

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL - UK EYES ONLY

ANNEX C

in DOP(1) on
3 NOV 05

LC/IRAQ/SSR/IPS

31 October 2005

IRAQ - UK POLICY FOR POLICE SECURITY SECTOR REFORM (SSR)

Wholesale reform of the Iraqi Police Service (IPS) is beyond the scope of UK influence. A three strand approach is needed: Iraqi Government tackling corruption and IPS loyalty to government aims; the Ministry of Interior (MOI) dismissing those who are ineffective because they do not meet expected standards; and UK MOD optimising its national contribution to Police SSR.

Reconfiguration of UK commitments in isolation, will not deliver the desired effect. Indeed, only Iraqi-led police reform coupled with increased coalition investment will invigorate the SSR effort.

A new framework should be adopted for IPS SSR in MND(SE), with an enhanced role for the UK MOD.

IPS SSR Assessment of Progress

Throughout Iraq, development of the IPS is hampered by corruption, intimidation and divided loyalties. IPS and the more robust Special Police Commandos have been linked to human rights abuses and extra judicial killings. On the margins of the IPS, there is evidence of complicity with the insurgents, particularly in attacks against the coalition. Overall, the IPS is about a year behind the development of the Iraqi Army (IA); but the position is uneven across the country. In MND(SE), eradicating the deeply seated influence of the Shia religious parties and their associated militias on the IPS will be a long term (10 years) project and should be Iraqi-led. The IPS SSR initiative will not solve this problem.

In MND(SE) over the summer, the UK military support in the IPS training regime has increased, but there is little prospect of the IPS recovering ground against IA development in the short term. For example only 44% of the Basrah police are trained and equipped; a shortage of weapons and vehicles is further hampering progress. IPS SSR is constrained by inadequate resources (IPS SSR represents only 2-3% of UK spending in Iraq), sub-optimal use of civilian police advisers and the divided loyalties of many in the IPS, the later of which is beyond coalition control.

UK's ability to influence reform of IPS SSR across Iraq is limited. Opportunities exist to engage with the Iraqi government and the coalition in Baghdad, through MOI capacity building; occupation of key MNF-I posts; and, to a lesser extent, the role of the UK Senior Police Adviser (SPA).

IPS Reform

The need for IPS reform is axiomatic. A three-strand approach is proposed:

- Iraqi Government to tackle corruption and IPS loyalty to government aims;

¹ A fact sheet summarising how IPS training is currently delivered is attached to this paper.

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL - OUR EYES ONLY
DECLASSIFIED

- IMOI pursuing (and funding) a severance package for those who are ineffective because they do not meet expected standards (criminality/health/education/ability);
- UK MOD optimising our national contribution to Police SSR.

Action in Baghdad

To achieve successful reform we must influence Iraqi and MNF-I policy in Baghdad. Potentially, we are well placed to achieve this as the emphasis shifts towards the IPS in 2006 (the MNF-I "Year of the Police"). Under the Ambassador's direction, linkages with the IMOI and MNF-I could be used to champion IPS reform with the new Iraqi administration. UK influence in the IMOI should be strengthened by deployment of Home Office officials. We should make use of the friendly contacts that we established with Gen Peterson (the new commander of Coalition Police Advisory Training Team (CPATT)), when he passed through London en route to his post, to influence US policy. The aim will be to encourage the Iraqi Government to deal with the systemic problems in the IPS and to expedite the work of the IMOI Qualifying Committee so that the IPS severance package can be implemented.

Action in MND(SE)

In MND(SE) a twin-track approach is required:

- Consolidating IPS SSR activity under unified military direction (optimising our existing efforts);
- Enabling the GOC to deploy additional (civil and military) resources as necessary.

