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From the Private Secretary

17 September 2002

Dear Mark,

IRAQ: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH FOREIGN SECRETARY AND SIR JEREMY GREENSTOCK, 17 SEPTEMBER

The Foreign Secretary and Sir Jeremy Greenstock briefed the Prime Minister on 17 September on the state of play on the Iraq UNSCR(s). Jonathan Powell, David Manning, Alastair Campbell, Sally Morgan and I were also present. The following were the conclusions:

- We should continue to press, quickly, for a **new Resolution**, (a) describing Saddam as in "material breach" of his obligations, (b) setting out the demand on Saddam to allow unconditional UNMOVIC entry, and (c) using the strongest language the Security Council market would bear on the consequences in the event of non-compliance. For instance, Ivanov had used the formulation "Iraq will take responsibility for the serious consequences which will follow".
- We should seek to secure in the first Resolution as much as possible of the wording required, using the argument that the tougher the Resolution the less likely military action would become. We should keep an open mind on whether a **second Resolution** would be required, ruling it neither in nor out. It would be too much for the US to accept two Resolutions now.
- The proposed **declaration of Iraq's WMD** should be an update rather than a final and complete declaration. We should pursue it in parallel with the return of inspectors, not delay the inspectors' return.
- **Publicly**, we should describe Saddam's offer of accepting inspectors as a tactical ploy, exactly as we had expected. We suspected that he had absolutely no intention of complying with all UN demands. It showed that our tough approach was working. We must maintain the pressure. The inspection regime must be tough and able to do its job.

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- The Prime Minister would telephone **Putin** in the coming days, in concert with Bush's call to Putin.
- We should keep in close touch with **Blix**, so that the Resolution took account of his practical considerations. Blix would have to be very tough with the Iraqis on eg access to presidential sites.

I am copying this to Peter Watkins (MOD), Ian Fletcher, John Scarlett and Desmond Bowen (Cabinet Office), (PS/C), Sir Jeremy Greenstock (UKMis New York), Sir Christopher Meyer (Washington), Sir John Holmes (Paris) and Sir Roderic Lyne (Moscow).

Yours,



MATTHEW RYCROFT

Mark Sedwill
FCO

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