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07 September 2005

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Dear

**SUBJECT: IRAQI POLICE SERVICE TRANSITION PLAN FOR SOUTHERN IRAQ**

1. Please could you circulate the following to the senior officials group for their information prior to the meeting on Friday.
2. I attach the UK's Iraqi Police Service (IPS) Transition Plan for Southern Iraq. It has been produced by the Consulate in Basra in consultation with the UK Civilian Police contingent and the Multinational Division (South East) (MND(SE)). It sets out objectives and activities necessary for the IPS to achieve various stages of capability needed to provide effective security in the Southern provinces. This has been agreed by DFID, MOD and Home Office.
3. The significant features of the Plan are the quantitative and qualitative targets it sets, the role of the Co-ordination Group in monitoring and reporting progress and the regular audits to ensure that resources and processes are optimally managed for success.
4. Strictly speaking, there is no transition of responsibility to the IPS as Coalition Forces do not undertake policing tasks – these have been undertaken by the IPS for many months. The IPS has however been limited in what it can do due to a lack of trained manpower, shortages of equipment and inadequacy of facilities, amongst other things. The plan addresses these shortcomings and uses the military transition time-scales as convenient and necessary deadlines to achieve certain standards. These are based on the recognition that once the level of coalition military protection is reduced, the scope for UK civilian police and contractors to develop the IPS will also reduce.
5. The Plan acknowledges a number of risks. There are particular concerns over infiltration by militias, corruption, de-Ba'athification and weakness of support functions (e.g. payroll and Human Resource Management), and on the sustainability and success of the IPS. Strategies for dealing with these issues are however largely outside the scope of the Plan.

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6. Within these constraints, the current assessment is that IPS development will achieve the targets set, within the planned timeframes and, that current UK resources are just adequate to accomplish the targets (there is no spare budgetary capacity for contingencies in this financial year).
7. The plan will be regularly reviewed and may require amendments in the light of events on the ground. The cross-Whitehall SSR Steering Group will have a first review of the plan in early October to ensure that targets are being met.

Kind Regards,

Security Sector Reform  
Iraq Directorate

cc:

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## Southern Iraq: Iraqi Police Service – Transitional Plan

### **1. Introduction**

This paper, which is a joint assessment by the Consulate General, Police Advisory Team (PAT) and Multi-National Division South-East (MNDSE) in Basra, has been produced in the absence of a national policing strategy for Iraq. It has three aims:

- to determine our targets for policing transition in southern Iraq;
- to assess progress in terms of the 5 Strategic Priorities (see Annex A); and
- to set out an action plan for achieving our policing targets by Transition.

The IPS runs its own operations in southern Iraq. Standards across the south vary, but generally speaking the IPS has a growing capacity to perform policing functions from community patrolling to counter-terrorism. It has enough training and equipment to allow it to patrol 24-hours a day. It has the capability to respond to calls for assistance from the public and co-ordinate with other agencies in an emergency. It has the resources to tackle public disorder and is capable of gathering intelligence and detecting crime. It knows how to manage a crime scene and exploit forensic evidence.

We should not think in terms of a 'handing over' of control to the IPS. What we are doing is providing training and advice aimed at improving IPS performance – especially in those areas where we have particular concerns, such as improving co-ordination, encouraging public accountability and raising human rights awareness – and attempting to ensure those improvements are sustainable.

Transition planning should bear in mind another key point. We have been training the IPS in civilian policing in an insurgency environment. Our remit has not included making the IPS in to a counter insurgency force. That role will fall to the Iraqi army, to come in behind MND(SE) at transition.

### **2. Targets for sustainable security**

This paper has been developed within the frameworks of current military planning. The Consulate-General, PAT and MND(SE) in Basra jointly assess that we should aim for the following targets across the southern provinces at the beginning of each transition phase:

#### **(a) Targets for transition to Tactical Overwatch Phase**

During this phase, PAT and MND(SE) will remain in province, but UK support levels will be gradually reduced.

