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**To: Rt. Hon. Charles Clarke, Home Secretary
Mr Chris Fox, President of ACPO**

Copy: Sir Ronnie Flanagan, HMCIC
Mr Stephen Rimmer, Home Office
Mr Peter Storr, Home Office

Mr Stephen Pattison, FCO
Ms Joan Link, FCO

Mr Dominic Asquith, Iraq Directorate FCO

DCC Colin Smith, Chief Police Advisor [Iraq]

**From: Paul Kernaghan, Chief Constable
ACPO International Affairs Portfolio**

**Subject:
Report on 4th Visit to Iraq by Chief Constable Kernaghan – 12/16 May 2005**

1.0 Introduction

1.1 The visit consisted of two distinct phases:

- [1] 12-14 May
- [2] 15-17 May

1.2 The primary aim of phase one was to provide an insight in to British civil police operations in Iraq to a representative group of Chief Constables. Sadly, I was unable to attract representatives of forces which have either not contributed to operations in Iraq or have expressed serious reservations. In the event I was accompanied by Sir Ronnie Flanagan [HMCIC], Mr Hugh Orde [CC, PSNI] and Mr Colin Cramphorn [CC, West Yorkshire].

1.3 Sir Ronnie's presence was ideal, in that all the officers deployed in Iraq felt his visit demonstrated support at the highest level within the police service. My fellow Chief Constables are proven supporters of international operations and both have had personnel deployed in Iraq. I am extremely grateful to them for making the time to visit Iraq and again I know officers welcomed their presence.

1.4 Phase two enabled me to obtain a comprehensive update on the situation in Iraq and the assessments of relevant stakeholders [diplomatic and military].

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- 1.5 Recipients of this report [or their offices] have all received copies of my previous three reports and I suggest it should be read in the light of those reports. On this occasion I have structured the report as follows:

Overview

Specific issues/problems requiring action

Implications for the work of the FCO Strategic Task Force [STF]

- 1.6 I have deliberately included material of interest to the STF, as I was constantly struck by facts on the ground which bring the STF's discussions to life. Iraq is in many ways a unique theatre of operations, but it vividly illustrates the contemporary realities of Peace Support Operations [PSO] and the critical role civil police officers have in such operations. Diplomats and military commanders appear unanimous in their appreciation of the role of civil police in pursuing critical national objectives. The challenge facing those of us in the police service and the Home Departments is to develop a coherent, proportionate and professional response to the demands of PSO.

2.0 OVERVIEW

- 2.1 Coalition forces [including police personnel] are in Iraq at the request of the Iraqi government and in pursuance of UN Security Council Resolution 1546. The indicative timetable to which all parties are working suggests that a constitution should be agreed by August, followed by a referendum in October and full elections in December 2005. It appeared that some slippage was built in to the expectations of all concerned but it is hoped that an elected government will be in place by early 2006.
- 2.2 The clear focus of coalition forces was Security Sector Reform [SSR] based on the realisation that withdrawal [in full or in part] was dependent on there being capable indigenous forces. In relation to the four governorates covered by MND [SE], it was hoped that the Iraqis would assume primacy in two of them [Maysan and Multhanna] by this autumn.
- 2.3 The British police assistance effort in MND [SE] consisted of provincial police advisors and a training team based at the Regional Police Training Academy [RPTA]. Though the Dean of the RPTA is an Iraqi colonel, it appears an attempt to hand over the entire operation to Iraqis earlier this year had failed.
- 2.4 The British police assistance effort is made up of two distinct groups of personnel. Serving police advisors seconded to the FCO provide the provincial police advisors and trainers at the RPTA. In addition, the FCO have engaged a group of International Police Advisors [IPAs] via a contract with 'Armorgroup'. These officers are in the main recently retired British officers [predominantly former RUC] supplemented by a few New Zealand and Australian officers. They provide mentoring in local police stations. They are not subject to the security regime mandated by ACPO for serving officers and carry rifles in addition to pistols [Personal Protection Weapons].
- 2.5 A small complement [25] of International Police Liaison Officers [IPLOs] provided by CPATT [Civil Police Assistance Training Team] are also active in MND [SE] being primarily employed in SWAT type training tasks. These personnel do not wear uniform and form part of a US contract with 'DynCorp' which covers the whole of Iraq.

