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IRAQ: WE DO NOT KNOW ENOUGH ABOUT...

These are the questions for your back pocket in the US.

Iraq's CBW and ballistic missile capability (current CBW agent stocks; number and type of weapons, especially the number of long range Al Hussein missiles and launchers; location and capability of production facilities).

Saddam's 'red lines' which would provoke him to use CBW against coalition forces or his neighbours.

What Saddam plans to do if there is a credible military force being prepared eg in Kuwait. Does he consider pre-emption a possibility?

Will he fully accept inspectors if the US threat seems imminent? If he does accept (likely according to the intelligence), how open is he willing to be?

The cohesion of the key military and security organisations (especially the Republican Guard, in particular the officer corps, and the Special Security Organisation (SSO)). At what point will they desert/stop doing their duty?

Who might act against Saddam and would they act before Baghdad is occupied by coalition forces?

The prospects for an uprising of the civil populace in Shia cities and what the security forces' response would be.

The likely popular attitude to a US invasion and the arrival of US or allied troops on their territory.

What would be the Israeli response to an Iraqi CBW attack?

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