- **Training:** 70% of police force trained
- **Police support infrastructure:** police self-sufficient in day-to-day administration and communication; 70% of equipment (vehicles, weapons, infrastructure) provided
- **Intelligence capability:** initial intelligence capability established

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- **Operational capability:** adequate command, control and co-ordination systems in place; specialist support in operation; signs of development in criminal investigation; procedures established for IPS liaison with Iraqi Army
- **Public support:** procedures in place for interaction with the criminal justice system and media; human rights awareness levels raised; systems for investigation and removal of corrupt/inefficient police in place; basic complaints system established

(b) Targets for transition to Operational Overwatch Phase

During this phase, PAT and MND(SE) will reduce their presence on the ground, with all routine security operations left to Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), but will retain the capacity to intervene.

- **Training:** 85% of police force trained; most training transferred to Iraqi instructors
- **Police support infrastructure:** administrative practices/communication consolidated and refined; 85% of equipment (vehicles, weapons, infrastructure) provided
- **Intelligence capability:** enhanced intelligence capability; Criminal Intelligence Unit (CIU) pilot project underway
- **Operational capability:** effective command and control systems in place; improved IPS liaison with Iraqi Army; enhanced specialist support and criminal investigation
- **Public support:** more developed interaction with criminal justice system and media; improved human rights awareness reflected in working practices; improving record of investigation and removal of corrupt or inefficient police; complaints system working

(c) Targets for transition to Strategic Overwatch Phase

During this final phase, PAT and MND(SE) will have no presence on the ground, but will retain the option of providing support from overseas if necessary.

- **Training:** 100% of police force trained; all further routine training by Iraqi trainers
- **Police support infrastructure:** administrative practices/communication significantly improving; 100% of equipment (vehicles, weapons, infrastructure) provided
- **Intelligence capability:** CIU components in place and processes being developed
- **Operational capability:** command and control systems fully operational; systematic IPS liaison with Iraqi Army; partnerships developing with other law enforcement agencies; satisfactory level of specialist support and criminal investigation
- **Public support:** systematic interaction with the criminal justice system and media; human rights abuses reduced; sound processes in place for the removal of corrupt or inefficient police; complaints system working

3. **How are we doing now?**

Our ability to assess progress quantitatively, in terms of training and equipment delivered, is good (see Annex B). Our main training focus is Basic Recruit Training (BRT – for new recruits) and Transitional Integration Programme (TIP – for pre regime change police). A total of 13,145 of 23,711 (55%) police officers have been trained to date in BRT and TIP.

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And we have trained 85 IPS instructors to deliver training across the south. In many cases (eg TIP and Tactical Support Unit training), they are already doing so without assistance.

Our ability to assess progress qualitatively is not as good as it needs to be. The qualitative assessments below are generalised and will be further refined during a capability audit.

(a) Muthanna province

Progress has been satisfactory in Muthanna, because of co-operation, the benign security environment and the relatively small police operation, though insufficient numbers have so far been released for BRT/TIP training. The Muthanna police are running operations in most fields now, and PAT and MND(SE) assess that targets for transition should be met.

- **Training:** 40% trained in BRT and TIP (the Muthanna police are now at last releasing sizeable numbers for training, so progress should be rapid); 60% in specialist training
- **Police support infrastructure:** basic facilities exist; administrative support provided, but further assessment needed (which is due to start); equipment auditing instructions issued; finance a concern and thus budgetary training required
- **Intelligence capability:** competent intelligence dept in place, led by professional and apolitical officers; good liaison with Interior Ministry (MOI) and Iraqi military
- **Operational capability:** adequate command, control and co-ordination systems; specialist support needs further development; SWAT team being used on proactive operations and their skills are improving; criminal investigation on track
- **Public support:** limited progress on interaction with criminal justice system; initial steps taken to engage with media; development of civil accountability slow; systems being developed for dealing with corruption and inefficiency

(b) Maysan province

Progress in Maysan has slowed because of patchy co-operation from the authorities and IPS. PAT have so far visited 19 of the 32 police stations. But training remains largely on track and co-operation has resumed. PAT and MND(SE) assess that the police in Maysan are effective in many fields and transition targets should be met if co-operation continues.

