has been discussed, favorably, with senior CPATT colleagues. He could also take on responsibility for specialist areas – Major Crime, Technical Support etc.

- 2.4 There are opportunities to build on our current Training commitment at Baghdad Staff College (Senior Officers) by taking a lead role at the Baghdad Forensic Training College and increasing specialist trainers in Intelligence and Major Crime.
- 2.5 Whilst it may appear that we would be moving increasingly away from a 'strategic' to a 'training' role, any future strategic influence, be it CivPol or DFID, can only come through integration, at the appropriate rank and level, within CPATT. We would do this through an ACC, 2 Chief Superintendents and (potentially) a Superintendent. Focus at a strategic level should be at IPS (Deputy Minister Ali GHALIB) and Intelligence (Deputy Minister Hussain Ali KAMAL). The days when the UK could believe, unilaterally that it had influence as 'Advisor to the MOI' have long passed, and were, with the possible exception of the first incumbent, DCC Doug BRAND, largely illusory.
- 2.6 The UK has an acknowledged expertise in professional training. We should continue to exploit this, perhaps taking the opportunity to lead on involvement of a more multi-national training component in both Baghdad and Basra.
- 2.7 The key areas for UK influence in Baghdad remain, I believe, consistent into 2006:
 - IPS Strategic Support and Advice
 - Intelligence
 - Major Crime and Forensics
 - Training
- 2.8 We have abundant experience and skill and can make a real contribution.
- 2.9 The UK must maintain its commitment. ACPO (nationally) has not covered itself with glory here. Over half of the 43 Chief Officers will not deploy officers to Iraq. The number of officers available from even PSNI and MDP has dropped. Over one in three officers selected for Iraq fail to deploy due to medical or withdrawal, often at late notice. An increasing number leave mission early

Basra

- 2.10 Despite reassurances from London it is quite clear, to myself and senior CivPol officers on the ground in Basra, that the military are initiating changes in their relationship with CivPol. This is unfortunate as it is increasingly becoming obvious that 'partnership' is a

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one sided (CivPol) concept. Clarification from London would be valuable. I expect this will properly await Sir Ronnies review. That is entirely appropriate.

- 2.11 I have included at Part II suggestions about resource deployment that would enhance partnership and co-ordination and allow, through doing what is essential, not desirable, a move to transition.
- 2.12 The key area to address, and one highlighted not only since September, but in reports since my arrival in Basra in February, is the issue of militia influence in the Basra IPS and the lack of real MOI authority into the Province. I note that the former does not form part of Sir Ronnies ToRs.
- 2.13 On the question of militia influence there have already been many supported options:
- do nothing and except the reality,
 - abolish the police and rebuild and retrain it (all 13000 of them),
 - replace a large number with officers from outside the Province,
 - deploy 'out of region forces' – Special Police Commandos?
-) 2.14 I have written in previous reports, one just after the 19 September incident, that this requires some clear thinking, nerve and positive action.
- 2.15 Firstly: a strong Chief of Police (CoP) with a loyal, vetted and supported command team.
- 2.16 Second: clear direction and support from the Deputy Minister for Police, Ali GHALIB. We have good close advisors in etc. We should utilise this to ensure that the CoP gets this support.
- 2.17 Thirdly: a good support infrastructure e.g. PHQ at the Warren. We are seeking to locate the NIIA, Serious Crimes Unit, Custody Suite and Forensic Laboratory at this site. Good investment here would locate all the essential (and 'difficult') units close to the CoP. It would also give us the ability in a secure environment to properly advise and develop these units. This to me is one of the KEY drivers.
- 2.18 Fourthly: either the MOI (ideally) or the MNF-I must continue to remove the unacceptable 'bad eggs' in Basra – DIA, SCU etc. At least 3 are accused of serious crime (murder, torture and kidnapping) and another 70 'undesirables' who should, at the least be sacked from the police. It is unrealistic to believe that there will not always be a large part of the police with 'allegiance' or support for Shia parties. It must be seen as a continuum from a low level to an unacceptable one. An analogy would be the Royal Ulster Constabulary in the 1970s. A majority were Protestants, many gave political support to Unionist Parties, some extreme Unionist Parties, a very small minority supported Protestant Paramilitaries and a very, very small number were active in those Paramilitaries. The RUC acted robustly and swiftly against the latter, drove the next level out of the force and over 30 years changed the culture and composition of the force.

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- 2.19 I would not presume to discuss the concept of a 'Police Reform Agenda' in Iraq. Sir Ronnie may have views here.
- 2.20 Whatever we do to develop the Iraqi Police requires time. We can, and must take, with Iraqi support, if not lead, action against criminals in the police. The public at large must see them as that. In the long term we must develop the culture. This could take 10-15 years. The roots for that lie in the development of an Office Cadre within the IPS and capable, supported and professional units (Crime, TSU, and Intelligence). The UK is already involved in many of these areas.

Concluding Comments

- 2.21 As I come towards the end of my 12-month contract I can reflect on some successes achieved as a group. There is a robust and supported structure, both in Baghdad and MND(SE). Good officers with the right skill sets and the determination to succeed. There are some acknowledged personal failures, mainly in strategic influence at MOI level.
- 2.22 My greatest concern for the future is co-ordination with the military. It is ironic that in Baghdad, as relations between CivPol (both US and UK) are developing rapidly with a balance, and acknowledged respect between professionals, this is not reflected in MND(SE).
- 2.23 There has never in my 10 months in MND (SE) been that professional respect. Senior UK Military have almost totally failed to acknowledge the equivalent seniority of their Civilian colleagues. In the UK some of us have, in public order or terrorist incidents, acted as Gold Commander over senior Military at Brigadier level and above. We are used to working as part of multi-discipline teams comprising civil servants, military, professionals from the private and public sector. That is what we have become used to. I think the UK Police do it well with style and expertise.
- 2.24 I sincerely hope that will develop in MND(SE). We must move away from comments made by a previous GoC:

'Beat Bobbies from Hampshire, and even RUC men, concerned with Human Rights and traffic violations, are of limited use'

- to a true partnership. I know that desire and drive exists amongst all the UK policing contingent - serving CivPol and ArmorGroup IPA's. Officers, the majority ex RUC/PSNI, who have given 30 years loyal, professional and dedicated service to policing do not become overnight, again to quote the same GoC:

'...the salaries paid are large, and this is clearly the real motivation for many of those who become IPA's'

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- 2.25 There are huge challenges facing the development of the IPS in MND(SE). There are resources and skills in both military and CivPol to achieve what was started over 2 ½ years ago. In a spirit of partnership it can be achieved.

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Next Steps on Policing – Review

Part II

1. Terms of Reference

- 1.1 To review UK Policing support to the development of the Iraqi Police Service (IPS):
 - 1.11 Review current priorities – assess performance against ToRs and previous Review dated 15 May 2005 (attached at **Appendix A**)
 - 1.12 Resources currently available
 - 1.13 Identify future priorities and Resource implications.
 - 1.14 Proposals to resource any gap between 1.12 and 1.13

2 Review

- 2.1 My agreed Terms of Reference (ToR) remain useful as a 'Mission Statement' setting out the tasks for the next 12 months of UK effort in both Baghdad and Basra.

