

D/Sec(O)/2/37/8

13 September 02

PS/Secretary of State

*Sats limited  
Approval  
given by phone  
17/9*

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PJHQ CIV SEC

IRAQ - URGENT OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS (UORs)

References:

A. MO 6/17/15H dated 5 September 2002

B. MO 6/17/15H dated 9 September 2002

**Issue**

1. The need to take forward essential UOR work for potential operations against Iraq.

**Recommendation**

2. That Secretary of State:

- a. notes that we have got as far as we can in defining urgent equipment and sustainability measures without consulting more widely; but that the very limited nature of our consultation and the broad scope of the force packages on the table implies that we cannot have high confidence in the judgements we have made;

- b. agrees we take forward a limited package of "ambiguous" tasks on 16 essential UORs; noting that these are aimed at remaining "invisible" over the next month in line with his direction, but should provide enough information for an approach to the Treasury on these UORs;

- c. notes that these tasks do not cover the full range of capability shortfalls which have been identified; and that we need take to forward work on a wider set of UORs which will be pursued as soon as the "invisibility" constraint is lifted to inform a wider approach to the Treasury; this requires a limited expansion of the CENTURION Group.

## **Timing**

4. Urgent. The sooner work can begin on essential tasks the greater confidence we can have that we can meet the minimum capability requirements for potential operations against Iraq.

## **Background**

5. You requested advice at Reference A. As the Secretary of State is aware, work has been ongoing over the summer to drill down on the equipment (mainly Urgent Operational Requirements) and sustainability measures, which may be required for future operations against Iraq. Consultation has, however, so far been constrained to a limited group aware of contingency planning for Iraq (the CENTURION Group) with some raising of specific questions (where no connection with Iraq contingency planning might be inferred) with a wider community. The outcome is a database listing capability shortfalls by Environment, including Joint, Medical and Sustainability issues, and defining them in terms of:

- a. Essential items – without which the force or force element cannot operate – “showstoppers”.
- b. Full Operational Capability Enhancements – required to give the force a full operational capability for up to 30 days combat (subject to attrition rates).
- c. Follow on Enhancements – these enhance operational capability beyond 30 days combat, and achieve substantial risk reduction.

6. Because this work has been kept close hold, judgements have been made based on often very limited information available. For example, we have not been able to consult with subject matter experts (SMEs) in the majority of cases to determine the degree of priority for certain UORs; this may change if we were to do so. Judgements on the shape and size of the US force, the degree of risk we might be prepared to take, the Concept of Operations (CONOPS), the terrain and, among other issues, the extent of Host Nation Support and the development of work-rounds, when known, will all bear on decisions relating to UORs. Further, in the absence of wider consultation we now judge that we have taken this work as far forward as we possibly can.

## **Capability Shortfall**

7. The work has been stringent in categorising the shortfalls; our focus has been on the showstoppers. We have looked at these as they articulate to the various potential capability packages on which Secretary of State has already been briefed. The key issues are as follows:

8. Maritime. There are 6 measures (only 3 for Package 1) relating to improving mine detection capability, force protection and improvements to interoperability with US forces where we need to commence work immediately. Further, we would need to consider advancing HMS OCEAN's refit package (which would be publicly visible) to enable her to deploy within US timescales. OCEAN would be a key element to the Amphibious Ready Group.
9. Land. It is for the land component that there is the least degree of definition on the probable operational deployment. Notwithstanding this uncertainty, we judge 6 equipment measures as essential: Challenger II desertisation, and the provision of additional fuel and water bowzers, enhanced combat body armour, SA80 and logistic vehicles. Three other measures (Heavy Equipment Transporter, Light Equipment Transporter and air-conditioning for HQ IT Systems) are considered high priority but have possible work-arounds. The variability of the likely composition of the land package gives rise to a wide spectrum of potential UORs in terms of both equipment and numbers. Our work to date has focused on ensuring the maximum potential for operations and the costs are calculated accordingly.
10. Air. With the exception of measures that provide essential support to Special Forces (Package 0), we have identified no showstoppers for the Air component provided control of the air is delivered by the coalition air component. All force elements are available for each package within 2 months, albeit at differing levels of risk. The air package will, however, require a substantial commitment to UORs to bring the force up to full operational capability with specific reference to defensive aids suites, communications, command and control and NBC protection measures.
11. Special Forces. Other than the supporting SF air and aviation package (mentioned above), SF issues are being addressed separately.
12. NBC protection. The issue for all three service is not so much that we do not hold equipment (capability exists), but whether we hold sufficient in the face of the risk. Medical countermeasures are also available; the picture is improving with adequate stock availability anticipated by late September, except Collective Protection is available for only and there is a concern over the effectiveness of some of which may need replacing.
13. Medical. Key equipment issues are associated with the need to deploy up to 4 Hospitals to theatre. The necessary equipment can be procured off the shelf within around 90 days.
14. Sustainability. Sustainability is closely related to the level of HNS available. The DLO are rationalising their understanding of the logistic support issues that will affect the operational effectiveness of the components. Currently we believe there are no absolute show stoppers. There are however a large number of areas of high risks which are being urgently examined.