- **Training:** 57% trained in BRT and TIP (the Maysan police are releasing more officers for BRT/TIP training, so progress should be rapid); 93% in other specialist training
- **Police support infrastructure:** buildings and equipment audited; communications poor due to badly maintained communication systems; local disputes hinder progress
- **Intelligence capability:** basic system for collecting and disseminating intelligence
- **Operational capability:** Permanent Joint Operations Centre (PJOC) established but stand-alone; Tactical Support Unit (TSU) are short of equipment and weapons; SWAT operational; Serious Crime Unit (SCU) actively engaged in investigation
- **Public support:** robust judicial process; courts well run and equipped; new custody facilities at al Majar al Kabir; dedicated media dept; complaints system in place

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(c) Basra province

Police reform in Basra is the most complex task facing us. Far more police need training than in the other provinces combined; and the culture of corruption and abuse is deeply ingrained. Militia infiltration threatens our efforts to encourage an independent, apolitical police force. Tackling this will take time. But the Basra police are already running many of their own operations and progress has been made in several areas. If the IPS can get to grips with militia infiltration, and seriously address the problems of corruption and abuse within the force, transition targets are achievable within the longer time scale envisaged for Basra province.

- **Training:** 42% trained in BRT and TIP; 77% in other specialist training
- **Police support infrastructure:** full audit of equipment and infrastructure completed and has revealed shortfalls; financial controls assessed as adequate, but monitoring of spending weak; communications improving significantly
- **Intelligence capability:** CIU project in Basra developing rapidly as a pilot project for the whole of Iraq, but some way to go yet; designated head dismissed following UK lobbying, but other bad men are still active
- **Operational capability:** effective procedures for command and control established; emergency call centre operating; major incident exercises held; PJOC established; TSU conducting joint operations with MNF; good criminal investigation capability
- **Public support:** audit of custody facilities conducted; media training underway and complaints procedure being improved, but abuse of detainees is continuing in some depts; progress made on community policing; protection team provided for judiciary

(d) Dhi Qar province

Police reform in Dhi Qar is supervised by the Italians. Our ability to assess progress on training and capability is improving through regular Core Co-ordination Group updates. Current Italian indications suggest that Dhi Qar is on track to meet transition targets.

- **Training:** 90% trained in BRT and TIP; 176% in other specialist training
- **Police support infrastructure:** excellent administrative processes and equipment auditing procedures established; infrastructure developing well; buildings adequate
- **Intelligence capability:** basic intelligence process exists; scope for improvement with additional training and IT support
- **Operational capability:** PJOC and emergency call centre operating and growing in effectiveness; joint operations with MNF and Iraqi Army above average; police work to reasonable standard, but specialist aspects (eg forensics) could improve
- **Public support:** general level considered adequate for the region

4. **Current priorities**

This section sets out our action plan for the four provinces over the next 3 months, based on current assessments and resources. The action points will be achieved, and progress at each milestone assessed, by PAT and MND(SE) personnel working on the ground.

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(a) Training

We are entering a difficult period in terms of training targets. Police Chiefs are already reluctant to release police officers. They will be still more so during the period between the referendum and elections (mid-October to December), but we think that training will remain on track: Annex C sets out milestones for measuring progress on training during this period. Training should pick up again in early 2006.

Progress on BRT would be significantly improved if courses could be held locally in the south. This would also give Chiefs of Police more flexibility for releasing officers than at present, since training could be suspended for a week at busy periods (eg referendum and elections). We are pursuing this with MOI, the Civilian Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT) and IPS Chiefs of Police.

Other priorities are to build training self-sufficiency by running more instructor training courses (milestone: 50 more IPS trainers to be trained by 31 December) and to establish IPS training at the new Regional Police Academy at Shaiba by 1 October.

(b) Police support infrastructure. These activities will be done in co-ordination with MOI and CPATT as appropriate.