3 Performance Against Priorities (May 2005)

- 3.1 Priorities set in May 2005 fall into two distinct areas: Strategic Priorities in respect of UK influence in Baghdad and Operational (implementation) priorities in MND (SE) in Basra.

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- 3.2 Priority areas include Strategic Development of IPS, Criminal Intelligence, Crime Investigation (inc. Forensics) and Training.
- 3.3 **Strategic Development of the IPS.** Whilst I agreed this with my then US Counterpart, Steve CASTEEL, US Department of State (DoS) Advisor to MOI it has proved to be extremely illusive. It was acknowledged in May that "... *this is going to require 'herculean efforts' and interpersonal skills in the face of strong US, particularly US Military, desire for hegemony over IPS development.*" This proved to be the case. The strategy agreed in London and Washington was never likely to be agreed in Baghdad by MNF-I let alone the Iraqis. Attempts to work with US DoS colleagues in IRMO were brought to an end by a period of 'infighting' from June 2005 between IRMO and MNSTC-I which was finally resolved in the latter's favour.

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- 3.4 Resource limitations were identified in May with no resources, except myself, dedicated to this key activity. A post for an identified senior UK Civil Servant (Home Office) with experience in Police Strategic Development and Police Structure never materialised.
- 3.5 In addition, difficulties in setting up appropriate command structures in Baghdad and Basra and carrying out effectively 5 posts etc meant this became 'one task too many'. A prospective role as Advisor to Deputy Minister of Police, MG Ali GHALIB, also proved elusive. A personal disappointment.
- 3.6 Since May the appointment of Chief Superintendent (ret'd) and Chief Superintendent (ret'd) to CPATT P3 MOI and CPATT Policy and Plans has taken forward both the support to MG Ali GHALIB (is his principal advisor and works in MOI Main with him) and the development of an Iraqi Policy Strategy/Plan (is currently tasked within CPATT on this)
- 3.7 **Intelligence.** This was identified in May as one of the few areas where the UK still had a foothold, through the attachment to the UK Team, of a Czech Intelligence Advisor.
- 3.8 To a large extent this was, despite huge effort by Jan, an illusory position. 18 months of effort had produced numerous plans but, as the Deputy Minister (Intelligence), MG Hussain Ali KAMAL nothing 'on the ground'. The UK role was challenged by IRMO and an unseemly debate between UK, IRMO and US Intelligence (C2) was only ended by the decision to give MNSTC-I the lead on IPS development. This and the arrival of Chief Superintendent (ret'd) has greatly accelerated progress. A working rapport was quickly struck between Mark and (lead on Intelligence Transition Team, we wrote a policy for the Iraqi Criminal Intelligence Agency – National Information and Investigation Agency. This, and a complimentary proposal to pilot the NIIA in Basra Province, have been accepted by General ZAHNER (MNF-I C2) and General DEMPSEY (MNSTC-I). Training Programs, with UK input, are set for January and funding etc being arranged for development of the NIIA at the new Basra PHQ. Exceptional progress in less than 4 months. The UK are again a main player in this area.
- 3.9 The UK Team developed the 'TIPS' Programme (a Confidential Telephone Hotline) which is producing both good intelligence and a means of training basic Informant Handling techniques to the police. In May this was within a 'whisker' of being taken over by the US. This is now established under a Detective Sergeant with 6 officers supporting Iraqi officers and staff.
- 3.10 **Crime Investigation.** This has again progressed exponentially. Superintendent (Canada) is now the lead Senior Police Advisor in CPATT Technical Support, dealing with Forensic, Major and Organised Crime. Another Canadian, is leading on the development of the Baghdad and Regional Laboratories, again within CPATT. previously Hampshire, but now retired and ArmorGroup, has been offered the prestigious post of Director of Forensic College within

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the Baghdad Police Academy. This is very much supported by MG Ali GHALIB, an ex-investigator himself. Future resourcing issues addressed later.

- 3.11 CivPol maintain a leading role on the Hostage Working Group. Inspector has maintained the high level of professional involvement, recently highlighted in the kidnap (and release) of Guardian journalist. There are plans to link the next post-holder with MCU development in CPATT.
- 3.12 Both C/Superintendent and C/Inspector my Staff Officer, have been actively involved supporting SO13 and Iraqi Police in progressing the Margaret HASSAN case.
- 3.13 **Policing Centre of Excellence.** Resourced from all Colleagues on the Team, including myself, this provides a focus for policing issues across Iraq and Internationally. We sit on most Working Groups e.g. Special Police, MOI Strategic Plan etc etc.
- 3.13 **Baghdad Police Training Academy.** This, like TIPs, was an area which in May, we were close to relinquishing. The appointment of Supt. Supt as Deputy Director has not only 'saved the day' but also, due to his good work resulted in his appointment to the post of lead Director on the Iraqi Staff College. This is the 'jewel in the crown' of training posts and will give the UK disproportionate influence in the development of the future leaders of the IPS. Two additional NPT trainers are en route to assist in curriculum development on the short and 3 year Officer courses. Mention must also be made of the two CivPol Weapons Instructors, and who have in difficult conditions boosted UK presence. The UK were recently requested to provide additional Weapons Instructors to cover for US colleagues. We were unfortunately unable to assist. This can still be sustained if sufficient skilled individuals are available.

BASRA

- 3.14 Whilst Baghdad has been the 'strategic' centre for IPS Development, Basra has continued to be the central focus of UK involvement, particularly in terms of resources.
- 3.15 Priority across the 3 Provinces was identified as implementing the '**12 Month IPS Development Strategy and Plan**'. This received wide circulation and consultation with all stakeholders, particularly Iraqi. Accompanying plans and resource were undertaken with Military, ArmorGroup and CPATT IPLOs. A Training Coordinating Group, including CivPol and AG was established at 4 Div HQ, Basra Air Station' to further priorities and allocate resources. Whilst the latter progressed, despite Military involvement and consultation, the latter were reluctant to progress this key piece of work, preferring instead to argue about 'lead' and write endless 'fragos'. Ironically, whilst this Strategy, long overdue in MND (SE), was being debated, CPATT in Baghdad started to rollout the 'Police, Partnership Programme' (P3) across Iraq. The '12 Month IPS Development Plan' and P3 are identical and complimentary in most terms of areas covered and

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implementation. Ironically, 6 months later, what might have been achieved if the Military had embraced the strategic plan can only be surmised.