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- 2.6 The Chief Police Advisor [Local DCC] Colin Smith has recently assumed command of all UK civil police personnel in MND [SE] including the 'Armorgroup' IPLOS.
- 2.7 Progress has been made in training Iraqi Police Service [IPS] personnel. However, with the exception of groups such as the Tactical Support Unit [TSU] they remain of questionable quality. The initial concept of creating a community policing force on the classic Anglo-American model appears to have been overtaken by a more realistic recognition, that first and foremost a police force must be effective if it is to secure public support. Thus, in the face of an insurgency, it is essential that the force can defend itself and its police stations. This has improved but philosophical confusion still appears to bedevil the project. Equally, I am still of the view that there is a disconnect between CPATT [Baghdad] and the British led effort within MND [SE]. In view of this problem being identified as early as May 2003, it is disappointing that it has not been addressed and resolved.
- 2.8 The future is unclear in relation to the pace of military disengagement. However, for a variety of reasons, not least the forthcoming deployment of the ARRC to Afghanistan, the current level of commitment for the UK military is unsustainable. I suggest there will be a need for UK military support and training assistance in some form for a prolonged period of time. The scope of any police element will obviously be dependent on the wider national effort.
- 2.9 The Senior Military Representative Iraq [SMRI] is seeking to encourage the newly appointed government to project a forceful image in terms of the counter-insurgency effort and to inspire popular morale. He summed up what should be the role of international assistance in the following terms. The 'what' must be a matter for the Iraqi government but we can help them with the 'how'. I totally endorse that approach and suggest our CPA is working on a complementary approach in MND [SE].
- 2.10 Steve Castell has been a feature of various coalition formations in Baghdad since at least November 2003 to my certain knowledge. He has acted as Chief Police Advisor to the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior and in more recent times to four Iraqi Ministers of the Interior. In the course of our meeting he advised me that he will shortly be leaving Iraq and will be replaced by a career foreign service officer, who has served as American Ambassador to a small African country. The FCO may wish to consider what this means in terms of foreign influence on Iraqi MOI policy and the ability to exert influence in the future. I would merely comment that Steve Castell was not a police officer but a highly experienced specialist in the field of drugs enforcement. Our system may not be perfect but we do currently produce career police officers with a broad base of operational expertise allied to command experience. We must ensure that in future we seek to develop officers for international missions and place them appropriately within mission structures. The relocation of Colin Smith to Baghdad appears well timed.
- 2.11 In the course of my visit I observed an Italian Carabinieri formation based at An Nasiriyah [Italian spelling]. Prior to my visit the FCO [Iraq Directorate] asked me to specifically comment on the scope for increased usage of European gendarmerie type formations. On the basis of my visit and pre-existing professional knowledge, I have to say that I feel Iraq is an ideal environment for such formations. The Carabinieri are a classic case study. They possess and deploy professional capabilities which range from criminal investigators to high end public order specialists. This integrated range of capabilities is exactly what is required to develop an effective Iraqi Police Service. Highly professional they

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themselves tentatively suggested that they have had to alter 'Anglo-Saxon' lesson plans to more accurately reflect the realities of contemporary Iraq. Indeed, they viewed the recruit training package as being of limited usefulness. I would suggest that there is a need for feedback from MND [SE] to be more integrated in to training materials produced by CPATT.

- 2.12.** *It is recommended that, subject to diplomatic imperatives, a real effort is made to attract an increased presence by European gendarmerie type formations. However, such deployments must be integrated in to an overall national plan.*
- 2.13** The Iraq Directorate also suggested that some external funding might become available and requested my views on how best it could be employed. The CPA indicated that kit is being centrally managed by CPATT and additional foreign funding for specific procurement programmes would only complicate the situation. His clear preference was for more IPLOS via sources such as 'Armorgroup'. In essence, he finds these personnel more flexible in terms of deployment than seconded officers and they can work at station level on mentoring functions.
- 2.14** In general it is clear that police officers should only be employed on duties which require genuine police expertise and experience. Many elements of recruit training [e.g. firearms training] can be assigned to military personnel.
- 2.15** I made a point of meeting every civil police officer seconded for duty in Iraq. I assessed their collective morale as excellent. However, it should never be forgotten that they are operating in an extremely challenging environment and living in testing conditions. The personnel at the Basra RPTA are confined to their campus and living conditions are the worst experienced by any of our officers. It is a matter of continuing regret that their hard work has not received appropriate media coverage in the UK. Whilst morale is as I have said excellent, minor issues have a disproportionate effect given the overall conditions. Therefore, it is essential that the issues highlighted below receive attention by relevant departments and rapid feedback is provided to the officers in Iraq.