**By 31 August 2005:** IPS self-sufficient in daily administration; rationalisation of the structure of the Police HQs completed; 50% of operational equipment provided to the IPS and facilities in place to maintain it; improved budgetary management.

**By 30 September 2005:** Administrative practices consolidated; 60% of the operational equipment provided; more equipment repaired, in daily use and accounted for; methods to pass delegated authority to senior officers developing; budgetary controls tightening.

**By 31 October 2005:** 70% of operational equipment issued; IPS personnel department functioning effectively and initial steps taken to regularly appraise officers; senior police officers being held accountable and culture developing; budgets under control; CPATT-sponsored financial training delivered.

(c) Intelligence capability

**By 31 August 2005:** Intelligence capability established and preparations being made to conduct operations on an intelligence-led basis; lines of demarcation established between CIU and IPS; efforts made to grade and shared information with specialist agencies (TSU and SWAT); major criminals identified and objectives set.

**By 30 September 2005:** Intelligence-led operations planned with specialist agencies; protocols developed between CIU and IPS; information being managed responsibly and stored securely; proactive measures taken against terrorist and organised criminals.

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**By 31 October 2005:** CIU equipped; secure communications being developed; operations being conducted against identified targets, with greater co-operation within the province; contribution made to the struggle against terrorism in the south.

**(d) Operational capability**

**By 31 August 2005:** PJOCs firmly established and co-ordinating routine IPS responses; IPS interacting with other emergency services, with 24-hour emergency line available; major incident plans drafted; capability to deal with public disorder established; basic forensic capability and adequate crime scene management in place; basic investigative capability and interviewing skills established, with adequate file preparation techniques; source of funding found to build regional Forensic Laboratory and timetable established.

**By 30 September 2005:** PJOCs analysing data and targeting resources accordingly; preparations being made to cope with widespread public disorder; detailed plans in place for policing October referendum; TSU duties rationalised and trained officers allocated to appropriate tasks; contractor identified to build regional Forensic Laboratory.

**By 31 October 2005:** TSU and SWAT impacting on organised crime; improved forensic capability and ability to present best court evidence; SCU developing specialist capability such as a Drugs Squad; reduction in spurious arrests; 15 October referendum successfully policed and any disorder dealt with proportionately; Forensic Lab construction underway.

**(e) Public support**

**By 31 August 2005:** methods explored for increasing judicial oversight; initial efforts made to develop Court Liaison Teams (CLT) and a Prisoner Escort Unit (PEU) in Basra; IPS developing an appreciation of the role of the media; human rights awareness levels raised and co-ordinators selected; human rights monitors working and community co-ordinators appointed; review of the Discipline Code completed and opportunities for the Discipline Police identified; Good Practice Forum held to share best practice across the southern regions (eg printing human rights guidance on all police notebooks); voters able to register to vote in referendum without intimidation.

**By 30 September 2005:** confusion over interpretation of "24-hour" rule resolved and PEU operating; media department improving and interacting with local agencies; potential of Basra CLT & PEU assessed for other provinces; issues raised by HR monitors addressed; community initiatives introduced to all IPS sectors and framework document circulated; elements of a Discipline Code introduced and Discipline Police empowered to take action.

**By 31 October 2005:** efforts to reduce the number of remand prisoners co-ordinated; media department efficient and developing protocols with local agencies; PEU impacting on provinces and CLT performing adequately; Community Policing Conference held in Basra; resources targeted to reduce serious misconduct; efforts made to instigate Judicial Complaints Committee in Basra; voters able to vote in referendum without intimidation.

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#### **5. Capability audit process**

The PAT and MND(SE) are jointly writing an audit questionnaire to assess IPS capability in terms of the 5 Strategic Priorities in each of the 4 southern provinces. This will be ready for use by 15 August. It will include an assessment of all senior IPS officers (Police Chiefs and sector commanders) and their ability to deliver. A joint team will audit IPS operations in Muthanna, Maysan and Basra by 15 September. (We will ask the Italians to audit their IPS in Dhi Qar at the same time using a translated version questionnaire.) The results will be evaluated and an action plan created, reviewing targets and milestones in the 12-month Plan, by 30 September. This is expected to fine-tune the plan rather than be an overhaul. Implementation of the action plan will begin in early October.