- 3.16 The drive towards 'conditions based' transfer to Iraqi control in July brought about the IPS Transition Plan expertly crafted by [redacted], FCO London and senior CivPol/FCO in Basra. It is interesting that this in effect reinvigorated the original IPS 12-Month Development Plan, using the same 5 Strategic Objectives with new targets and milestones. This again was not widely welcomed by the Military despite acceptance in Basra, Baghdad and London. In any event, deteriorating security conditions in Maysan (from July) and Basra (from September) and subsequent 'lock downs' overtook the plan in its present form.
- 3.17 The **Regional Police Training Academy** at Az Zubayr (AZ) was a UK initiative from 2003, initially as Basra Provincial Training but then 'adopted' by the MOI as a Regional Academy. 23 officers, predominately CivPol, have conducted Basic, Development and Management Courses. From May 2005 all IPS Basic Recruit Training was carried out at JIPTC or Baghdad Academy. The SSR Co-Ordinating Group, lead by the Provost Marshal and Chief Inspector [redacted], set up at Basra APOD, was extremely successful in sending many recruits to Baghdad and JIPTC for Basic Training
- 3.18 AZ closed in August 2005 with the opening of the new Joint Training Academy (JTA) at Shaibah for Border DBE, (1000) and IPS (500) training. Initial security problems were overcome by the efforts of Superintendent [redacted].
- 3.19 Like every other plan in Iraq the purpose and designation of the JTA is currently under review and most likely to change. The Iraqis are no longer keen to use Baghdad Police College for anything but Officer Training. This leaves a considerable shortfall in BRT Training, which cannot be compensated at JIPTC in Jordan. The current proposal is that JTA become (again) an IPS Regional Academy which will train 1000 strong BRT courses. This is dependant on DBE Training moving to Mittica and the availability of Trainers. The proposed start date is 1 February 2006. I have indicated to CPATT that ALL of this additional training will have to be resourced centrally by CPATT and MOI. CPATT are currently looking to deploy an additional 10 Trainers to JTA although of the originally promised 8 to support Supt. [redacted], only 2 are currently in post.

4. Current Resources

- 4.0 ALL the posts identified in my May Review have been filled. A schedule of current strength and allocated posts (31 October 2005) is included at APPENDIX B.
- 4.1 The integration of all CivPol and ArmorGroup resources under the direction of UK CPA-I facilitated the gradual increase of UK resources in Baghdad in order to meet the priorities discussed above.

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- 4.2 New CivPol postings are, for serving officers, 12 months. Difficulties are still experienced in getting a large pool of suitable applicants from which to choose. Over a third of officers selected to deploy to Iraq either fail medical examination or withdraw, often very shortly before deployment. This is disappointing. A number terminate their deployments early for domestic or other reasons.

5. **Future Priorities (November 2005)**

- 5.1 I intend to look forward here primarily to the end of June 2006.
- 5.2 The debate over whether to prioritize resources in Baghdad (strategic) or MND(SE) (operational) remains as pertinent now as it was at my initial deployment to Iraq in January 2005. Both remain key areas of British influence.
- 5.3 The past 6 months have seen in Baghdad the growing ascendancy and importance of CPATT under the MNSTC-I umbrella. General CASEY, CG MNF-I, has declared 2006 as the 'Year of the Police' with a transition of resource prioritisation from Iraqi Army (IA) to Police (IPS)
- 5.4 Security deterioration in MND(SE) and focus on long term problems within the IPS in Basra Province and changing conditions for transition (lengthening time scales) have highlighted the need for increased training, advising etc of IPS. This must be balanced, however, with the new MOD 'lead' responsibility, and some uncertainties about the deployment of CivPol in MND(SE) in the future.
- 5.5 The past few months has seen an increase in CivPol/ArmorGroup resources in Baghdad. This has been a deliberate attempt, successful I believe, to increase UK influence in some key areas in Baghdad. There is scope for some repositioning and new opportunities.
- 5.6 Key additional or revised priorities:

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- 5.7 **IPS Support/CPATT:** A key issue since May 2005 has been the imbedding of UK CivPol resources in Baghdad into CPATT. This has been the subject of a previous report in August indicating that, excluding UK CPA-I and Staff Officer, ALL UK resources are in CPATT/MNSTC-I Teams or Projects.
- 5.8 I have recently raised with MG Joe PETERSON, CG CPATT, an initial proposal for the UK, in the early part of 2006, to second an Assistant Chief Constable (or T/ACC) into CPATT at Adnon Palace. This officer could effectively become a fourth Deputy CG (in

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addition to Brigadier Simon CARAFFI, David DUBROTKA and I
There is more work to be done here before this can be progressed further:

- Would this been an addition to current ACPO secondment i.e. UK CPA-I?
- If 'yes' – what is the funding implication?
- If 'funding', where does this sit with proposals within DFID for a senior 'Home Office' official to advise on capacity building (?) in MOI? Can we do both, or indeed all 3.
- Job Description for postholder?
- Can we identify a suitable candidate?
- UK military support – Brigadier Simon CARAFFI is currently the 'senior Deputy to CG'. There may be issues that need resolving here. Simon is due to be replaced in January by Brigadier BOAG.

5.9 This is an issue for further debate in London and might be appropriate for Sir Ronnie FLANAGAN to comment upon.

5.10 Current deployments are:

- C/Superintendent
 - C/Superintendent :
- P3 MOI: Advisor to MG Ali GHALIB.
CPATT – Policy Plans.

5.11 Already planned:

- Inspector
- P3 MND(SE) Liaison:

5.12 The latter post is a temporary (initially 2 months) secondment to help improve liaison between CPATT P3 and SSR Team etc in MND(SE). This is still not good. Agreement has been reached with Brigadier CARAFFI and MND(SE) for this move. Arrangements have been made to replace his duties as Team Support Manager (TSM) with an ArmorGroup officer.

5.13 There is an opportunity to put additional officers (Superintendents) into CPATT posts. I would be very keen to put in another officer (superintendent or Chief Inspector) to support C/Superintendent. Despite the best will in the world, and his occupation of office and accommodation at MOI Main and FOB Shield, he cannot be there every day. Our US colleagues have a 'buddy' arrangement. I would like to emulate this to ensure we retain primacy in this key influential area.

5.14 **Crime Investigation;** Current deployments are:

- Superintendent
 - Sergeant :
 - :
- Senior Police Advisor CPATT
Technical Support/MCUs
CPATT - Forensic Laboratory
CPATT - Forensic College

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5.15 Already planned:

CPATT Technical Support
(MCU).

5.16 Following a recent Major Crime Conference, discussion has begun with CPATT about the UK deploying 2/3 Major/Serious Crime Investigation Trainers to support the development of Major Crime Units across Iraq. This initiative has the support of Deputy Minister Ali GHALIB. It would support UK influence in this already identified strategic area and be complimentary to other training work in respect of intelligence

5.17 **Baghdad Forensic Training College:** I have agreed with David DOBROTKA, Deputy CG (Civilian) CPATT, that the UK would through : take over Directorship of the Forensic Training College at Baghdad Police College. The building is near completion and it is hoped to start training in the New Year.

5.18 has indicated that the overall requirement is likely to be himself and a maximum of 6 Trainers. I am content that this can, until March 2006, be resourced from within ArmorGroup staffing in Iraq. The number of SOC's deployed in MND(SE) was increased last year. ArmorGroup are already recruiting more to cover the newly signed Japanese Muthanna contract. It is intended that the College would revert to full Iraqi control and management by end of 2006/2007 Financial Year.