## Way Ahead

15. At reference B, Martin Williams made clear that "for now actions must remain invisible... and this situation is likely to last for about a month". With this constraint in mind we have sought to determine what essential tasks need to be taken forward over the next month. The question of what is "invisible" is a tricky one. As the Secretary of State is aware, the wider we expose contingency planning within the Department, the more likely evidence of planning and preparation for military action will become known publicly. Furthermore whilst isolated consultations with Industry may not provide direct evidence of planning and preparation, many approaches to Industry would allow a picture of planning and preparation to emerge. Our aim has been therefore to propose a package of tasks with the lowest public footprint possible. In doing so we have worked to two principals: to minimise the number of tasks and to make tasks individually "ambiguous" i.e. each can be explained individually as being taken forward for reasons other than contingency planning for action against Iraq.

16. Against this background, I recommend we should as a matter of urgency begin taking forward 16 tasks, 10 of which involve the preparation of business cases and the remainder which will look at accelerating existing programmes. This will involve several IPTs who in turn will need to start discussions with Industry. The rationale for each task can, however, be explained as being part of wider departmental activity. None of the tasks involves, initially, the commitment of additional resources, but the work will allow us to provide detailed costing for an initial approach to the Treasury. The 16 tasks are detailed at Annex.

17. Beyond these tasks, there remains a number of UORs (depending on the selected force package) that will be urgently required to bring the force we commit up to full operational capability. These fits include such measures as operational risk reduction, enabling interoperability and ensuring stocks are maintained sufficient for the length of the campaign. Many of these items will be very tightly time-constrained and may not be achievable within the required timescales. These will need immediate action as soon as the "invisibility" constraint is released. In order to plan for this we need to properly scope the implications and needs of this wider UOR and sustainability requirement.

18. This will involve direct consultation with the Directors of Equipment Capability (1\*) and the Directors General (2\*) and Business Unit Directors (1\*) at the DLO. If Secretary of State is content, we need therefore to expand the CENTURION group now to cover these individuals. Taking this forward now will be key to our ability to make a consolidated approach to the Treasury in due course.

## Presentational Issues

19. Notwithstanding the approach set out at paragraph 15, presentation is a key issue. As recent experience of reporting of *routine* missions in the No

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Fly Zones has demonstrated, there is intense media interest in any military activity which might be construed as paving the way for military action against Iraq. In advance of a decision to make clear that the Department is involved in contingency planning and preparation for action against Iraq, we could develop separate lines explaining the background to each of the tasks we are taking forward.

20. Were we to be faced with questions linking the tasks together, it would be difficult to argue that the work was anything other than prudent contingency work. To argue otherwise would give the misleading impression that the measures - when we begin expenditure - could somehow be absorbed by reprioritisation of the existing Defence Budget. I recommend therefore that in such circumstances we would continue to stress that while no decisions have been taken on military action, it is necessary now to take certain contingency preparations against any potential operations. Furthermore, as matters are taken forward at the UN, there way well be an opportunity soon for us to make clear that we are making preparations for military action, in order to put pressure on Saddam.

Simon Cholerton  
Sec(O)1

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**ANNEX**  
**TO D/SEC(O)/2/37/8**  
**DATED 12 SEP 02**

**POTENTIAL SHOWSTOPPERS – PACKAGES 0, 1,2 AND 3**

SUBJECT	REQUIREMENT & JUSTIFICATION	ACTIVITIES IN THE NEXT MONTH	Approx final cost	VISIBILITY
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)
<b>PACKAGE 0 SPECIAL FORCES, AIR AND AVIATION</b>				
Protection/ NVG/ Communications	<p>The range of measures set out below are essential to provide protection, enhanced night-flying capability and secure communications to                      and                      aircraft. The requirement is to fit                      3 aircraft (to assure available) with all enhancements and                      aircraft with secure communications. The measures are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Flight Deck Armour - considered essential protection to the cockpit.</li> <li>• C130K Mk3 NVG Compatibility – considered essential for the conduct of low light/level operations.</li> <li>• Defensive Aid Suites to counter the expected threat.</li> <li>• Secure communications and JTIDS for interoperability with the US.</li> </ul>	<p>The Business Case will need to be written prepared and potential contracts and prices discussed with Industry.</p>	£40m	<p>This activity will be visible to IPTs and industry. It could be explained away as routine work as part of efforts to expand the fleet of aircraft protected for operations in Afghanistan (in support of the residual UK commitment) and linked to wider aspirations relating to the SDR New Chapter.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">✓</p>
	<p>A range of measures to provide protection, enhanced night-flying capability and secure communications to about                      which are deemed essential for the scale of operation and operating environment being considered. The measures include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Improved Night Vision Devices, FLIR image and</li> <li>• Enhanced Defensive Aid Suites and</li> <li>• Enhanced Mission Planning Equipment.</li> </ul>	<p>The Business Case will need to be written prepared and potential contracts and prices discussed with Industry.</p>	£30m	<p>This activity will be visible to IPTs and industry. It could be explained away as routine work as part of efforts to expand the fleet of aircraft protected for operations in Afghanistan (in support of the residual UK commitment) and linked to wider aspirations relating to the SDR New Chapter.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">✓</p>