#### **6. Resource issues**

This paper assumes that current PAT numbers in southern Iraq will remain at the current level (26 CivPol staff and about 140 Armor Group contract personnel, some of whom are funded with Dutch and Japanese resources). We will need to maintain these staffing levels until drawdown to Basra and Dhi Qar. Once we have analysed the impact of draw-down in Muthanna and Maysan, we will look to reinforce policing efforts in Basra and Dhi Qar, as necessary. PAT personnel that are not required to achieve our transition targets in the two remaining provinces will be released from their contracts accordingly.

##### **(a) What we have funding for**

The PAT have adequate funding to meet training targets. Most of our other targets depend essentially on PAT mentoring of IPS, for which current resources are adequate. MND(SE) provide accommodation and force protection for the PAT. They provide equipment for the IPS and are closely involved in planning and developing infrastructure projects. MND(SE) military police also provide training and mentoring for senior IPS officers.

Construction of hardened accommodation, vehicles and communications at Shaiba for the PAT (total cost \$280,000) has been agreed from FCO Conflict Issues Group funding. The UK contractor is arriving shortly in Basra to start work on this project.

##### **(b) What we do not yet have funding for (in priority order)**

- Construction of model detention facilities in each province (total cost for 4 estimated at \$800,000: MND(SE) are awaiting confirmation of US funding via the Danes; UK construction company lined up); without at least one set of facilities in each province, IPS may continue to place detainees in cells that contravene human right standards.
- Construction of the regional Forensic Laboratory (£1.5 million: urgent action needed by PAT to secure CPATT funds): a failure to find funds for this project would impact on IPS efficiency across the south.
- Facilities, equipment and training for a joint operations centre for Iraqi Customs Police, Border Enforcement Dept and Coastguard to combat drugs, crime and immigration on the Shatt al-Arab (£250,000 from FCO Drugs & Crime Fund: an

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amended bid is being submitted): an important element in maintaining security across the southern provinces

- Additional training resources for Shaiba to cover construction of a practical training facility (\$30,000): desirable but not essential

Further resource requirements may be identified by the capability audit in September.

## **7. Risks**

Factors that could obstruct our plans to meet targets within time/resource constraints (in order of seriousness) and suggested solutions:

Militia activity, political activism and tribal affiliation within the IPS are serious obstacles to PAT reform efforts. Shi'a militia activity, including alleged assassinations carried out by IPS officers, represents a particularly urgent problem. Political/tribal affiliations create operational tensions. Basra's Police Chief says he is marginalising politicised officers, but there is no evidence to suggest this is working. The least bad solution is to urge the IPS to identify and dismiss those that are beyond the pale quickly, and ensure that tough action is taken against persistent offenders in future. The risk is that those dismissed could turn into overt hostile militias. We are producing a separate paper on militia activity within the IPS.

Criminality, corruption and inefficiency within the IPS are linked but lesser problems that undermine IPS professionalism. We are urging the MOI to dismiss ineffective and corrupt officers with a severance package and ensure that tough action is taken against corruption thereafter. If funds are not found, the IPS in the south will almost certainly prove unable to clean up its staff, perpetuating current inefficiency, criminality and corruption.

Abusive behaviour towards detainees is endemic in the IPS. We believe that our training is making a difference, but it is unrealistic to expect that we can eradicate abuse entirely. We must continue to press through all agencies and at all levels for thorough investigations of alleged abuses, step up our efforts to raise human rights awareness and ensure systematic abusers are dismissed and prosecuted. Baghdad are producing a separate paper on this.