The MNF-FCO training effort must be fully integrated and targeted towards those in the IPS who are committed to our aims. Significant reform of the IPS SSR process is needed. The utility of the civil police contingent (CivPol) personnel is limited by their contractual terms of service and civilian working practices. We need to review the CivPol and ArmorGroup contract arrangements. If they were brought under military direction (the command and control issues would need to be finessed), the policing component would be employed to meet the priorities of operational transition, with its output reported through the established military chain. Working within agreed parameters, the head of the civil police training mission would receive operational direction from General Officer Commanding (GOC) MND(SE), retaining a right of veto in exceptional circumstances, and with reference to Whitehall.

Resources

This paper does not intend to anticipate any conclusions that Sir Ronnie Flanagan might make during his forthcoming visit. But the stark truth is that no matter how much resource is put into the IPS training effort now, the additional benefit that will accrue will not be large; the issue of divided loyalties and the malign influence of the Shia religious groups and their militias will continue to provide a drag anchor on the progress of reform.

Nonetheless, if we are to make any impact at all on the training of the IPS there will be a resource bill. Additionally, if we are to invigorate the policing effort under an MOD lead constraints upon CivPol activity, such as force protection and transportation restrictions, need to be alleviated. Increased military commitment will deliver results and GOC MND(SE) estimates

2 of 3
CONFIDENTIAL - OUR EYES ONLY
DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL - UK EYES ONLY

that two dedicated sub-units (250 troops) with protected mobility and 13 Military Police will be needed to deliver IPS transition in line with existing plans in Basra, Maysan and Al Muthanna provinces.

The Way Ahead

In Theatre

Our principal failing in IPS SSR has been the absence of effective control of the civil police component. A revised approach should be adopted in MND(SE) with an enhanced role for the military, which would employ specialist military expertise; co-ordinate other departments' activities and monitor and report progress. The GOC MND(SE) would act in consultation with the new Consul General and the CivPol team in Basra. In Baghdad, SBMR-I and HMA would seek to promote reform, overseeing renewed investment in key Iraqi ministries.

In Whitehall

The civil police component would continue to be administered by the FCO. The measurement of progress in IPS SSR would be provided via military channels. A cross-Whitehall SSR committee, chaired by MOD, (and including Home Office representation) would monitor this framework and issue direction where needed, reporting progress to, and acting on the instruction of, Ministers. The overall UK strategic direction for IPS development would be subsumed within the proposed ad-hoc ministerial meeting (jointly chaired by SofS and the Foreign Secretary), which would meet every two weeks.

Summary of Action Points

- Removal of criminal and corrupt elements within the police, ideally by the Iraqi authorities, but otherwise by MNF.
- IMOJ implementation of a severance package in conjunction with the dismissal of ineffective police.
- Redoubling our efforts on training the remaining police, until the 'good' outweighs the 'bad' and the IPS is able to police itself. This will only be achieved through:
 - Unity of command amongst those who are to deliver our SSR IPS efforts in MND(SE).
 - Alleviating the constraints on CivPol activity, to optimise the effort.
 - Providing the necessary military resources to augment the civil SSR effort.
 - Closer alignment of MND(SE) and CPATT activity.
 - More effective cross-Whitehall oversight of police SSR.

DECLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL - UK EYES ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL
DECLASSIFIED

Training the Iraqi Police Service (IPS) – Current Approach in MND(SE)

What training is delivered?

- **Basic Recruit Training (BRT)** – An 8 week course covering rudimentary police skills: arrest; recovery of evidence; statement techniques; interview techniques; preservation of crime scene; foot and vehicle patrolling; firearms training; use of notebooks; police ethics/human rights; searching of individuals, property and vehicles; basic law; and basic investigation techniques.
- **Specialist Training** – Covers areas such as investigation, traffic, armourer training, unarmed combat and surveillance.
- **Other Training** – Covers more advanced skills such as urban and tactical support unit training, special weapons and tactics training, training for police supervisors and management.

How is police training currently delivered in MND(SE)?