3.0 SPECIFIC PROBLEMS/ISSUES REQUIRING ACTION

3.1 TRAVEL [IN TO AND OUT OF IRAQ]

- 3.1.1** UK civil police personnel are still experiencing problems in connection with their travel arrangements in to and out of theatre. I was advised that crossing in to Kuwait to avail of commercial flights can be a major problem owing to visa issues and related forms of travel identification. It appears it is essential that all civil police personnel [civpol] are in possession of an MOD identity card highlighting their status as MOD contract staff.
- 3.1.2** Undue delay in travelling home is a major issue to the officers concerned and I know at least one Chief Constable will view this basic administrative step as emblematic of the treatment afforded by the FCO to seconded personnel.
- 3.1.3** *It is recommended that urgent action is taken to ensure civpol personnel do not encounter unnecessary delays in entering and leaving Iraq and in any event enjoy no different treatment to that afforded to other FCO/DFID personnel serving alongside them.*
- 3.1.4** A second issue related to travel is that of air fare classification. Officers believe, in my opinion rightly, that all personnel should be treated in a similar manner.

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Thus, the recent move to Club/Business airfares for FCO/DFID personnel but the allocation of economy fares to civpol personnel is unacceptable. I cannot see why the taxpayer should treat DFID personnel better than police officers working alongside them. Personally, I am not advocating Club class travel for all concerned but rather equality of treatment.

- 3.1.5** *It is recommended that the FCO review travel arrangements and ensure that personnel are not afforded different treatment based solely on which government agency they work for.*

3.2 TRAVEL [WITHIN IRAQ]

- 3.2.1** Security arrangements in relation to civpol personnel were agreed as part of the decision to deploy them. In essence, personnel at the RTPA operate solely within a secure compound and the provincial advisors are provided with Close Protection Teams – supplied by CRG.
- 3.2.2** This was an appropriate regime and I am grateful to the FCO for instituting it. However, liaison with the CPA suggests that it is inflexible and has given rise to certain anomalies.
- 3.2.3** The CPA submitted a minute to the Consul General Basra dated 3/3/05 [Appendix 'A']. I have considered that submission and in the light of my recent visit would comment as follows.
- 3.2.4** I have considerable sympathy with Colin Smith's aim of increasing flexibility and thus operational effectiveness. However, as the ACPO lead I must have due regard for the role of British police officers abroad and reflect to a degree what I know are the views of my fellow Chief Constables.
- 3.2.5** I would be supportive of allowing seconded police officers to travel in an armoured vehicle escorted by British military vehicles. I am reluctant to agree to travel in military vehicles as they provide significantly poorer protection than the 4x4's operated by CRG and which all FCO personnel utilise.
- 3.2.6** The issue of providing carbines to seconded British police officers and associated tactical training is I suggest a step too far at present. Possession of such weapons and training does not detract from their essential police role but I know my peers, whose careers have been limited to GB, would not share that assessment. I note Colin Smith's comments re the background of many civpol officers in Iraq but it is essential that all British officers are treated on the same basis. Previous experience in the RUC should not result in different treatment – which could be interpreted as either recognising their inherent qualities and previous experience or as placing a lesser value on their safety and treating them as de facto cannon fodder.
- 3.2.7** The disparity between the rules governing seconded and contract personnel is totally understandable given the restrictions affecting serving officers but the FCO may wish to review the position for the future.
- 3.2.8** *It is recommended that seconded British civil police officers be permitted to travel in a single armoured [CRG crewed] vehicle if it is escorted by at least two British military vehicles. No change in the weaponry provided to such officers is recommended. If there was clear ministerial support for such a change in weapons policy, I would gladly champion it with colleagues. However, in view of*

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the current climate of opinion within ACPO, I do not feel it would receive much support.