Strategic direction and management, both from the MOI and at provincial level, is inadequate. Police Chiefs cannot sack police officers without MOI permission and when the MOI does dismiss them, individuals lack the right of appeal that exists in the MOD. Government policy needs to be lawful and consistent. Uncertainty over the future direction of national intelligence policy risks creating conflicting intelligence agencies in Basra, one answerable to the Baghdad MOI, the other to Basra's Chief of Police. There is no culture of delegation. In other provinces the MOI has failed to pay the IPS on time resulting in policemen walking off the job. It needs to build a dependable administrative capacity. We are encouraging the MOI to address these issues.

Detention facilities: Changing the culture of abuse will have limited practical effect if the IPS continue to lock detainees in tiny, cramped cells that infringe international standards.

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We need to maintain pressure for such cells to be expanded/demolished. Our aim should be to leave at least one set of reasonable detention facilities per province.

The security situation in Maysan – or elsewhere – may prevent us meeting our targets. If poor co-operation resumes in Maysan, we may have to cut our losses and concentrate on provinces with better security and co-operation. In terms of training targets, the best way to mitigate this risk everywhere is to speed up our programme to train IPS instructors.

Dismissal of senior officers (eg the Muthanna Chief of Police) destroys many months of costly mentoring. We need first to assess all Police Chiefs and sector commanders in the south, and continue to lobby the MOI to remove the ineffective and guarantee security of tenure for those we consider effective for a fixed period of time.

Poor turnout rate for training courses is a continuing problem. Police Chiefs are reluctant to release officers at busy times and officers themselves are reluctant to travel to Baghdad or Jordan. The way to address both concerns is to do more training in the south. We are pressing CPATT and MOI to alter their insistence on training taking place in Baghdad.

#### **8. Co-ordination and progress reports**

The Core Co-ordinating Group will continue to meet twice weekly and submit progress reports to a Steering Group, consisting of the Deputy Consul General, Chief Supt David Haverly (PAT) and Lt Col Ian Stenning of MND(SE), which will meet once a fortnight. The key elements of this report will be updated at the beginning of every month for the UK SSR Committee, via the Iraq Directorate of the FCO. Iraqi police officials can attend the Core Co-ordination meetings and the UK Chief Police Advisor Iraq will ensure that the Plan remains consistent with CPATT and MOI policy.

#### **9. Conclusion**

The IPS in southern Iraq is functioning, with minimal supervision. We could leave today and it would continue to function. There would, however, remain serious question marks about the destabilising activities of militias, corruption, lack of public accountability and human rights abuse within the IPS. We are addressing these problems, but they will not disappear overnight. Steady progress is being made on training. We now need to refocus on other deliverables in the 12-month Plan. We know where we want to be at transition. We expect to meet our targets in Muthanna and Maysan, if the security situation allows. Dhi Qar (an Italian lead) appears to be on track. Basra is a much more complex operation, but we have more time. We must be realistic about what we can achieve here: our aim should be to leave an IPS comparable to other competent police forces in the region.

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## **Annex A – The Five Strategic Priorities**

The UK's 12-month Development Strategy for the Iraqi Police Service (IPS) sets out a detailed plan for increasing police capability in southern Iraq to counter insurgency, to maintain order and to develop into a community-based, accountable service subject to political governance. The five strategic priorities are, in summary form:

- **Training:**

- basic training
- leadership courses
- developmental training

- **Police support infrastructure:**

- human resources
- finance and contracts
- communications
- logistics

- **Intelligence capability:**

- collection, collation, analysis and dissemination of intelligence
- criminal, terrorist and counter-insurgency

- **Operational capability:**

- effective command and control systems
- co-ordination
- specialist support (SWAT and TSU)
- criminal investigation (including forensic)

- **Public support:**

- police interaction with criminal justice system (courts, prisons etc)
- police interaction with public and media
- development of public and civil accountability
- removal of corrupt and inefficient police officers through robust complaints system
- human rights awareness

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## Annex B – Summary of Training by Province