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Lynx 7 SF Helicopters	<p>A range of measures to provide protection, enhanced night flying capability and secure communications to about 10 LYNX 7 helicopters, which are deemed essential for the scale of operation and operating environment being considered. The measures include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Improved Night Vision Devices, FLIR image and Laser Protection.</li> <li>• Enhanced Defensive Aid Suites and Laser Warning Receivers.</li> <li>• Enhanced Mission Planning Equipment.</li> </ul>	The Business Case will need to be written prepared and potential contracts and prices discussed with Industry	£20m	<p>This activity will be visible to IPTs and industry. It could be explained away as part of efforts to expand the fleet of aircraft protected for operations world-wide and linked to wider aspirations relating to the SDR New Chapter.</p> 
NBC - Protection	The requirement is to improve NBC IPE, Collective Protection and NBC Detection, particularly for aircrew, to enhance protection and enable crews to operate effectively in a NBC threat/hazard environment.	We need to investigate with DEC (NBC) what scope there is to meet this requirement.	£2m	<p>This could be limited for the moment internally to those who need to know within the MoD. But equally if investigations indicate a need for quick procurement action it can be explained away as part of contingency work to improve home defence capabilities.</p>

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
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SUBJECT	REQUIREMENT & JUSTIFICATION	ACTIVITIES IN THE NEXT MONTH	Approx final cost	VISIBILITY
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)
<b>PACKAGE 1 MARITIME</b>				
Mine Counter Mine Vessels – Anti-Jamming	The requirement is to provide a precise navigation anti-jam system, which enables better track guidance for Mine Counter-Mine Vessels in a low level jamming environment. All equipment is available Off the Shelf (OTS). This provides protection against potential jamming of GPS systems, which is essential for mine clearance.	The Business Case will need to be written prepared and potential contracts and prices discussed with Industry.	£0.2m	This activity will be visible to IPTs and industry. If limited to those vessels deploying to the Gulf as part of routine exercises this measure can be explained away as prudent protection measures in the light of heightened tensions within the Middle East. Such equipment is already widely in service in the RN.
Type 23 Frigate and Royal Fleet Auxiliaries - Combat Identification	One Type 23 Frigate (Package 2 only), the organic Force Lynx helicopters and a number of RFAs require Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) Mode IV fitting to improve combat ID/"Friendly Fire" avoidance. It provides the only guarantee of a unit's 'friendly status.	The Business Case will need to be written prepared and potential contracts and prices discussed with Industry	£5m	This activity will be visible to IPTs. It could be explained away as routine work to expand current fits and an ongoing requirement to improve interoperability with Allies. It can also be explained as work addressing NAO concerns over Combat ID.
Destroyer and Frigate Escorts – Link 16	Three escorts require a Link 16 capability to allow interoperability with the US and to provide essential enhancements for combat ID and situational awareness. There are few windows available for fitting equipment before ships might need to deploy. If these are missed the costs will be substantially higher and fitting far more difficult.	The Business Case will need to be written prepared and potential contracts and prices discussed with Industry	£0.5m	This activity will be visible to IPTs and industry. It could be explained away as routine work linked to the SDR New Chapter and a package of communications improvements to improve Network Centric Capabilities and interoperability with Allies.