3.3 Recognition – Medals

- 3.3.1** I have been raising this issue consistently for two years and as recently as 3/5/05 I submitted a request to the FCO for an update.
- 3.3.2** The 'OP Telic' medal qualification criteria as published by the MOD suggest that civil police are eligible and, indeed, I was officially advised that our officers were so eligible. That advice was subsequently disavowed but I was informed that a special medal had been announced by the Prime Minister for humanitarian service in Iraq. I am unaware of any progress in relation to giving effect to the Prime Minister's announcement.
- 3.3.3** *It is recommended that as a matter of urgency, the FCO and the Home Office address this issue. A two year delay in providing official recognition for all civil police personnel seconded for duty in Iraq suggests to some that their efforts are unappreciated. I know that is not the case with ministers and trust that the efforts of colleagues in the FCO and Home Office will produce a clear response from officials in other departments.*

3.4 Firearms – Training Issue

- 3.4.1** Personnel deployed in Iraq are issued with and trained in the use of the 'Glock 17' semi-automatic pistol. However, I have observed, and the CPA is very conscious, that training policy and operational usage vary.
- 3.4.2** Officers are trained to 'chamber a round' on loading the weapon. However, 'in theatre' officers are constantly moving from environments where weapons must be loaded to environments where magazines must be removed from the weapon. I suggest that precedence should be afforded to the theatre rules. The current position is not conducive to safety.
- 3.4.3** *It is recommended that FCO firearms trainers be provided with feedback from personnel in theatre and alter their training regime accordingly. It should be noted that a senior firearms instructor [Superintendent McLaughlin] is in theatre at present and his recommendations would enjoy my full support as the ACPO lead.*

3.5 Length of tour

- 3.5.1** Currently officers are seconded on the basis of an initial tour of six months which can be extended by mutual agreement for a further six months. However, practice alters from force to force. It would assist the Chief Police Advisor if there was more notice as to whether or not extensions were going to be granted, if requested. Equally, a three month extension causes major problems re succession planning and programme management.
- 3.5.2** It is recommended that officers be seconded for six months and at the three month point invited to extend to a twelve month tour of duty. Ideally, Forces should plan on the basis of a twelve month tour subject to reviews every three months. It should be noted that officers as volunteers can at any time request

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that they be returned to their parent forces. A uniform approach between all contributing forces would greatly assist.

3.6 Chief Superintendents – Urgent Need

- 3.6.1** The CPA highlighted his need for two Chief Superintendents as a matter of urgency. There was a critical need to deploy one by 17/6/05 to provide continuity and command cover for the CPA. The Chief Constables of PSNI and West Yorkshire undertook to see if they could assist in this regard. However, I will return to this issue in section three.

3.7 TIPS

- 3.7.1** TIPS is, I am advised, an acronym devoid of meaning. However, it was sold to me and London based FCO personnel as essentially an Iraqi version of 'Crimestoppers'. However, a recent visit to Baghdad by FCO personnel revealed that TIPS is rather more pro-active than 'Crimestoppers' and major concerns were quite rightly expressed in relation to the safety of British officers associated with the management of TIPS.
- 3.7.2** A key objective of my visit was to establish a clear picture of TIPS and what duties exactly were British personnel undertaking.
- 3.7.3** TIPS provides a telephone number which is widely publicised throughout Iraq. In essence it provides a mechanism by which people can provide information to the authorities and to a degree it mirrors the 'confidential telephone line' instituted in Northern Ireland in the 1970's. However, the office does not merely receive anonymous 'tip-offs' but seeks to interview the informants with a view to better establishing their credibility and, indeed, to a degree engages in the tasking of informants.
- 3.7.4** Informants are requested to meet TIPS personnel within the guarded 'international zone' in Baghdad. Thus, all informants should have been searched before they meet TIPS personnel.
- 3.7.5** 20% of callers to TIPS come in to make statements. The key to the system is the ability of the Iraqi call receivers and the corporate reputation of TIPS. The TIPS scheme forms part of a nascent criminal intelligence operation headed by a . This officer impressed me and is in turn an open admirer of the British personnel assigned to his operation. The officers concerned made it very clear that their professional integrity was a key element of the success of TIPS to date.
- 3.7.6** The aim of TIPS, as in all aspects of British police assistance in Iraq, is to create a system and migrate it to full Iraqi ownership. However, that has not been achieved to date. Thus, the continued success of TIPS requires an ongoing British commitment.
- 3.7.7** I was briefed that TIPS had made a major contribution to gathering intelligence to counter the insurgency and was really the only effective intelligence tool in town. It requires the commitment of four/five UK officers and if they withdraw, I was confidently advised the US will take it over. It was suggested that TIPS give us strategic influence in Baghdad and was frankly the most effective contribution we are making. Withdrawal would mean we are contributing nothing visible or unique in Baghdad and was frankly the most effective

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contribution we are making. Withdrawal would mean we are contributing nothing visible or unique in Baghdad.