Course Title	Dhi Qar (MTOE 5623)		Basra (MTOE 13358)		Muthanna (MTOE 1960)*		Maysan (MTOE 4287)*	
	Trnd	Target	Trnd	Target	Trnd	Target	Trnd	Target
Basic Recruit Training (BRT)	213	214	1205	4905	96	692	309	530
Transitional Integration Programme (TIP)	5032	5622	4463	8655	411	588	1416	2505
First Line Supervisors (FLS)	tbc	tbc	82	tbc	129	375	35	250
Investigations	80	100	396	416	39	85	87	110
Tactical Support Unit (TSU)	484	200	550	600	150	100	565	400
Special Weapons & Tactics (SWAT)	25	25	25	25	27	25	36	25
Military Ops in Urban Terrain/JAG	347	100	40	100	100	100	200	100
Penman Land Rover Instruction	4	4	7	4	4	4	4	4
Penman Land Rover Driver Course	0	15	0	19	0	15	0	15
Management – Basic (Lieutenant +)	43	77	345	583	16	68	43	81
Management – Advanced (Major +)	8	24	67	241	6	18	2	46
Sergeant Major Course	9	9	10	10	2	2	8	8
Surveillance	0	0	18	Tbc	0	0	0	0
Train the Trainers Courses	8	18	62	70	8	14	7	17
<b>Totals</b>	<b>6253</b>	<b>6408</b>	<b>7270</b>	<b>15628</b>	<b>988</b>	<b>2086</b>	<b>2712</b>	<b>4091</b>

**Note 1:** \* Targets relate to the Modified Table of Organisation & Equipment (MTOE), the official list of police personnel. In practice, there has been over-recruitment in Muthanna and Maysan. We will not be able to train non-MTOE police officers within our current budget and timetable. They will have to be trained in due course by Iraqi trainers.

**Note 2:** The Scene of Crime Officer (SOCO) course is a regional resource: 69 SOCO trainees out of a target of 130 (53%) have received training so far.

### Current overall percentages (as of 31 July 2005):

#### BRT & TIP Training

Dhi Qar	90% trained (5245/5836)
Basra	42% trained (5668/13560)
Muthanna	40% trained (507/1280)
Maysan	57% trained (1725/3035)

#### Specialist Training (excluding SOCO)

Dhi Qar	176% (1008/572)
Basra	77% (1602/2068)
Muthanna	60% (481/806)
Maysan	93% (987/1056)

### Glossary:

- Basic Recruit Training (BRT) = basic training for new untrained recruits
- Transitional Integration Programme (TIP) = training for pre-regime change police, designed to bring them in line with democratic policing methods
- First Line Supervisors (FLS) is designed for Sergeants and Warrant Officers

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**Annex C – Training Milestones for Autumn 2005**

**Total Numbers (& % of target) Completed Training**

	<b>TIP TRAINING</b> (& % of target achieved)				<b>BRT TRAINING</b> (& % of target achieved)				<b>SPECIALIST TRAINING</b> (priority courses only)			
	1 Sept	1 Oct	1 Nov	1 Dec	1 Sept	1 Oct	1 Nov	1 Dec	1 Sept	1 Oct	1 Nov	1 Dec
<b>Basra</b>	4583 (53%)	4723 (55%)	4863 (56%)	5003 (58%)	1329 (27%)	1619 (33%)	1769 (35%)	1969 (40%)	1039	1134	1229	1324
<b>Maysan</b>	1576 (63%)	1656 (66%)	1816 (72%)	1896 (76%)	338 (64%)	530 (100%)	-	-	221	270	319	360
<b>Muthanna</b>	511 (87%)	588 (100%)	-	-	199 (29%)	299 (43%)	399 (58%)	499 (72%)	243	292	341	390

**TIP:** Predictions are based on current numbers being trained in the southern provinces.

**BRT:** Predictions are based on current numbers being sent for training in Baghdad/Jordan.

**Specialist:** Numbers in this table relate exclusively to priority training areas (= First Line Supervisors, SOCO, Basic and Advanced Management and Investigations).

NB: These predictions are based on a worst case scenario for IPS trainee numbers released during the period from the referendum to the elections. We would expect training throughput to pick up in 2006, once the elections are over.

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