5.19 This is a key area in which UK expertise is respected and will be influential in the long-term development of IPS crime investigation. Strongly supported as a key area for UK resources in 2006/2007. This would give us lead on two Colleges in Baghdad..

5.20 **Intelligence (NIIA):** Progress on implementation and development of the NIIA is a key part of UK work in both Baghdad and MND(SE). Momentum gained in the past 4 months needs sustaining until at least end of 2006.

5.21 Current deployments are:

- | | |
|--------------------|-------------------------------------|
| • C/Superintendent | Senior Police Advisor C2 ITT. |
| • C/Inspector : | Deputy – Surveillance and Training. |
| • Sergeant : | Analyst Advisor. |

5.22 In order to support the NIIA Project has identified the need for 2 additional officers to support the Training (Source Recruitment and Handling) due to commence in January 2006. These can currently be resourced from suitably skilled (ex RUC/PSNI Special Branch) ArmorGroup officers deployed in MND(SE).

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5.23 **Intelligence (TIPs):** It is still my intention for TIPs to be passed to Iraqi control and management by the end of March 2006. C/Superintendent and I are currently involved in meetings with US Intelligence and Military Commanders over issues relating to TIPs – co-ordination with US Military TIPs programs, Iraqi ownership, MNSTC-I/C2 role and relationships etc. There remain 3 potential options:

- (a) Hand over to Iraqi ownership by end March 2006 (preferred option).
- (b) Hand over to Iraqi/US control by end March 2006.
- (c) Retain UK resources until later in 2006.

5.24 Current deployments:

- Sgt. OC TIPs
- 3 x ArmorGroup Trainers TIPs
- 3 x CivPol PCs (ArmorGroup wef 12/05) Trainers TIPs

5.25 **Training (Baghdad Police College);** UK influence here is now high with a respected Deputy Director in Superintendent . Current Deployments:

- Superintendent Deputy Director
- 2 x PCs Weapons Instructors

5.26 Already planned:

- 2 x Officers (1 retd) Curriculum Development, Officer College. One in 1105 and second in 0106

5.27 A long-term opportunity exists to deploy a Trainer (retd) into the Management Courses. This is currently all US IPLOS.

BASRA

5.28 **Basra – Command Team:** This was augmented since the May Review and should remain at the current level, to be reviewed in June 2006.

5.29 In order to accelerate work on the IPS Transition Plan/P3 and anticipating changes as the result of new MOD lead, a large part of the team will deploy to Basra APOD to collocate with Military, IPLOs etc. Both and will move to accommodation and offices at the APOD to work at 4 Div HQ.

5.30 The need to properly co-ordinate in an equal partnership cannot be over-emphasised. I cannot help but smile at comments made by a predecessor (ACC Phil READ) in June 2004 –

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'Meanwhile the military had their SSR change program well under way. With the substantial resources the military had, we were sometimes overwhelmed by their activity. We sometimes felt like a little fishing boat caught in the wake of an ocean cruise liner'

5.31 The division of responsibilities in the command team now means that ; will have TWO deputies – one at Basra Palace and one at Div HQ.

5.32 Current Deployments:

- | | |
|---------------|------------------------------|
| • Chief Supt. | Deputy CPA-I (Basra) |
| • Supt. . | Chief SSR Coordinator - APOD |
| • Supt. . | Basra Senior Police Advisor |
| • Insp. | Team Support Manager |
| • C/Insp. | SSR Training coordinator |
| • Vacant | Projects (Custody, PHQ etc) |

5.33 When the priority in MND(SE) shifts from Maysan and Muthanna (June 2005) there is an opportunity to redeploy one of the two redundant Senior Police Advisors to Basra (Palace or APOD) to sustain work there (until December 2006?)

5.34 **Intelligence Project (NIIA Pilot):** With the acceptance of the NIIA proposals in Baghdad and agreement on NIIA pilot in Basra, implementation will start in early 2006 – accommodation at new Basra PHQ, training, equipping etc. It is anticipated that 2/3 additional officers (ArmorGroup?) will be required to support the roll out. These can be resourced from ArmorGroup until at least the end of March 2006 within existing contract.

5.35 **JTA Shaibah:** I would leave an option open, post end of March, for the UK to retain the Directorship (and Deputy) of the potentially larger Regional Academy. This again would be in line with developing UK strategic influence through training – Officer, Forensic, Crime/Intelligence and Regional. Accommodation etc is already in place in Shaibah Camp.

5.36 **AI Muthanna:** Currently the most productive area in MND(SE) due to a benign security environment. Since the May Review the CivPol team has been augmented by a Training Advisor to support the increased number of ArmorGroup officers deployed as a result of Dutch funding and the recently signed Japanese Muthanna Contract.

5.37 Current deployed:

- | | |
|------------------|-----------------------|
| • Superintendent | SPA AI Muthanna |
| • 1 x PC | Training Co-ordinator |

5.38 This level should remain until 'drawdown' in the Province OR when 'conditions for transition' are reached (June?).

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5.39 **Maysan:** As per Al Muthanna. Currently deployed:

- Superintendent SPA Maysan

5.40 **ArmorGroup:** I have deployed a number of ArmorGroup officers from MND(SE) to Baghdad to support work there – TIPS and Forensic College. There will be a requirement for ArmorGroup officers to be deployed in Iraq until at least June 2006 (December 2006 in Basra).

5.41 Some CivPol posts identified in the May Review – Forensic Advisor and Police Liaison Officer – have now been replaced by ArmorGroup and Military respectively.

Resource Gaps

6.1 The following additional staff will be required to resource the proposed priorities to end March 2006:

• Assistant Chief Constable, CPATT		NEW POST
• Superintendent, CPATT	ASAP	NEW POST
• 2/3 x Major Crime Trainers	TBC	NEW POSTS
• Director Forensic College	Nov 2005	ArmorGroup
• 6 x Trainers at Forensic College	Jan 2006	ArmorGroup
• 3 x Trainers at TIPS	Dec 2005	ArmorGroup
• TSM (Baghdad)	Nov 2006	ArmorGroup
• 2 x Trainers - NIIA Project (Baghdad)	Jan 2006	ArmorGroup
• 2 x Trainers – NIIA Project (Basra)	Jan 2006	ArmorGroup

6.2 The following CivPol posts become redundant in the period to end March 2006:

• Deputy Chief Constable – UK CPA-I	CivPol	See Note A
• C/Inspector – Staff Officer to UK CPA-I	CivPol	See Note A
• 3 x Trainers TIPS	CivPol	Nov/Dec 2005
• 6 x Trainers TIPS	ArmorGroup	
• Oc TIPS	CivPol	
• 8 x Trainers – Shaibah JTA	CivPol	Nov/Dec 2005
• 1 x Superintendent – Director Shaibah JTA	CivPol	
• 9 x Trainers – Shaibah JTA	CivPol	