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SUBJECT	REQUIREMENT & JUSTIFICATION	ACTIVITIES IN THE NEXT MONTH	Approx final cost	VISIBILITY
(c)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)
<b>PACKAGE 2 MARITIME</b>				
Destroyer and Frigate Escorts - Missile Defence	The requirement is to equip 2 Destroyer and Frigate escorts with a robust Anti-ship Missile Defence, including seduction, distraction and softkill capability. Two of the required 5 DD/FF for Package 2 will be unprotected and will therefore operate at greater risk unless this measure is implemented.	This will require the procurement and fitting of a range of equipments to units. The Business Case will need to be written and agreed by the Approving Authorities. A contract will need to be let by the IPT, involving industry.	£15m	Where prudent CINCFleet has already directed some equipment to be fitted from available stocks for those units earmarked for NTG 03 as routine business. Further procurement could be put down as ongoing work to enhance the fleet's protection. 
INMARSAT	This requirement provides for secure terminal equipment and INMARSAT interface units to allow an instant, direct secure telephone capability between USN and RN units, and with ashore authorities.	The Business Case will need to be written prepared and potential contracts and prices discussed with Industry.	£5m	This activity will be visible to IPTs and industry. It could be explained away as routine work linked to the SDR New Chapter and a package of communications improvements to improve Network Centric Capabilities and interoperability with Allies. 
Destroyer and Frigate Escorts - Mine Avoidance	This would equip up to 5 escorts with the Passive Update Mine Avoidance (PUMA) system to enhance their protection against the presence of in-volume buoyant and free floating mines.	The Business Case will need to be written prepared and potential contracts and prices discussed with Industry	£10m	This measure could be linked to the Missile Defence option above. It could be put down as ongoing work to enhance the fleet's protection. 

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SUBJECT	REQUIREMENT & JUSTIFICATION	ACTIVITIES IN THE NEXT MONTH	Approx final cost	VISIBILITY
(c)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)
<b>PACKAGE 3 LAND</b>				
CR2 and AS 90 – Desertisation	The requirement is to improve CR2 and AS90 for operations in desert conditions in the light of experience on SAIF SAREEA II (SS2). This would involve the provision of engine monitoring equipment, side skirts and dust filters for CR2 and measures to improve engine cooling for the AS90.	Work is already in hand to examine these problems. It involves industry and unit trials at BATUS. We would need to continue investigating solutions through IPTs to industry.	£15m	The Requirement was noted in Op GRANBY and Ex SS2 lessons identified, and raised by the NAO. This is ongoing work and currently being investigated in the context of Ex SS lessons learned. Most of the upgrades would be permanent for operations throughout the world.
Close Support Fuel & Water Bowsers - Mobility	The current fleet of Close Support Fuel and Water bowsers does not have an off-road capability, severely limiting their operational employment. Replacement of the current fleet is in hand with a medium mobility close support fuel and water tankers to enable delivery to forward areas. A tri-Service solution is required.	A contract has already been let, but is not expected to deliver vehicles until Mar 03. We need to investigate the scope to advance production or develop alternative solutions.	Possible minor additional costs.	This will require consultation with the DEC and IPTL, and industry, but may be explained away in terms of routine activity pressing to have capability delivered to meet known capability gaps.
General Support Fuel Tanker	The current fleet of 59 vehicles is insufficient to meet the likely demands of the operation and the requirements to outload fuel from the Sea Port of Disembarkation. Without these vehicles sustainability and tempo will be limited. A tri-Service solution is required.	As above	As above	As above

*Need more plausible explanations.*

*on 9's*

*if there were to be a*

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Enhanced Body Armour (ECBA)	13,345 sets of ECBA are available in stock, which will limit its distribution to the fighting echelons only, leaving support staff – who will nevertheless potentially face a high risk environment - less well protected.	We need to investigate with the IPTL, through the DEC, the scope for procuring more. The provision of Kevlar is likely to be the most difficult element to this.	£2m	This can be put down to ongoing work to raise stock to the levels required by Defence Planning Assumptions. Routine business.
SA80A2	The new SA80A2 is being brought into service at a rate of 4,000 per month. Even with the proposed lead-time it may only be possible to equip the fighting element.	We need to investigate with the IPTL, through the DEC, the scope for advancing issue of the weapon.	£1m	In the light of the publicity on this subject in Afghanistan this can be explained as routine Departmental business to deal with an ongoing problem. ✓
Logistics Vehicles	The serviceability of the current DROPS logistic vehicle fleet is low resulting from operational, exercise (SS II) and routine use over recent years. The fleet of current vehicles is unlikely to meet the demands of the operation.	We need to investigate with the IPTL, through the DEC, the scale of the problem and the scope for developing solutions.	£5m	Serviceability of DROPS on SS II was a major concern and this can be considered routine follow-on work to address the problem. ✓

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Please see my  
notes

~~MW~~  QWH  
14/5  
Secretary of State for Defence

SofS

2 key decisions here:

A approve a package of  
16 "essential" tasks; 10  
of which are preparing  
business cases (which  
will involve consultation  
with IPTs and industry)  
each with a cover story;  
6 accelerating existing  
programmes, again  
with cover stories, which  
seem, at best, thin.

B a limited expansion of  
the contingency planning  
group to include MOD  
officials in the equipment  
and logistics areas. This  
is needed to improve  
preparation of future  
VOBs.

No money is being  
committed here.

Tasks are "ambiguous" rather  
than "invisible".

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