This training is delivered by a combination of:

- **Jordan Contingent** - Currently 61 UK staff are based at Jordan International Police Training Centre (JIPTC) who contribute to delivering BRT. In MND(SE) out of 6341 authorised officers, 2735 students have completed BRT.
- **Civilian Police (CivPol)** - There are 44 retired and serving civilian police officers involved in a variety of training and mentoring tasks: 18 are based in Baghdad including the UK Chief Police Adviser and his deputy, who also acts as mentor to the Deputy Minister for Policing; an officer is seconded to CPATT (see below). The remaining 26 staff (including the Senior Police Advisor (SPA) in Basrah) mentor, and liaise with, the Iraqi Police in MND(SE) and conduct specialist training courses.
- **Contractors** - There are 106 UK International Police Advisors (IPAs) provided by a company called ArmorGroup. Five are based in Baghdad with the remaining officers based in MND(SE). They have a close relationship with CivPol and are deployed by the Chief Police Adviser in Baghdad. They mainly act as advisers to IPS, although security considerations often restrict their access to IPS stations and facilities. They also run training courses and act as mentors to the Chiefs of Police in each province.
- **Coalition Forces in MND(SE)** - The Italian Brigade is responsible for IPS training and mentoring in Dhi Qar province employing their Carabinieri. UK Royal Military Police (RMP) and other coalition troops mentor and provide basic follow up training for the IPS to BRT in the other 3 provinces. Wherever possible, specialist training is also conducted in MND(SE) (including by coalition partners eg Danes and Czechs).
- **Coalition Police Advisory Training Team (CPATT) in Baghdad** - CPATT, headed by a US General, is responsible for delivering police training across Iraq (including MND(SE)). CPATT International Police Liaison Officers (IPLOs) provide IPS training and mentoring in MND(SE) and also assist in ensuring that training in MND(SE) is consistent with efforts elsewhere Iraq.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

How is training in MND(SE) managed/co-ordinated?

A Core Co-ordination Group operating in Basrah manages and co-ordinates the IPS training effort in MND(SE) on behalf of the Senior Police Advisor in Basrah. This group comprises representatives from MND(SE), the civilian police, IPAs, IPLOs, the Carabinieri the Czech MP Company. Similar co-ordination groups operate at Provincial level (in Maysan and Al Muthanna). They publish a fortnightly update on all IPS training undertaken and track progress against targets.

How is Police SSR funded?

Overall, UK spending in Iraq in FY 05/06 is expected to be approximately £1Bn. IPS SSR spending represents less than 2% of this.

UK IPS SSR funding all comes from the Treasury Reserve via two different tri-department (DFID, FCO and MOD) funds – the majority is from the Global Conflict Prevention Pool (GCPP):

- **CivPol** - £3.3M for FY 05/06 funded from the Peace Keeping Fund;
- **Contractors** - £8.2M for FY 05/06 (plus an additional £2.9M for security costs) funded from GCPP for 68 IPAs;
- **Dutch and Japanese Governments** – provide funding for the other 38 IPAs.

GCPP and the Peace Keeping Fund are both fully allocated for 05/06.

How is Police SSR equipped?

Critical equipment required for IPS in MND(SE) to perform policing effectively are body armour and other personal equipment (weapons, patrol cars, communication and specialist equipment). On average, 57% of authorised equipment has been issued to police units, although holdings of some equipment such as body armour, weapons and hand-held radios are near-complete.

This equipment comes from two different sources:

- **US via Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I)** – provides the majority of equipment;
- **Project OSIRIS 2** – which is MOD funded from the Treasury Reserve. To date the UK has provided vehicles, weapons and body armour to the IPS.

How are we progressing against the training targets?

The progress in the four southern provinces varies:

- **Basra** - 47% of IPS have received BRT or transitional training for current IPS officers and 84% have received specialist training;
- **Dhi Qar¹** - 92% of IPS have received BRT or transitional training and 100% have received specialist training;
- **Maysan** - 69% of IPS have received BRT or transitional training and 100% have received specialist training;
- **Muthanna** - 77% of IPS have received BRT or transitional training and 90% have received specialist training.

¹ Figures for Dhi Qar are supplied by the Italians and have not been independently verified