

JIC Minutes, 4 September 2002

PRESENT

Mr J M Scarlett
Cabinet Office
(In the Chair)

Air Marshal J C French
Ministry of Defence

'C'
Secret Intelligence Service

Mr S Boys-Smith
Home Office

Mr S J L Wright
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Mr A J Cragg
Ministry of Defence

Mr M Kidd
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Sir David Omand
Cabinet Office

Mr J A Miller
Assessments Staff

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT

The Honourable Eliza Manningham-Buller
Security Service
(Items 1 - 4)

[...]
Government Communications
Headquarters

Mr S Pollard
Ministry of Defence

Mr W Nye
Treasury
(Items 1 - 4)

Sir David Manning
Cabinet Office
(Items 1 - 4)

Dr J Fuller
Cabinet Office
(Item 3)

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]
Assessments Staff

[...]
Assessments Staff

[...]
Assessments Staff

[...]
Assessments Staff
(Items 1 and 2)

[...]
Assessments Staff
(Item 3)

[...]
Assessments Staff
(Items 3 – 5)

SECRETARIAT
[...]

1. [...]
2. [...]

~~UK SECRET~~ – [...]

3. **DRAFT NOTE** [...]

The Committee considered a draft assessment entitled “Iraqi Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons – Possible Scenarios”, [...]

In discussion of the draft, the following main points were made:

- a) the draft had been through an informal CIG of experts, and had been prepared at the direction of the Committee, to look at ways in which Iraq might use its Chemical and Biological weapons capabilities. Once finalised it would be of immense interest to Ministers and officials, and would help to underline the importance and seriousness of the threat Iraq posed with these weapons. The fact that Saddam Hussein possessed these capabilities, and that he showed every sign of being prepared to use them, was significant. Another important message, which needed to be brought out more clearly in the draft, was that if the chips were down, and Saddam believed his regime to be under real threat of extinction, nothing was going to deter him from using such weapons. Readers of the paper needed to be reminded of Saddam’s unpredictability, and of the fact that his thought processes did not work in a recognisably Western, rational and logical way. The draft should also distinguish more clearly between the three different ways in which Iraq might use its offensive chemical or biological capabilities: in weaponised form against military targets; in an unconventional attack on military targets; or as part of a sponsored terrorist attack aimed at spreading fear and influencing public attitudes; and
- b) since the draft had been written and circulated, an important and valuable supply of new intelligence had been received, from a variety of sources judged by the producers of the intelligence to be reliable and authoritative. The draft needed to be updated to include this new intelligence, with an expert assessment of its significance. It also needed to make clearer which of its judgements were based on firm intelligence, which were based more on informed assessment or interpretation, and where the major gaps in the UK’s knowledge and understanding of Iraq’s capabilities remained. It was possible that further insights from intelligence would be forthcoming

in the relatively near future. These might not only inform any future assessments but might also need to be reflected somehow in the dossier on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programmes that was being prepared for publication.

THE CHAIRMAN proposed that the paper should be revised to reflect the Committee's discussion, before being circulated again at working level to the relevant experts for further comment. Once that had been done, he invited the Secretary to issue it in final form.

The Committee-
Agreed

~~UK CONFIDENTIAL~~ – [...]

4. **CIG ASSESSMENTS ISSUED SINCE THE LAST MEETING** [...]

The Committee took note of the following CIG Assessments circulated [...]

a. "Iraqi Trade: A Tool of Influence", [...] dated 3 September 2002; and

[...]

5. [...]

6. [...]

[...]

7. [...]

[...]

8. [...]