6.3 The following posts will be required from beginning April 2006.

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• Assistant Chief Constable CPATT	CivPol	See Note A
• 2 x C/Superintendent (CPATT)	CivPol	
• Superintendent CPATT	CivPol	
• C/Superintendent (Intelligence Project)	CivPol	
• 4 x Intelligence Advisors	CivPol	See Note B
• TSM (Embassy Office)	CivPol or ArmorGroup	
• D/Inspector (CPATT MCU/HWG)	CivPol	
• 2/3 x Major Crime Trainers	CivPol or ArmorGroup	
• Superintendent - Director Baghdad Staff College	CivPol	
• 2 x Curriculum Development Officers	CivPol	
• Director - Forensic Training College	ArmorGroup	See Note C
• 6 x Trainers Forensic Training College	ArmorGroup	See Note C
• Superintendent CPATT Technical Support	Canadian	
• Senior Police Advisor - CPATT Laboratories	Canadian	

BASRA

• C/Superintendent – SPA MND(SE)	CivPol	
• Superintendent – Chief SSR Co-Ordinator	CivPol	
• Superintendent – Basra	CivPol	
• 2 x Superintendents – SPA Muthanna and Maysan	CivPol	
• 1 x Training Advisor – Muthanna	CivPol or ArmorGroup	
• C/Inspector (Intelligence)	CivPol	
• 2 x Intelligence Advisors/Trainers	CivPol or ArmorGroup	
• C/Inspector (Projects)	CivPol	
• C/Inspector (SSR Co-ordinator)	CivPol	
• TSM	CivPol or ArmorGroup	
• Superintendent – Director Shaibah JTA	CivPol	?
• Inspector – Deputy Director Shaibah JTA	CivPol	?

NOTES

Note A

Discussed in text. There are some issues around deploying an ACC into CPATT etc. I have indicated I will, if requested extend my contract beyond January for 3 months. London and Sir Ronnie will have views on this.

Note B

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There is a need to increase the Intelligence Project Team. This can be covered from within the existing ArmorGroup Contract (until June?). A longer term decision needs to be made in due course as to whether this should be CivPol etc.

Note C

I can resource the Director and 6 Trainers from within current ArmorGroup Contract. It is a distinct 'package' and one worthy of consideration as a separate funded project (GCPP?) or perhaps funded by a donor country. It clearly fits within the definition of a 'benign' project.

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Part III

Appendix I

Next Steps on Policing – Review

15 May 2005

UK Chief Police Advisor - Iraq

1. Terms of Reference

1.2 To review UK Policing support to the development of the Iraqi Police Service (IPS):

- 1.15 Review current priorities
- 1.16 Resources currently available
- 1.17 Identify resources required to achieve priorities
- 1.18 Proposals to resource any gap between 1.12 and 1.13

2 Review

- 2.1 I do not regard my agreed Terms of Reference (ToR) as 'Confidential' but useful as a 'Mission Statement' setting out the tasks for the next 12 months of UK effort in both Baghdad and Basra. I attach a copy of ToR agreed with FCO at **Appendix A**.
- 2.2 I am cognizant of, and contributed toward, the recent 'Review of GCPP Funded Police and Prison Work in Iraq'. It is noteworthy that ALL of the 14 Recommendations in the Report (090505) have either been implemented by, or subject to, my appointment. I concur with all the Recommendations.
- 2.3 In order to be timely and useful under operational pressures and constraints this review must be, and will be brief.
- 2.4 The appointment of a UK Chief Police Advisor, Iraq with direction and control over all UK policing assets (including those under ArmorGroup) will help in moving valuable resources to meet the identified priorities.

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3 Priorities

- 3.1 The attached ToR is the first clear statement of UK intent in respect of support to the development of the IPS in Iraq (both Baghdad and Basra). Priorities fall into two distinct areas: Strategic Priorities in respect of UK influence in Baghdad and Operational (implementation) priorities in MND (SE) in Basra. They are not mutually exclusive and as I will indicate, in some cases intransigently linked (Intelligence). For clarity I will deal with each separately:

Baghdad

- 3.2 It is clear that current UK resources in Baghdad are dwarfed by the increase in US equivalent. Whilst always proportionately greater than UK this has demonstrably grown in recent months as the US priority, post General Gary LUCK visit in January 2005, has moved from 'warfighting' to 'iraqification'. This is particularly true in respect of development of the IPS. Initial UK influence in several areas has gone or been substantially weakened. As programmes have been developed, resource gaps have been identified. UK inability to significantly fill these gaps has inevitably resulted in the US doing so, diminishing UK influence. Priority areas include Intelligence, Crime Investigation, Training, and Strategic Development.
- 3.3 UK inability to 'walk the talk' and tendency to write long, strategic doctrinal papers (often targeted at the wrong levels and individuals) has been interpreted by the US as typical British procrastination. The US clarion call (not totally untypical of our own Military) is enunciated by Lt General PETRAEUS, Head of MNFSTC-I as 'Action, Action and Action'.
- 3.4 In order to increase influence at the Strategic Level we need to focus activity over the next 12 months on the key targeted areas. These are indicated in the ToR, but need to be seen as Primary and Secondary:

Primary

- 3.5 **Strategic Development of the IPS.** I have verbally agreed this with my US Counterpart, Steve CASTEEL, US Department of State (DoS) Advisor to MOI. This needs to be pitched at the Minister level. On 120505, at his specific request, I gave a short presentation (10 minutes) to his MOI Structure Conference in Baghdad, comprising senior Iraqi Police Service (IPS), Chief of Police (CoPs) and Governors. This was the only non-Iraqi input. It should be noted to sustain this is going to require 'herculean efforts' and interpersonal skills in the face of strong US, particularly US Military, desire for hegemony over IPS development. (An alliance of interest with DoS and IPLOs (US CivPol advisors) is a potential channel). There are currently no resources, except myself dedicated to this key activity. A need for a senior UK Civil Servant (Home Office) with experience in Police Strategic Development and Police Structure has been identified.

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- 3.6 **Intelligence (and Crime Investigation).** This is identified as one of the few areas where the UK still has a foothold. This has, co-incidentally arisen through the attachment to the UK Team, of a Czech Intelligence Advisor. heads the Intelligence Project and 'sits at the top table'. This is a key area for resources. Requirements: a senior experienced Special Branch or Intelligence Officer with UK national experience. Additional skills required include a Crime Analyst and a Systems/IT advisor. The UK Team have developed the 'TIPS' Programme (a Confidential Telephone Hotline) which is producing both good intelligence and a means of training basic Informant Handling techniques to the police. One post is dedicated to development of Forensic Capability. A key post that should be continued which links to similar development in MND (SE).
- 3.7 **Policing Centre of Excellence.** Resourced mainly from two senior Canadian Colleagues on the Team, but assisted by all, including myself, this provides a focus for policing issues across Iraq and Internationally. This is a small resource but a disproportionate influence. It helps to 'fly the flag' for policing in a land dominated by the Military.

