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*(live explanation the background to this, + Parry's reply)*  
*Mr Westmacott -*  
*Jan 6/2*

*c Mr Parry*  
*- Ar gene*

*Seen only after the deadline. But I can't believe this policy will survive in the cold*

05 February 2001

*Right of a Washington morning:*  
*it seems to be a recipe for (i) inflicting S. Arabia*  
*- point A; (ii) abandoning type of PS unity (because*  
*the target is no longer a (immediate)*

Peter Westmacott Esq  
DUSS Wider World  
FCO  
*Suspension of sanctions if WMD PS/PVS*  
*development stops, but Saddam*  
*(point B): a slap in the face to Chirac;*  
*(iii) cross Arabs.*

*Alan Goulby*  
*William Parry*

*Dear Mr Parry*  
*I much preferred the policy in*  
*your note. I wonder if he read it*

*(in case not yet seen.)*  
*John*  
*6/2*

IRAQ: POLICY REVIEW: FOREIGN SECRETARY'S VIEWS

JOHN KERR

1. The Foreign Secretary reviewed Iraq policy at the briefing supper which Sir C Meyer hosted here this evening. Emyr Jones Parry asked me to let you know the outcome.

2. The Foreign Secretary's starting point was that 1284 was no longer sustainable. It made sense, not least in UNSC-handling terms, to keep it on the table. But we should accept that Saddam had no intention of complying with it. We should give up, therefore, the effort to get inspectors back into Iraq, and embark instead on a set of policies which did not depend on Iraqi cooperation for their sustainability.

3. The Foreign Secretary outlined a new package as follows:

- Sanctions should be better targeted at military and dual-use items. This would mean the US taking a less restrictive approach on contract holds. Keep financial controls in place, but look at ways to facilitate reconstitution of Iraqi infrastructure (the oil industry in particular)

- Clamp down on smuggling, particularly with , to help prevent Saddam reconstituting WMD (and as detrimental to oil-for-food efforts)

- Spell out more explicitly our red lines for Saddam (WMD reconstitution, moves against Kuwait or the Kurds)

- Set out a "Contract for the Iraqi people" (cf the FRY/Milosevic), offering a vision for Iraq post-Saddam. *JB*  
Activities of the Iraqi opposition should be rolled into this. *???*

*nm 013/001/07*  
- Linked to the above, stop talking about OFF as part of a

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sanctions regime, and sell it more convincingly as a humanitarian programme

K - Dispense with SNFZ patrols (essentially because they pose too high a risk of losing an aircraft), but signal a determination to continue to enforce protection for the SNFZ population via deterrence

4. In terms of tactics, the Foreign Secretary felt that once we had squared the US for this approach we should aim to sell it discreetly with key regional players and, in parallel, selected UNSC members (some aspects of the policy would probably require a new SCR).

5. The Foreign Secretary was keen to confront Colin Powell with the scale of the oil trade. Could you or a copy addressee let us have suitably striking figures on the amount of the trade (eg as a proportion of total Iraqi oil revenues), by 1300Z your time on 6 February?

6. If you or others have views on the above, please let us have them by the same deadline.

Yours ever.

  
Peter Gooderham

cc: Alan Goulty, Director, MENA, FCO  
William Patey, MED

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