3.7.8 *It is desirable that officers posted to the TIPS operation have relevant professional backgrounds i.e. detective service. In addition, it is essential that they possess security clearance. Evidence of prior vetting must be supplied to the Chief Security Advisor [British Embassy, Baghdad] prior to their deployment. I recommend that action is taken to ensure this takes place in future.*

3.7.9 I recognise that having British officers working outside secure offices exposes them to a higher degree of risk that was originally envisaged. However, there is a degree of risk inherent by reason of merely being in the international zone. In view of the overall security infrastructure, I support continued involvement in the TIPS operation by British officers.

3.7.10 The CPA may be able to influence developments nationally via the Iraqi MoI. I recommend that in addition to that one post, the UK should concentrate on assisting the IPS develop an intelligence system. Nominal participation in training establishments in Baghdad does not appear worth the effort or to justify the investment of scarce human resources.

4.0 IMPLICATIONS FOR THE WORK OF THE STRATEGIC TASK FORCE

4.1 My visit necessarily concentrated on the day to day realities of Iraq, but it reinforced my views on planning to improve our national response to future PSO taskings.

4.2 In the context of TIPS, London has sought to provide officers with no security clearance classification. This means that they are rejected by the US in terms of access to even relatively low level intelligence material. It is vital that we seek to assign qualified officers to specific postings. However, this is merely one example of a more fundamental problem which is bedevilling the whole issue of international assistance missions.

4.3 The IPCPT and contingent commanders are trying to allocate officers from a very limited pool to postings abroad. Thus, the British practice at present is to make the best fit possible, recognising that our pool is composed mostly of generalists occupying the lower ranks in the service. Increasingly, the need is for specialists and more senior officers. I make no apology for once again proclaiming that career development is central to breaking the current logjam. The IPCPT and contingent commanders should be able to pick the most suitable officers for specific assignments from a long list of eager and well qualified volunteers. Sadly, that is not the current position. We must move to a position where international assignments are valued and seen as potentially career enhancing. The critical shortage of Chief Superintendents evidences our current problems.

4.4 It is recognised that various departments will have different terms and conditions of service and that it is a matter for the FCO to negotiate secondment packages in relation to salary enhancements and allowances on the basis of those variable starting points. However, in terms of local infrastructure and travel arrangements, there is no justification for different arrangements. The risks and hardships in Iraq for example apply equally to a junior FCO official and the Ambassador, or to a DFID official and a seconded

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police officer. It is important that accommodation and travel arrangements reflect that reality.

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- 4.5 Environments such as Iraq pose interesting challenges for policy makers. Do we deploy abroad and retain our domestic mindset in terms of capability and a set view of what constitutes policing or do we adapt in an agreed manner to local conditions. I have indicated that I think Colin Smith's desire to bolster his seconded officer's self defence capability is in advance of what many ACPO members would agree to. However, it remains a valid proposition and the STF may wish to address it in terms of developing a doctrine for future operations. It should be noted that CPA's proposal is designed to achieve a set goal, namely a more flexible means of deploying and employing seconded officers, as opposed to any desire to increase their self-defence capability per se.
- 4.6 Iraq is a genuinely integrated operation, in that HMG's objectives will only be achieved by the creation of an Iraq, capable of upholding domestic law and order and constitutional stability. We can only withdraw when the Iraqis can assume full responsibility for their own security. To that end diplomatic policy is totally dependent on SSR and its military and police elements. CPATT is an organisation devoted to creating and equipping a civil police force, yet it is dominated and mostly staffed by the military. Why is that? I would suggest it is because no other group of qualified personnel were in a position to undertake the task. The military have an agreed command and control capability and they get things done. Police officers should ideally run CPATT but at present the UK could not supply even a small number of appropriately qualified senior officers, capable of inter-acting with their diplomatic and military counterparts. Training for PSO is an essential prerequisite of future operational effectiveness. The STF must address this issue.

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