Secondary

- 3.8 **Baghdad Police Training Academy.** The UK currently has substantial resources invested in direct IPS Training – the largest non-US contingent (58) at Jordan International Police Training Centre (JIPTC) and runs (Director and 22 trainers), with Czech, Danish and Italian (Carabinieri) input, the Regional Police Academy at Az Zubayr near to Basra City. We currently have senior representation at Deputy Director Level at the Baghdad Academy and two trainers. This can still be sustained if sufficient skilled individuals are available.
- 3.9 **Ancillary Advisors.** A small number of advisors who occupy operational support posts, e.g. a Hostage/Kidnap Advisor. This post has been very high profile and the current post holder has played a pivotal role in MNF response. He has been highly praised by the NSY SO13 Team investigating the kidnap and murder of Margaret HASSAN. This can be sustained if a skilled individual is available (urgent).

Basra

- 3.10 Whilst Baghdad has been the 'strategic' centre for IPS Development, Basra has been the central focus of UK involvement, particularly in terms of resources.
- 3.11 British 'run' MND (SE) comprises the four Provinces of Basra, Maysan, Al Muthanna and Dhi Qar (local spellings differ). Senior Police Advisor Iraq (South) has been the CivPol lead in Basra and Maysan since start of mission in July 2003. Muthanna was, until March 2005, under the control of the Dutch Military supported by a large contingent of Dutch Military Police. Police lead was effectively from Dutch Senior Military Commander to GOC MND (SE) through Security Sector Reform (SSR) – the Divisional RMP Provost Marshall or Colonel equivalent. In March 2005 Muthanna Province came under direct UK

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control and CivPol assets were deployed as soon as available. Dhi Qar, under Italian Military control, remains as per Al Muthanna until March this year i.e. link to GOC through SSR.

- 3.12 Priority across the 3 Provinces is now to implement the '**12 Month IPS Development Strategy and Plan**'. Copy attached at **Appendix C**. This has received wide circulation and consultation with all stakeholders, particularly Iraqi CoP's. The Strategy prioritises activity in 5 key areas – Training, Operational Capability, Intelligence, Supporting Infrastructure and Public Support. It will concentrate on areas that have 'Iraqi buy in', are achievable within 12 months and importantly, sustainable (by the Iraqis), beyond 12 months. Accompanying plans and resource taskings have been undertaken with Military, ArmorGroup and CPATT IPLOs. A Coordinating Group, including CivPol and AG is being established at 4 Div Hz, Basra Air Station' to further priorities and allocate resources. Police/Military Teams will co-ordinate implementation across the Provinces. Whilst this Strategy, long overdue in MND (SE), was being rolled out CPATT in Baghdad started to rollout the 'Police, Partnership Programme' (P3) across Iraq. The '12 Month IPS Development Plan' and P3 are identical and complimentary in most terms of areas covered and implementation. The US administration have failed to realize (or acknowledge) the role of CivPol in MND (SE) and directed Military direction of P3 across ALL Provinces. Despite some tensions this is being resolved locally
- 3.13 The **Regional Police Training Academy** at Az Zubayr (AZ) was a UK initiative from 2003, initially as Basra Provincial Training but then 'adopted' by the MOI as a Regional Academy. 23 officers, predominately CivPol, have conducted Basic, Development and Management Courses.
- 3.14 With effect from May 2005 all IPS Basic Recruit Training will be carried out at JIPTC or Baghdad Academy. JIPTC is scheduled to be closed in late 2006. AZ will remain important in conducting continuation, TIP, specialist and development training. It will have an important role over the next 12 months in training and developing Iraqi Trainers to take over the majority of police training, except specialist courses.

Current Resources

- 4.0 Whilst I am cognizant of the number of persons currently in post, I am unsighted on what is the overall 'staffing' allocation or budget for Iraq. There is no clear indication of the number of posts that are budgeted by the FCO either in Baghdad or Basra. The posts appear to have been allocated on a locally/centrally identified basis. Some posts are currently unfilled e.g. Deputy Post in Basra or have been filled to fulfill a short term requirement. Where a suitable replacement has not been found posts, particularly training have been re-allocated.
- 4.1 This is not a personal failing on any department but reflects a sometimes unstructured approach. This has been hampered by a number of factors – the division of responsibilities between Basra and Baghdad, lack of overall command and co-ordination

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between Baghdad, Basra and Az Zubayr, distinct contractual arrangements between CivPol posts, lack of integration of ArmorGroup officers into overall structure and above all a lack of a Development Strategy and Plan setting priorities against which long term resources can be committed.

- 4.2 The current 6 month posting policy has itself created difficulties. Allowing for R & R, induction etc a seconded officer is likely to spend a little over 4 months on the ground in Iraq. Extensions and renewals, whilst welcome, have done little to help continuity. A 'handover' period is a luxury. Many officers have departed weeks or months before their replacement.
- 4.3 Current resource allocation (weft 150505) is as follows; (please note that the need to swiftly produce this report will create errors. A comprehensive spreadsheet of posts and expected arrivals against my priorities will follow shortly.)

Chief Police Advisor Iraq
SO to CPA I

Deputy Chief Constable
Chief Inspector

4.4 Baghdad

Deputy to CPA I

C/Supt. (Note: This has been a Canadian Officer attached to the Team. Non Funded by FCO. Now vacant. A further secondment not likely for 3 or 4 months)

Project Leader – Crime & Forensics

Supt. (Note: This is been a Canadian Officer attached to the Team. Non Funded by FCO)

Project Leader – Intelligence

Intelligence Officer (Note: This is been a Czech Officer attached to the Team. Non Funded by FCO – will need replacing shortly by a UK Officer))

Support Team Manager

Inspector

TIPs Team

1 D/Sergeant
3 Constables

Hostage and Kidnap Advisor

Police Constable

Deputy Director Baghdad Academy

Chief Inspector
2 Training Officers (currently vacant)

4.5 Basra

The Organisational Chart sets out the current allocation of posts:

CivPol Advisor to Cop (Basra)	Superintendent (+1 AG Deputy)
CivPol Advisor to Cop (Maysan)	Superintendent (+1 AG Deputy)
CivPol Advisor to Cop (Al Muthanna)	Chief Inspector (+1 AG Deputy)
Training Co-Coordinator	Chief Inspector (+1 AG Support)
Projects (Intelligence)	Chief Inspector (+5 AG)
Police Liaison Officer to Military	Chief Inspector
Military Liaison Officer to Police	Military (Major)
Team Support Manager	Inspector (+1 AG Support)
Crime and Forensic Advisor	Civilian (+5 AG Support)

- 4.6 There are 70+ ArmorGroup Officers working in the 3 Provinces. They have been increasingly integrated both into training provision through the IPS 12 Month Development Plan but also into the support structure, providing additional administration support, deputy cover (retired C/Inspectors and Supt) to CivPol Advisors and specific project support – Forensic and Intelligence. They are a very flexible resource and can be deployed against priorities.

