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D/DCDS(C)/05/04/05

8 Aug 02

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UPDATED GUIDANCE FOR POSSIBLE MILITARY OPERATIONS (IRAQ)

Reference:

A. D/DCDS(C)/05/04/05 dated 8 Jul (Replaced by this Guidance).

SITUATION

- Consequent to Reference, UK staffs have been engaged with US staffs in the Pentagon, CENTCOM, Supporting Commands and Component HQs.
- The CENTCOM Plan was briefed to SecDef and POTUS during the period 3-5 Aug. Component Plans are scheduled for end Aug.
- There are more signs that US mil thinking is being integrated within an Inter Agency process, but it remains patchy.
- MODUK planning posture with US staffs is on the basis of being 'as positive as possible' but without implying premature political commitment. As for US planners, 'no decisions yet taken', is the general line. UK Ministers have not yet authorised any expenditure on Force Preparation issues.
- Factors arising from Op FRESCO (MOD response to potential National Fire Strike) and other Commitments¹ need to be factored into this ongoing work.
- Within an overall Intent that mil ops must be successful, 3 key conditions remain extant for UK involvement:

¹ D/DJW/11/3 dated 5 Jul, Concurrency Paper for COS (Notal) provides a baseline. FRESCO worst case scale of effort could involve up to 20,000 with penalties to match.

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- Public opinion domestically and internationally must be prepared.
- Giving UNMOVIC a chance to succeed remains important.
- MEPP – there needs to be discernible progress.
- Maintenance of OPSEC and minimising 'Need to Know' remains critically important. SofS Intent and Direction is very clear in this area, and the implications of this constraint are understood and accepted. The Warrior group (PJHQ) and Centurion Group (MOD) must remain on a named individual basis.

ASSUMPTIONS

- US Endstate. Assume this to be:
 - Saddam's regime leadership and supporting power base destroyed; WMD capability and infrastructure eliminated; Iraq's territorial integrity intact with sufficient force to defend itself and no ability to threaten its neighbours; and an acceptable provisional/permanent government in place.
- UK Endstate. Assume this to be:
 - A stable and law abiding Iraq, within present borders, co-operating with the IC, no longer posing a threat to its neighbours or to international security, and abiding by its international obligations on WMD.
- UK Scale of Effort. Options for UK involvement (less UKSF being handled separately) are currently based on:
 - Package 1- In-Place Support. This package could cover everything from planning teams, ISR support, AAR, Lift, Diego Garcia, Cyprus issues etc.
 - Package 2 - Enhanced Support. Package 1 plus additional Maritime and Air capabilities at up to medium scale of effort.
 - Package 3 - Discrete UK Package. This Package could include selected Enablers plus UK Force Elements upto a Div, with a discrete role in the North within an integrated US-led campaign.
- For all Packages, we should plan/assume that UK must be self sufficient in logistics and lift, and that UK will be granted full access to US intelligence products

UPDATED TASKS

- TASK 1. Maintain currency of UK Mil Strat Estimate. Be prepared to reissue wef 3 Sep (to be cleared by DCDS(C)). Main Effort is to focus on all those issues that will inform Chiefs of Staff judgements on 'Is there a Winning Mil Strategic Concept/Plan?' Key considerations include:

- Is mil plan set within an integrated pol strategy?
- Is the Int good enough to give high confidence that objectives in support of WMD Elimination, Regime Replacement, Post Conflict Ops and Minimising Unintended Consequences' can be achieved?
- Is the strategy for the 'North' joined up?
- Is the Information Campaign in place and effective?
- Is the Coalition dimension adequately covered?
- Are the CBRN judgements insofar as they affect combat operations sound?
- Are the logistics/correlation of forces/rear ops judgements sound?

Action: SPG.

- **TASK 2.** Maintain the Op Estimate and reissue by 13 Sep.

Action: PJHQ.

- **TASK 3.** Continue to refine/answer the following mil strat info requirements:

- WMD. Actionable/Releasable intelligence in order to support all measures aimed at eliminating WMD and supporting combat ops..
- Regime Cohesion. Focus on Fault lines, Fragility, Options, Targeting & Chance of Success.
- Regime Replacement. Focus on 'Day After' issues in order to inform Post Conflict Estimates, CONOPS and Plans.
- Regional Dimension. Attitudes, Intent, 'What ifs' etc judged against whole duration of any mil campaign.
- Saddam's Diplomatic/Mil Options. Keep focus on his whole capability, not just military. What are his options? What is the most likely? What is the worst combination of COAs from a UK/Coalition perspective and can it be countered?
- APODs/SPODs/Kuwait. Part of the Regional Dimension but given criticality to any plan these remain a separate mil strat info requirement.

Action: ACDS(Ops) to CDI.

TASK 4. Identify within extant UK Intent/Constraints the key Policy, Strategic, Operational and Tactical Issues within Packages 1 and 2. Identify FRESCO and other concurrency issues.

Action: SPG (Pol/Strategic) and PJHQ (Ops/Tac).

TASK 5. Continue to scope with CENTCOM/EUCOM the US Strategy, CONOPS and CONPLANS for Package 3 scenarios, whilst making it clear to US staffs that this is currently without firm commitment.

Action: PJHQ.

TASK 7. Continue to take (clearing any high visibility measures as required with MODUK) all necessary measures to bring JRRF Force Elements to Readiness within extant Policy. Scope JRRF reconstitution options on the assumption that significant elements of Packages 1-3 deploy within the rolling 6 months period ahead.

Action: PJHQ.

TASK 8. Internal stocktake by MOD/PJHQ/FLCs to identify opportunities within currently planned, but unrelated activities (on a rolling 6 months basis) which could be exploited for future Force Preparation, Deployment or Employment. Also identify difficult areas and related decision points.

Action: DOMA (for MOD issues); PJHQ to FLCs.

TASK 9. Enablers.

-- Maintain UK planning and liaison staff within US compartments at Pentagon, CENTCOM, EUCOM and Component HQs. PJHQ to ensure that UK embedded staffs are fully up to speed with UK Intent and that consistent messages are maintained in to the US chain of command.

Action: MOD/PJHQ.

- As far as possible on a contingency basis within SofS Intent/Constraints, drill down UORs in support of Package 1-3 options.

Action: ACDS(Ops) with DG Op Pol.

- Maintain close engagement with the Cabinet Office led work on the Information Campaign as policy develops.

Action: DTIO with SPG.

- Produce an overview of the Medical Estimate and a Medical Issues Action Plan in support of future ops (Tasker already issued by DCDS(C)).

Action: Brig McMillan with MOD, PJHQ, SG & FLCs.

- Scope UK involvement with Ex INTERNAL LOOK and Ex LUCKY WARRIOR and other Training/Force Preparation exercises in line with overall Intent of 'positive engagement without final commitment'.

Action: PJHQ.

- **TASK 10.** Ensure that Op FRESCO planning takes into account Iraq considerations, and vice versa, in order to strike the best overall balance against these 2 potentially conflicting requirements. In broad terms we should seek to protect Package 1 and Package 2(-) from worst case FRESCO implications. We should also examine whether it is possible to protect at least a Package 3 Brigade from FRESCO impact.

Action: DMO with DNO/DAO and SPG.

TIMELINES AND PRESENTATION

- Aug – Sep. Battle Rhythm as required.

Action: ACDS(Ops)

- Chiefs of Staff Strat Think Tank – 6 Sep. DCDS(C), CJO and CDI to update Chiefs on respective areas of work.

DCDS(C)