4.7 **Az Zubayr (AZ) Regional Training Academy**

The attached Organisational Chart sets out the current allocation and strength

Director of Training	Chief Inspector
Deputies, Trainers etc.	20

Additional resources (2 officers) are provided by ArmorGroup.

- 4.8 As previously indicated a comprehensive report covering all current postholders, end of tour dates, expected arrivals, replacements etc and new posts against priorities, is being prepared with my staff officer. This will follow shortly. It is in effect a further Appendix.

Resources Against Priorities

- 5.1 The priorities in **Baghdad** are set out in Paras 3.5 to 3.9 above.
- 5.2 Resource requirements to meet these priorities:

Deputy to CPA –I (Baghdad)	C/Supt
Advisor On Strategic Policy and Structure	Senior Civilian

Intelligence Project Head	C/Supt or Civ Equivalent
TIPs Team	1 D/Sergeant 3 Constables
Crime and Forensic Advisor	Skill Based (C/Insp?)
Kidnap and Hostage Advisor	Skill based (D/Insp?)
Police Centre Excellence	2 CivPol posts (Canadian or overseas if possible)
Deputy Director Training Baghdad Academy Trainers (2)	C/Inspector or Supt Constables.
Support Team Manager	Inspector

- 5.3 The priorities in **Basra** are set out in Paras 3.10 to 3.12 above.

The posts required are as set out in Para 4.5 above with the addition:

Deputy to CPA-I (Basra)	Chief Superintendent
SPA – I (Basra) (Cover to Deputy CPA-I)	Superintendent
CivPol Advisor (Al Muthanna)	Upgrade to Supt. post

- 5.4 The priorities in **Az Zubayr Academy** are set out in Paras 3.13 to 3.14 above.

The posts required are as set out in Para 4.6.

- 5.5 The total number of posts required is not anticipated to increase. Re-focusing of priorities to meet the IPS 12 Month Development Plan will necessitate moving officers from AZ to Provincial Academies (based at existing CivPol locations in Basra, Al Muthanna and Maysan). The movement of trainers to Baghdad Academy to fill the 2 posts is also under review. CPATT have offered 3 Trainers and an Administrator to support AZ courses – being pursued expeditiously.

Resource Gaps

- 6.1 I have previously indicated that I am not aware of the overall staffing budget for IPS Development in Iraq.

6.2 It is anticipated that, without a dramatic change in circumstances in Iraq or governmental direction, there should, cognisant of Para 6.1 above, be no additional resource requirements.

6.3 This is qualified by the following criteria:

- ✓ Renewal of current Armor Group (AG) Contract.
- ✓ Further integration of AG officers into support roles for CivPol.
- ✓ Flexibility of contracts, terms and conditions to allow movement, within Iraq under overall control of CPA- I.
- ✓ Identification and matching of officer profiles with required skill sets.
- ✓ Major resource allocation by UK Military and CPATT (MND SE) into the IPS 12 Month Development Plan (agreed with GOC MND-SE). Particularly essential to meet challenging military drawdown plans in Al Muthanna and Maysan for end of 2005.
- ✓ Continued (and increased) support by ACPO and UK Forces to CivPol Mission in Iraq.
- ✓ Greater flexibility (risk assessed) in movement of CivPol officers, particularly in MND-SE

6.4 There are further opportunities to increase resource allocations at nil cost to budget:

- ✓ Approach to Commonwealth Partners (Australians, New Zealand etc) to second senior Police Officers to support Mission in Iraq. The Canadians currently provide 2 officers (one currently vacant). The Australians have a major military deployment in Al Muthanna – seconded officers could greatly support the CivPol effort there. These approaches need to be made quickly, at a senior level co-coordinated through Embassy Baghdad.
- ✓ A similar approach could be made to our European Partners. The EU Project headed by Stephen WHITE may assist in Senior IPS Officer development.
- ✓ Where direct officer secondment is not an option due to political concerns, funding of additional AG contracts – I am aware and have contributed to possible Japanese involvement in Al Muthanna – should be vigorously pursued. The more resources available the more tasks can be completed within the current timescales.
- ✓ Identification by Military of police officers currently serving as Territorial Army Reserve in MND SE and their attachment to joint Military/Police tasking and direction to drive forward the IPS 12 Month Development Plan. (GOC MND SE is aware)
- ✓ Better co-ordination with CPATT and MNSTC –I to draw down some of the resources available in Baghdad into MND-SE (already underway through CPA-I)
- ✓ Better recruitment of recently retired police officers (notably RUC/PSNI) with required skill sets

- 6.5 I repeat the 'health warning' made at the beginning reference the need to produce a quick report for Baghdad and London. Further reports in respect of more detailed personnel allocation and costings are currently being prepared and will be forwarded through Embassy.
- 6.6 I believe the priorities set are achievable within 12 months and within current resource allocation. The key driver is TIME. **Additional posts in Basra and Baghdad need to be identified and in country within 4 weeks (mid-June)**
- 6.7 We have failed in the past through lack of appropriate succession planning, handovers etc. Substantial effort has been put into driving UK effort forward in both Basra and, more recently, Baghdad. Progress in Iraq is hindered by communications, IT and movement constraints. We must not allow this or poor co-ordination with, and within, the UK to diminish this drive. CivPol have many critics in Iraq in the form of US (and UK) military. **We must not fail.**

Deputy Chief Constable
UK Chief Police Advisor - Iraq

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APPENDIX A

Chief UK Police Adviser

Principal Purpose of Job

To increase UK influence in and input to the development of the Iraq Police Service, to lead and direct the UK Police Team in Iraq and to be HMA's principal adviser on policing issues.

Objectives

Iraq-wide:

1. Early agreement with the Minister of the Interior and his US advisers on a strategic policing plan for Iraq.
2. Assist the Minister in the implementation of the agreed strategy.
3. Contribute to the development of an effective MOI/IPS intelligence capability.
4. Become the central point of reference on policing policy and operations for the Minister of Interior and senior US officials.
5. Lead and direct the British Police Team in Iraq in accordance with agreed priorities and international standards.
6. Provide timely advice and assistance to HMA on policing and security matters.

Actions in support of those objectives will include:

- Work with HMA to persuade the Minister of Interior to adopt the UK/US strategic framework and to help develop an Iraqi Policing Strategy and Policing Plan
- Co-ordinate with the US (CPATT), the UK's police training and mentoring programme
- Conduct an urgent review of UK deployments against agreed priorities and make recommendations by 15 May.
- Agree the level of resources available to the UK Policing Team and secure the deployment of appropriate skilled personnel to agreed timelines.
- Ensure UK police activity and training conforms to all relevant international laws and standards.
- Provide effective leadership to and management of the UK Civ Pol, UK Contractors (through the Contractor's management chain) and any assigned UK civil servants.
- Ensure the good discipline, safety and security of all assigned personnel. Specifically, ensure that any relevant UK embassy security and safety regulations are adhered to as well as complying with restrictions imposed by the FCO International Police Team

MND(SE):

1. Develop and deliver a 12-month strategy and development plan for the IPS.
2. Deliver UK supplied (both contractor and Civ Pol) police training and mentoring together with HQ MND(SE) and other agencies.

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Actions in support of those objectives will include:

- Agree and implement the 12-month Police Plan with HQ MND(SE) taking into account timelines and the relative capacity to deliver agreed priorities.
- Advise on integration of donor countries' contribution to police training, equipment and funding
- Co-ordinate IPS development with the UK Prisons project leader.
- Use the Prisons Project legal advisor to assist in policy development and implementation as appropriate

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Iraqi Police Service – Development Strategy.

Strategic Aim.

"To develop an efficient, effective, credible and community supported police service"

Strategic Intent.

Whilst capability to counter insurgency and maintain public order is a current priority, the long term objective is for the development of a community based, accountable police service subject to political governance.

Strategic Principles.

Current strategic development must:

- Be led by the Iraqi Police Service with the agreement and support of the key Iraqi stakeholders – Chief's of Police, Minister of the Interior.
- Be achievable within 12 months.
- Be sustainable, under local control, beyond 12 months.
- Have aim of police primacy on public order, criminal investigation and internal security.
- Multinational assistance and support be civilian police led and co-ordinated.
- Be Measurable

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Strategic Drivers/Enablers

- Training.
- Equipment.
- Finance.

Strategic Priorities

Five priority areas to be addressed in the next 12 months.

- **Training**: Basic, Leadership and Developmental areas to be prioritised. Courses and regional, provincial or local training arranged.
- **Police Support Infrastructure**: at Police Headquarters level - Human Resources; Finance (and Contracts), Communications, Logistics.
- **Intelligence Capability**: The Collection, Collation, Analysis, Action and Dissemination of Intelligence - criminal, terrorist and counter-insurgency.
- **Operational Capability**: Police to have effective Command and Control Systems with aim of Policy Primacy; Co-Ordination; Specialist Support (SWAT and TSU); Criminal Investigation (inc. Forensic).
- **Public Support**: Development of Police interaction with the Criminal Justice System (Courts, Prisons etc), Media and Public; Development of Public and Civil Accountability; Ability to remove corrupt and inefficient police officers through a robust, transparent and accountable Complaints System (Professional Standards).

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APPENDIX II**Resources - Iraq**

Version 18/10/2005 (Baghdad)

Iraq

Post	Name	Rank	End of Mission Date	Comments
Chief Police Advisor-Iraq		DCC	09/01/06	
Staff Officer to CPA-I		Ch Insp.	24/10/05	6 month extension. Salary to T/Chief Inspector wef 241005

Baghdad

Deputy Chief Police Advisor – Baghdad		C/Supt	27/11/05	6 month extension
CPATT – Policy and Plans		C/Supt	05/10/05	
Advisor on Strategic Policy & Structure	vacant	Senior Civilian		New Post - See latest GCPP review by Part of Difid Capacity Building Project.
Team Support Manager		Insp.	280905	
Project Leader – Technical Support + Special Commando's; ERU.		Supt	10/01/06	Working with No current knowledge of replacement.

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Intelligence

Project Leader - Intelligence		C/Supt	24/01/06	
Intelligence Support (Crime Manager)		Insp.	13/11/05	6 month extension
Intelligence Support (Intelligence Advisor)		Sgt	13/11/05	6 month extension
TIPs Team Leader		D/Sgt.	30/11/05	6 month extension 'in hand' (IPCPT).
TIPs Team		PC	06/12/05	Not extended. To be replaced with Armor Group (AG).
TIPs Team		PC	02/12/2005	Not extended. To be replaced with Armor Group (AG).
TIPs Team		PC	30/11/2005	Not extended. To be replaced with Armor Group (AG).
TIPs Team		AG	Wef 14/07/05	Armor Group Contract
TIPs Team		AG	Wef 06/06/05	Armor Group Contract.

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Crime

Forensic Advisor		AG	01/003/06	AG contract
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Assistant to Forensic Advisor		AG		AG contract
Forensics-laboratories		Insp.		Canadian deployment
Hostage & Kidnap Advisor		D/Sgt	12/12/05	Not extended. To be replaced by D/ Insp. 121205 attached to CPATT (Technical Support-MCU).

Training

Deputy Director Baghdad Academy		Supt	27/11/05	6 month extension.
Baghdad Academy Training Officer		PC	04/11/05	6 month extension.
Baghdad Academy Training Officer		PC	04/11/05	6 month extension
Baghdad Academy Training Officer		PC	12/12/05	Curriculum Development, Officer College, BPC.
Baghdad Academy Training Officer		PC		Awaiting CV

Basra

Deputy Chief Police Advisor – Basra (SE)		C/Supt	13/01/06	
Senior Police Advisor – Iraq (South)		Supt.	17/12/05	Replaced I who left mission early. 6 month extension sought.
Senior Police Advisor -		Supt	27/08/06	12 month contract

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Basra				
Senior Police Advisor - Maysan		Supt	03/09/06	12 month contract
Senior Police Advisor - Al Muthanna		Supt.	?????	
SSR Training Co-ordinator		C/Insp.	?????	This role has now become SSR Training Co-ordinator based at Basra APOD.
Deputy SSR Training Co-ordinator		AG		Armor Group contract
SSR Training Liaison Officer [Maysan]		AG		Armor Group contract
SSR Training Liaison Officer [Muthanna]		PC	29/11/05	6 month extension supported as : performing an impressive role progressing the training plan in Muthanna.
Projects	vacant	C/Insp.		Vacancy to be filled.
Intelligence Project		C/Insp.	01/10/05	
Police Liaison Officer to Military		(Surrey Insp)	Wef 07/06/05	To be replaced by another serving TA, CivPol, identified by the Military OR Not to be replaced.
Military Liaison Officer to Police		WO2		Military deployment.
Team Support Manager		Insp	06/02/06	
CoP Advisor - Basra		AG		Armor Group
CoP Advisor - Maysan		AG		Armor Group
CoP Advisor - Al Muthanna		AG		Armor Group

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Shaiba Regional Training Academy (IPS)

Deputy Director (IPS)		Supt.	06/12/2005	6 month extension in rank of T/Supt wef 010905.
Deputy Director (IPS)		Civilian	30/11/05	6 month extension.
Trainers:		DC	17/12/05	6 month extension
		PC	17/12/05	EOM 140905 – welfare reasons. No replacement sought.
		PC	17/12/05	6 month extension.
		PC	30/11/05	Not to be replaced.
		PC	02/12/05	Not to be replaced.
		PC	05/12/05	6 month extension 'in hand' (IPCPT)
		PC	17/12/05	6 month extension.
		Ret'd	30/11/05	Not to be replaced.
		PC	17/12/05	6 month extension.
		PC	05/12/05	6 month extension.

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		PC	05/12/05	6 month extension.
		PC	01/10/05	Not to be replaced.
		PC	05/11/05	Not to be replaced.
		PC	05/11/05	6 month extension.
		PC	04/11/05	Not to be replaced.

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